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Abstract 
In this dissertation, I question critical approaches that argue for Giacomo Leopardi’s 
and Samuel Beckett’s pessimism and nihilism. Beckett quotes Leopardi when discussing the 
removal of desire in his monograph Proust, a context that has spurred pessimist and nihilist 
readings, whether the focus has been on one writer, the other, or both. I argue that the 
inappropriateness of the pessimist and nihilist label is, on the contrary, specifically exposed 
through the role of desire in the two thinkers. After tracing the notion of desire as it 
developed from Leopardi to key twentieth-century thinkers, I illustrate how, in contrast to the 
Greek concept of ataraxia as a form of ablation of desire, the desire of and for the Other is 
central in the two authors’ oeuvres.  That is, while the two writers’ attempt to reach the 
respective existential cores of Beckettian “suffering of being” and Leopardian “souffrance” 
might seem to point towards the celebrated nothingness of their existential quest, closer 
examination reveals that the attempt to still desire common to both authors is frustrated and 
outdone by a combative desire that pervades their later work. Hence, while the desire to 
cease desiring is at the philosophical kernel of both authors’ oeuvre, it also draws attention to 
and exacerbates the inextinguishable quality of desire. Looking at Leopardi’s later poetry in 
the ciclo d’Aspasia, including the last poem “La Ginestra, o il fiore del deserto,” and 
examining Beckett’s  plays Endgame, Happy Days, Krapp’s Last Tape and Not I, I argue that 
desire in Leopardi and Beckett could be read as lying at the cusp between Jacques Lacan’s 
and Emmanuel Levinas’ theories, a desire that both splits the subject (and is thus based on 
lack) as much as it moulds the subject when called to address the Other (inspiring what 
Levinas terms ‘infinity’ as opposed to ‘totality,’ an infinity pitted against the nothingness 
crucial to pessimist and nihilist readings). The centrality of desire in Leopardi and Beckett 
also comes close to the Lacanian desire-as-paradox, a desire that is lodged at the heart of 
Leopardi’s and Beckett’s dianoetic laugh and held to be expressive of their particularly dark, 
but elevating, humour. 
Keywords 
Suffering of Being, Desire, Pessimism, Nihilism, Laughter, Humour, Leopardi, Beckett  
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 Introduction 
Samuel Beckett repeatedly quotes Giacomo Leopardi’s poem “A se stesso” in his 
monograph Proust where the notion of desire is central. Lines 4-5 are quoted by Beckett and 
they reappear in Dream of Fair to Middling Women and in Molloy (see 1.1): “In noi di cari 
inganni | non che la speme, il desiderio è spento” (“Not only our hope | but our desire for dear 
illusions is gone”; Proust 18; my translation). In Proust, just before quoting this poem, 
Beckett catalogues Leopardi as one of the sages who proposed the only impossible solution– 
the removal of desire–to living. The question of the “ablation of desire” (Proust 18), which 
Beckett here chooses to reflect upon, is the same one that riddled Leopardi, and later Arthur 
Schopenhauer (whose philosophy considerably bridges Leopardian and Beckettian thought) 
when they reflected upon the individual’s insistence on keeping the false glitter of desiring 
intact. 
The centrality of the “ablation of desire” for Leopardi and Beckett (oftentimes read 
via Schopenhauer), where the desired experience itself is already conceived as the homeland 
of delusion, has spurred pessimist and nihilist readings. I argue that the inappropriateness of 
the pessimist and nihilist labels attributed to Leopardi and Beckett is, on the contrary, 
specifically exposed through the role of desire in the two thinkers. While the sage who 
aspires to the removal of desire is central in both writers, the sage ideal Beckett is proposing 
through Leopardi–particularly in the monograph of time-honoured Schopenhauerian ascent– 
is a failed sage, a notion that Beckett’s later work (but even more so Leopardi’s later oeuvre) 
repeatedly emphasizes.  
The Leopardian and Beckettian sage ideal is also ultimately not upheld with respect 
to aestheticism (see 2.3.1; 2.3.2). Schopenhauer proposes that to be snatched away from 
desire can transport the individual into the state of pure cognition, where aesthetic 
appreciation is possible: “the one eye of the world that gazes out from all cognizing 
creatures” (World as Will and Representation 1: 221). This is foreshadowed by Leopardi’s 
ultra-sensitive individual at the mercy of “souffrance,” who aspires for atarassia (ataraxia), 
and whose quiet suffering enables artistic production. It also clearly prefigures and intersects 
productively with the Beckettian “suffering of being” (Proust 19), which is an attempt at the 
interruption of longing, and both a source of dolour as much as an apt condition for aesthetic 
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appreciation. The human being is, nonetheless, always only close to a desireless and will-less 
realm (see 2.3.2). As Schopenhauer asks, “who has enough strength to survive there [in a 
state of will-lessness] for long?” (1: 222). Aestheticism requires the elevation of 
consciousness to the will-less, timeless subject of cognition but when the difficult state of 
pure contemplation is impossible to achieve, what remains is “the emptiness of the idle will, 
the misery of boredom” (1: 228).1 
In contrast to ataraxia as a form of dissolution of desire, the desire of and for the other 
is central in the two authors’ oeuvres. That is, while the two writers’ attempt to reach the 
respective existential cores (Beckettian “suffering of being” [Proust 19] and Leopardian 
“souffrance”) might seem to point towards the celebrated nothingness of their existential 
quest, closer examination reveals that the attempt to still desire common to both authors is 
frustrated and outdone by a combative desire that pervades their (relatively) later work. 
Hence, while the desire to cease desiring is at the philosophical kernel of both authors’ 
oeuvre, it also draws attention to and exacerbates the inextinguishable quality of desire.  
Looking at Leopardi’s post-1828 poetry, particularly the poems in the ciclo 
d’Aspasia, as well as the last poem “La Ginestra o il fiore del deserto,” and examining 
Beckett’s  plays Endgame and Happy Days, I argue that desire in Leopardi and Beckett could 
be read as lying at the cusp between Jacques Lacan’s and Emmanuel Levinas’ theories. It is a 
desire that encompasses the struggle between the forces of Thanatos and Eros desire as self-
preservation as opposed to desire in social interaction. These forces are also central to the 
death  as opposed to sexual  drives at the core of Freud’s pleasure principle and Lacan’s 
breached subject in “moi” and “je.” This desire which splits the subject (and is thus based on 
lack) is countered by Levinasian desire that moulds the subject when called to address the 
other (inspiring what Levinas terms ‘infinity’ as opposed to ‘totality,’ an infinity pitted 
against the nothingness crucial to pessimist and nihilist readings). The centrality of desire in 
Leopardi’s and Beckett’s later work can also be defined through the Lacanian desire-as-
paradox lodged at the innermost core of dianoetic laughter and held to be expressive of a 
                                                 
1
 Schopenhauer affirms that “what someone truly wills, the striving from his innermost essence and the goal he 
pursues accordingly . . . could never alter with external influences such as instruction: otherwise we could 
recreate him” (1: 321). Schopenhauer here admits the essential inner immutable core of desire, or, as the Latin 
Stoic Seneca puts it “velle non discitur” (“willing cannot be taught” 81: 14). Motives can only alter the direction 
of their striving, but not the striving itself. 
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similarly-conceived dark, but elevating, humour in the two authors. This dianoetic laughter is 
manifest in Leopardi’s moral tales “Detti memorabili di Filippo Ottonieri” and “Dialogo di 
Timandro e di Eleandro” as well as in Beckett’s plays Krapp’s Last Tape and Not I. 
Leopardi’s and Beckett’s art then, is not simply concerned with the Schopenhauerian 
attempt to rip the flimsy film of desiring and willing in order to reach pure aesthetic 
contemplation. Nor can existential pain simply be eased through the cessation of one’s 
strivings. In the pages that follow, I show how for both authors there is a paradoxical human 
desire that (differently from the “subjective spirit of base desire” that Schopenhauer debunks 
as the stimulating in art [1: 233]) compels the individual to endure his existence. My 
contention is that the easing of existential anguish lies in the final acceptance that the human 
being cannot become void of desire. This inextinguishable desire−positive in effect, albeit 
challenging to experience−can bring about compassion.  
Schopenhauer claims that “all love (caritas) is compassion” (1: 401). Compassion, 
says Schopenhauer, “is apparent in our heartfelt participation in the friend’s well-being and 
woe and the selfless sacrifices made on account of the latter” (1: 403). This conception of 
compassion in Schopenhauer could, to a degree, be construed as rooted in Leopardi, where 
compassion entails being able to feel other individuals’ suffering (see 1.2.1; 2.3.2; 3.2). It is a 
notion, however, that differs from, for instance, Levinas’s, because while in Schopenhauer 
compassion is found by stilling desire, in Levinas compassion undergoes an inverse 
movement (see 1.5). I will be arguing for a desire that, in spite of the attempt to still its 
source, paradoxically brings about more of a Levinasian kind of compassion. In “La 
Ginestra,” Endgame and Happy Days the self becomes a compassionate subject in being, as 
in Levinas, “unable to shirk: this is the ‘I’” (Totality and Infinity 245). The desiring subject 
thus has a pivotal role to play in the desire for the O/other, a Lacanian desire characterized by 
a ‘coring out’ effect, albeit also a Levinasian desire in its being-for-the-other. It is also a 
desire that admits its earthly insignificance through humour–a humour that encompasses 
Freudian death and life-drives, Lacanian demand versus desire (see 1.4.2), or what Gavriel 
Reisner terms, “an opposition to desire within the ego . . . anti-desire,” pitted against “a force 
of desire which supersedes the ego” (14). 
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This dissertation unfolds in four chapters, framed by the present introduction and a 
conclusion. In chapter one, I briefly trace the theme of desire, contextualizing my choice of 
writers in the specific designated framework, delving at some length on the contributions of 
Leopardi, Schopenhauer, Freud, Lacan and Levinas, all relevant in the shaping of Beckettian 
desire.  
I prepare the groundwork for the discussion of desire as the outcome of the human 
subject’s division. It is a discussion whose trajectory passes through Leopardi’s desire of 
amor proprio (building on eighteenth-century conceptions of amour propre) and develops 
into Schopenhauerian Will as opposed to its negation. It passes through Freud’s death as 
opposed to life-drives and Lacan’s cleaved subject into “moi” and “je,” where the “moi” is 
specifically equated by Lacan to amour propre (see 1.4.1). In this manner I lay the basis for 
the analysis, in the third chapter, of Leopardi’s poetic voices and the utterances of Beckett's 
dramatic characters. The voices’ and characters' attempt at, and failure to, come to terms with 
the elusive nature of their speech can be equated with the impossibility of reunifying Lacan's 
split subject. An immediate consequence is that desire is displaced onto the violence of a 
language that cuts up what it addresses and represents an act that, I argue, is repeated in the 
speech spewed out by Mouth in Not I, Krapp in Krapp’s Last Tape, Hamm and Clov in 
Endgame and Winnie in Happy Days.
2
 This speech, however, is also examined in Endgame 
and Happy Days through the ‘Saying,’ the being-for-the-Other, conceived according to the 
philosophical analysis of Levinas. 
In chapter two, “A dull and indistinct pain: ‘Vain longing that vain longing go,’” I 
briefly review the criticism that construes Leopardi and Beckett as pessimists, nihilists and 
existentialists. I explore the negation of desire, crucial to Leopardian atarassia tinged by 
“souffrance” (see 2.1) and Beckettian “suffering of being,” arguing that both writers’ work 
stems (but also significantly differs) from pessimism, nihilism (and existentialism). Their 
work ultimately concedes the imperishable quality of human desire. 
 In chapter three, “Making Suffering Sufferable: Desire for the Other in Leopardi and 
Beckett,” I flesh out the discussion revolving around irreducible desire by arguing for a 
                                                 
2
 The direct consideration of desire in Lacan, as in amour courtois to which it inspires, reveals the very 
impossibility of its completion and wholeness while the discourses that sublimate desire in the same courtly 
love tradition are as direct as their detours. 
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desire that hangs in the balance between the Lacanian and Levinasian notions. I suggest that 
desire as presented in the two writers’ oeuvres goes beyond anything that could possibly 
offer fulfilment.  Desire is a surplus always exterior to Levinas’ ‘totality’ because it affirms 
the otherness, integrity and transcendence of the Other. Desire here goes beyond the 
Beckettian “suffering of being” or Leopardian atarassia (tinged by “souffrance”), because it 
wrestles free of the disintegrating effect of this epiphanic moment and instead engages with 
the other with an eye to serve. It compels one to first freely make a choice for the 
traumatizing face-to-face encounter  the choice to oppose nothingness through the (painful) 
evocation of infinity. The face of the other (who is Other) represents what Levinas refers to 
as ‘exteriority’ (otherness, infinity, what disrupts and destabilizes sameness, the ‘Saying’ 
over the ‘Said’). The Leopardian poetic voices and the Beckettian interlocutors, in their 
desolate and marginal existence, are torn and split subjects. They, nonetheless, take account 
of the strange world inhabited by the other person who, on being addressed, becomes Other.   
Language, notwithstanding its elusive quality, can thus serve as a vehicle through 
which desire is channelled−a desire that is insatiable, endlessly-reproductive, asymmetrical, 
non-reciprocal, and non-dialogic, albeit yearning for that which transcends the ‘I.’ The 
essence of language is the relation with the Other: “It is the ethical exigency of the face, 
which puts into question the consciousness that welcomes it. The consciousness of obligation 
is no longer a consciousness, since it tears consciousness up from its centre, submitting it to 
the Other” (TI 207). This submission is metaphysical desire which interprets the production 
of being as goodness.  
Following Levinas, I thus argue that the ethical relation with the Other has to be 
thought beyond the confines of the system of language which has invariably made it end in 
‘totality.’ In seeing a beyond not only to being, but also to language, in underscoring the 
“Saying” over the “Said,” Levinas shifts priority onto the interpersonal encounter. I construe 
the foundational power of the ‘ethical encounter’ in “La Ginestra,” Endgame and Happy 
Days in forging community with the other person: “if communication and community is to be 
achieved, a real response, a responsible answer must be given. This means that I must be 
ready to put my world into words, and to offer it to the other … by first freely making a 
choice for generosity and communication” (Totality and Infinity 14). Levinas’ Other saddles 
the ‘I’ with unfamiliarity and even alienation but concomitantly binds it with commitment. In 
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Levinas the pre-other self is thus an “I” that answers the call which, unlike in Lacan, leads 
less to alienation than to inspiration. 
 In both Leopardi and Beckett the conflicting presence of what could be construed as 
Lacanian torn subjects who are, however, confronted by the Levinasian good-of-the-other, 
makes the balance tip towards a Levinasian desire that can potentially enable unique 
compassion: “In the irreplaceable subject, unique and chosen as a responsibility and a 
substitution a mode of freedom, ontologically impossible, breaks the unreadable essence. 
Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the enchainment to itself where the 
ego suffocates in itself” (Otherwise Than Being 124). More than bringing about compassion 
as a psychological event, desire is thus equated with being obsessed with the other, putting 
oneself in the place of another.  
In chapter four, “The Paradoxical In-Between Space for Desire: Leopardi’s and 
Beckett’s Humour,” I take up the thread of my argument again, this time examining the role 
of infinite desire at the core of the intriguingly dark humour that characterizes the Leopardian 
and Beckettian oeuvre. I contextualize the two authors’ contribution in a lineage of theories 
of the comic, exploring the development of the dianoetic laugh, particularly its taking root in 
the two writers in question. I argue for the role of Lacanian desire at the kernel of humour 
noir, channelling attention towards bringing out its Freudian legacy. Desire-as-paradox at the 
crux of the dianoetic laugh−and thus the lack of will to desire counterpoised to the infinitely 
self-regenerating desire−are interlocked within the soul of the catastrophically sombre 
laughter generated by Leopardi’s ventriloquists Filippo Ottonieri and Eleandro in the 
Operette morali. The same murky humour reverberates in Beckett’s Krapp’s Last Tape and 
Not I. 
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Chapter 1  
1 On Desire 
1.1 What Desire?  
“A se stesso,” Leopardi’s poem quoted by Beckett primarily in Proust, is central 
in affirming the fundamental common ground in Leopardi’s and Beckett’s respective 
existential enquiry. The removal of desire in Leopardi, explicitly announced in “A se 
stesso,” knows its roots and motivations in the famous terrifying inscription above the 
garden of unhappiness which defines the Leopardian “souffrance”:  
Entrate in un giardino di piante, d’erbe, di fiori. Sia pur quanto volete ridente. Sia 
nella più mite stagione dell’anno. Voi non potete volger lo sguardo in nessuna 
parte che voi non vi troviate del patimento. Tutta quella famiglia di vegetali è in 
stato di “souffrance,” qual individuo più, qual meno. (Zibaldone 4175-78) 
Enter a garden of plants, of herbs and flowers; Even the most delightful of 
gardens. Even in the mildest of seasons. You cannot look anywhere but you will 
find it suffused with pain. All that family of plants is, to a degree, in a state of 
“souffrance.” Some of those plants suffer more, some others suffer less. (my 
translation)  
“A se stesso” is again cited by Beckett, this time the opening line in Dream of Fair to 
Middling Women where Leopardi is jeeringly placed in a list of mostly fictitious writers 
of “gloomy composition”:  
. . . he declined the darkest passages of Schopenhauer, Vigny, Leopardi, 
Espronceda, Inge, Hatiz, Saadi, Espronerda, Becquer and the other Epimethei. All 
day he told the beads of his spleen. Or posa per sempre, for example, he was 
liable to murmur, lifting and shifting the seat of the disturbance, stanco mio cor. 
Assai palpitasti . . . and as much of that gloomy composition as he could 
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remember. (61-2) 
Once more the emaciation of desire is instigated by suffering and is a result of desire 
fleeing  into the inner core of existential agony where, as Beckett writes in Proust, “the 
boredom of living is replaced by the suffering of being” (19). This idea is, to a degree, 
prefigured by Leopardi in “Dialogo di Torquato Tasso e il suo genio familiare” where “la 
vita umana . . . è composta e intessuta, parte di dolore, parte di noia; dall’una delle quali 
passioni non ha riposo se non cadendo nell’altra.” (“human life is made up of and 
interwoven partly with suffering and partly with boredom; and it cannot escape from one 
except by falling into the other”; Operette morali 176-7). The suffering that underlies 
boredom and desire is overwhelming: “E questo [il patimento] è il più potente di tutti: 
perché l’uomo mentre patisce, non si annoia per niuna maniera” (“And the latter 
[suffering] is the most powerful of all, for as he suffers, the human being can in no way 
be bored”; Operette morali 178). Schopenhauer corroborates this thought when he says, 
“our mental activity is a continuously delayed boredom” (1: 338) because “life swings 
back and forth like a pendulum between pain and boredom” (1: 338).  
Suffering replacing boredom is also paramount in the second and third quotations 
from Leopardi that Beckett uses in Proust. The second quotation is inserted in a context 
where Beckett is alluding to choice as indicative of will. He argues that it is to the 
obliteration of will, as of desire, that the wise aspire:  
… And as before, wisdom consists in obliterating the faculty of suffering rather 
than in a vain attempt to reduce the stimuli that exasperate that faculty. ‘Non che 
la speme, il desiderio…’ One desires to be understood because one desires to be 
loved, and one desires to be loved because one loves. We are indifferent to the 
understanding of others, and their love is an importunity. (63) 
Desire consumes humanity, which idea again justifies the third Leopardian quotation “e 
fango è il mondo,” initially serving as an epigraph in Proust.3 This verse is quoted again 
                                                 
3
 The full quotation: “Amaro e noia | La vita; altro mai nulla; e fango è il mondo” (“Boredom and bitterness 
| is life; it is nothing but this; the world is dirt”; my translation) is taken from the same poem “A se stesso” 
lines 9-10 (see 3.3). 
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in Molloy, where the Leopardian truncated quotation is found in an intentionally obscene 
context highlighting the ubiquity of suffering exposed by tearing through boredom. Even 
within Molloy’s will to be amputated there is an amputation of the Leopardian quotation 
on desire to be found in Proust. The implication seems to be, once again, that the sage-
ideal Beckett is proposing through Leopardi is a failed sage: 
It was she dug the hole because I couldn’t, though I was the gentleman, because 
of my leg . . . I had so to speak only one leg at my disposal, I was virtually one-
legged, and I would have been happier, livelier, amputated at the groin. And if 
they had removed a few testicles into the bargain I wouldn’t have objected. For 
from such testicles as mine, dangling at mid-thigh at the end of a meagre cord, 
there was nothing more to be squeezed, not a drop. So that non che la speme il 
desiderio, and I longed to see them gone, from the old stand where they bore false 
witness, for and against, in the lifelong charge against me. (35) 
This chapter contextualizes the significance of Beckett’s Leopardian quotations on desire 
by delineating the etymology of the two authors’ conceptions of desire. The development 
of the two authors’ notions in relation to thinkers like Schopenhauer will be of particular 
interest. The line of argumentation will then be sustained through twentieth-century 
philosophies of desire, primarily the propositions by Lacan (preceded by Freud) and 
Levinas, highlighting aspects that can be read in both Leopardi and Beckett.   
It is important, at the outset, to define idiosyncratic references that are at the 
kernel of the argument. The distinction between the desire of the O/other, for instance, is 
pivotal. The desire of the other with a lower case ‘o’, as conceived by Lacan, is the other 
who is a reflection and projection of the ego. In this way the little other is inscribed in 
what Lacan calls the Imaginary order (see 1.4.1). The Lacanian big Other, on the other 
hand, designates an otherness transcending the illusory otherness of the Imaginary 
because it cannot be assimilated through identification. Lacan equates this radical alterity 
with language and the law: the big Other is inscribed in what Lacan calls the Symbolic 
order. Lacan states, “it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject” (Écrits 
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7).
4
 I thus speak, as in Lacan, of the Other as the object of unconscious desire. 
Nonetheless, the “other” as another subject is equally barred from unconscious desire (as 
an Other).
5
 The Other can thus be construed as both the Lacanian Other who is forever 
painfully longed-for but remains elusive and perennially splits the subject as much as the 
obscurity of the other person. It is an internal/external other. The desire for the Other 
remains forever elusive in Lacan, while the desire for the other as an ontologically robust 
presence remains central in Levinas. It is indeed in Lacan and Levinas that the otherwise 
overused term “other” becomes Other–terms that are the linchpin of the two thinkers’ 
respective revolutionary projects.  
A word is at this point also necessary as to why Lacan and Levinas will be 
brought together on the question of desire in Leopardi and Beckett. For years, these two 
thinkers were read in isolation from one another, owing to antagonism between their 
respective methodological approaches−a modification of Husserlian phenomenology for 
Levinas (see 1.5), and a (post) structuralist version of Freudian psychoanalysis for Lacan 
(see 1.4).
6
  I bring Lacan and Levinas together (and this becomes a fully-fledged 
                                                 
4
 The term “other” was widely used in France by the 1950s. The influence of G.W.F Hegel had made the 
term a cliché. This explains Lacan’s warning: “I is an other . . . Don’t let this impress you! . . . The 
other−don’t use this term as mouthwash” (Seminar Book II 7).  
5
 The other is more than simply the other person; the other is conceived in this study as otherness as seen in 
the face-to-face encounter, in the reality of death as the ultimate other, in the image of the self as self/other 
in the mirror, in the image of the other as unity as seen through the eyes of the infant. The Other, on the 
other hand, is formed in the subject’s subjection to the order of sexual difference and thus to language. As 
will be explained in 1.4.1, for Lacan it is precisely through language that sexual identity is produced in the 
subject. We thus speak of the “Other” (capital O) when the other is not the one seen in the mirror during 
what Lacan defines as the Mirror Stage, but the one which represents the entrance into the Symbolic Order, 
the Law of the Father, the Phallus as transcendental signifier. Lacan asks, “Which other is this, then, to 
whom I am more attached than to myself? …His presence can only be understood in an alterity raised to 
the second power, which already situates him in a mediating position in relation to my own splitting from 
myself, as if from a semblable. I have said that the unconscious is the Other’s discourse (with a capital O), 
it is in order to indicate the beyond in which the recognition of desire is tied to the desire for recognition. In 
other words, this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which my lie 
subsists” (Écrits 436; see 1.4.1). In “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” Lacan goes 
on to say: “the unconscious is (the) discourse about the Other…But we must also add that man’s desire is 
the Other’s desire…namely that it is qua Other that man desires” (Écrits 690). 
6
 Levinas’s relationship to phenomenology changes because while his early work is clearly 
phenomenological in method, he moves into tricky territory when he discovers the non-phenomenon of the 
face, that which cannot be contained in consciousness. By the time he moves from Totality and Infinity 
(1961) to Otherwise than Being (1974), a radical change has taken place in the Levinasian approach. In his 
later work, particularly Otherwise than Being, Levinas recognized the problem of the ontological bent of 
his earlier work and shifts away from it (see 1.5). In so doing, as I mention in chapter three, Levinas inched 
closer to, though without meeting, Lacan. 
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comparison in the third chapter) without attempting to efface their differences in any 
way. Their opposition is not only not ignored, but rather celebrated in the spirit of true 
dialogue. Though it will seem that the positions of Lacan and Levinas cannot both be 
true, it is precisely the truth of both positions with relation to the Leopardian and 
Beckettian texts that I will be arguing for when discussing desire in chapter three. 
For Lacan the psychoanalytic study of subjectivity, in the uncovering of desire, 
leads to knowledge of the Unconscious. It is only in understanding unconscious desire 
that one can lift the symptoms caused by psychic conflict. Levinas, on the other hand, 
retrieves from the immemorial past that something which structures one as subject for-
the-other, even though it means to do so without specific prescriptions of content. In both 
cases before being the Cartesian ego, the ‘I’ is a subject.7 Lacanian theory is anti-
humanist in its emphasis on the subject’s failure to coincide with itself. Levinasian theory 
is post-humanist in the manner in which the ‘I’ is always already by and for-the-other.8 I 
argue toward a theory of the Leopardian and Beckettian subject traversed by an 
inextinguishable desire, but who is also a subject desiring-the-good-of-the-other. The 
latter is framed within a theory of ethical subjectivity.
9
 
                                                 
7
 “Self” is a term that Lacan avoids at every turn since he considers it wrapped in humanist meaning. Lacan 
uses the term “subject”–emphasizing the subjected nature of the person and its radical linguistic and 
cultural construction. In his post 1950s work, however, Lacan reserves the term “subject” for the subject in 
language that is he reserves the term for one who has moved from the Imaginary to the Symbolic. The 
imaginary ego and the imaginary I are not yet “subjects” because they are still defined primarily by the 
intersubjective exchange between child and (m) other.  See 1.4.1. 
8
 Lacan and Levinas posit the human person as subject to forces outside of herself. From this point of view 
they go against the humanist tradition understood as the dominant way of thinking about the human person 
in the Enlightenment and beyond. As I shall underscore, however, Lacan and Levinas refused the humanist 
tradition in different ways. In the case of Lacan, we speak of anti-humanism marked by the choice of the 
terminology “subject” (from sub-jectum) rather than human “self.” The reality of subjectivity here is 
subjection and subjugation. Lacan expresses his indictment of the Cartesian cogito as follows: “The 
promotion of consciousness as essential to the subject in the historical aftermath of the Cartesian cogito is 
indicative, to my mind, of a misleading emphasis on the transparency of the I in action at the expense of the 
opacity of the signifier that determines it” (Ĕcrits 685). In “Subjection and Subjectivation,” Balibar insists 
that the concept of subjectivity stands as a challenge to precisely that idea of self-knowledge implicit in the 
cogito and in all its post-Cartesian forms.  Levinas, on the other hand, deals with the post-human, 
specifically through the humanism of the other person. The latter humanism, as I shall argue, determines 
one’s own, rupturing one’s subjectivity. Nonetheless, the Levinasian subject is a ‘self’ before it is called to 
be for-the-other and, as such, radically differs from the anti-humanist theory of Lacan (see 3.1).  
9
 By ethical subjectivity I mean to designate an approach that takes as its goal the explication of the ethical 
nature of the human person, the latter taking as its starting point the anti-humanist critique of the self and 
positing of the subject qua subjectum in its place (See 3.1). In Lacan, the unearthing of the unconscious 
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The use of desire in this study is thus both based on, and concomitantly contrasts 
with, the classics, Plato and Aristotle in particular.
10
 The thought of Levinas, for instance, 
is a dialectic response to Platonic conceptions of desire (see 1.5.6). Plato describes desire 
as responsiveness to form which is different from the Levinasian concept where desire is 
an open responsiveness, beyond or before form. Nonetheless, the concept put forward in 
very different terms by both Lacan and Levinas, whereby the construction of one’s 
identity occurs through the desire of and for the Other, is already expressed in Plato's 
Phaedrus and Symposium, where the desirable is presented as a reflection of the soul 
desiring another.  
1.2 Desire as Lack 
As early as Symposium, desire highlights what would become one of the guiding 
threads in Leopardi’s and Beckett’s respective conceptions, the dearth through which one 
recognizes the potential completion of one’s own need.11 Desire as lack is present in its 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
aims to bring to the fore the Freudian dictum: “where it was, I must come into being. This goal is one of 
reintegration and harmony, I might even say of reconciliation” (Écrits 435).  
10
 Among the very first writings to inform the western conception of desire are Plato’s Phaedrus and 
Symposium, and excerpts in Republic. In Republic Plato offers a description of the three types of desire in 
the soul: the appetitive, the spiritual and the rational (nous). Thumos is the motivational element desiring 
what it takes to be good, beautiful or true. As to the Aristotelian concept, in De Anima 3: 9-11, Aristotle 
accepts Plato’s three kinds of desire, but refutes the Platonic tripartition of the soul. In De Anima Aristotle 
insists that desire takes place in the en-souled body. As to the irrationality of human desire, which Aristotle 
highlights, this seems to go against the Socratic conception as it is presented in the earlier Platonic 
dialogues whereby human desire aims at the good and is thus fundamentally rational. In Nichomachean 
Ethics Aristotle explains how the weak-willed agent’s beliefs do not shape his desires. For Aristotle, desire 
plays an important role in ethical behaviour. Desiring the right thing is pivotal to Aristotle’s account of 
virtue. Aristotle makes choice (prohairesis) a necessary condition for the possession of virtue and he 
defines choice as deliberate desire (Nichomachean Ethics III.3 1113a11; VI.2 1139a23). Aristotelian desire 
is thus not the same as eros, philia, nomos or theoria but it functions between knowledge and action. 
11
Aristophanes proposes a theory of desire based on lack whereby the innate human desire for one another 
brings the human being back to his original state, trying to reunite and restore him to his true human form: 
“Each of us is a mere fragment of a man (like half a tally-stick); we’ve been split in two, like filleted plaice. 
We’re all looking for our ‘other half’” (Plato, Symposium 36). Socrates, however, rejects Aristophanes’ 
view. For Socrates, eros does not return to the self: “love is not love of a half, nor of a whole, unless it is 
good… the good is the only object of human love” (Symposium 58). It is the desire for the permanent 
possession of the good beyond being that characterizes Socratic love (a phrase Levinas will later adopt). 
Indeed Socrates’ famous comment in Republic Book 10 on what imitative poetry generally appeals to, 
totally relegates the role of appetitive desire per se. As is the case with desire-involving pains and pleasures 
in the soul, imitative poetry has the very same effect: “It nurtures and waters them and establishes them as 
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incipient form in Phaedrus and Symposium where the frustrated attempt at reaching the 
fullness of knowing, having, or being with the “other” is crucial. This dualistic dynamic, 
which is also one of repulsion and attraction as well as pain and pleasure, takes on a 
specific discursive form, in Freud’s language, as Thanatos, yoked in sublimated form to 
the life-yielding project of Eros.  
The forces of pleasure and pain, Eros and Thanatos, or, desire versus anti-desire 
(see introduction), are crucial to the development of Leopardian philosophy, whose 
influence crosshatches intellectual history, with the most immediate and prominent heir 
being Schopenhauer, succeeded by early Nietzsche (see 2.4) and Freud (1.3). 
Schopenhauer echoes Leopardian thought when he states, “procreation and death are to 
be thought of as belonging to life and essential to the appearance of the will” (1: 303; see 
1.2.2). Antonio Prete goes a step further and reads Leopardian desire as a manifestation 
of the Eros-Thanatos dilemma of the Freudian death drive (17) and, in this context, reads 
Leopardi as a precursor of Lacan.
12
  
1.2.1 Leopardian Desire: “l’isperanza di esser quieto” 
Desire is the initial and final concern of Leopardi’s philosophical speculation. 
Desire for pleasure (and thus the search for happiness) is “una pena, e una specie di 
travaglio abituale per l’anima” (“a pain, and a kind of habitual labour for the soul”; 
Zibaldone 172,1; my translation) and only those who have perpetually suffered can 
recognize its essence.
13
 Desire is crucial to Leopardi’s “teoria del piacere” (theory of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
rulers in us when they ought to wither and be ruled” (Republic 606 D 1-7). The theory of halves of 
Aristophanes is also mentioned by Lacan (Écrits 717). 
12
 Alberto Folin agrees with reservation with Prete’s interpretation: “non c’è da stupirsi che una parte della 
critica leopardiana più recente abbia imboccato senza riserve la via dell’attualizzazione, individuando nel 
filosofo-poeta di Recanati un anticipatore illustre di Freud, di Heidegger, e di Marcuse, se non addirittura di 
Lacan e di Deleuze. Nessuno scandalo per questo genere di lettura che, se contenuta entro i limiti del 
rispetto filologico dei testi . . . può risultare efficace” (“it is not surprising that a section of recent Leopardi 
criticism has fallen prey to interpretations which construe the Recanati poet-philosopher as a worthy 
precursor of Freud, Heidegger and Marcuse, if not also Lacan and Deleuze. These interpretations are not 
scandalous, and if carried out in full respect of the philological limits of the text, they can be efficacious”; 
95; my translation). 
13
 Leopardi’s philosophical speculation started from the initially strictly physical sensation of suffering. As 
he says: “La mutazione totale in me, . . . seguì  . . . dentro un anno, . . . nel 1819, dove privato dell’uso della 
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pleasure), which, as Alberto Folin points out, owes considerably to the idea of pleasure as 
a distraction from pain widely in circulation among Enlightenment thinkers (97).
14
 Folin 
affirms that the definition of pleasure as the cessation of pain is largely expounded by the 
Idéologues starting with P.-L.-M. Maupertius (96).
15
 Luigi Derla draws an important 
distinction between the Italian thinkers of the eighteenth-century, in whom the concern 
with pleasure is always connected with its social aspect, and the modern insight of 
Leopardi who alerted his readers to the importance of focusing on the individual’s 
suffering and thus the impossibility of speaking of a collective happiness (149).
16
 Derla 
also highlights how pleasure as a distraction from the agonizing human condition at the 
mercy of an insatiable desire is already found in many Enlightenment thinkers. The same 
line of argumentation is followed by Luca Sorrentino in “Leopardi e la teoria del piacere 
nel 700” where the eighteenth-century pursuit of public happiness is pitted against 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
vista, e della continua distrazione della lettura, cominciai a sentire la mia infelicità in un modo assai più 
tenebroso, cominciai . . .  a riflettere profondamente sopra le cose, . . .  a divenire filosofo di professione” 
(“the total change in me, . . .  took place . . . in a year, . . . in 1819, when deprived of the use of sight, and of 
the ongoing distraction of reading, I started feeling my unhappiness in a much more acute and darker way, I 
started . . . to reflect profoundly on things . . . to become a philosopher by profession”;  Zibaldone 162; my 
translation). 
14
  Leopardi’s “teoria del piacere” is mostly expostulated in the entries in the Zibaldone dated between the 
12
th
 and the 23
rd
 of July 1820. In these indices, Leopardi defines pleasure as the cessation of pain and thus 
as characterized by negativity. Also see Derla, 148-69.  
15 The nature of pleasure, the object of desire and self-love, had certainly become particularly major in the 
philosophical thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The major Italian theoreticians of 
sensationalism in aesthetics and ethics in the eighteenth century were Cesare Beccaria and Alessandro and 
Pietro Verri. Pietro Verri had written the essay “Discorso sull’indole del piacere e del dolore” (1773) which 
Leopardi does not quote but he does use citations on this subject by C. Montesquieu and Claude-Adrien 
Helvétius, whose lesson Verri had assimilated. The doctrine of desire, however, is also central to Etienne 
Bonnot de Condillac who called desire “le plus pressant de tous nos besoins” (Animaux 597-98). Condillac 
is listed by Giuseppe Pacella in “Elenchi di letture leopardiane” as an author read by Leopardi (574). The 
influence of French eighteenth-century writers like J.J. Rousseau, C. Montesquieu, C.A. Helvétius and E.B. 
de Condillac (but also Voltaire, d’Alembert, d’Holbach, Maupertius and Mme de Staël) is discussed in 
Serban’s Leopardi et la France (1913) and many essays by Alberto Frattini, particularly “Leopardi e gli 
ideologi francesi del Settecento” in Leopardi e il Settecento.  Leopardi departs from the same point where 
Condillac leaves off and develops his theory of desire as the very essence of human nature: “L’anima 
umana . . . desidera sempre essenzialmente, e mira unicamente . . . al piacere ossia alla felicità” (“The 
human soul . . . is essentially in a perennial state of want, and aims solely . . . at pleasure or better at 
happiness”; Zibaldone 182; my translation).  
16
 Indeed, unlike the Idéologues, who after rejecting innatism and abolishing metaphysics turned to deal 
with the social aspect of the human being, for Leopardi, the abolition of metaphysics (even though it is 
debatable whether we can actually speak of the complete abolition of metaphysics in Leopardi) did not, 
strictly speaking, imply an involvement in social problems. 
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Leopardi’s drive for unattainable absolute pleasure.17 Daniela Bini points out that 
eighteenth-century sensationalists and materialists like J.-O. La Mettrie, Denis Diderot 
and P-.J.-G. Cabanis, have long been recognized by criticism to have been influential on 
Leopardi. She claims that Leopardi’s materialism à la Mettrie, however, developed into 
something closer to the pessimism of the Marquis de Sade in his conception of 
destructive nature (87-88). In his formulation of the theory of pleasure, Leopardi 
followed not just sensationalism and materialism but another central creed of the 
eighteenth-century−empiricism–mentioning and building directly on John Locke.  
Agreeing with Locke and the Idéologues he wrote: “è già stabilito dagli ideologi 
che il progresso delle cognizioni umane consiste nel conoscere che un’idea ne contiene 
un’altra (così Locke, Tracy etc.) e questa un’altra ec” (“It has been established by the 
Idéologues that the progress of human cognitions consists in knowing that one idea 
contains another [and thus Locke, Tracy etc.] and this yet another”; Zibaldone 832; my 
translation).  
The opposition between the human being’s overall desire for infinite happiness 
and the limited and delusory nature of reality is the fundamental theme of Leopardi’s 
lyrics (see 3.2). Pleasure is fictitious as is clear in the negative definition given in the 
poems “La quiete dopo la tempesta” (“The Calm After the Storm”) and “Il sabato del 
villaggio” (“Saturday in the Village”). The eternal anguish caused by desire is well-
expressed in the last lines of the moral tale, “Dialogo di un venditore d’almanacchi e di 
un passeggere” where the passeggere concludes: “Quella vita ch’è una cosa bella, non è 
la vita che si conosce, ma quella che non si conosce; non la vita passata, ma la futura” 
(“The life that’s beautiful is not the life we know, but the life we don’t know; not the past 
life, but the future”; Operette morali 480-81). Desire is thus felt most acutely during 
childhood and in courtship, both being periods in the individual’s life when, according to 
Leopardi, the expression of desire is tied to its future fruition.
18
 Leopardi concludes: 
                                                 
17
 Sorrentino interestingly compares Leopardi’s concept of desire with Hegel’s dialectic of desire, which 
was also inspirational to Lacanian desire. 
18As Folin states, Leopardi’s interest in pleasure is not simply empirical (and this explains why Leopardi 
significantly does not distinguish physical from moral sensation) but it goes right to the core of the 
ontological question of ‘unpleasure.’ Pleasure is not an act but tension towards the act. Pleasure can never 
10 
 
Conseguito un piacere, l’anima non cessa di desiderare il piacere, come non cessa 
mai di pensare, perché il pensiero e il desiderio del piacere sono due operazioni 
egualmente continue e inseparabili dalla sua esistenza. (Zibaldone 183) 
Once a pleasure is satisfied, the soul does not cease to desire pleasure, as it does 
not cease to think, because both the thought and the desire of pleasure are two 
activities which are equally incessant and inseparable from existence. (my 
translation)
 
 
The illusion of infinity is a moral sensation that can only be produced by rhetorical re-
figurations of the past (memory) or future (hope) and thus the pillars of Leopardi’s 
poetics are rimembranza, speranza and desiderio. It is intriguing to note that speme or 
speranza, (hope), and desiderio (desire), are interlaced concepts in Leopardi (see 2.1), as 
is also clear in the Leopardian quotation Beckett chooses to repeatedly cite: “non che la 
speme il desiderio è spento.” Although in Leopardi the nexus between desire and hope is 
an important one, and the Italian poet ultimately admits the irreducibility of both, in 
Beckett this interweaving is not as smooth. While I argue that the inextinguishable 
quality of desire is recognized by Beckett, this is not the case with hope which is mostly 
debunked.
19
 Nonetheless, it is not to be overlooked that as a widely-read and well-
informed reader of Leopardi, Beckett would have certainly been aware of the 
implications of the chosen quotations.  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
be in the present (102).This starts to hint at the connection, in Leopardi as in subsequent theoreticians of 
desire (including Beckett in Proust), between desire and memory.  
19
 In Beckett hope is discussed in the “Clare Street Notebook,” particularly in an entry dated August 11, 
1936: “There are moments where the veil of hope is finally ripped away and the eyes, suddenly liberated, 
see their world as it is, as it must be. Alas, it does not last long, the perception quickly passes: the eyes can 
only bear such a merciless light for a short while, the thin skin of hope re-forms and one returns to the 
world of phenomena. . . .   Hope is the cataract of the spirit that cannot be pierced until it is ripe for decay. 
Not every cataract ripens: many a human being spends his whole life enveloped in the mist of hope. And 
even if the cataract can be pierced for a moment it almost always re-forms immediately; and thus it is with 
hope. And people never tire of applying to themselves the comforting clichés inspired by hope” (UoR MS 
5003, 33, 35 cited in Matthew Feldman’s “Sourcing ‘Aporetics’: An Empirical Study on philosophical 
Influences in the Development of Samuel Beckett’s Writing,” 394-95). I argue that Beckett’s later works, 
however, while portraying hope as hellish, make no bones about the equally hellish condition of 
hopelessness (see 3.3; 3.4). 
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In Leopardi, hope cannot ever be completely depleted to the extent that “anche 
una scintilla, una goccia di lei, non abbandona l’uomo, neppur accadutagli la disgrazia la 
più diametralmente contraria ad essa speranza” (“even a glitter, a drop of it [hope], 
remains in the individual and this is the case even when the worst of calamities, the ones 
that are most adverse to hope, befall him”; Zibaldone 285,1; my translation). “Speranza” 
(hope) and “desiderio” (desire) thus become  interlaced with the  “indefinito” (indefinite): 
“Dalla mia teoria del piacere seguita che l’uomo, desiderando sempre un piacere infinito 
e che lo sodisfi intieramente, desideri sempre e speri una cosa ch’egli non può concepire” 
(“From my theory of pleasure it follows that the individual, always desiring an infinite 
pleasure which pleases him entirely, is perennially desiring and hoping for something 
which he cannot conceive”; Zibaldone 1017,1; my translation). As Folin insists, desire 
for Leopardi is “ontologicamente vano in quanto esso non è mai realizzabile” 
(“ontologically impossible in that it cannot ever be realized”; 102; my translation and 
emphasis). The reference to “Speranza” in the excerpts posthumously collected in the 
Zibaldone as Trattato delle passioni is linked to the desire for happiness (see 2.4.2; 3.2): 
“Tanto è lungi dal vero che la speranza o il desiderio possano mai abbandonare un essere 
che non esiste se non per amarsi, e proccurare il suo bene, e se non quanto si ama” (“It is 
far from the truth that hope or desire could ever abandon the human being in that he 
exists only insofar as he can satisfy his self-love and bring about his own well-being, in 
direct proportion to self-love”; Zibaldone 1547,1; my translation). Hope and desire are 
both characterized by the indeterminacy that imbues the individual’s imaginings of past 
and future, as well as her or his anticipation of pleasure, including the “piacere della 
disperazione” (“the pleasure of despair”).20 Leopardi ironically concludes that the 
experience of pleasure in the present is a most unhappy moment in life. Schopenhauer 
will similarly state that “the form of the will’s appearance . . . is really just the present” 
(1: 304).  
                                                 
20
 By October 18, 1825, Leopardi will question the sole existence of despair: “Disperazione, rigorosamente 
parlando, non si dà” (“Despair, strictly speaking, does not exist”; my translation). Despair is interwoven 
with thought, desire and hope, all becoming central to Leopardian ethics: “Ella è cosa forse o poco o nulla o 
non abbastanza osservata che la speranza è una passione, un modo di essere, così inerente e inseparabile dal 
sentimento della vita, cioè dalla vita propriamente detta, come il pensiero, e come l’amor di sé stesso, e il 
desiderio del proprio bene. Io vivo, dunque io spero” (“It has been ignored or overlooked that hope is a 
passion, a way of being which is inseparable from the feeling of life, from  life in its essence like thought, 
self-love and the desire of one’s own well-being. I live, therefore I hope”; Zibaldone 4145; my translation).  
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Leopardi thus underscores both the promise of pleasure and the consuming effect 
of this promise. The pivot of desire hinges primarily on amor proprio and amor di sé 
(both forms of self-love) at the roots of all feeling.
21
 Amor proprio is the basic form of all 
love that bears the marks of eros desire characterized by lack.  Desire of amor proprio 
and, consequently, desire of pleasure, usurp all man’s effort: “L’uomo (per l’amore della 
vita) ama naturalmente e desidera e abbisogna di sentire, o gradevolmente, o comunque, 
purché sia vivamente” (“The individual [for the love of life] naturally loves and desires 
and needs to feel, pleasurably or at least intensely”; Zibaldone 891; my translation). The 
restless and infinite desire of amor proprio, insatiably searches for satisfaction, placing 
pleasure at its horizon and conceiving of pleasure as a necessary passageway to (illusory) 
happiness: “Giacchè il desiderio non è d’altro che del piacere, e l’amor della felicità non 
è altro che l’amor proprio” (“Given that desire is nothing but desire of pleasure, and love 
of happiness is nothing but self-love”; Zibaldone 2495; my translation).22 Thus ends can 
never be fulfilled and suffering is ever-present. 
Self-love degenerates into selfishness when the individual enters in contact with 
others. When amor proprio is taken to an extreme, it reflects the egoistic outlook of the 
“secolo superbo e sciocco” (“proud and foolish century”; see 3.2) where egoism 
crystallizes sentiment into the mauvaise honte which originates from Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (2.4.1). Amor proprio is mentioned by Lacan when he refers to eighteenth-
century discussions on self-love, primarily through La Rochefoucauld’s idea of the 
resistance of amour-propre, on which desire is based.  Amour Propre in Lacan is located 
                                                 
21
 Leopardi is influenced by Jean Jacques Rousseau’s distinction between amour propre and amour de soi. 
It is pertinent to point out that Rousseau’s distinction pits the concept of self-love as self-preservation and 
self-love in its contextualization when it comes in contact with the external world. The idea of amor 
proprio in Leopardi denotes the primitive, infinite passion, which predates all others, but it is also projected 
negatively when it becomes excessive. References to amor proprio are to be found in Leopardi’s 
posthumously-collected indices of the Zibaldone in Trattato delle passioni where the Italian poet links self-
love to the equally infinite desire for pleasure: “La massa dell’amor proprio …è infinita assolutamente, e 
per se stessa” (“Self-love . . . is absolutely infinite and self-reproductive”; 2153,2; my translation). 
Leopardi says, “. . . coll’intensità della vita cresce quella dell’amor proprio, e l’amor proprio è desiderio 
della propria felicità, e la felicità è piacere” (“. . . as the intensity of life grows, self-love also grows, and 
self-love is desire for one’s own happiness, and happiness is pleasure”; Zibaldone 3835,1; my translation).   
22
 Leopardi’s intention might have been that of demonstrating the immanent and material origin of desire 
within the human being but in his philosophical interrogation he departs from the stimulus-response in 
which sensationalist interrogation is locked and introduces the capital distinction between desire of a 
pleasure and desire of pleasure, the latter paving the way for Freudian drives (see Folin; 104). This desire 
of pleasure, as in Freud and Lacan differs from need. See Prete; 17-18. 
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in the Lacanian “moi” (see 1.4.1) and is that by which “I can’t bear the thought of being 
freed [from desire] by anyone but myself” (Lacan, Écrits 87). As Antonio Prete argues, 
Leopardi’s desire for self-preservation (which is steeped in eighteenth-century 
discussions on self-love as opposed to the social order of desire) leads to the distinction 
Freud will make, first in Beyond the Pleasure Principle and then in Civilisation and its 
Discontents, about the death versus life forces (22). This division also becomes pivotal in 
Lacan.  
 Leopardi thus speaks of amor proprio at the root of an existential “souffrance.” 
For Leopardi, the human being who is destined to utmost “souffrance” is the ultra-
sensitive individual, “l’uomo sensibile,” the one endowed with abundant amor proprio, 
epitomized in the child, youth, the people of Antiquity and the uncivilised tribes. In an 
entry in the Zibaldone, Leopardi writes: 
L’amor proprio è veramente maggiore assai ne’ i fanciulli e ne’ i giovani che ne’ i 
maturi e ne’ i vecchi, maggiore negli uomini sensibili e immaginosi che ne’ i 
torpidi. I fanciulli, i giovani, gli uomini sensibili sono assai più teneri di sé stessi 
che nol sono i loro contrarii. Nella stessa guisa discorrasi dei deboli rispetto ai 
forti e simili. Così generalmente furono gli antichi rispetto ai moderni, e i selvaggi 
rispetto ai civili, perché più forti di corpo, più forti ed attivi e vivaci d’animo e 
d’immaginazione (si per le circostanze fisiche, si per le morali), meno 
disingannati, e insomma maggiormente e più intensamente viventi. (Zibaldone 
3107,1) 
Self-love is indeed more abundant in children and young individuals rather than in 
mature and old ones, in sensitive and imaginative beings rather than in the 
apathetic. Children, young people, sensitive individuals are far more self-loving 
than their older counterparts. With the same line of argumentation one can 
conceive of the weak as opposed to the strong. In this manner one can pit the men 
of Antiquity to modern men, the savages to the civilized, because the former are 
physically stronger, and thus more active and vivacious in spirit and imagination 
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(due to both physical circumstances and moral ones), less disillusioned, and more 
intensely alive. (my translation) 
Amor proprio is also directly proportional to fear: “Il timore, passione immediatamente 
figlia dell’amor proprio e della propria conservazione, e quindi inseparabile dall’uomo, 
ma sopratutto manifesta e propria nell’uomo primitivo, nel fanciullo, in coloro che più 
conservano dello stato naturale” (“fear, the immediate heir of self-love and one’s own 
self-preservation, and thus inseparable from man, is primarily manifest in the primitive  
individual, the child and those who are still proximate to their original state”; Zibaldone 
2206,1; my translation).  
There is thus in desire of amor proprio an awareness of an irreversible distance: 
the distance resulting from a one-way relationship with the pulsating rhythm of physis, 
symbolized by the child, the archetypal imagination and knowledge described by 
Giambattista Vico (Vichian idea that only the primitive human being was a true poet: see 
2.4.1), and the pristine qualities that are proximate to Rousseau’s noble savage. 
Civilization and its knowledge have rendered opaque that same intrinsic relation with 
physis, distracting any attentive listening to the dialogue between finitude and 
nothingness, the dialogue at the crux of one of the Leopardian definitions of noia (see 
2.2). This unbridgeable distance is also one of the reasons behind human presumption, a 
recurrent theme in the Operette morali, particularly in “Dialogo di un folletto e di uno 
gnomo” in which the folletto tells the gnomo: “Io tengo per fermo che anche le lucertole e 
i moscerini si credano che tutto il mondo sia fatto a posta per uso della loro specie” (“I 
firmly believe that even lizards and gnats think that the whole world was especially made 
for their species”; 90-91). 
The insatiable desire of amor proprio is the real pathos and its only expression is 
through la lontananza, l’indefinito, il vago (distance, indefiniteness, vagueness). The 
dialectical nature of desire is clearly not new to the history of thought and while 
Leopardi’s immediate source must have been Blaise Pascal (Zibaldone 474), and (as 
stated above) French eighteenth-century thinkers, its roots reach as far back as Plato’s 
Symposium (see 1.2). Indeed Leopardi’s phrase “il troppo produce il nulla” 
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(“excessiveness produces nothingness”; Zibaldone 1653,2; my translation) characterizes 
his entire oeuvre where the paradoxical essence of life is conveyed through a style built 
on syntactical as well as logical oppositions. Leopardi’s poetics is based on a sentiment 
of the world but a sentiment that, far from being opposed to the theoretical 
comprehension of things, derives from it. Indeed, what De Sanctis describes in relation to 
Leopardian composition does not take place accidentally:  
Perché Leopardi produce l'effetto contrario a quello che si propone. Non crede al 
progresso, e te lo fa desiderare; non crede alla libertà, e te la fa amare. Chiama 
illusioni l'amore, la gloria, la virtù, e te ne accenda in petto un desiderio inesausto 
. . . E scettico, e ti fa credente; e mentre non crede possibile un avvenire men 
tristo per la patria comune, ti desta in seno un vivo amore per quella. . . 
(Schopenhauer e Leopardi 69)  
Because Leopardi produces an opposite effect to the one he proposes. He does not 
believe in progress, but makes you long for it; he does not believe in freedom, and 
he ignites love for it. He calls illusions all notions of love, glory, virtue, while 
firing you up with an insatiable desire for them… He is sceptical, but turns you 
into a believer; and while he does not believe in a less unhappy future for his 
country, he flames up your heart with a strong and vivid love for it. . . (my 
translation) 
In Leopardi criticism, De Sanctis was followed by Benedetto Croce (even though their 
criticism of Leopardi differs considerably), the latter starting a tradition that opposed 
Leopardi’s poetry to his philosophy. This criticism, which also sees Leopardi’s so-called 
pessimistic philosophy as the consequence of his personal unhappiness, forms part of the 
neo-positivistic school which flourished at the end of the nineteenth-century. Following 
Croce’s dismissal of the importance in Leopardi of the relationship between philosophy 
and poetry, it was Walter Binni and Cesare Luporini, together with Natalino Sapegno and 
Sebastiano Timpanaro who revived the interest in Leopardi’s philosophical thought and 
pursued it in a critical fashion (see 3.2). Sapegno in volume III of his Compendio della 
letteratura italiana, Binni in La nuova poetica leopardiana and Luporini in Leopardi 
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progressivo dealt a mortal blow to the Crocean interpretation of Leopardi. It was also 
Binni who first pointed out the poetical value of Leopardi’s late poetry.  
Thus it is by now well-established that Leopardi’s philosophy is inextricably 
interlaced with his poetics. Leopardian poetics moves from a search for noncuranza (see 
2.3.1), the “stato di tranquilla disperazione” (“state of quiet despair”; Zibaldone 618,2; 
my translation) and the “isperanza di esser quieto” (“the desire for quietude”; Zibaldone 
4259,5; my translation) to an abandonment of such aspirations. Stoic philosophy is 
initially perceived as the wisdom through which painful desire can be eradicated (2.2.1): 
“Dei beni umani il più supremo colmo è sentir meno il duolo” (“Of all beneficial aspects 
of humanity the supreme one is when pain is least felt”; Zibaldone 2673,3; my 
translation).
23
 Leopardi’s translation of Epictetus (and the Preambolo) and several indices 
in the Zibaldone posthumously collected as Manuale di filosofia pratica (initially 
Manuale di filosofia pratica: cioè un Epitteto a modo mio),
24
 reveal, at this early stage, an 
aspiration towards an ascetic model, a cura del sé which attempts to stem the tide of 
desire and search for “quiete” (quietude). Leopardi says: 
Così oggi fuggo ed odio non solo il discorso, ma spesso anche la presenza altrui 
nel tempo di queste sensazioni. Non per altro se non per l’abito che ho contratto di 
dimorar quasi sempre meco stesso, e di tacere quasi tutto il tempo, e di viver tra 
gli uomini come isolatamente e in solitudine. (Zibaldone 2471,1) 
Thus I escape and scorn not only conversation, but oftentimes also the 
                                                 
23
 Leopardi’s profound knowledge of classical thought cannot be ignored. An excellent essay on this topic 
is Timpanaro’s “Il Leopardi e I filosofi antichi.” Timpanaro wonders why in Leopardi so few references are 
made to Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius with whom he clearly had spiritual affinity: “Non possiamo 
leggere “La Ginestra” senza pensare al De rerum natura.” (“We cannot read ‘La Ginestra’ without thinking 
of De rerum natura”) After having examined the influence of Greek philosophy on Leopardi, however, 
Timpanaro concludes: “I maestri prediletti di filosofia furono sempre per il Leopardi i materialisti e i 
sensisti del secolo XVIII” (“the favourite philosophical masters for Leopardi were always the materialists 
and the sensationalists of the XVIII century”; 228; my translation).  
24
 Prior to this, the title suggested in Epistole in versi in 1825 was “Massime morali sull’andare del manuale 
di Epitteto, Rochefoucauld ec” in Zibaldone.2. xxvi. It is pertinent to point out what Timpanaro wrote 
about Leopardi’s interest in Epictetus: “L’interesse per Epitteto, e per la filosofia ellenistica . . . si accord[a] 
realmente con una fase di disimpegno politico e di tentative di adattamento alla realtà della vita, che il 
Leopardi attraversò all’incirca dal 24’ al ‘27” (“his interest in Epictetus and Hellenistic philosophy . . . 
intersects  with a phase in his life where political apathy and attempts at adapting to the reality of life were 
dominant, a phase Leopardi went through roughly between 24’ and ’27”; 219; my translation). 
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concomitant presence of others when I am in this state. This is due to no other 
reason than the habit I have acquired of staying on my own, and quietly living 
among human beings in isolation and in solitude. (my translation) 
It is important to point out, however, that Leopardi interprets Epictetus “a modo mio” 
(“in my own way”) that is rather idiosyncratically. Indeed Leopardi both adheres and 
refutes Epictetus’ Stoicism. One and a half years after translating Epictetus, the Recanati 
poet would already admit that Stoicism could be tedious and rather than restoring peace 
to the soul, it could bring about exasperation: “Sono stanco della vita, stanco dell’ 
indifferenza filosofica, ch’è il solo rimedio de’ mali e della noia, ma che in fine annoia 
essa medesima.” (“I am tired of life, tired of philosophical indifference, which is the only 
remedy to existential ills and boredom, but which ultimately bores itself”; Letter to 
Francesco Puccinotti, August 16, 1827, in Epistolario 1366; my translation).  
The aspired-for serenity of ataraxia “atarassia” (see 2.1) is refuted by successive 
entries in Manuale di filosofia pratica where the suppressed desire erupts with full-force 
(see 2.3.1; 3.2). Thus, despite the centrality of Leopardi’s formative readings in the 
Stoics Seneca’s De tranquillitate animi, Cicero’s concept of “tranquillitas” and readings 
from Marcus Aurelius the notion of “atarassia” (see 2.1; 3.2) proves for Leopardi to be 
elusive because desire affirms its being limitless and boundless. At the heart of the 
Leopardian research is the perennial tension in the “inquietudine del desiderio.” The best 
example of the ultimate failure of atarassia can be found in the concluding lines of 
“Aspasia,” where atarassia is the result of a defeat and not the state of a victorious 
struggle (see 3.2). 
The suspension of desire and the invitation towards “noncuranza” cannot be, for 
Leopardi, a retreat into oblivion and even less a regression into the obscure zone of 
passivity; it can be neither a centripetal nor a centrifugal escape from the self. The ardent 
ignorance of the child and the enigmatic depth of the animalistic non-knowledge, to 
which the pastore errante makes reference in “Canto notturno d’un pastore errante 
dell’Asia,” (“Night Song of a Nomadic Shepherd in Asia”) are themselves sources of a 
very palpable feeling. The uomo sensibile, according to Leopardi, needs physical, moral 
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and mental solitude, unknown to the sociable, mundane individual (Zibaldone 633,1). 
This methodical internal life: “contribuisce a mettere in moto l’immaginazione, a destare 
e pascere le illusioni, a far che l’uomo abbondi d’immagini e di deliri, e con questi 
facilmente faccia di meno delle opere, e basti a se stesso, e trovi piaceri in se stesso, ad 
accrescere la vita e l’azione interna in pregiudizio dell’esterna” (“contributes to put the 
imagination into action, to build and nourish illusions, to make it possible for the human 
being to abound in images and strong fantasy, and with these to easily do without work. 
In this sense one can suffice to oneself, and find pleasure in oneself, thus making life and 
internal action grow to the detriment of the external one”; Zibaldone 3676,1; my 
translation).  
The not being-able-to-feel, however, is the worst threat the sensitive human being 
could face because s/he is more likely to be “disingannato profondamente e stabilmente, 
perché ha tutto profondamente e vivamente provato” (“profoundly and completely 
disenchanted, because he has tried out everything with deep and intense commitment”; 
Zibaldone 1653,2; my translation).
25
 Sensitive beings are thus the most exposed to desire 
because they are “più sitibondi della felicità, e più inquieti dà desiderii, cioè dal desiderio 
della propria felicità” (“ more inclined to crave happiness intensely, and more restlessly 
desire their own happiness”; Zibaldone 3835,1; my translation). And the propensity for 
desire coincides with the propensity for thought: “Sempre che l’uomo pensa, ei desidera, 
perché tanto quanto pensa ei si ama. Ed in ciascun momento, a proporzione che la sua 
facoltà di pensare è più libera ed intera e con minore impedimento, e che egli più 
pienamente ed intensamente la esercita, il suo desiderare è maggiore” (“While man 
thinks, he desires, because the more he thinks the more he loves himself. And in every 
moment, the freer is his faculty to think, the more fully and intensely he exerts it, and the 
                                                 
25
 Suffering is thus necessary to break through the crystallization of indifference allowing a return to 
creativity that had been entirely blocked by the “rassegnata disperazione” (“resigned despair”; Zibaldone 
2161,1; my translation). Suffering allows the human being to live au hazard. Despair is pitted against 
limited desire and hope. Despair results from an unlimited desire, which characterizes the magnanimous 
who are (specifically because of this reason) destined to unhappiness. As argued in 3.2, Leopardi will 
propose the “quiete nel patimento” (“quietude in suffering”) which is evoked by the “lenta ginestra.” It is a 
suffering that evokes the pain of the people of Antiquity, a form of consolation pregnant with eros and p 
athos and which offers a different form of resistance that is attained by turning the tables onto rationality. 
In this later poetry Leopardi needed to become a philosopher only in order to realize that his ideas were no 
longer Vichian but Romantic. 
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stronger is his desire”; Zibaldone 3842,2; my translation). This unlimited desire of life in 
the sensitive being subtends the entire “teoria del piacere.” 
Hence, while the teachings of Epictetus remain as a backdrop, the Leopardian 
analysis undercuts the attempt to isolate, negate or repress desire. Desire is upheld against 
the “geometria della ragione” (geometry of reason).26 Being able to feel, and to desire, 
bring about compassion, that is, the ability to suffer with the other (see 3.2). Desire in 
Leopardi is thus placed somewhat close to the surface, away from deep-seated 
ruminations within the self, and while arguing for its dissolution, as Beckett will do in 
Proust (see 2.2), Leopardi also makes a strong case for its necessity (3.1; 3.2).  
In this exploration, desire becomes temporally interlaced not only with the search 
for pleasure and the necessity of illusions, and thus expressions of hope and happiness 
but also despair and solitude.
27
 Leopardi declares, however, the necessity of facing the 
impossibility of happiness. He asserts that “solo il falso, cioè l’illusione” (“only falsity, 
that is to say only illusions”; Zibaldone 315, 2; my translation) can make one’s life 
happy. It is thus through a rigorous application of reason that the Italian poet discovers 
the destructive power of rationality which, in the end, turns against itself: “La vita dunque 
e l’assoluta mancanza d’illusione, e quindi di speranza, sono cose contraddittorie” (“Thus 
life and the absolute absence of illusion, and thus of hope, are contradictory”; Zibaldone 
                                                 
26
 This does not mean that Leopardi at any point abandons reason. Sensationalism, materialism and 
idealism in Leopardi are linked to his loyalty to rationalism. The dialectical crux of his methodology was 
his way of turning reason against itself. “Il mio sistema,” he wrote in the Zibaldone, “introduce non solo 
uno Scetticismo ragionato e dimostrato, ma tale che…la ragione umana per qualsivoglia progresso 
possibile, non potrà mai spogliarsi di questo scetticismo…e che non solo il dubbio giova a scoprire il 
vero…ma il vero consiste essenzialmente nel dubbio” (“My system . . . introduces not only a reasoned and 
proven Scepticism, but in such a manner that… human reason for whichever progress is possible, can never 
denude itself of this scepticism…and not only doubt  helps to discover the truth . . . but truth essentially 
consists in doubt”; Zibaldone 1075-76; my translation). Rationalism in Leopardi destroys itself in 
discovering the irrationality of existence. The human being is bound to his rational condition and, 
consequently, to suffering. Passions are the new force, which result from the recognition of the inadequacy 
of reality and the legitimate quest for meaning. 
27
 The solitude sought by the modern individual is not the same as the solitude of reflection or the search 
for wisdom of the people of Antiquity. In the latter, solitude safeguarded the human being’s naturalness and 
thus his being closer to a dream-like, creative and  primitive existence. Indeed, the knot that ties illusions to 
happiness lies in Antiquity where happiness and unhappiness were “solide e solidamente opposte fra loro” 
(“solid and solidly opposed one to the other”; Zibaldone 338,2; my translation). The solitude of the modern 
individual is not born out of the desire to seek virtù, but out of misfortune, the recurrence of which makes 
illusions disappear. Solitude that is regularized by method becomes autistic and brings about its own 
implosion.   
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1865; my translation). Amor proprio cannot survive without deluding itself. Poetry needs 
the imagination of the naïvely Antique but it also needs to face the truth through reason 
(and sentiment).
28
 
 In the research on desire in the posthumously-collected Manuale the indices 
become an exercise in self-analysis through observation of one’s interaction with the 
other (see 3.2). This reveals Leopardi’s early grasp of the layers of desires that are deeply 
rooted in the human being, paving the way for an investigation of the unconscious. For 
Leopardi human beings are self-divided, time-torn creatures who are incapable of 
coinciding with their own selves. Indeed, it is specifically in the conception of internal 
splitting that Leopardi is a forerunner of Freud and Lacan.
29
 Leopardi, prefiguring 
Schopenhauer, Freud and Lacan, proposes that infinite force (which he calls amor 
proprio) that cannot but perennially desire, but which concomitantly aims at self-
preservation−the ultimate attempt in such preservation being that of stilling life forever. 
Human beings desire even in the full knowledge that their desire is to desire in vain; an 
absolute desire felt “in modo così chiaro e definito” (“in a clear and definite way”; 
Zibaldone 1573,1; my translation). Lacan eerily echoes Leopardi when he speaks about 
the freedom to desire in vain as opposed to the impossible ataraxic model. Lacan states: 
“happiness is denied to whomever does not renounce the pathway of desire . . . This 
renunciation can be willed, but at the cost of man’s truth, which is quite clear from the 
disapproval of those who upheld the common ideal that the Epicureans, and even the 
Stoics, met with. Their ataraxia deposed their wisdom” (Écrits 663). 
Life is an infinite chain of desires, and this compels Leopardi to suggest that 
“l’uomo (o l’animale) non possa vivere senza desiderare, perché non può vivere 
                                                 
28
 Leopardi’s early poetical attempts were necessary failures to recreate naïve poetry and they were bound 
to become sentimental (in a Schillerian sense) compositions by their very internal mechanism. His early 
“canzoni” are more about a lament of the lost ideals of the past than their present absence. The later poems 
become sentimental specifically because, as argued below, they derive strength from the antithesis between 
finite and infinite. As Friedrich von Schiller would say: “The sentimental poet is…always involved with 
two conflicting representations …with actuality as a limit and with his idea as infinitude” (Naïve and 
Sentimental Poetry 116). 
29
 Leopardian desire proves to be antithetical to the Aristotelian conception where desires are forms of 
intentional awareness, and therefore consciously controllable, and where the truth of rational emotions can 
be distinguished from the falsity of irrational ones.   
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senz’amarsi, e questo amore essendo infinito, non può esser mai pago” (“the human 
being [or the animal] cannot live without desiring, because he cannot live without self-
love, and this love being infinite, cannot ever be quenched”; Zibaldone 1653,1; my 
translation).
30
 Happiness is knowledge of “un sistema, un complesso, un ordine, una vita 
d’illusioni indipendenti, e perciò stabili: non altro” (“a system, a complex of ideas, an 
order, a life of independent and stable illusions: nothing else”; Zibaldone 633,1; my 
translation). A certain kind of superficiality is necessary to happiness where the human 
being “si getta, per così dire, alla ventura in mezzo alle cose, agli avvenimenti” (“throws 
himself, so to speak, in the midst of things, of events, without a plan”; Zibaldone 1580,1; 
my translation). This also implies a brave acceptance of suffering as in the “lenta 
ginestra” (see 3.2).  
Desire when and where there is nothing to desire but pain and suffering becomes 
one of the definitions of the Leopardian state of noia (see 2.2), a sentiment that 
approximates Beckett’s habit and boredom (2.2). According to Leopardi, the human 
being is almost constantly in a state of noia because he can never cease to desire 
happiness which is never truly forthcoming. For Leopardi, however, noia (and this is also 
the case with Beckett’s “suffering of being”), could also denote the grandeur and 
aesthetic ability of human sensibility. As Leopardi states in Pensieri, “La noia è in 
qualche modo il più sublime dei sentimenti umani” (“Noia is in some ways the most 
sublime of human feelings”; LXVIII; my translation). According to this definition, noia 
seems to reconnect to Plato’s aesthetic cognition of things as pure Ideas, which will later 
be echoed by Schopenhauer (see 1.2.2; 2.4.2), even though Leopardi ultimately refutes 
Platonic Ideas. The same resignation that accompanies noia is also experienced in 
Schopenhauer’s tearing of the veil of mȃyȃ, the rupture of the principium individuationis, 
and the abandonment of the will to life (1: 280; see 2.3.2). In a passage that Beckett 
clearly echoes in Proust, but which Leopardi foreshadows in many excerpts, 
Schopenhauer states: 
                                                 
30
 Leopardi continues to say that unhappiness is inescapable for those who search the infinite without any 
intermediaries or distractions. Reason needs imagination and the poet needs to also be a philosopher. 
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The essence of a human being consists in the fact that his will strives, is satisfied, 
and strives anew, and so on and on, and in fact his happiness and well-being are 
nothing more than the rapid progress of this transition from desire to satisfaction 
and from this to a new desire, since the absence of satisfaction is suffering and the 
absence of a new desire is empty longing, languor, boredom. (1: 288) 
This passage underlines the infinity of desire, a crucial quality for Leopardi and the 
psychoanalytic successors. Annihilating all forms of desire is indeed what Leopardi 
initially aspires to but finally refutes. Desire and the “souffrance” that comes with it re-
flourish in a somewhat transfigured reality, which gives back intact the illusion of 
happiness. Only in this transfigured manner is the lightness of survival (also through 
humour; see 4.1) possible.
31
  
The tension that characterizes Leopardian desire is thus between the infinite and 
the terrible sublime as opposed to the contained and the confined. The Leopardian tension 
implied in the “inquietudine del desiderio,” is an infinite desire which also aims at 
infinitude and is, as in Levinas (see 1.5; 3.1), foiled by the painfully finite.
32
 Nonetheless, 
given that nothing can escape the hic et nunc, one question to crop up requires our 
attention–from where does this tension towards that which goes beyond spatio-temporal 
limitations spring? Leopardi’s answer is simple the “facoltà immaginativa” (“the faculty 
of imagination”; Zibaldone 167; my translation). 
The physical barrier of the “siepe” in “L’Infinito” represents the limit inherent in 
finite reality and the experience of such finiteness is the mechanism which triggers the 
imagination towards infinitude. The infinite in this case, however, is sweet and has none 
of the malevolence of the Sublime infinite hinted at through the presence of a malicious 
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 The idea that the idealistic moment in Leopardi’s philosophy is to be found in his poetry is put forward 
by Daniela Bini (12). She specifically claims: “The ideals disappear from Leopardi’s late poetry and poetry 
itself appears as the ideal. When truth becomes the only content of poetry, the finiteness and 
meaninglessness bow to the creative power of man, which makes finiteness eternal and gives to 
meaninglessness a poetical purpose” (162). As she argues, this could prove hard to accept by anti-Crocean 
critics who are still suspect of idealism. 
32
 Indeed in “L’Infinito”, the poetic voice frees its imagination by painfully limiting its sensory perception 
through “l’ermo colle” in order to attempt to grasp the infinite by contrast. “L’Infinito” represents the pure 
mental mechanism functioning through antithesis, consciously recreating the dialectical movement of life. 
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universe in the last poem “La Ginestra” (see 3.2). In this last poem, less than 
abandonment to the infinite, the infinitely sublime surroundings are now of real matter 
and no longer simply related to the imagination.
33
 In “La Ginestra,” through the power of 
reason, the human being has unveiled nature in her sublime senselessness and longs for 
that same sense of the sublime.
34
 In “La Ginestra,” from the frail, finite matter of one’s 
being thought springs out in all its imaginative power, proving its nobility by placing 
itself in the engulfing incomprehensibility of its existence. It is within its 
incomprehensibility that, as is the case with the Levinasian desire discussed at the end of 
this chapter, it reaches out to the other.
35
 
1.2.2 From Leopardian Desire to Schopenhauerian Will 
The Leopardian notion of desire is taken up by Schopenhauer pointing forward to 
Freud’s reflections on the unconscious. Schopenhauer specifically praises Leopardi:  
no one has treated this subject [human desolation] so thoroughly and exhaustively 
as Leopardi in our own day. He is entirely imbued and penetrated with it; 
everywhere his theme is the mockery and wretchedness of this existence. He 
presents it on every page of his works, yet in such a multiplicity of forms and 
applications, with such a wealth of imagery, that he never wearies us, but, on the 
                                                 
33
 In many passages in the Zibaldone, Leopardi stated that the infinity for which our soul strives is not an 
intellectual or spiritual entity but a physical one. Leopardi could sense that the contradiction lay in the 
dialectical essence of our nature. The desire for pleasure is a sign of our being part of nature (our 
physicality), whereas the need for infinity derives from the rational part of our being. 
34
 Edmund Burke’s essay “A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful” was in Leopardi’s library in the Italian translation, published in 1804 (see Bini; 155). An 
excellent study of the influence of the English thinkers in Leopardi’s concept of the Sublime is to be found 
in Perella’s Night and the Sublime in Giacomo Leopardi.  
35
 It is important to point out that the desire for the other in Leopardi does not imply transferring one’s 
desire onto another subject because that would bring about moral death and in Leopardi the acceptance of 
the impossibility of happiness finds its scope in Beneficenza (Zibaldone 614, 2). The other is a limited 
human being and it is that same limit that channels the moral sensation of desire of the infinite. 
Concomitantly, however, the desire of the infinite, the desire of the absolute, typical of magnanimous 
subjects, requires illusions and dreams. This Romantic message annuls the Stoic teachings about control 
and limit. (It has to be stated, however, that in spite of what could be termed as his Romantic spirit, 
Leopardi repeatedly attacked Romantic writers. See Zibaldone 191,3 and also his essay “Discorso di un 
italiano sopra la poesia romantica”).  
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contrary, has a diverting and stimulating effect. (The World as Will and 
Representation 2: XLVI).
36
  
In the period that spans from Schopenhauer to Freud the great project of Enlightenment 
runs aground on an obdurate core of desire (struggling against Will, as Schopenhauer 
would term it), which throws it alarmingly out of kilter. What appears as an already 
suspicious desire in Leopardi, becomes in Schopenhauer’s hands the blind, insatiably 
hankering Will which, like desire for Leopardi, is witnessed in the self and the world as 
embodied striving driven by lack: “desire lasts a long time and demands go on forever; 
fulfilment is brief and sparsely meted out.  But even final satisfaction itself is only 
illusory.” (World as Will and Representation 1:219) 
The world manifests itself to experience as a multiplicity of individual 
objects−Schopenhauer calls this the objectivation of the will. The form of all cognition is 
the principle of sufficient reason, or the “principium individuationis” (1: 137).37 
Schopenhauer associates the “levels of the will’s objectivation” to Plato’s Ideas which are 
“always being and never becoming” (1: 154-55). The will finds in the human being, as 
(Platonic) Idea, “its clearest and most perfect objectivation,” (1: 178). In a passage that 
Beckett clearly echoes in Proust, and that Leopardi equally clearly foreshadows, 
Schopenhauer describes human endeavour and desire as follows:
 38
 
                                                 
36
 In a note to his translation of “History in the Service and Disservice of Life,” the second of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Unmodern Observations (otherwise translated as Untimely Meditations), Gary Brown writes: 
“Nietzsche, like Schopenhauer, felt intense admiration [for Leopardi’s poetry and prose]. Schopenhauer 
had seen in Leopardi the supreme contemporary poet of human unhappiness, and it was to Nietzsche . . . 
that Hans von Bulow . . . dedicated his translation of Leopardi into German . . . Of Leopardi Nietzsche 
remarked [in “We Classicists,” the last of the Unmodern Observations] that he was ‘the modern ideal of a 
classicist’ and one of ‘the last great followers of the Italian poet-scholars’ [“Richard Wagner in Bayreuth,” 
the fourth of the Unmodern Observations]  . . . who, along with Merimée, Emerson, and Landor, could 
rightly be called ‘a master of prose’ [The Gay Science 92].” (93n-94n). See 2.4. 
37
 The will as thing in itself lies outside the province of the principle of sufficient reason, although each of 
its appearances is entirely subject to this principle since it conditions the general form of all appearance; 
and human activities, like all other appearances, must be subject to it. 
38 As to the invisible chord of sympathy between Beckett and Schopenhauer, the latter has long been 
recognized by criticism: “Beckett had a ‘sensed affinity’ with Schopenhauer; consequently emphasized the 
latter’s pessimism, artistic views and the role of the will” (Feldman, “Samuel Beckett’s Early 
Development” 190). 
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Always delud[ing] us into believing that their fulfilment is the final goal of 
willing; but as soon as they are attained they no longer look the same and thus are 
soon forgotten, grow antiquated and are really, if not admittedly, always laid to 
the side as vanished delusions; we are lucky enough when there is still something 
left to desire and strive after, to carry on the game of constantly passing from 
desire to satisfaction and from this to a new desire, a game whose rapid course is 
called happiness and slow course is called suffering, so that the game might not 
come to an end, showing itself to be fearful, life-destroying boredom, a wearied 
longing without a definite object, a deadening languor. (1: 188-89)  
The world as ‘will’ can either be considered with respect to its affirmation or negation. 
The negation of the will and the role of art in this negation (see 2.3.2),
 39
 which is clearly 
prefigured by Leopardi’s atarassia tinged by souffrance and pre-announces Beckett’s 
suffering of being (see 2.1), still proves elusive to complete will-lessness and 
desirelessness (see 2.3.2).
40
  
In a clear foreshadowing of Freud, and an echo of the Eros-Thanatos dilemma at 
the heart of Leopardian poetics, Schopenhauer explains that the drive to reproduce is the 
most fundamental expression of the affirmation of the will to life: “ [the] ultimate 
purpose; the highest goal of life in the natural human being, as it is in the animal” (1: 
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 The goal of art is “to arouse cognition of these Ideas through the presentation of particular things . . .– 
something that is possible only given a corresponding alteration in the subject of cognition” (1: 285). 
Schopenhauer insists: “the objective side of aesthetic spectatorship, the intuitive apprehension of the 
Platonic Idea always occurs simultaneously with and as a necessary correlate to this subjective side” (1: 
223).   
40
 Negation of the will is, according to Schopenhauer, directly related to the feeling of the Burkean 
Sublime, as is also one of the definitions Leopardi gives of noia (also see 1.2.1; 2.1; 3.2).
 
Schopenhauer 
explains the difference between the beautiful and the sublime as follows: “what distinguishes the feeling of 
the sublime from the feeling of the beautiful is this: with the beautiful, pure cognition has won the upper 
hand without a struggle . . . With the sublime, on the other hand, that state of pure cognition is gained only 
by means of a conscious and violent tearing free from relationships between the same object and the will 
(relationships that are recognized as unfavourable) by means of a free and conscious elevation over the will 
and the cognition relating to it. This elevation must not only be achieved consciously, it must also be 
sustained and is therefore accompanied by a constant recollection of the will, although not of a particular, 
individual willing, such as fear or desire, but rather of human willing in general, to the extent that it is 
universally expressed through its objecthood, the human body” (1: 226). If the world as representation is 
the visibility of the will, then art is the clarification of this visibility. The thought of Schopenhauer on Will 
and desire and its relation to art is inherited by Friedrich Nietzsche, particularly in the early work The Birth 
of Tragedy. (see 2.4)
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356). On the other hand, however, “from the same source . . . ultimately emerges also 
what I call the negation of the will to life” (1: 405). The latter is central to Asceticism, by 
which Schopenhauer understands the “deliberate breaking of the will by forgoing what is 
pleasant and seeking what is unpleasant” (1: 419). This disquieting dichotomy between 
the will to life and the negation of this will becomes crucial in Freudian drives discussed 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  
1.3 Freudian Desire 
The Freudian concept of desire (a non-Freudian term which owes considerably to 
the Leopardi-Schopenhauer-[Nietzsche, see 2.4] lineage) revolves around a subject 
whose identity is fixed in Oedipal repressions.
41
 Freudian desire is thus once more 
formulated in terms of loss. From Freud’s earliest works, particularly The Interpretation 
of Dreams, it is laid down as a rule that the expression of desire must be sought in a 
dream and thus in the unconscious. Lacan (whose notion of desire, as argued below, 
builds considerably on Freud’s) amplifies on how the dream has the structure of a rebus− 
that is, a form of writing (Écrits 221; 424): 
42
  
Does it mean nothing that Freud recognized desire in dreams?. . .we must read 
The Interpretation of Dreams to know what is meant by what Freud calls ‘desire’ 
there…What we must keep in mind here is that this desire is articulated in a very 
cunning discourse. (Écrits 620) 
Lacan, however, also points out that it is “in Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious 
that the root of desire in the unconscious is demonstrated [by Freud] in all its subtlety” 
(Écrits 223; see 4.4).  
Freud goes back to Plato’s Symposium (see 1.2), albeit in a complete inversion of 
the Platonic search for a transcendent ideal, in order to explain the inner human struggle 
                                                 
41
 Lacan says: “Castration is the altogether new mainspring Freud introduced into desire, giving desire’s 
lack the meaning that remained enigmatic in Socrates’ dialectic” (Écrits 723). 
42Although Lacan is greatly interested in Freud’s early discoveries–the Unconscious, transference, the 
sexual life of children–that are so fundamental for Lacanian thought, Lacan also draws on Freud’s later 
texts where Freud sought to write his insights into a stable psychoanalytic system. A Work like The Ego 
and the Id is, in many ways, the foil for the early Lacan in essays such as the “Mirror Stage.” 
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of desire. Variations of desire as wanting traverse Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
which condenses the Freudian ‘wish’ and ‘drive’ (Trieb), the latter crucially different 
from instinct.
43
 The Freudian drive implies that which is impossible to fulfil in its very 
naming.
44
 Significantly, however, the drive, a motivation tracing the human need for 
satisfaction, becomes, in (Lacanian) desire, a motivation tracing a human need for 
signification. As Zupancic points out, an important and eloquent distinction divides 
desire and drive: 
Desire sustains itself by remaining unsatisfied. As for the drive, the fact that it 
‘understands that this is not the way it will be satisfied’ does not stop it from 
finding satisfaction ‘elsewhere’. Thus, in contrast to desire, the drive sustains 
itself on the very fact that it is satisfied. (242) 
Freud formulates the conflict between the search for the irreducible origin of human 
desire and the realization of its lack in the struggle between life and death drives, or what 
Gavriel Reisner terms desire versus anti-desire (see introduction; 1.4.2; 4.3). Freud pits 
internal forces tending towards self-assertion on the one hand, against forces of self-
preservation: “an old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at 
one time or another departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths 
along which its development leads” (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 45). Ego-forces are 
primarily equated with the death drive, and sexual forces tally with life (52). The pleasure 
principle is thus in the midst of, on the one hand, reactionary, regressive forces whose 
compulsion to repeat mask the ultimate attempt at self-preservation self-annihilation 
expressed through the death-drive. On the other hand, the pleasure principle is fought for 
by the equally forceful life-forces (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 52). Freud describes 
the process of the death-drive, what could be construed as conceptually close to the 
Lacanian Imaginary demand (see 1.4.2), or what we have termed ‘the desire not to desire’ 
                                                 
43
 Lacan explains: “instinct . . .  is defined as a kind of [experiential] knowledge we admire because it 
cannot become knowledge. But in Freud’s work something quite different is at stake, which is a savoir 
certainly, but one that doesn’t involve the slightest connaissance, in that it is inscribed in a discourse of 
which the subject . . . knows neither the meaning nor the text” (Écrits 680).  
44
 Lacan's elusive descriptions foreground the transformations of desire as an elusive power: “it is precisely 
because desire is articulated that it is not articulable” (Écrits 681). Lacan states: “Freudianism hews a 
desire, the crux of which is essentially found in impossibilities” (Écrits 722). 
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in precise terms: “the dominating tendency of mental life, and perhaps of nervous life in 
general, is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to 
stimuli (the ‘Nirvana principle’ to borrow a term from Barbara Low [1920, 73] )  a 
tendency which finds expression in the pleasure principle” (Beyond The Pleasure 
Principle 67). Once more this description cannot but remind us of Leopardi’s atarassia 
and Beckett’s “suffering of being” (see 2.1). Amor proprio in Leopardi is thus, as 
Antonio Prete insists, not in contradiction with desire as a quest that struggles at the heart 
of Freudian drives (17). This discussion also unwittingly steers our course back into 
Schopenhauer’s harbour and Freud himself will quote Schopenhauer’s phrase that death 
is the “true result and to that extent the purpose of life,” while the sexual drive is the 
embodiment of the will to live” (Beyond the Pleasure Principle 59-60). The struggle 
between life and death drives is exposed most compellingly in the fragments of the 
narratives in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  
There are five narrative fragments: four narratives of return are aligned against a 
single narrative of advance. The narratives of return include the embracing-again of 
original pain. These regressive stories activate what Lacan will term the Imaginary in 
narrative enactments of the death drive (again echoing Leopardi’s atarassia) and they are 
all about the desire to return to an absence. The motivating force of the return is 
unconscious fear of desire as an infinite, self-regenerative force (desire).  
This anti-desire/desire conflict, an absence in presence, is palpable in the 
discovery of the fort/da game described in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where the 
symbolic presence of words is inextricably bound with an absence. As in Leopardi, 
whereby the emphasis in desire is not on the object desired but the sense of loss of what 
is no more, the same oscillation experienced in desiring what is no longer can be grafted 
onto desire of the sheer sense of nothingness as opposed to desire of the infinite: 
“L’orrore e il timore che l’uomo ha, per una parte, del nulla, per l’altra, dell’eterno” (“the 
horror and fear that the human being experiences, on the one hand, of nothingness, on the 
other, of the eternal”; Zibaldone 644,1; my translation).  
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   Leopardi’s combative poetic voices struggling to voice suffering through a 
cleaved subjectivity, as well as Beckett's attitude toward contemporary art where there is 
“nothing to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire to 
express, together with the obligation to express" (Three Dialogues 103), can be placed in 
the context of Lacan's understanding of Freudian discoveries on desire and language as 
interlaced with the unconscious. As the French psychoanalyst states: “By taking one’s 
bearings from the joint between the consequences of language and the desire for 
knowledge–a joint that the subject is–perhaps the paths will become more passable 
regarding what has always been known about the distance that separates the subject from 
his existence as a sexed being, not to mention as a living being” (Écrits 195). 
1.4 Lacanian Desire 
Lacan's desire, oriented in a field of language and the Law, and ordered in relation 
to the function of speech in its different forms (also in relation to slips, witticism and 
jokes, see 4.4), can be seen as pivotal in Leopardi’s tormented poetic voices and Beckett's 
dramatic characters who are ultimately prevented from attaining a reconciliation with 
their speech.
45
 In what echoes the Leopardian notion of desire superimposed on Freud’s 
second topography id-ego-superego, Lacan locates in the ego “[what] was already 
glimpsed by the traditional moralists, who called it amour-propre” (Écrits 355), only to 
                                                 
45
 According to the French psychoanalyst desire and language persistently return to a scene wherein 
conscious intentionality gives way to unconscious drives. The coexistence of desires and one’s ethical 
being create a split consciousness. The Lacanian registers of the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real orders of 
being can offer an explanation to the role of desire. In what is called the Mirror Stage, the Lacanian subject 
is split into “moi” and “je”. The "moi", emerges from two stages: the pre-mirror and the mirror stage. In the 
pre-mirror stage the infant identifies with the external world and has a fragmented body-Image. The mirror 
stage is characterized by the infant's identification with the primary caregiver. This is what Lacan refers to 
as the “transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image” (Écrits 76). The child 
now takes this perception of the (m)other as a reflection of her/himself. The infant therefore assumes an 
image based on a false recognition which situates "the agency known as the ego, prior to its social 
determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual" (Écrits 
76). The Infant's sense of being a unified self is thus based on the other with a lower case o, within the 
Imaginary Order. Language designates the period of the post-mirror stage, the child's transition from the 
Imaginary to the Symbolic Order. The mother as the primordial object of desire is now repressed to the 
infant’s unconscious. The object of its gratification is forbidden and the subject is hollowed by this 
prohibition into the perpetual non-being or “manqué d’être” we know as desire.  At this point, the principal 
agent of the Symbolic Order, the "Name-of-the-Father", is introduced as an Imperative to the child, the 
Other with a capital O. Language is therefore identified as negation: “the unconscious is the Other’s 
discourse” (Écrits 10).    
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assert the crucial rupture within that ego in its relation to one’s own body image, linking  
all objects of one’s desires to the other’s desire. 
1.4.1 The Freudian Model in Lacan  
The Freudian drive already enfolds an absence, which only becomes a readable 
presence in enunciation. Starting with Freud, the unconscious becomes a chain of 
signifiers that insists on interfering in the cuts offered by actual discourse. The most 
significant cut is the one that constitutes a bar between the signifier and the signified.
46
 
Lacan says: 
Following in Freud’s footsteps, I teach that the Other is the locus of the kind of 
memory he discovered by the name “unconscious,” memory that he regards as the 
object of a question that has remained unanswered, insofar as it conditions the 
indestructibility of certain desires. I will answer this question with the conception 
of the signifying chain, inasmuch as  once this chain has been inaugurated by 
primordial symbolization (made manifest in the Fort! Da! Game, which Freud 
elucidated as lying at the origin of repetition automatism)  it develops in 
accordance with logical connections whose hold on that which is to be signified, 
namely, the being of entities, is exerted through the signifying effects I describe 
as metaphor and metonymy. (Écrits 479)  
It is in the same vocalic connotation of presence and absence, the very foundations of 
Freud’s doctrine intuited in the Fort/Da game, that Lacan designates the discovery of the 
linguistic phoneme. Lacan writes:  
Through the word−already a presence made of absence−absence itself comes to 
be named in an original moment whose perpetual recreation Freud’s genius 
detected in a child’s game. And from this articulated couple of presence and 
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Language, says Lacan, is a concatenation of signifiers, “the signifier . . . [being] a unique unit of being 
which, by its very nature, is the symbol of but an absence” (Écrits 10). The signifier reigns in that “the 
unconscious is the fact that man is inhabited by the signifier” (Écrits 25). 
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absence . . . a language’s world of meaning is born, in which the world of things 
will situate itself. (Écrits 228)  
Lacan will amplify the absence-presence dyad in the context of the Freudian theory of 
condensation and displacement grafted onto the metaphor-metonymy axes unravelled by 
“playing on the multiple staves of the score that speech constitutes in the registers of 
language” (Écrits 241).47 This theory articulates what links metaphor to the question of 
being and metonymy to its lack.
48
 Desire is caught in metonymy, “eternally extending 
toward the desire for something else” (Écrits 431).  
The moment of the speaking I’s entrance into socially elaborated situations, 
“decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into being mediated by the other’s 
desire” (Lacan, Écrits 79). This moment reproposes the Freudian death-life struggle and 
is characterized by “primary narcissism” (Lacan, Écrits 79), on the one side, and the 
alienating I function, on the other.  But since the signifier is only a veil of the Other’s 
desire, it is the latter that the subject is required to recognize, that is the fact that he or she 
is a subject divided by the signifying splitting.
49
 Terry Eagleton explains it as follows: 
Desire is nothing personal. . . it is an affliction that was lying in wait for us from 
the outset, a tragic scenario which we inherit from our elders, a disfiguring 
medium into which we are plunged at birth. It is the ‘object in the subject’ which 
makes us what we are, an alien wedge at the core of our being . . . (143) 
                                                 
47
 Lacan says: “The form of mathematicization in which the discovery of the phoneme is inscribed, as a 
function of pairs of oppositions formed by the smallest graspable discriminative semantic elements, leads 
us to the very foundations that Freud’s final doctrine designates as the subjective sources of the symbolic 
function in a vocalic connotation of presence and absence” (Écrits 235).  
48
 Lacan says, “‘condensation’ is the superimposed structure of signifiers in which metaphor finds its field; 
its name . . . shows the mechanism’s connaturality with poetry . . . ‘displacement’  this transfer of 
signification that metonymy displays . . . is presented, right from its first appearance in Freud’s work, as the 
unconscious’ best means by which to foil censorship” (Écrits 425). He continues to say, “This signifying 
game of metonymy and metaphor  . . .  links my fate to the question of my destiny  this game is played, in 
its exorable subtlety, until the match is over, where I am not because I cannot situate myself there” (Écrits 
430).  
49
 The resultant lack-of-being contradicts the philosophy of being which concentrates on the conception of 
the self-sufficiency of consciousness. Lacan’s dichotomy is thus against, “the ego as centred on the 
perception-consciousness system or as organized by the ‘reality principle.’” On the contrary, Lacan 
professes “to take as our point of departure the function of misrecognition that characterizes the ego” 
(Écrits 80).  
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To be true to one’s desire is a fidelity to failure, since desire is an infinity which looms up 
in negative guise in the individual’s persistent failure to be gratified and in “signification 
[that] can be sustained . . . by reference to another signification” (Écrits 415). Such de-
centering of the subject will become central in the discussion of the Leopardian poetic 
voices and Beckett’s dramatic characters’ utterances in chapter three. In chapter four this 
de-centering of the subject becomes crucial with relation to humour and the death-life 
drives at its kernel, or what Lacan terms, “the frivolity of jokes–the specific joy of which, 
as Freud shows us on the basis of his technique, stems from the fact that they make us 
share the dominance of the signifier” (Écrits 372; see 4.4).   
1.4.2 Lacanian Demand and Desire: Anti-Desire and Desire 
Lacan makes important distinctions when he pits desire to what he terms 
‘demand’ and ‘need’. The difference between demand and desire (Reisner’s anti-desire 
against desire) is pivotal in the articulation of language. Ellie Ragland-Sullivan very 
succinctly defines demand as follows:  
In yet another turn of phrase, Lacan named demand “the metonymy of Desire.” 
All demand is an appeal for love and recognition from the Other (A). But demand 
is doomed to repeat itself in a circuitous manner because the Other’s Desire is 
alien, solitary and insatiable, a condition of absoluteness and detachment. (86) 
Desire is thus the Symbolic counterpart to Imaginary demand and Real need. But this 
demand for unity in, and by, the other can never be satisfied. Demand falls short of need: 
. . . it is in the oldest demand that primary identification is produced, the one that 
occurs on the basis of the mother’s omnipotence−namely, the one that not only 
makes the satisfaction of needs dependent upon the signifying apparatus, but also 
that fragments, filters and models those needs in the defiles of the signifier’s 
structure. Needs become subordinate to the same conventional conditions as does 
the signifier in its double register… (Écrits 517) 
33 
 
Desire thus emerges in the realization that needs and demands are not the same thing. In 
the Symbolic, comes the association of this impossible demand with the unconditional 
love desired represented by complete unity−that is, by a return to the Real.50 Lacan refers 
to this unconditional love as the objet petit a, defining it as “the absolute condition of 
desire” (Écrits 571). The past object that desire seeks, the objet petit a, is introduced by 
the impossibility of satisfaction.
51
 Desire emerges in the gap between demand and need 
(as the failure of demand to meet itself). Lacan explains:  
For the unconditionality of demand, desire substitutes the “absolute” condition: 
this condition in fact dissolves the element in the proof of love that rebels against 
the satisfaction of need. This is why desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction 
nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the 
first from the second, the very phenomenon of their splitting. (Écrits 580)   
Desire is the failure of demand to articulate itself in the Symbolic. It is the signifier that 
fails to articulate the signified. Demand is displaced by desire as the Symbolic “je” 
struggles against “moi.” Desire is that which fills the gap between the need for instinctual 
enjoyment and the demand that this need be filled by the (m)other. But in this, desire is 
always already determined by the Other. The cleavage between “moi” and the “je,” 
demand and desire is there to remain: “. . . the moi is the enemy of Desire. Desire, on the 
other hand, is insatiable and infinite” (Ragland-Sullivan 60). The moi’s desire is thus 
more akin to Imaginary anti-desire, the desire to cease desiring, the regressive move of 
Freudian death drive and Leopardi’s atarassia. The desire for recognition, on the other 
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 Introducing the phallus as the privileged signifier serving the function of signifying the lack of being, that 
by which “the Ancients embodied therein the Nous and the Logos” (Écrits 584), Lacan says: “The demand 
for love can only suffer from a desire whose signifier is foreign to it. If the mother’s desire is for the 
phallus, the child wants to be the phallus in order to satisfy her desire. Thus the division immanent in desire 
already makes itself felt by virtue of being experienced in the Other’s desire, in that this division already 
stands in the way of the subject being satisfied with presenting to the Other the real [organ] he may have 
that corresponds to the phallus; for what he has is no better than what he does not have, from the point of 
view of his demand for love, which would like him to be the phallus” (Écrits 582). 
51 In Seminar VII Lacan explains: “In daring to formulate a satisfaction that isn’t rewarded with a 
repression, the theme that is central or preeminent is, what is desire? . . . realizing one’s desire is 
necessarily always raised from the point of view of an absolute condition. It is precisely to the extent that 
the demand always under−or overshoots itself that, because it articulates itself through the signifier, it 
always demands something else . . . that the desire is formed as something supporting this metonymy, 
namely, as something the demand means beyond whatever it is able to formulate.” (Seminar VII 294) 
34 
 
hand, is the desire to be desired, itself linked to the desire to be a unity. Thus while 
demand is for and because of the other, desire is for and through the other. And as the 
Other is an ideal that can never be attained, desire will always remain unfulfilled. 
I argue that the Symbolic struggling against the dominant image of the Imaginary−the 
clash between desire and demand−proliferates in the chosen Beckettian plays as in the 
Leopardian poetic voices with the introduction of the O/other. In chapter three the 
founding moment of subjectivity in the Leopardian and Beckettian presentation of the 
desire of the O/other will be discussed (in comparison to the Levinasian notion) by 
revisiting Lacan’s “Mirror Stage,” “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” and “The Function 
and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis.” 
1.5 Levinas and the Desire of the Other 
Levinas’ concepts of desire evolve in stages. Time and the Other, where Levinas 
is still deeply phenomenological in method, introduces the basic premise that the subject 
is constituted in the intervention of the Other.
52
 In this early work, to which I refer in the 
analysis of Happy Days in 3.4, the epitome of alterity and otherness, as it will partially be 
the case for Leopardi in, for instance, “Alla sua donna,” is the feminine (3.2). In Totality 
and Infinity the notion of desire is taken into the choppy domain of ethics.
53
 Levinas’s 
discussion of subjectivity takes the form of an attack on totality, which he posits against a 
redefined notion of a prophetic ethical ‘metaphysics.’54 Otherwise Than Being further 
abstracts and theorizes the primacy of the ethical approach. In this section I discuss 
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 In Time and the Other, time is that which constitutes the subject in its inter-subjectivity. The structure of 
the subject as “by” the other (though not yet “for” the other) is set out and the relation with the other person 
is construed as the starting point in the subject’s attempt to overcome the limits of death. 
53
 The central term “infinity,” is explicitly borrowed from Descartes’ Meditations, where it referred to the 
divine–which “dazzled” the Cartesian ego. Levinas explains: “For the Cartesian cogito is discovered, at the 
end of the Third Meditation, to be supported on the certitude of the divine existence qua infinite, by relation 
to which the finitude of the cogito, or the doubt, is posited and conceivable. This finitude could not be 
determined without recourse to the infinite, as is the case in the moderns, for whom finitude is, for 
example, determined on the basis of the mortality of the subject” (TI 210). Descartes, says Levinas, 
“discovers a relation with a total alterity irreducible to interiority, which nevertheless does not do violence 
to interiority−a receptivity without passivity, a relation between freedoms” (TI 211). 
54
 What I mean by prophetic in this context is that Levinas’s work comes out of a tradition of Judaic 
thought that takes seriously the social voice of the Hebrew prophets. On more than one count, in the 
background of Levinas’s vision, particularly in his last works, is the attempt to voice the original call to 
goodness of God’s commandments. Clearly, I do not take my argument this far.  
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Levinas’ conceptions of need, desire, eros and related topics in Time and the Other 
(1946-47), Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise Than Being (1974), themes that 
project their shadows on each other. 
1.5.1 Metaphysical Desire versus Need 
The distinction between desire and need is central to Levinas: “desire is an 
aspiration that the Desirable animates . . . need is a void of the Soul; it proceeds from the 
subject” (Totality and Infinity 62). Need indicates the insufficiency of the needy. Need, 
however, is not simply lack because “the human being thrives on his needs” (TI 114).  
 In Platonic terms, need is not the heavenly Eros but the vulgar Venus (TI 114). 
The satisfaction of need for Levinas has no relationship to the divine. This in spite of the 
fact that metaphysics is mostly built on a structure of need in a quest to reunite the same 
with the other. Until union has been attained, there is disquietude as nostalgia (TI 102). In 
Plato’s philosophy, Levinas finds, “the Good [that] is Good in itself and not by relation to 
the need to which it is wanting” (TI 102-03).  
Desire in Levinas is thus for that which transcends the ‘I.’ It is metaphysical 
desire that “tends toward something else entirely, toward the absolutely other” (TI 33). 
Metaphysical desire is “desire [that] does not coincide with an unsatisfied need; it is 
situated beyond satisfaction and non-satisfaction. The relationship with the Other, or the 
idea of Infinity, accomplishes it” (TI 179). In Leopardi’s “La Ginestra” and Beckett’s 
Endgame and Happy Days I argue that the individual is, through the presence of the 
bruising strangeness of the other, confronted with the Sublime Infinite as an 
overwhelming force, and as in Levinas, the individual is challenged to redirect desire 
towards the other person.
55
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 The Sublime infinite in “L’Infinito” is ultimately sweet and positive but the Universe and the Sublime 
Infinite hinted at through that universe in “La Ginestra” are negative. On the Sublime in Leopardi, Daniela 
Bini says the following: “The idea of infinity, as a source of sublime, that emerges from Burke’s passages 
is of an irrational type, which can be found only in Leopardi’s early phase. ‘No passion so effectually robs 
the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear,’ wrote Burke. It is difficult to imagine the poet of 
“La Ginestra” to agree with such a statement…in Leopardi’s sublime there is a component of pain, but it is 
of a metaphysical type. It is the suffering of a soul who sees the evil of reality through the eyes of reason. 
… The feeling of pain in Leopardi is a consequence of an act of reason, whereas in Burke it is the means 
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1.5.2 Metaphysical Desire, Transcendence, Infinity and Height 
Metaphysical desire is thus instigated by the non- in-difference of one to another. 
Levinas explains: “the transcendence of the Other . . . accounts for freedom” (TI 225). 
This transcendence is, once again, manifested positively: “passing over to being’s other, 
otherwise than being” (OTB 3).56 It is separation with regard to the Infinite: “Desire 
which does not arise from a lack or a limitation but from a surplus, from the idea of 
Infinity” (TI 210). 57  
This relation is already fixed in the situation described by Descartes, and quoted 
by Levinas, where “the ‘I think’ maintains with the Infinite it can nowise contain and 
from which it is separated a relation called ‘idea of infinity’” (TI 48). Levinas states: “. . . 
infinity overflows the thought that thinks it” (TI 25).58 The idea of infinity revealed, but 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
which keeps reason away” (157). This argument is opposed by a number of critics most prominently by 
Bortolo Martinelli in his 2003 book Leopardi; Tra Leibniz e Locke. 
56
 Transcendence has multiple meanings in Levinas. A transcendental phenomenology, for instance, is 
characterized by sensation and by things encountered in the light. The light that makes a thing appear, 
however, drives out the shadows and thus empties space. Thus a thing is encountered in the light as much 
as the thing is encountered in nothingness. For Levinas to comprehend a particular being is “to apprehend it 
out of an illuminated site it does not fill” (Totality and Infinity 190). Indeed in driving out darkness, the 
light does not arrest the incessant play of what he calls the there is (see 2.5). Yet vision in the light is 
precisely the possibility of forgetting the horror of the there is (see 2.5). This deliverance from the horror of 
the there is is evinced in the contentment of enjoyment. Levinas, however, emphasizes, “Vision is not a 
transcendence. It ascribes a signification by the relation it makes possible . . . Light conditions the relations 
between data; it makes possible the signification of objects that border one another. It does not enable one 
to approach them face to face . . . Vision is a forgetting of the there is because of the essential satisfaction, 
the agreeableness of sensibility, enjoyment, contentment with the finite without concern for the infinite” (TI 
191). The transcendence I will be interested in, particularly in the analysis of Endgame, is described by 
Levinas: “If the transcendent cuts across sensibility, if it is openness preeminently, if its vision is the vision 
of the very openness of being, it cuts across the vision of forms and can be stated neither in terms of 
contemplation nor in terms of practice. It is the face; its revelation is speech” (TI 193). 
57
 Levinas explains: “The Infinite then cannot be tracked down like game by a hunter. The trace left by the 
infinite is not the residue of a presence; its very glow is ambiguous. Otherwise, its positivity would not 
preserve the infinity of the infinite any more than negativity would” (OTB 12). 
58
 Descartes comes in once more whereby, as Levinas states, “The knowing of the cogito thus refers to a 
relation with the Master−with the idea of infinity or of the Perfect. The idea of Infinity is neither the 
immanence of the I think nor the transcendence of the object.
”
 The movement of the Cartesian cogito is a 
movement of descent toward the ever more profound abyss of the “there is” (see 2.6). Levinas says that 
Descartes in this manner enters into a work of infinite negation which is “a movement unto the abyss, 
vertiginously sweeping along the subject incapable of stopping itself” (TI 93). Levinas says that the ‘I’ in 
negativity breaks with participation but it does not find in the cogito a stopping place. Descartes, according 
to Levinas, “gauge[s] in advance the return of affirmation behind the negation” (TI 93). What Levinas adds, 
however, to this Cartesian thought is that “to possess the idea of infinity is to have already welcomed the 
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not disclosed, through the other person who is Other is argued for in “La Ginestra,” 
Endgame and Happy Days (see 3.2; 3.3; 3.4).  
Once it recognizes its material needs, the ‘I’ can turn to what it does not lack. It 
distinguishes the material from the spiritual, and opens to desire. This requires discourse 
antecedent to which is the other’s ‘Height’ (see 3.3). The Other is the poor one who 
presents him or herself as an equal. His equality within this essential poverty is 
paradoxically also a commandment (and thus the idea of Height): “The Other qua Other 
is situated in a dimension of height and of abasement−glorious abasement; he has the face 
of the poor, the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, and, at the same time, of the master 
called to invest and justify my freedom” (TI 251). Levinas explains: “This command can 
concern me only inasmuch as I am master myself; consequently this command 
commands me to command. The thou is posited in front of a we (TI 213). In “La 
Ginestra”, the thou is posited in the appeal to form a social chain against the far too 
powerful surrounding Nature. In Endgame and Happy Days this power lies in the 
overwhelmingly confined setting of the dark basement and the sucking mound 
respectively, the latter blocking Winnie who can “no longer turn, nor bow, nor raise” 
(CDW 160). I argue that in all three situations, the presence of the other person has bound 
the self before it can enter into any contractual system of language and exchange. I argue 
that the self is, in these literary works, always already for-the-other. The poetic voice’s 
appeal to reach out to the other in “La Ginestra” and the presence of Hamm, Nagg and 
Willie as Other could be construed as coming from a dimension of height, albeit without 
opposing the ‘I’ as obstacle or enemy; without an attempt to ‘totalize’ the other.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Other” (TI 93). It is the other who can offer that stopping place for the cogito. Levinas explains: “In 
returning to the Cartesian notion of infinity, the “idea of infinity” put in the separated being by the infinite, 
we retain its positivity, its anteriority to every finite thought and every thought of the finite” (TI 197). 
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1.5.3 Totality 
‘Totality’ in Levinas expresses the mode of depriving the being of its alterity.59 
Levinas explains that ‘Totality’ is usually achieved through, “A third term, a neutral term, 
which itself is not a being. . . It may appear as Being distinguished from the existent . . . 
the light in which existents become intelligible. To theory as comprehension of beings the 
general title ontology is appropriate” (TI 42). 
 In chapter three I argue that Winnie (but also Clov) are initially neutralized as an 
object appearing by taking their place in the light (see 3.3; 3.4). The neutralization in the 
light is equivalent to being reduced to same: “To broach an existent from Being is 
simultaneously to let it be and to comprehend it . . . – wholly light and phosphorescence” 
(TI 45). Clearly Levinas is countering Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, particularly the 
Heideggerian theses professed in Being and Time (see 2.5; 3.1).
60
 Levinas rebuts that the 
relation with the Other cannot be subordinated to ontology: “In subordinating every 
relation with existents to the relation with Being the Heideggerian ontology affirms the 
primacy of freedom over ethics” (TI 45). 
1.5.4 The Ethics of the face-to-face and The Rupture of Subjectivity: 
Alterity 
Levinas calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology through the 
ethical encounter found in the face-to-face. The discussion of the face does not revolve 
around the materiality of skin or features, but it is more the “epiphany” (TI 262) of the 
face that denudes a principle: “we can proceed from the experience of totality back to a 
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 Alterity is the unidentifiable. Its sense is the unilateral direction of an approach, caught in a being 
ordered. The structure of the experience of alterity can be expressed in terms of temporality, which is the 
internal format of subjectivity. The openness by which subjectivity opens to things is itself opened by the 
internal scission of the instant of its presence, the internal movement of its moment whereby it does not 
hold itself together in utter identity, but splits, gets out of phase with itself, and clings to itself despite this 
fission. This creates a gaping open of itself and a clinging on to itself. The present instant is extended by a 
past which it cannot catch up with or coincide with or represent. 
60
 In Otherwise Than Being he says: “Phenomenality, the exhibition of being’s essence in truth, is a 
permanent presupposition of the philosophical tradition of the West” (132). It is specifically this notion that 
he attacks in this work (see 2.5). 
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situation where totality breaks up, a situation that conditions the totality itself. Such a 
situation is the gleam of exteriority or of transcendence in the face of the Other” (TI 24).  
The primordial expression in the face of the Other states: “you shall not commit 
murder” (TI 199). The infinite gleams in the face of the Other, “in the total nudity of his 
defenseless eyes” (TI 199).61 Here Levinas’ thought represents a return to what is 
ultimately central to Leopardian ethics, and which imbues Beckett’s drama, namely the 
emphasis on the weak, needy, afflicted human body that calls out for compassion.   
As mentioned above, Levinas reacts to Heidegger’s notion of subjectivity as a 
function of Being (see 2.5): “subjectivity, consciousness, the ego presuppose Dasein, 
which belongs to essence” (OTB 17). Levinas insists on the beyond ‘essence,’ the 
“otherwise than being” (OTB 18), expressed as infinity. The subject, in what we refer to 
below as ‘Saying,’ is presented as a sensibility. Subjectivity in Levinas thus becomes 
structured as responsibility and has an antecedent and autonomous structure.
62
 It is in the 
incarnation of consciousness that subjectivity is exposed to the exterior and committed to 
alterity.
 63
 In “La Ginestra,” Endgame and Happy Days the protagonists, obliged and thus 
subjected with regard to the neighbour, are the breaking-point but also the binding place, 
where, ‘essence’ is exceeded by the infinite. In its being, subjectivity thus undoes 
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 The discussion about the eyes will be dealt with in the analysis of Endgame where the resistance through 
the eyes is the ethical resistance which gauges the temptation to ‘totalize’ the other and in reaction opens up 
to the infinite. This, I argue, is the notion of Infinity in the background of Endgame, an infinity that 
counters the notion of nothingness. 
62
 Levinas states “Subjectivity of flesh and blood in matter– the signifyingness of sensibility, the-one-for-
the-other itself– is the preoriginal signifyingness that gives sense, because it gives . . . diachrony of 
sensibility, which cannot be assembled in a representational present, refers to an irrecuperable pre-
ontological past, that of maternity.” (OTB 78). In Levinas’ early work, fecundity is crucial: “a personal 
relation, though it be not given to the “I” as a possibility” (TI 57). Fecundity is, “the movement of the lover 
before this frailty of femininity, neither pure compassion nor impassiveness, indulges in compassion, is 
absorbed in the complacence of the caress” (TI 257). The notion of the ‘caress,’ which Levinas describes as 
that which “transcends the sensible . . . the desire that animates it is reborn in its satisfaction, fed somehow 
by what is not yet” (TI 257-58), becomes particularly determining, together with the notion of the maternal, 
in my reading of Happy Days. In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas abstracts the relation between the I and 
the Other and rather than fecundity and the erotic, the emphasis is on the ‘I’ desiring what it does not lack 
through the Other’s approach. The notion of the maternal is still, however, umbilical. Where in Totality and 
Infinity the feminine stood as a testament to the other’s distance, in Otherwise than Being, the maternal is 
the metaphor for the ‘I’ that marks this state of giving as the foundational mode of the subject’s coming to 
be. 
63
 Before being a devotion to Being, subjectivity is a subjection to the Good. The Good is not the correlate 
of an axiological option or valorization. Subjectivity in Levinas is a subjection to the force of alterity, 
which demands goodness.   
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‘essence’ by substituting itself for another and in this act it is absorbed in signification, 
the ‘saying’ or the verb form of the infinite.  
The one-for-the-other in the ego, also called Hospitality (see 3.3), delivers this 
for-the-other passively. Against ontological philosophy, which accounts for subjectivity 
as a locus engendered by the inner movement of Being, Levinas thus proposes 
subjectivity as the locus where alterity makes contact.  
1.5.5 The Ethicality of Discourse: The ‘Saying’ over the ‘Said’ 
The surpassing of phenomenal or inward existence lies in expressing oneself, 
through which one serves the Other. Levinas says: “In the approach of a face the flesh 
becomes word, the caress a saying” (OTB 94). The ethical relationship which subtends 
discourse “is not a species of consciousness whose ray emanates from the I; it puts the I 
in question” (TI 195). Discourse thus presents itself as justice: “language is justice” (TI 
213) and “Justice is a right to speak” (TI 298). The ethical dimension of conversation and 
the centrality of justice recall Leopardi’s “conversar cittadino, / E giustizia e pietade,” in 
“La Ginestra” (see 3.2) where addressing the other has the same Levinasian function of 
strengthening the ‘I’ by opening it to the other. 
Justice in Levinas, but this I argue is also the case in “La Ginestra” and in 
Endgame, is incorporated in the desire of the Other which, despite being by essence 
murderous (in Leopardi the relation with the other is a clear source of suffering), is faced 
with the other as the impossibility of murder: “Language, source of all signification, is 
born in the vertigo of infinity, which takes hold before the straightforwardness of the 
face, making murder possible and impossible” (TI 262). The ethical relation in Levinas, 
as in “La Ginestra” and in Endgame, “is imposed upon the ‘I’ beyond all violence by a 
violence that calls it entirely into question” (TI 47).  
The orientation toward the Other in “La Ginestra” and Endgame is thus found, as 
in Levinas, in the relationship of conversation: “In the concrete the positive face of the 
formal structure, having the idea of infinity, is discourse, specified as an ethical relation” 
(TI 80). To approach the Other in conversation is to escape dissolution into the Neuter, a 
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similar concept to the one Leopardi expressed as the threat that the individual disappears 
within the masses (see 3.2).    
But Levinas takes the relation with the Other a step further in that he equates it to 
teaching: “this conversation is a teaching . . . it comes from the exterior and brings me 
more than I contain” (51). Levinas proceeds to describe an early definition of ‘Saying’ as 
opposed to ‘Said’ “which consists in continually undoing its phrase by the foreword or 
the exegesis, in unsaying the said, in attempting to restate without ceremonies what has 
already been ill understood in the inevitable ceremonial in which the said delights” (TI 
30). The Saying measures the pre-ontological weight of language.
64
 The Said, on the 
other hand, is the birthplace of ontology.
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The other person’s radical and irreducible alterity, pushed into the domain of 
language, becomes the Saying which disrupts and gives sense to the Said (see 3.1). It is 
because language now depends first on one-being-for-the-other, Saying, that there is 
meaning, the Said, and time, the future and the past. 
In chapter three I argue that the Saying is what binds the social catena in 
Leopardi’s “La Ginestra,” and is also what irrevocably binds Clov to Hamm, Nell to 
Nagg and Winnie to Willie. Hamm, Nagg and Willie come to wound the subject so that 
Clov, Nell and Winnie expose themselves in their saying.
66
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 Saying is never present in the Said, for the Said is already caught within the economy of truth. Saying, 
like the erotic, hides while uncovering and enters the Said otherwise than the vibration of the Said: it is 
traced in the Said−the pure future−as the disruption to which the egoist subject passively submits in a 
vulnerability it can never recuperate−the immemorial past. It is a matter of elaborating more precisely what 
is meant by ‘the trace of the Other,’ by the meaningfulness of the plasticity of the face, by the proximity of 
the Other, the non- in-difference, the for-the-other, the expression and command, the responsibility to 
respond to the Other, the Saying of the Said, the diachrony or emphasis. 
65
The Said is the intelligibility of system and synchrony as opposed to the Saying which is the intelligibility 
of signifyingness itself, which is asymmetry and diachrony: “The saying extended toward the said is a 
being obsessed by the other, a sensibility which the other by vocation calls upon and where no escaping is 
possible. . . . The other calls upon that sensibility with a vocation that wounds, calls upon an irrevocable 
responsibility, and thus the very identity of a subject (OTB 77). 
66
 Levinas’ second major work, Otherwise than Being, explores the intertwining of the Said and the Saying 
with time: “The entity that appears identical in the light of time is its essence in the already said. The 
phenomenon itself is a phenomenology. It is not that a discourse, coming from one knows not where, 
arbitrarily arranges the phases of temporality into a ‘this as that.’ The very exposition of Being, its 
manifestation, essence qua essence and entities qua entities, are spoken. It is only in the said, in the epos of 
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1.5.6 Time as the Postponement of Death and the Good beyond Being  
Levinas focuses on the time structure of this ethical orientation-non-in-difference. 
He proposes that the relation with the Other has to enable the discontinuity of inner life 
so as to interrupt historical time. He states: “the discontinuity of Cartesian time, which 
requires a continuous creation, indicates the very dispersion and plurality of created 
being” (TI 58).67 Time is indeed defined by Levinas as “the postponement of death” (TI 
232), in its being, “the mode of existence and reality of a separated being that has entered 
into relation with the Other” (TI 232). The centrality of the otherness of death, 
particularly the way this otherness is counterpoised to the “nihilation of nothingness” (TI 
234), is discussed in both the analyses of Endgame and Happy Days. The extraordinary 
everydayness of one’s responsibility for other persons is also the being without regard for 
death, a clear opposition to the Heideggerean being-toward-death (see 2.5). Levinas 
explains: “In the being for death of fear I am not faced with nothingness, but faced with 
what is against me . . . as though the approach of death remained one of the modalities of 
the relation with the Other” (TI 234).68 In this light the ‘I’ wills in a non-egoist manner, a 
will that flows into the essence of desire.  
The Good has thus chosen the ‘I’ before the ‘I’ could choose it.69 Levinas is fond 
of recalling, in this regard, Plato’s words, “the Good beyond Being,” a good in itself and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
saying, that the diachrony of time is not added to the identical entities it exposes; it exposes them as 
identities illuminated by a memorable temporality” (37).  
67
 He continues to say: “In its temporalization, in which, thanks to retention, memory and history, nothing 
is lost, everything is presented or represented, everything is consigned and lends itself to inscription, or is 
synthetized or, as Heidegger would say, assembled, in which everything is crystallized or sclerosized into 
substance−in the recuperating temporalization, without time lost, without time to lose, and where the being 
of substance comes to pass− there must be signalled a lapse of time that does not return, a diachrony 
refractory to all synchronization, a transcending diachrony. . . . But if time is to show an ambiguity of being 
and the otherwise than being, its temporalization is to be conceived not as essence, but as saying.” (OTB 9-
10). 
68
 In Otherwise Than Being Levinas goes on to say: “The ‘deepest’ level of life−that of vulnerability and 
susceptibility to pleasure and pain− is taken to be constituted not by a relationship with death, a relationship 
of being with nothingness, but by a relationship with alterity” (xvi). 
69
 Levinas explains: “The negativity of this anarchy, this refusal of the present, of appearing, of the 
immemorial, commands me and ordains me to the other . . . It thus diverges from nothingness as well as 
from being” (OTB 11). The immemorial is the impossibility of the dispersion of time to assemble itself in 
the present, the insurmountable diachrony of time, a beyond to the said.
 
It is interesting to point out that the 
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not by relation to need. Levinas chooses to quote from Phaedrus, “the value of the 
delirium that comes from God, ‘winged thought’ ” (TI 49). He also specifies, however, 
that desire does not coincide with love as analyzed by Plato and the basic difference 
between the two is that “immortality is not the objective of the first movement of Desire, 
but the other, the Stranger” (TI 63).70 Understood in these terms, the idea of Infinity is 
produced as Desire for the Infinite, “which the desirable arouses rather than satisfies. A 
desire perfectly disinterested goodness” (TI 50). As Levinas explains: “The soul . . . 
dwells in what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling in the ‘other’ 
(and not logically, by opposition to the other)” (TI 115). The other provokes 
responsibility against my will by substituting me for the other as a hostage. One finds 
oneself by being accused. 
1.5.7 On Being Accused, Suffering and Substitution 
It is on being accused that the ‘I’ is singled out in the accusative “declined before 
any declension, possessed by the other” (OTB 142). The subject is described as a self, 
from the first in the accusative form:
71
 “It is the obsession by the other, my neighbour, 
accusing me of a fault which I have not committed freely . . .” (OTB 92).72 This is the 
Saying, a passive exposure to being, an exposure to death–invisible, premature and 
violent. I refer to this exposure to death and the idea of being accused in the exposure to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Sovereign Good of the Greeks is referred to by Lacan as that which acts as “anti-weight” to the ego, the 
“amour propre  the subject experiences as contentment in his pleasures, insofar as a look at this Good 
renders these pleasures less respectable” (Écrits 647). 
70
 Levinas says: “The myth Aristophanes tells in Plato’s Symposium, in which love reunites the two halves 
of one sole being, interprets the adventure as a return to self” (TI 254). According to Levinas, however, “To 
love is to fear for another, to come to the assistance of his frailty. In this frailty, as in the dawn, rises the 
Loved, who is the Beloved” (TI 256). 
71
 It has to be underscored that the term ‘accusative’ is specifically used by Beckett. In both the fourth Text 
for Nothing, first published in English in 1959, and the poem ‘Sanies I’, written in the early thirties, Beckett 
chooses to interpolate the term ‘accusative.’ The term is taken outside its purely grammatical sense while 
also creating an intertextual network. The word becomes a particularly Beckettian joining of guilt to 
grammar. In Endgame I use the term accusative in the Levinasian sense without the specifically Beckettian 
meaning attributed to this word in the above-mentioned texts. 
72
 Levinas goes on to say: “In obsession the accusation effected by categories turns into an absolute 
accusative in which the ego proper to free consciousness is caught up. It is an accusation without 
foundation, to be sure, prior to any movement of the will, an obsessional and persecuting accusation. It 
strips the ego of its pride and the dominating imperialism characteristic of it. The subject is in the 
accusative, without recourse in being, expelled from being, outside of being” (OTB 110). 
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the Other in both the analysis of Endgame and Happy Days (3.3; 3.4). The passivity of 
the subject in saying is “suffering in the offering of oneself” (OTB 54). 
 In the offering of oneself lies uniqueness of the chosen one, a traumatic 
uniqueness. Levinas calls this being chosen without assuming the choice “goodness 
despite itself” (OTB 57). Subjectivity can be pitted against consciousness because, as 
Levinas states, “. . . subjectivity is not called . . . to take the role and place of the 
indeclinable transcendental consciousness . . . It is set up as it were in the accusative 
form, from the first responsible and not being able to slip away” (OTB 85).  
As I argue in chapter three, in patience, the ‘I’ endures violence from the other 
without, however, sinking into the nothingness that reduces time to the purely subjective: 
“it is produced only in a world where I can die as a result of someone and for someone in 
patience the will breaks through the crust of its egoism and . . . displaces its centre of 
gravity outside of itself, to will as Desire and Goodness limited by nothing” (TI 239). I 
argue that Suffering becomes sufferable in Leopardi and Beckett specifically because the 
I is ruptured but simultaneously ready for substitution.
73
 Levinasian ethics is echoed in 
the chosen works of Leopardi and Beckett in the way that ethics itself,
74
 as Critchley 
says, “. . . is critique. It is the putting into question of the liberty, spontaneity and 
cognitive emprise of the ego that seeks to reduce all otherness to itself. Ethics is the 
location of a point of otherness” (Cambridge Companion to Levinas 15).  
This is the concept of suffering for the other I argue for in “La Ginestra,” 
Endgame and Happy Days−a suffering that is not focused on stilling desire as is the case 
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 Substitution is conceived as maternal support for the material destitution of another: “the immemorable 
past that has not crossed the present, the positing of the self as a deposing of the ego, less than nothing as 
uniqueness, difference with respect to the other as non-indifference” (OTB 58). Levinas says: “Subjectivity 
is from the first substitution offered in place of another, but before the distinction between freedom and 
non-freedom. . . . It is the null-place in which inspiration by the other is also expiation for the other, the 
psyche by which consciousness itself would come to signify. The psyche is not grafted on to a substance, 
but alters the substantiality of this substance which supports all things. It alters it with an alteration in 
which identity is brought out” (OTB 146). 
74
 As Levinas states “ethics is no longer a simple moralism of rules which decree what is virtuous. It is the 
original awakening of an ‘I’ responsible for the other; the accession of my person to the uniqueness of the I 
called and elected to responsibility for the other” (Is it Righteous to Be? 182). 
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in the Beckettian “suffering of being” or Leopardian “souffrance,” to which, before 
delving into the textual analyses, we first need to turn  
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Chapter 2  
2 A Perennially Dull and Indistinct Pain: “Vain Longing that 
Vain Longing Go” 
“He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” Ecclesiastes I:18 
In this chapter I first compare the Leopardian “souffrance” and the Beckettian 
“suffering of being,” in both cases a pain which is interwoven with the desire to cease 
desiring. Leopardi’s and Beckett's work is extensively concerned with giving expression 
to the “ablation of desire,” (Proust 18), a state which exposes the agonizing human kernel 
in its essence.  
A word is at the outset necessary in order to explain why “souffrance” and 
“suffering of being,” and the urge to suspend insatiable craving, have respectively led to 
these two writers’ collocation within the pessimist, nihilist, and some branches of the 
existentialist traditions. I elucidate “souffrance” and “suffering of being” in relation to 
these three traditions and prepare the terrain for the main argument in chapters three and 
four where it is my contention that, despite the fact that the two writers’ philosophical 
outlooks spring from such traditions, neither Leopardi nor Beckett is simply a pessimist, 
a nihilist or an existentialist. Keeping in mind Beckett's own warning against “the 
neatness of identifications” (Disjecta 19), the claim here is not that Leopardi and Beckett 
are non-this or anti-that negative school of thought or that they try to overcome nihilism, 
pessimism or existentialism (in Leopardi’s case ante-litteram). What is being proposed is 
that despite the crucial abrogation of desire−and the specter of nothingness that haunts 
their oeuvres−Leopardi and Beckett acknowledge the irreducible quality of human desire 
and it is through such acknowledgement that resistance can be evinced.
75
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 It has to be pointed out that despite Beckett’s reading of Leopardi, where the emphasis clearly lies on the 
Italian poet’s proposal to extinguish the flame of desire, Leopardi indeed theorizes endlessly about the 
infinity of desire, the contradiction between the impulse to fulfillment and unconditional happiness and the 
reality of “souffrance.” When considered within the entire corpus of his work, on relatively few occasions 
does Leopardi advocate the removal of desire. In Leopardi, on the contrary, the attempted removal of desire 
47 
 
Beckett calls this irreducible desire in Worstward Ho the “vain longing that vain 
longing go” (481), an endeavor that meanders through several thinkers, most important 
for this context being the ataraxia of Stoic Ethics, Leopardian atarassia and 
Schopenhaur’s negation of the will. “Souffrance” and “suffering of being,” in their turn, 
could be compared, at least to a degree, to the quintessential underlying truth of aletheia 
in Martin Heidegger as well as the state of existing without existents in the Levinasian il 
y a. Nonetheless, the previously-mentioned sage and his knowledge acquired through 
desirelessness (see introduction), become incommunicable, ineffective and impossible 
and this is the situation Leopardi and Beckett affirm in their maturity. The ascetic is just 
as likely to be embittered (and in Leopardi bored) as exhilarated by his attempt to lose 
desire.  
2.1 “Souffrance” and “Suffering of being” 
While there are clear differences between what the “suffering of being” and 
“souffrance” imply, and the latter will be partially juxtaposed to atarassia and specific 
notions of noia in order to approach the meaning ascribed to the “suffering of being,” the 
two terms also share important common ground.  
In Leopardi, “souffrance” is directly proportional to the individual’s sensitivity 
(see 1.2.1). The sensitive being strives to escape the trappings of civilization and in this 
estrangement the creative power of the imagination is enhanced.
76
 Leopardi specifically 
states that the creative power is enhanced by stilling all the passions: 
Il poeta nel colmo dell’entusiasmo della passione ec. non è poeta, cioé non è in 
grado di poetare. All’aspetto della natura, mentre tutta l’anima sua è occupata 
dall’immagine dell’infinito, mentre le idee segli affollano al pensiero, egli non è 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
often leads, I argue in this chapter, to boredom, which is not the absence of desire but desire in its purest 
state−desire of desiring despite the lack of an object of desire (See 2.1). 
76
 This nucleus of Leopardian thought can be reconnected to one of the most famous idéologues, that is 
Pierre-Georges Cabanis, Rapports du physique et du moral de l’homme, I, 142. All the debate around the 
development of the idéologues, from Destutt de Tracy to Maine de Biran, is present in the Leopardian 
analysis of passions (see 1.2.1). 
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capace di distinguere, di scegliere, di afferrarne veruna: in somma non è capace di 
nulla, né di cavare nessun frutto dalle sue sensazioni: dico nessun frutto o di 
considerazione e di massima, ovvero di uso e di scrittura; di teoria né di pratica. 
L’infinito non si può esprimere se non quando non si sente. (Zibaldone 714,1), 
At the height of enthusiasm brought about by passion, the poet is not a poet, that 
is, he is not able to produce poetry. At the sight of nature when all his soul is 
entranced by images that evoke the infinite, when ideas crowd his thoughts, the 
poet is unable to distinguish, to choose, to capture any of these ideas: in short he 
is unable to produce anything, or to bring any of his sensations to fruition: I 
emphasize the lack of fruitfulness of this situation both with relation to the theory 
and the practice of writing. The infinite cannot be expressed if not when it is not 
felt. (my translation). 
This longed-for stillness comes close to the Stoic ataraxia (see 2.3.1), or Leopardian 
atarassia (see 1.2.1) best described as: “non c’è maggior piacere (né maggior felicità) 
nella vita che il non sentirla” (“there is no greater pleasure [nor greater happiness] in life 
than that of not being able to feel it”; Zibaldone 3895; my translation]). Leopardi’s 
atarassia, however, has to be oxymoronically tinged by “souffrance,” in order to 
approach Beckett’s “suffering of being” in its potential artistic attainment. As Leopardi 
says, the notion of infinity is conveyed by that which is specifically finite (clearly 
prefiguring Levinasian thought) and in this oxymoronic twist it evokes a sensation of 
pleasure, but also of pungent pain (see 1.2.1): “Tutto ciò che è finito . . . desta sempre 
naturalmente nell’uomo un sentimento di dolore . . . Nel tempo stesso eccita un 
sentimento piacevole . . . e ciò a causa dell’infinità dell’idea che si contiene in queste 
parole finito, ultimo” (“All that is finite . . . always naturally evokes in the human being a 
sentiment of pain . . . Concomitantly, it excites a pleasant sentiment . . . and this is due to 
the infinity of the idea contained in the words finite, ultimate”; Zibaldone 2251,1; my 
translation). 
Beckett’s “suffering of being,” however, cannot be neatly grafted onto atarassia 
oxymoronically tinged by “souffrance” and, if anything, it recalls another notion 
49 
 
Leopardi would delve into−noia. Noia has more than one meaning and while it refers to 
the boredom of existence, its revised version connotes a sense of the euphoric and 
terrifying Burkean Sublime (see 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 3.2). Beckett’s “suffering of being” evokes 
noia in all its nuance.  
On the one hand, then, the “suffering of being” connotes the degree zero of 
feeling expressed by noia: “la noia non è altro che il vuoto dell’anima, ch’ è riempito, . . . 
da quel pensiero, e occupato intieramente per quel punto” (“noia denotes nothing but the 
emptiness of the soul, which is filled up . . . by that thought, and entirely occupied for 
that end”; Zibaldone 88,2; my translation). In another excerpt Leopardi states, “anche il 
dolore che nasce dalla noia e dal sentimento della vanità delle cose è più tollerabile assai 
che la stessa noia” (“Even suffering that is born out of noia and the general vanity of 
things is indeed more tolerable than noia itself”; 72,2; my translation).77 Here noia stills 
the subject of all tension, as Leopardi further explains in the entry dated September 30, 
1821: “La noia è la piu’ sterile delle passioni umane. Com’ella è figlia della nullità, così è 
madre del nulla: giacché non solo è sterile per sé, ma rende tale tutto ciò a cui si mesce o 
avvicina ec.” (“noia is the most sterile of human passions. As it is a child to nullity, 
concomitantly, it mothers nothingness; insofar as it is not simply sterile per se, but it 
reduces to sterility everything with which it comes into contact or to which it becomes 
proximate”; Zibaldone 1815,1; my translation).  
On the other hand, in Pensieri, noia becomes the most extreme form of the 
sublime in the spectrum of sentiments (see 1.2.1).
78
 Sublime noia implies going through 
                                                 
77
Noia is always strictly connected to the existential argument in the indices in the Zibaldone posthumously 
collected as Memorie della mia vita. It is not a sentiment but the absence of sentiment.  
78 Leopardi states: 
. . . il non potere essere soddisfatto da alcuna cosa terrena , né, per dir cosí, dalla terra intera; considerare 
l’ampiezza inestimabile dello spazio, il numero e la mole maravigliosa dei mondi, e trovare che tutto è poco 
e piccino alla capacità dell’animo proprio; immaginarsi il numero dei mondi infinito, e l’universo infinito, e 
sentire che l’animo e il desiderio nostro sarebbe ancora più grande che si fatto universo; . . . e però noia, 
pare a me il maggior segno di grandezza e di nobilità, che si vegga della natura umana. Perciò la noia è 
poco nota agli uomini di nessun momento, e pochissimo o nulla agli altri animali. (Pensieri LXVIII) 
. . . the inability to be satisfied with worldliness or, so to speak, with the entire world; To consider the 
inestimable amplitude of space, the number of worlds and their astonishing size, then to discover that all 
this is small and insignificant compared to the capacity of one’s own mind; to imagine the infinite number 
of worlds, the infinite universe, then feel that our mind and aspirations might be even greater than such a 
universe; . . . and yet it seems to me that noia is the chief sign of the grandeur and nobility of human nature. 
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that terrifying experience of the empty interstellar spaces, which finds expression early in 
Leopardi with “L’Infinito” [“The Infinite”].79 One can sense here an echo of the same 
noia that in “Dialogo di Torquato Tasso e del suo Genio familiare” was intended as 
“desiderio puro della felicità” (“pure desire of happiness”; 176; see 1.2.1). Sublime noia 
also paradoxically approximates the Stoic piacere del fermarsi (“the pleasure of 
cessation”). This attempt at cessation at the heart of noia (even when it is oxymoronically 
conceived as desire in its pure state) is necessary in order to feel the necessarily painful 
but aesthetically productive condition of “souffrance” and “suffering of being.” As 
Matthew Feldman surmises with relation to the “suffering of being,” “for Beckett, 
achievements within the arts–as vehicles for the reflection necessary to apprehend, 
redeem and palliate painful human circumstances−become revelatory” (“Samuel 
Beckett’s Early Development” 192).80 
The quintessential agony necessary for the production of art in Leopardi and 
Beckett finds its synthesis in Schopenhauer (see 2.3.2), whereby the artist is, at all times, 
riveted by observations of the spectacle of what he calls the will’s “objectivation.” As I 
argue in 1.2.2 and 2.3.2, the objectification of the will is close to the Thing-in-itself. This 
is the Schopenhauerian Idea (of clear Platonic ascent) mentioned in Proust: “Its action 
[Habit] being precisely to hide the essence  the Idea  of the object in the haze of 
conception  preconception” (23). It is important to point out, however, that in 
Schopenhauer exposure to the Thing-in-itself through what Beckett calls, “the death of 
Habit and the brief suspension of its vigilance” (23), redeems the artist from life only 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
This is why noia is practically unknown to unambitious men and scarcely or not at all known to other 
animals. (my translation) 
79
 These infinite spaces later become a bitter image in “A se stesso,” the same poem Beckett chooses to 
quote three times in Proust, where infinity becomes “l’infinita vanità del tutto” (“the boundless vanity of 
all”; Canti  234). 
80
 This outlook is also expressed by Beckett when he speaks, in a letter to MacGreevy dated  September 16, 
1934,  about the lack of a  relation between the artist and the world encompassing the artist’s alienation 
from his own self, with respect to Cézanne who “had the sense of his incommensurability not only with life 
of such a different order as landscape, but even with life of his own order, even with the life−one feels 
looking at the self-portrait in the Tate […]−operative in himself” (Letters 227). In another letter to 
MacGreevy dated August 14, 1937, Beckett similarly praises artist Jack B. Yeats commenting, “What I feel 
he gets so well [. . .] is the heterogeneity of nature & the human denizens, the unalterable alienness of the 2 
phenomena, the 2 solitudes” (Letters 540). 
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momentarily and can offer but an occasional source of comfort. This brief exposure, 
which in Beckett (but also in Leopardi) is distressful, is succinctly expressed in Proust: 
“The pendulum oscillates between these two terms: Suffering  that opens a window on 
the real and is the main condition of the artistic experience, and Boredom  With its host 
of top-hatted and hygienic ministers” (Proust 28). 
2.2 “My imagination provided equations for the unknown in this 
algebra of desire”: the Desire to cease desiring 
Beckett in Proust and Leopardi in “A se stesso” thus convey the message that 
satisfaction is essentially only ever negative and desire as lack is the prior condition for 
every pleasure: “whatever the object, our thirst for possession is, by definition, 
insatiable” (Proust 17). All this is carried out without taking note that, as Schopenhauer 
says, “we are drawing water with the vessel of the Danaids” (1: 345) and “we are caught 
in the veil of māyā” (1: 406).  
Desiring thus constitutes a rather thick surface which Beckett in Proust and 
Leopardi in “A se stesso” reveal every intention to rip apart in order to expose what 
underlies the Beckettian Habit and Leopardi’s “assuefazione” (which is in turn based on 
Rousseau’s Habitude [see 2.2.1]). Leopardi’s “assuefazione” prefigures Beckett’s 
“alchemy of Habit [that] has transformed the individual capable of suffering into a 
stranger for whom the motives of that suffering are an idle tale” (Proust 26). In Leopardi, 
“assuefazione” has brought about the modern, physically-and-morally enfeebled 
individual in the grip of the age of positivism (see 2.2.1), who could be construed as 
foreshadowing the Beckettian “ballast that chains the dog to his vomit” (Proust 19). 
As is the case with Heidegger’s Dasein (see 2.5), Beckettian Habit and 
Leopardian “assuefazione” live in the possibilities that permit fleeing from an authentic 
awareness of death (in Heidegger conceived as its uttermost possibility; Being and Time 
297-99). In Proust Beckett refers to the human being’s “reluctance to die, this long and 
desperate and daily resistance before the perpetual exfoliation of personality” (25).  
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2.2.1 The Stoic Ascendancy:  “Souffrance” and “Suffering of being” 
The initial solution to the apathy that characterizes the Leopardian modern, 
physically and morally weak individual (see 1.2.1; 2.4.2), in Beckett similarly 
represented by the individual’s “haze of …[his] smug will to live” (Proust 15),81 is the 
Stoic ataraxic bliss of the proverbial sage who is aloof from both jubilation and pain. 
In Leopardi, such ataraxic bliss is aspired for through atarassia, central to 
Manuale di Epitteto (1825).
82
 The Stoic sage in the Manuale di Epitteto represents, for 
the early Leopardi, the highest apex a human being can attain through the exclusive use 
of reason. Stoic ethics, its penetration in the Greco-Latin world, and the subsequent 
diffusion of the cura del sé, are central not just to the Epictetus manual, but also to the 
excerpts posthumously collected as Manuale di filosofia pratica where Leopardi 
professes to have found “un riposo dal desiderio” (repose from desire) which echoes the 
Epicurean “indipendenza dai desideri” (independence from desire).83 In the latter indices, 
Leopardi inches closer to grasping the necessary rules and regulations for internal 
equilibrium. Concomitantly, however, he also declares the impossibility of achieving 
such inner balance.  
As the Italian poet will demonstrate in his later works, and as Schopenhauer 
unequivocally claims, Stoic ethics “is not a doctrine of virtue at all, but simply a guide for 
rational living: its end and aim is the achievement of happiness through peace of mind” 
(1: 113). Consequently, Stoic ethics is fundamentally different from ethical systems that 
insist on virtue, such as Plato’s doctrine. Desire keeps thwarting the aspired-for inner 
peace. This can be immediately discerned from the way the Stoics were portrayed by, for 
instance, Schopenhauer, who reminds us that they “were never able to present their ideal, 
                                                 
81
 It is clear that Beckett is here criticizing Nietzschean thought, particularly as professed in the 
posthumously published The Will to Power. 
82
 Leopardi speaks about the idea that a certain good thing cannot be acquired, or certain evilness cannot be 
avoided, which stems from Stoic philosophy. Man is only responsible for things which depend on his 
choices (Zibaldone 65,1). 
83
 Epicurus, Lettera a Meneceo. Opere, 34: “Ancora consideriamo gran bene l’indipendenza dai desideri, 
non perché sempre ci debba bastare il poco, ma affinché, se non abbiamo molto, il poco ci basti” (“We still 
consider it highly beneficial to be independent from desire, not because little should suffice, but so that, 
once we are in a situation  where  we do not have  aplenty, the little should suffice”; my translation) . 
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the Stoic sage, as a living being with inner poetic truth . . . His perfect composure, peace 
and bliss really contradict the essence of humanity” (1: 118). 
Beckett’s championing of stoicism is as shortlived as Leopardi’s. As Rosen points 
out “Beckett’s tone, like that of the cynics, is both a good deal more negative and much 
more playful than that of any of the classical stoics” (86). Rosen goes on to say that 
Beckett rejects the more hopeful aspects of both stoicism and cynicism, particularly their 
confidence in the mind’s capacity of self-government. In Beckett’s characters, insists 
Rosen, and this could also be said of Leopardi’s poetic voices, “thought is not rationally 
directed but obsessively suffered” (87). Rosen describes Beckett’s treatment of “the 
glorified apathy that is a Stoic ideal” as pervaded by “the depression that is more often its 
awful reality” (112). For both Beckett and Leopardi the Stoic sage  did, for a period, 
beckon as ideal, but what both writers ultimately uphold are sages who have failed. 
2.3 “Souffrance” and “Suffering of being” in the pessimistic 
tradition 
I now turn to a discussion of “souffrance” and “suffering of being” when 
perceived through a philosophically pessimist lens.
84
 Rosen speaks of the “thorough and 
combative nature of Beckett’s pessimism . . . a response to human suffering and their 
corresponding rationales that goes beyond bitterness and wit towards a different 
perspective, even, perhaps, a kind of solution” (33-34). Rosen states that “while he 
[Beckett] remained hostile to optimistic rationalizing . . . alterations in the later writing 
indicate [that] . . . like most pessimists, he has found that not only is suffering inevitable 
but that consolation is too” (48). Rosen connects Beckett’s pessimism to “the wit of 
introspective pessimists as Leopardi” (50), the latter also described as Beckett’s “spiritual 
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 Stoicism and Epicureanism are both oftentimes conceived as being at the roots of the long-standing 
tradition of pessimism. European pessimism, however, is often construed to have reached a peak in the 
second half of the nineteenth-century in France with thinkers like Baudelaire, Leconte de Lisle, Flaubert, 
the Goncourts, Dumas fils, Renan, Taine, Stendhal, Turgenev and Amiel. See Bourget, i.xxi-xxii. 
Sebastiano Timpanaro stretches the genealogy further back and construes the seeds of pessimism to be 
already present in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. In proving his thesis, Timpanaro quotes from 
Voltaire’s “Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne.” 
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precursor” (66). But what kind of pessimism have Leopardi and Beckett been associated 
with? Mark Bevir lists three types: existential, cultural and metaphysical. 
The principal idea of these three pessimist philosophical trends is that the human 
condition is marked by severe and persisting flaws that cannot be eradicated. Leopardi 
and Beckett are oftentimes associated with the cultural pessimism first brought under the 
spotlight by Rousseau in reaction to Enlightenment thinkers. Thus the perceived 
'cosmological pessimism' of Leopardi, which pessimism has not been related to any 
metaphysical dimension of the human being, but rather to the logical result of the 
material constitution of the universe, has been widely called, in Heideggerian terms, a 
form of aletheia, an uncovering of the nihilistic destiny of Western culture and thus more 
in sync with an existential pessimism (see 2.5). Existential Pessimists have also been 
associated with perceptions of human existence as partaking of absurdity. Martin Esslin’s 
famous categorizing of Beckett as part of the so-called Theatre of the Absurd, is very 
pertinent.
85
As I argue in chapter four, however, through their notion of humour, both 
Leopardi and Beckett combat such absurdist notions of existence. The typical existential 
pessimist, in his quasi-Stoic distancing from human affairs, only pertains to the early 
phases of the two writers.  
Antonio Prete in his Preface to Manuale di filosofia pratica (part of the 
Zibaldone) explicitly states that these indices clearly indicate that pessimism is an 
inappropriate term to attribute to Leopardi:  
Le osservazioni del Manuale mostrano come la voce pessimismo sia davvero la 
più impropria per definire lo svolgimento del pensiero leopardiano. Perché fino 
all’ultimo il poeta ha accolto nella lingua della poesia−e nel pensiero che è suo 
ritmo–il deserto e il fiore, il tragico e la leggerezza, il cerchio ineludibile della 
finitudine e il vento del desiderio, della sua incolmabile apertura. (XIII) 
The observations noted down in the Manual reveal how the label ‘pessimism’ is 
truly the most inappropriate when it comes to charting the development of 
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 Martin Esslin grouped together playwrights like Beckett, Eugene Ionescu and Harold Pinter and called 
their way of doing theatre– the theatre of the absurd.  
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Leopardian thought. Till the very end the poet captured in the language of 
poetry−and in the thought which constitutes its rhythm−the desert and the flower, 
that which is tragic and that which pertains to lightness, the ineluctable circle of 
finitude and the boundlessness of the wind of desire. (my translation) 
Both Leopardi and Beckett, however, have been prominently collocated in the 
metaphysical pessimist tradition, typified by Schopenhauer, and quintessentially 
represented by Quietism. 
2.3.1 “Souffrance” and “Suffering of being” in the Quietist Tradition 
Leopardi’s immediate heir and Beckett’s primary influence when it comes to the 
possibility of desirelessness (and will-lessness) is Schopenhauer (see 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 2.3.2). 
Schopenhauer echoes the ubiquitous Leopardian “souffrance” when he states that one 
“will also find enough in the suffering animal world to convince himself how essential 
suffering is to all life” (1: 337). Similarly, the idea of life as a “pensum,” which Beckett 
first encountered in Schopenhauer (Nixon, German Diaries 32) was of momentous 
importance to him.
86
 Beckett’s thoughts on life as “pensum” are evident in his reading of 
the Italian “artisan de ses malheurs” (a clear reference to Leopardi).87 Leopardi’s 
“souffrance” and Beckett’s “suffering of being,” can thus be read as intermediated by 
Schopenhauer construed in the quietist tradition, a central pillar of which thought is the 
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 “Das Leben ist ein Pensum zum Abarbeiten: in diesem Sinne ist defunctus ein schooner Ausdruck [Life 
is a pensum to be worked off: in this sense defunctus is a fine expression]” (Nixon, German Diaries 32). 
Schopenhauer follows earlier generations of pessimists, emphasizing the centrality of Weltschmerz (world-
weariness), the latter summarizing Beckett’s engagement with literary and philosophical pessimism.   
87
 Mark Nixon’s account of Beckett’s interest in the “quietistic and pessimistic tradition” is exclusively in 
terms of German Literature (“Scraps of German” 264, 278; German Diaries 51-6) while Feldman’s quietist 
reading is in terms of an “agnostic quietism,” (“Samuel Beckett’s Early Development” 184). Ackerley 
defines quietism as a “doctrine of extreme asceticism and contemplative devotion teaching that the chief 
duty of man is the contemplation of God, or Christ, to become independent of outward circumstances and 
sensual distraction” (88). Beckett’s letter to MacGreevy on  March 10, 1935, on the other hand, eschews 
non-secular attributes of quietism, “quietism of the sparrow . . . An abject self-referring quietism indeed, 
beside the alert quiet of one who always had Jesus for his darling, but the only kind that I, who seem never 
to have had the least faculty or disposition for the supernatural, could elicit from the text” (Knowlson, 
Damned to Fame 180).
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rejection of desire (distinct from the Pyrrhonian ‘epoché’),88 crucial to Leopardi and 
Beckett (Feldman, “Samuel Beckett’s Early Development” 183-200).89 
Schopenhauer indeed underscores what is pivotal to both Leopardi and Beckett: 
boredom as a pure experience of time. The attempt to escape such boredom is proposed 
through asceticism or self-denial following the Stoics’ suppression of desire. The 
Leopardian desiring at the core of which is “souffrance,” the division between 
“principium individuationis” and the thing-in-itself and Beckett’s Habit and Boredom 
that need to be ripped apart in order to expose the “suffering of being” come close to 
giving expression to the solitary quietist moment where the suspension of desire is both 
painful and aesthetically necessary.
90
 Indeed, the disparate features of pessimism, 
skepticism
91
 and melancholy contribute to the Quietist Weltanschauung from which 
Leopardi’s, Schopenhauer’s, and Beckett’s writings emerge. 
                                                 
88
Epoché played an important role in Pyrrhonism, the skeptical philosophy named after Pyrrho. Epoché is, 
according to this tradition, the suspension of judgment or the withholding of assent cultivated by the 
ancient skeptics.  According to this tradition, only by refusing either to affirm or to deny the truth of what 
we cannot know, can we achieve ataraxia. 
89
 In a letter to MacGreevy Beckett speaks of the ideals of “humility, utility, self-effacement” (See 
Feldman, “Samuel Beckett’s Early Development” 184). Knowlson refers to Beckett’s “quietistic impulse” 
(Damned to Fame 353) while Chris Ackerley explores this thread in “Samuel Beckett and Thomas á 
Kempis: The Roots of Quietism.” John Pilling’s Beckett’s Dream Notebook  also documents the 
development of Beckett’s quietist outlook underscoring references from Thomas á Kempis’ The Imitation 
of Christ and, even more prominently, St. Augustine’s Confessions and Robert Burton’s Anatomy of 
Melancholy. 
90
 Gottfried Büttner links Schopenhauer’s pessimism to Beckett’s “melancholic temperament, his 
inclination to resignation,” while ensuring this particular trait remains distinct from nihilism (114-15). I 
will discuss the issue of Beckett as nihilist at further length below. For the time being, it is sufficient to 
focus on Büttner’s three Schopenhauerian recommendations that he reads in Beckett when it comes to the 
miserable endurance of life−aesthetic contemplation, compassion and resignation. While I fully concur 
with the first two, I find myself in disagreement with the third, but I will discuss this in detail in chapters 
three and four. In these chapters I argue that accepting suffering does not automatically imply resigning 
oneself to it as much as denouncing the material world and desire does not automatically imply forfeiting it. 
90Quietism was initiated, according to W. R. Inge’s 1899 Christian Mysticism, by Miguel de Molinos (c. 
1640-95) in the pursuit of self-perfection and knowledge of God. This doctrine, however, was ultimately 
condemned as heretical. 
91
By scepticism we understand an undoing of values that never arrives at their complete annihilation. This 
position is expressed by E. M. Cioran in “Skeptic and Barbarian,” in The Fall into Time (1964). In The Will 
to Power Nietzsche defined skepticism as “a consequence of decadence, as is libertinism of the spirit” (26). 
Rosen says that Beckett’s “skepticism serves to balance and offset his pessimism” (51) and quoting Sextus 
Empiricus (“the originating hope of skepticism . . . is the hope of attaining quietude”) he speaks of Beckett 
as turning from “pessimism to skepticism as a healing alternative” (53).  The skepticism Beckett turned to 
is aware of being “this ataraxy of self-thinking thought” (54), “a state of mental suspension and . . . a state 
of unperturbedness or quietude” (54). 
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 In both Leopardi’s “souffrance” and Beckett’s “suffering of being,” the aesthetic 
potential of this desire-free moment is emphasized. It is an engagement with the quietist 
tradition that is secular.
92
 Beckett aptly describes this lonely, melancholic spirit in Proust 
where “for the artist, who does not deal in surfaces, the rejection of friendship is not only 
reasonable, but a necessity” (64). He continues to say: “the artistic tendency is not 
expansive, but a contraction. And art is the apotheosis of solitude . . . The artist is active, 
but negatively . . . drawn into the core of the eddy” (65-66). This description of the artist 
perfectly echoes the one given by Leopardi, particularly with reference to the poet (see 
2.2).  
Nixon reports that in Beckett’s Watt notebooks there is further reference to 
Leopardi’s poem “Canto notturno di un pastore errante dell’Asia,” the poem that perhaps 
best recites Leopardian pessimism. Nixon also quotes a letter dated April 21, 1958 sent to 
A.J. Leventhal where Beckett confirmed that “Leopardi was a strong influence when I 
was young (his pessimism, not his patriotism!)” (German Diaries 200). According to 
Feldman, however, “Leopardi’s ‘brooding’ . . .  rightly turns our focus from style and 
understatement toward content and sentiment . . . the thread linking these views is 
strongly rooted in a personal asceticism, one eschewing the distractions and sufferings of 
the world as ceaseless and superfluous” (186).  
It is important to once more underscore that what Feldman is claiming about a 
“personal asceticism” with respect to Leopardi is only valid for the early phase.93 I argue 
                                                 
92As Martin and Allard point out, pain is “not external to modern aesthetics as one possible object to be 
imitated but internal to it as its very condition” (4-5). In a wonderfully ambiguous statement from his 
German diaries dated February 1937, Beckett expresses his wish “to turn this dereliction, profoundly felt, 
into literature” (Knowlson, Damned to Fame 252).  Beckett went on to sketch, in this same diary, a new 
section which he significantly entitled “Journal of a Melancholic,” manuscript material that is mostly lost. 
See Nixon’s German Diaries. Furthermore, in his “Homage to Jack B. Yeats” Beckett would say that “the 
artist, who stakes his being is from nowhere, has no kith” (Disjecta 149).  
93
 In the early indices posthumously collected as Manuale di filosofia pratica, for instance, Leopardi 
identifies in amor proprio the excessive inclination bent on itself,  soon transformed  into “souffrance” (see 
1.2.1). This self-love can come close to self-hatred, which is hell-bent to destroy the self: “io dunque era il 
solo soggetto possibile dell’odio, non avendo riconosciuto esternamente altra persona colla quale potessi 
irritarmi de’ miei mali, e quindi altro soggetto capace di essere odiato per questo motivo” (“ I was thus the 
only possible subject of all this hate, not being able to recognize, externally, any other person with whom to 
be irritated because of  my pains and thus no other subject whom I could hate for this reason,”; Zibaldone 
506; my translation). Suicide becomes the extreme form of revenge on the self: “Concepiva un desiderio 
ardente di vendicarmi sopra me stesso . . . e provava una gioia feroce ma somma nell’idea del suicidio” (“I 
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that Leopardi in “La Ginestra,” and Beckett in his transition from prose to drama offer a 
different perspective on suffering and desire (see 3.2; 3.3; 3.4). Beneath the thick film of 
Leopardian “assuefazione” lay the desires which have been repressed from their 
esteemed place in Antiquity and childhood. In emphasizing the latter, the Italian poet-
philosopher clearly distances himself from the early ascetic model.
94
 Leopardi will finally 
ascribe importance to desire citing the people of Antiquity as the ones who were truly 
capable of experiencing its intensity.
95
 Feldman’s assertion that “Leopardi’s conviction 
stands as a central buttress to Beckett’s quietism” (“Samuel Beckett’s Early 
Development” 186) is thus completely correct only insofar as it relates to the early phase 
of Leopardi.  
2.3.2 Immediate heir of “Souffrance” and source of inspiration for the 
“Suffering of being”: Schopenhauer’s Negation of the Will 
Leopardi’s “wisdom that consists not in the satisfaction but in the ablation of 
desire” (Proust 18) is immediately bequeathed by Schopenhauer. The latter’s thoughts on 
desire, through which the Will manifests itself, become highly relevant when the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
conceived an ardent desire to avenge myself . . . and I felt an overall ferocious joy at the idea of suicide”; 
my translation). This desire could be construed as a striving for entropy, the death-drive mentioned in 1.2.1 
and 2.2. Leopardi’s modern individual living in the era of positivism is deprived of passion: “non prova mai 
passione o sentimento che si lanci all’esterno o si rannicchi nell’interno, ma quasi tutte le sue passioni si 
contengono per così dire nel mezzo del suo animo, vale a dire che non lo commuovono se non 
mediocremente, gli lasciano il libero esercizio di tutte le sue facoltà naturali, abitudini ecc.. In maniera che 
la massima parte della sua vita si passa nell’indifferenza e conseguentemente nella noia, mancando 
d’impressioni forti e straordinarie” (“he never demonstrates passion or sentiment that is externally visible 
or that takes root internally, but all his passions are locked, so to speak, in the midst of his soul, that is, he is 
never moved if not in a mediocre manner, he is allowed the free exercise of all his natural faculties, habits 
etc. in such a way that the majority of his life is spent in indifference and consequently in boredom, 
deprived of strong and extraordinary impressions”; Zibaldone 266,1; my translation). 
94
 Feldman reports that a typed copy of “A se stesso” is included in Beckett’s “Interwar Notes.” See 
Feldman, Beckett’s Books: A Cultural History of Samuel Beckett’s “Interwar Notes.” 
95 “. . . era più ordinariamente presso gli antichi, appo i quali la fermezza e la costanza e la forza e la 
magnanimità erano virtù molto più ordinarie che fra I moderni. E vedendo essi che spesse volte anzi 
frequentissimamente i casi della vita si oppongono ai desideri dell’uomo, erano compresi da terrore per la 
ragione della loro immobilità nel desiderare” (“. . . it was ordinarily to be found in the people of Antiquity, 
whose firmness, consistency and magnanimity were more ordinary virtues than they are in modern times. 
And noticing that oftentimes, very often I would say, life opposes the human being’s desires, the people of 
Antiquity were overcome  by terror when their ability to desire seemed to be  immobilized”; Zibaldone 90; 
my translation).  
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affirmation is pitted against the negation of  Will, an argument that prefigures the notion 
of desire as it evolves into its psychoanalytic version (see 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.3).
96
  
It is interesting to point out that for Schopenhauer the negation of one’s desires 
and will relates to moral goodness. When one’s distinction between oneself and others 
begins to fall away, one feels the suffering throughout the world as if it were one’s own. 
It has to be underlined, however, that while compassionate moral goodness and extreme 
will-lessness clearly involve a shift away from the natural affirmation of the will, it is 
equally evident that morality, as Schopenhauer conceives it, surely involves vehement 
willing, as Levinas points out (see 3.1).  
The most interesting question concerning this state of will-lessness, however, 
hinges on the already introduced aesthetic implications. Schopenhauer crucially 
highlights how the negation of the will enables for a blessed moment that the human 
being perceives a timeless Idea.
97
 Schopenhauer makes an argument that perfectly echoes 
the early works of Leopardi where, in searching rest from the “distracting contingencies” 
of desire, he resorts to the philosophy of Epicurus: 
. . .  then suddenly the peace that we always sought on the first path of willing but 
that always eluded us comes of its own accord, and all is well with us. It is the 
painless state that Epicurus prized as the highest good and the state of the gods: 
for that moment we are freed from the terrible pressure of the will, we celebrate 
the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing, the wheel of Ixion stands still. (1: 
220)  
                                                 
96
 For Schopenhauer, “the nature of every desire is pain: attainment quickly gives rise to satiety: the goal 
was only apparent: possession takes away the stimulus: the desire, the need re-emerges in a new form: if 
not, then what follows is dreariness, emptiness, boredom, and the struggle against these is just as painful as 
the struggle against want.” (1: 340).The complete self-abolition and negation of the will is the only thing 
that can appease the impulses of the will forever and is the “summum bonum” (1: 389). 
97
 Schopenhauer echoes Plato when he accords genuine being to the Ideas alone, while granting only an 
apparent, dream-like existence to the world that is real for the individual: “When the Idea emerges, subject 
and object can no longer be distinguished within it because the Idea, the adequate objecthood of the will, 
the genuine world as representation, arises only to the extent that subject and object reciprocally fill and 
completely permeate each other; in just the same way, the individual cognizing and the individual thing 
thus cognized are, as things in themselves, indistinguishable” (1: 203). 
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 The price for this precious epiphany is nothing less than the wholesale dissolution of the 
subject–the same painful kernel of Beckett’s “suffering of being” and Leopardian 
“souffrance.” An absolutely clean break between willing and will-lessness, desire and the 
ablation of desire, however, seems not to be achievable for human beings (see 
introduction). Neither the self as embodied, will-driven individual, nor the self as pure, 
pain-free subject yields entirely to the other. Asceticism (see 1.2.2) is not tenable. Desire 
survives and needs to be readdressed as is evident in this hilarious but effective passage 
from Watt: “It is useless not to seek, not to want, for when you cease to seek you start to 
find, and when you cease to want, then life begins to ram her fish and chips down your 
gullet until you puke, and then the puke down your gullet until you puke the puke, and 
then the puked puke until you begin to like it” (43). 
Desire resurfaces and it is through experiencing it that sensing the underlying 
suffering becomes possible: a suffering that can bring about a compassion that is less 
Schopenhauerian than it is Levinasian because it is a compassion brought about by the 
presence of desire not by its removal (see 3.1).  
2.4 Leopardi and Beckett within the nihilist tradition 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the negation of the will has also been termed 
“passive nihilism” (36) as opposed to “active nihilism,” the latter implying, in Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s  posthumously published The Will to Power, a “violent force of destruction” 
(18, Nietzsche’s emphasis).98 Nietzsche is indeed a central figure in any discussion on 
nihilism.
99
 In 1885-86, Nietzsche speaks of “pessimism as a preliminary form of 
                                                 
98The conflation of the terms ‘nihilism’ and ‘pessimism’ is not uncommon. Paul Bourget, for instance, uses 
the term nihilism of an entire movement in French literature from Baudelaire to Flaubert and Maupassant, a 
movement characterized, according to Bourget, by its ‘pessimism,’ its ‘misanthropy’ and its ‘world-
weariness’ (i.xxii). 
99In Nietzsche’s works written for publication, the term ‘nihilist’ first appears in Beyond Good and Evil: 
Prelude to a philosophy of the future (1886), where it refers to those “fanatics of conscience who would 
rather lie dying on an assured nothing than an uncertain something” (11). The words ‘nihilism’ and 
‘nihilist’ are then used repeatedly in the sequence of works written between 1887 and Nietzsche’s collapse 
in January 1889, including On the Genealogy of Morals, where it appears more often than in any of his 
other published works, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist and Ecce Homo. In these texts, the term 
‘nihilism’ is almost always used in reference to religion. In an autumn 1887 notebook entry, Nietzsche 
poses the question “What does nihilism mean?” He answers: “That the highest values devaluate 
themselves” (The Will to Power 9). The phrase ‘God is dead’ is Nietzsche’s well-known shorthand for this 
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nihilism” (11) and pits “pessimism as decline” to the favourably looked-on “pessimism as 
strength” (11).100 As Shane Weller makes the distinction, “pessimism of the weak 
kind−that is Schopenhauerian pessimism as opposed to Nietzsche’s own ‘pessimism of 
strength,’ which embraces the most fearsome thoughts about existence” (Modernism and 
Nihilism 33), clearly show that ‘pessimism of strength’ is Nietzsche’s synonym for 
nihilism. In entry 91 in “European Nihilism” (The Will to Power), Nietzsche criticizes the 
“narrowness and inconsequence of pessimism à la Schopenhauer or, worse, Leopardi” 101 
and admits that “this type of pessimism . . . can be perceived here and there in my Birth 
of Tragedy” (The Will to Power 56).102 Clearly Nietzsche’s conception of pessimism 
becomes increasingly closely aligned to active nihilism.
103
 It is also evident that while 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
devaluation. Shane Weller suggests that “there is much in Nietzsche’s notebooks to suggest that he took 
nihilism to have arisen in the nineteenth century, as a development out of Romantic pessimism” ( 
Modernism and Nihilism 32). Recent works on nihilism offer suggestive discriminations between various 
forms of nihilism. For instance, in The Specter of the Absurd: Sources and Criticisms of Modern Nihilism 
(1988), Donald A. Crosby distinguishes five distinct kinds: political, moral, epistemological, cosmic, and 
existential. Crosby says that whichever form it takes, the term ‘nihilism’ always implies negation or denial 
of a specific aspect of human life.  
100
 In entry 31 he says: “European pessimism is still in its early stages bears witness against itself: it still 
lacks that tremendous, yearning rigidity of expression in which the Nothing is reflected, . . . is still far too 
contrived and too little “organic” too much a pessimism of scholars and poets: I mean, much of it is 
excogitated and invented, is ‘created’ and not a ‘cause.’” (21). Furthermore, in entry 33, Nietzsche 
attributes the advent of pessimism to the fact that “the most powerful desires of life . . . have hitherto been 
slandered” (22). In entry 34 he states: “Modern pessimism is an expression of the uselessness of the 
modern world not of the world of existence” (23). In entry 82 he speaks of the chief symptoms of 
pessimism: “Russian pessimism (Tolstoy, Dostoevsky); aesthetic pessimism, l’art pour l’art, ‘description’ 
(romantic and anti-romantic pessimism); epistemological pessimism (Schopenhauer, phenomenalism); 
anarchistic pessimism; the ‘religion of pity,’ Buddhistic pre-movement; cultural pessimism (exoticism, 
cosmopolitanism); moralistic pessimism: I myself” (51). As to the development of pessimism into nihilism, 
Nietzsche describes it as follows “Denaturalization of values. Scholasticism of values. Detached and 
idealistic, values, instead of dominating and guiding action, turn against action and condemn it . . . 
pessimism is not a problem but a symptom” (24).  
101
 It is well-established that Nietzsche knew and appreciated Leopardi. See Giuseppina Restivo, 
“Caliban\Clov and Leopardi’s Boy: Beckett and Postmodernism,” 224. 
102
 In this entry where Leopardi is mentioned, Nietzsche also theorizes laughter in a Leopardian spirit: 
“perhaps I know best why man alone laughs: he suffers so deeply that he had to invent laughter. The 
unhappiest and most melancholy animal is, as fitting, the most cheerful” (The Will to Power 56; see 4.1). 
103
 In the excerpts collected in The Will to Power Nietzsche sheds the clear Schopenhauerian influence of 
The Birth of Tragedy. In entry 17 he claims: “has the ideal itself been renounced? At bottom, the last 
metaphysicians still seek in it true “reality,” the “thing-in-itself” compared to which everything else is 
merely apparent. It is their dogma that our apparent world, being so plainly not the expression of this ideal, 
cannot be ‘true’ and that, at bottom, it does not even lead us back to that metaphysical world as its cause. 
The unconditional, representing that highest perfection, cannot possibly be the ground of all that is 
conditional. Schopenhauer wanted it otherwise and therefore had to conceive of this metaphysical ground 
as the opposite of the ideal   as ‘evil, blind will’ that way it could be that “which appears,” that which 
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Leopardi and Schopenhauer are influential in the early works, particularly The Birth of 
Tragedy, Nietzsche increasingly came to renounce these models.  
In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), the influence of Leopardi’s and Schopenhauer’s 
conception of art is evident. Nietzsche’s distinction between the Dionysian and the 
Apollonian reminds us of Schopenhauer’s distinction between the Thing-in-itself and the 
“principium individuationis.”104 The aesthetic interpretation in Nietzsche, however, is the 
affirmation of life as that which is characterized by and which pierces into the 
“semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error” 
(The Birth of Tragedy 23).
105
 
 While Dionysian art might be connected  to artistic production in states-of-being 
similar to “souffrance” and “suffering of being,” it is clear that, as Nietzsche says  in The 
Will to Power, “Art . . . [is] the only superior counterforce to all will to [the] denial of 
life” (452). Like Leopardi and Schopenhauer before him, then, Nietzsche privileges the 
aesthetic as the only superior counterforce to deployments of the idea of nothingness but 
his proposition of the overcoming of nihilism entails the affirmation, rather than denial of 
the will (The Will to Power 35).
106
 In On the Genealogy of Morals he affirms, “to place 
himself in the service of the ascetic ideal is therefore the most distinctive corruption of an 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
reveals itself in the world of appearances. But even so he did not renounce the absoluteness of the ideal” 
(The Will to Power 16). 
104
Nietzsche would attack the notion of the thing-in-itself in Book Three of the posthumously- published 
The Will to Power. 
105
In The Birth of Tragedy he claims that in Attic tragedy the truth about existence is rendered bearable. 
The “highest and, indeed, the truly serious task of art” is “to save the eye from gazing into the horrors of 
night and to deliver the subject by the healing balm of illusion from the spasms of the will” (118). In his 
later work, Nietzsche will continue to describe art as both veiling and transfiguring but it is clearly the latter 
idea that will come to dominate his thinking of art. As Weller points out, however, “there are … at least 
two key differences between Nietzsche’s early and later position regarding art. First, he attempts to move 
away from a Schopenhauerian conception of art as a form of consolation- this move Nietzsche seeks to 
achieve by privileging the Dionysian over the Apollonian. Secondly, he changes his mind on where that 
Dionysian art is realized in modernity” (Modernism and Nihilism 83). 
106
 Perhaps this is a central motive for Beckett’s breaking away from Nietzsche already by the time of 
Proust, where the philosopher of amor fati is rather gratuitously attacked. Beckett also rankles against 
Andre Gide’s Nietzschean exhortation to “live dangerously” (mentioned in Proust) which is, for the early 
Beckett, too fundamentally affirmative of the will to live. 
63 
 
artist that is at all possible” (153-54, emphasis mine).107 Rather than proposing an 
overcoming of nihilism in Nietzchean fashion, or any overcoming of nihilism as such, the 
emphasis in the coming chapter will be on how the ‘nothingness’ at the heart of nihilism 
can be opposed through the art of writers like Leopardi and Beckett. Their literary works, 
I argue, combat ‘nothingness’ through the evocation of a sense of the infinite. Most 
interesting for this study then, is the opposition to nihilism offered by the notion of 
infinity. 
The opposition to ‘nothingness’ through the evocation of ‘infinity’ will become 
central in the third chapter where I argue that Leopardi and Beckett are not nihilist 
specifically because the desire of the Other, as it is manifested in their work, is both an 
infinite desire but also a desire that, in facing the finite, intuits the Sublime infinite 
beyond. 
2.4.1 Leopardi the nihilist 
The ‘nothingness’ against which the notion of infinity is pitted in this study, has 
been perceived as crucial since the first authoritative opinions on Leopardi expressed by 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (see 1.2.2; 2.4). The radically polarized positions expressed 
by Benedetto Croce and Emanuele Severino, at the two opposite ends of the twentieth- 
century, put the definition of Leopardi's philosophy at the crux of a fierce debate. Very 
revealingly, the twentieth century opened with Croce denying any genuinely theoretical 
dimension to Leopardi's works, considering his contribution purely confined to poetic 
production (see 1.2.1). At the opposite end of the temporal and critical spectrum, 
Emanuele Severino published Il nulla e la poesia (1990) and Cosa arcana e stupenda: 
L'Occidente e Leopardi (1997). In these works he defined Leopardi as the most radical 
nihilist thinker of the Italian philosophical tradition, arguing that Leopardi's works bring 
into light the general movement of Western history and philosophy. 
                                                 
107
In The Will to Power “disintegration of the will . . . is distinguished by the weakness of the personality” 
(27). The coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a “strong will” defined by the 
precision of direction (28-29). Concomitantly, however, he praises “adiaphoria” (indifference). He says 
“the will is weak and the prescription to avoid stupidities would be to have a strong will and to do nothing 
Contradictio” (28). In entry 268 he also praises the Stoics’ defence against will (153). 
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The interpretation of Leopardi as a writer with a clear focus on the existential 
nothingness is obviously not unfounded. In passages collected in the Donzelli edition of 
the Zibaldone, posthumously entitled Della Natura degli uomini e delle cose, Leopardi 
presents the anguished human being when faced by nothingness. Leopardi successfully 
predicted a scenario for modern times where civilization is defined by the loss of 
absolutes, blinded by the progressive and positivist myth, by the annulment of time and 
the self-absorption in the solipsistic egotism of the self. This bleak prediction reaches its 
climax in the contemplation of suicide in excerpts from the Trattato delle passioni: 
“Concepiva un desiderio ardente di vendicarmi sopra me stesso e colla mia vita della mia 
necessaria infelicità inseparabile dall’esistenza mia, e provava una gioia feroce ma 
somma nell’idea del suicidio” (“I conceived an ardent desire to take revenge upon myself 
and with my own life upon the necessary unhappiness of my existence and I felt a 
ferocious, albeit convinced, joy at the idea of suicide”; Zibaldone 503; my translation).108 
As opposed to the resistance in the titanismo of Antiquity, Leopardi describes two 
types of the modern human being. According to the first type, feelings (desire included) 
are repressed and, as in the Freudian hydraulic model proposed  in Jokes and their 
Relation to the Unconscious, desire is not only not destroyed but, on the contrary, it 
threatens to erupt any time with reinvigorated force and abrupt aggression that turns the 
subject against itself through “l’odio di se stesso (perché resta ancora all’uomo tanta 
forza di amor proprio, da potersi odiare)” (“self-hatred [because there is still in the human 
being considerable self-love to hate himself]”; Zibaldone 618,2; my translation).  
The second Leopardian delineation of the perfectly modern human being, 
however, prefigures the tone of indifference and nihilism of some later drama in Beckett. 
This is the modern human being the likes of whom “il mondo è pieno oggidi” (“the 
current world witnesses aplenty”; Zibaldone 618,2; my translation). The latter individual 
is not even capable of hating himself because “l’uomo non ha più tanto amor proprio da 
                                                 
108
 The collection of these indices has been compared to Montaigne’s Essais even though Leopardi never 
acknowledged the influence of this writer. See Introduzione to Leopardi, Trattato delle passioni, lxxxvii. 
Furthermore, the Greek exponent of Stoic Ethics, Epictetus, and the Latin exponents, Seneca and Cicero, 
are clearly common sources in both Montaigne and Leopardi, not to mention the role of go-between played 
out by J.J Rousseau. 
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aver forza di odiarsi” (“the human being no longer has enough self-love in order to be 
capable of self-hatred”; Zibaldone 618,2; my translation; see 1.2.1). In this state, the 
human being is depleted of compassion because his faculties have numbed “tutta la 
facoltà sensitiva, desiderativa etc.” (“his sensitivity, his ability to desire etc.; Zibaldone 
618,2; my translation). This is once more proximate to Beckettian Boredom and Habit 
whereby the human being is similarly merely able to “tenere una vita metodica, e di nulla 
mutare o innovare” (“follow a methodic life without ever changing or innovating 
anything”; Zibaldone 618,2; my translation). The consequences of this “stato di tranquilla 
disperazione” (“a state of quiet despair”; Zibaldone 618,2; my translation)  is that amor 
proprio,  a quality that is abundant in Antiquity, is transmuted  into what Leopardi terms 
inazione (inaction), indifferenza (indifference) and assuefazione. Thus while amor 
proprio is held to be an essential element in self-assertion: “l’amor di se stesso è l’unica 
possibile molla delle azioni e dei sentimenti umani” (“self-love is the only possible 
trigger of human action and sentiment”; Zibaldone 958,1; my translation),109 the absence 
of amor proprio leads to total indifference. Self-love taken to an extreme, on the other 
hand, degenerates into negative passions like hatred, egoism and envy. In Zibaldone 
2204-08, Leopardi speaks about excessive amor proprio which also locks the subject into 
neurotic isolation and this is why, in 958,1, Leopardi links self-love to “Sventura” 
(Misfortune).
110
 Excessive amor proprio enervates modern man because excessive desire 
and an overabundance of imagination impede action: “Spesse volte il troppo o l’eccesso è 
padre del nulla” (“oftentimes things that result in excess lead to nothingness”; Zibaldone 
714,1; my translation).
111
 The limiting force of amor proprio in Leopardi, as had been the 
case for Rousseau, is the mauvaise honte.
112
 
                                                 
109
Amor proprio is found, among other themes, in the Index to the Zibaldone, cross-referenced with 
“desiderio” and “compassione.” The argument that amor proprio is at the basis of social action is made by 
Cesare Luporini in Leopardi Progressivo, 185-274. 
110
 Leopardi states: “se l’egoismo è intero, la società non esiste se non di nome. Perché  ciascuno individuo 
non avendo per fine se non se medesimo, non curando affatto il ben comune, e nessun pensiero o azione 
sua essendo diretta al bene o piacere altrui, ciascuno individuo forma da se solo una società  a parte, ed 
intera, e perfettamente distinta, giacché perfettamente distinto il suo fine” (“if society is entirely egoistic, it 
does not exist but in name. Because every individual, not having as his goal but his own well-being, not 
being at all bothered by the common good, and not directing any of his actions towards the common good 
or others’ pleasure, forms on his own an entire society apart, which is perfectly distinct given that its end is 
perfectly distinct”; Zibaldone 669,1; my translation). 
111
Action, that which makes morality possible, is inhibited in those who have excessive amor proprio and 
those who are extremely sensitive. Amor proprio, Vitalità and Sensibilità are brought together in 4037,6. 
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It is interesting to note that in Pensieri Leopardi defines with bitter clarity the 
malice underlying amor proprio at the heart of Leopardian desire interlacing it to the 
analysis of “timore” (“fear;” see 1.2.1), defined as the most perfect and quintessential 
expression of egoism. Amor proprio, and fear of what is exterior to it, bring about this 
self-absorbed state of being suspended in a timeless vacuum and in total centripetal 
activity as a result of interlacing with “incivilimento” (“civil education”; preface to 
Trattato delle passioni xii; my translation). This second description of the modern 
individual provided by Leopardi could indeed justify attributes of ‘nihilism.’ 
In a somewhat non-historic past, however, Leopardi identifies the other side of 
desire of amor proprio, reconnecting once more to the world of Antiquity (1.2.1). This 
obverse side reveals the presumed fullness of time which can be temporarily recouped 
through the state of the “fanciullo” (child), in whom everything that is linked to an 
archetypal imagination and knowledge has its roots.
113
 The way to reconnect to these 
roots is by reaching out to nature through our present civilization. This attempt at a 
reconnection on the part of the modern human being can result in the conversion of 
reason to passion through an exercise of rationality, “convertir la ragione in passione” 
(Zibaldone 293-294, see 3.1; 3.2) pursuing not nothingness but the infinite transfiguration 
of desire into illusions. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
This amor proprio differentiates itself from the “cura del se’” of the Greek world (see 2.3.1). Its excesses 
stall action: “L’eccesso delle sensazioni o la soprabbondanza loro, si converte in insensibilità. Ella produce 
l’indolenza e l’inazione” (“excessive sensation, excess of sensations or its overabundance brings about 
insensitivity. It produces indolence and inaction”;  Zibaldone 714,1; my translation). 
112Rousseau’s mauvaise honte, which Leopardi somewhat assimilates, is the inertia which impedes social 
relations and, in the bored and desperate human being, it contrasts with the ease with which he rubbishes 
anything human. The same desperate modern individual who does not fear death, fears society confronted 
with which he loses his courage, because of the fear of being ridiculed. The fear provokes inability to act 
and to change “per tema di peggiorar quella vita della quale egli non fa più caso alcuno, della quale ei 
dispera, che non può parergli possibile a divenir peggiore” (“for fear of worsening that life to which he is 
no longer attached, of which he so despairs that it does not seem it could get any worse”; Zibaldone 3492; 
my translation). 
113
 This theory is elaborated in observations 1555 and 2684- 85 of the Zibaldone and in the operetta morale 
that, not coincidentally, deploys the Eden scene as backdrop, the “Storia del genere umano.” 
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2.4.2 Beckett the nihilist: Ubi nihil vales, Ibi nihil velis 
Beckett is also oftentimes associated (again no doubt justifiably) with the 
expression of nothingness. Despite the centrality of nothingness in his work, however, 
Beckett vehemently rejected the nihilist label: “I simply cannot understand why some 
people call me a nihilist. There is no basis for that” (Büttner 122). In A Taste for the 
Negative: Beckett and Nihilism Shane Weller points out that Beckett’s writing has been 
perceived to attest rather to anti-nihilism. This is especially the case following criticism 
associated with Deconstruction but already anticipated by Theodor Adorno. Beckett as 
among the most classically nihilist writers had by the time of post-structuralism long 
since become a most well-wrought of well-wrought urns. Given the centrality for this 
study of Levinas’ desire of the Other, the anti-nihilist reading of Beckett on the part of 
critics like Badiou and Critchley (see below) is not surprising. In an interview published 
under the title “I Have a Taste for the Secret” in 2001, Derrida describes negation of 
alterity as “nihilism.” He affirms that it is a form of violence that does not leave space for 
the other (92). On similar lines, in chapter three I argue that Beckett’s works resist 
nihilism specifically by opening a space for alterity.
114
 Nonetheless, in A Taste for the 
Negative and later works, Shane Weller insists that nihilism of sorts still haunts Beckett’s 
oeuvre (Modernism and Nihilism 130). Weller, however, also points out resistance to 
nihilism in Beckett that lies specifically in the “residual difference” deployed in his work 
(A Taste for the Negative 137). 
Theodor Adorno claims that Beckett cannot be perceived as nihilistic. In the 
section on nihilism in Negative Dialectics, Adorno finds in Beckett’s work the abiding 
within the negative which he takes as the only genuine countering of nihilism. Alain 
Badiou also declares that he is “entirely opposed to the widely held view that Beckett 
                                                 
114
 Derrida interestingly sees in Beckett’s work both nihilism and resistance to nihilism. He explains that 
nihilism is located in the content but, most crucially, Derrida states that the resistance to nihilism is to be 
found in the form of Beckett’s work, in the way it elbows room for the other, in the “composition, the 
rhetoric, the construction and rhythm of his works” (Acts of Literature 61). Literature, as Derrida conceives 
it (and Beckett’s oeuvre falls under this category), reveals the alterity at the heart of the same. It is precisely 
on account of this space for alterity that literature is, according to Derrida, to be accorded a privilege in the 
struggle against the bad violence of nihilism defined as the annihilation of alterity. When seeking to justify 
deconstruction, Derrida will specifically appeal to an ethic of hospitality and the value of the other. 
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moved towards a nihilistic destitution, towards a radical opacity of significations” (On 
Beckett 55).  As I discuss in 3.3 and 4.8, Badiou reads in Beckett’s work “a powerful love 
for human obstinacy, for tireless desire, for humanity reduced to its stubbornness and 
malice” (75). Critchley (see 3.3; 4.8) similarly dismisses the nihilist label as the “stalest 
of all the stale philosophical clichés” (Very Little…Almost Nothing 176). Critchley insists 
that Beckett offers “an approach to meaninglessness as an achievement of the ordinary 
without the rose-tinted glasses of redemption” (179).  
In “Three Dialogues” Beckett tries to come to theoretical terms with the 
possibility of an art that defines itself outside the quest for closure, which is nonetheless 
elusive, in a writing that is aporetic in nature. Negation is here the very work of language 
concerned with the presence of things before consciousness.
115
 The desire of ‘repose’ 
from desire, the latter resulting only in suffering (for as long as it remains unsatisfied) 
and boredom (as soon as it is satisfied), does not lie in nothing. Art will have to be 
rethought in relation to failure. The other-than-nothing is thus wrapped up in the same 
acceptance that “to be an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail” (125).116 This idea is 
already apparent in nascent form in Beckett’s famous letter to Axel Kaun. 
In this letter Beckett defines the reason for the negation of art, and thus of 
language, through language itself to be “to get at the things (or the nothingness) behind it 
. . . to bore one hole after another in it, until what lurks behind it  be it something or 
nothing  begins to seep through” (Disjecta 172). What lurks behind, the something or 
nothing, is exposed when life (as habit) is interrupted. This leads us back to insight into 
the “suffering of being” without which no art would be possible. In Beckett’s own works, 
the impossibility of nothing will thus have to be thought in relation not to nihilism but to 
the inevitability of both nothing and its obverse: the infinite. 
                                                 
115
 In the third of “Three Dialogues” Beckett speaks of the artist Bram Van Velde’s ability to express 
another-than-nothing in that he is “the first whose hands have not been tied by the certitude that expression 
is an impossible act” (121). 
116
 The ultimate aim of the writer’s “assault on words” has thus become a failing process, a “literature of 
the unword” (Disjecta 173). The art of negation and the centrality of art originating in its own impossibility 
are thus rethought in Three Dialogues. 
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E.M. Cioran conceives of a position in Beckett that is closer to skepticism and 
that explores the notion of nothingness as a start point. In 1976 Cioran wrote of Beckett: 
Ever since our first encounter, I have realized that he reached the limit that he 
perhaps began there, at the impossible, at the exceptional, at the impasse. And the 
admirable thing is that he has not budged, that having come up against a wall 
from the start, he has persevered, as valiant as he has always been: the limit-
situation as point of departure, the end as advent! (Anathemas and Admirations 
134-35; Cioran’s emphasis) 
These remarks point towards a resistance of nihilism in Beckett rethought in the form of 
endurance. Beckett does state that the entry point to his work is the maxim from Arnold 
Geulincx: Ubi nihil vales, ibi nihil velis (“where you are worth nothing, you should want 
nothing,” my translation). In a 1967 letter reprinted in Disjecta, Beckett writes: “If I were 
in the unenviable position of having to study my work my points of departure would be 
the ‘Naught is more real’. . . and the ‘Ubi nihil vales. . .’ both already in Murphy and 
neither very rational” (S. Kennedy 300). The “naught is more real” is a powerful phrase 
which is oftentimes attributed to Democritus (see 4.8).  Juxtaposing Geulincx and 
Democritus, and proposing this juxtaposition as an entry point to the study of his own 
work, is indeed effective in Beckett in that there is a productive argument to be had 
between the two philosophers on the subject of nothingness.  
The centrality of Democritus’ guffaw for Beckett, I argue in chapter four, does 
anything but prove his nihilism. Democritus’ is a laugh of indifference towards 
ontological impermanence and it derives cerebral power out of the knowledge of the 
illusory nature of earthly attachment. As to Geulincx, while Beckett’s fixation with the 
Ubi nihil vales Ibi nihil velis maxim in correspondence stretched over a long period of 
time (Tucker,“Murphy,Geulincx” 205), Beckett’s works develop in many different ways 
in the thirty years following the most Geulincxian of Beckett’s works–Murphy. While, as 
Tucker asserts, “Geulincx remains with Beckett, resurfacing by name in ‘The End,’ 
Molloy, and The Unnamable” (Tucker, “Murphy,Geulincx” 206), direct references to 
Geulincx elsewhere have not, so far, been identified, and the ‘where you are worth 
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nothing, you should want nothing’ is countered by theatrical characters that both want, 
but also do explore, an ethical dimension to their wanting. It is an ethical dimension that, 
rather than exult nothingness, indeed contributes towards evoking a sense of the infinite. 
2.5 “Souffrance” and “Suffering of being” within the 
Heideggerian existential tradition and the Levinasian “Il y a” 
Leopardi and Beckett have also been associated with the existential school of 
thought. In Leopardi, poems like “Canto Notturno di un pastore errante dell’Asia” have 
been read as marvelous expressions of existential anguish.
117
 In arguing for Leopardi’s 
and Beckett’s reintroduction in their work of desire as crucial (see chapter three), I will 
primarily argue for a Levinasian desire that is in dialectic with the teachings of, among 
others, Heidegger. The thoughts of Heidegger on nihilism greatly expand Nietzsche’s, the 
critique of whose thought comes to occupy a central place in Heidegger’s thinking in the 
1930s.
118
 Heidegger points out that to ask after ‘nothing’ is the very opposite of nihilism, 
since it is to ask after Being (Sein). According to Heidegger, asking after Being is the 
sole path towards the overcoming of nihilism.
119
  
For Heidegger, the essence of nihilism lies in the negation of the difference 
between Being and beings. In his view, Nietzsche’s proposed overcoming of nihilism 
through a revaluation of all values is in fact the consummation of nihilism as the 
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 Thinkers like Albert Camus will give expression to the existential questions prefigured by Leopardi on 
desire. Camus states that the absurdity of the human predicament lies in the “divorce between the mind that 
desires and the world that disappoints; my nostalgia for unity, this fragmented universe and the 
contradiction that binds them together” (50). 
118
 In addition to the lectures on Nietzsche, which were published over two decades after their delivery in 
1961, the essays and treatises in which Heidegger articulates his own conception of nihilism include “The 
Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is Dead”’ (1943), “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being’” (1944-6), 
and “The Essence of Nihilism” (1946-8).   
119 Nihilism is thus at work: 
. . . Where one clings to current beings and believes it is enough to take beings, as before, just as the beings 
that they are. But with this, one rejects the question of Being and treats Being as a nothing, which in a 
certain way it even ‘is’, insofar as it essentially unfolds. Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the 
oblivion of Being−that is nihilism. Nihilism thus understood is the ground for the nihilism that Nietzsche 
exposed in the first book of The Will to Power. (Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics 217) 
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forgetting of Being.
120
 To recognize the nihilism and the decline in the forgetting of 
Being is, according to Heidegger, pivotal. By recognizing the deracination brought about 
through the forgetting of Being, Heidegger’s phenomenology was perceived as leading 
individuals to “take hold of ourselves” in an authentic “resolution” of existence. 
Heidegger insists on the disclosure of being, or what for the Greeks was aletheia: 
‘truth’.121 This underlying ‘truth’ could, to a degree, be equated with the Leopardian 
“souffrance” and the Beckettian “suffering of being.” What is common to all three 
notions is that getting to their essential core is a way to move away from inauthenticity (a 
merely generalized, undistinguished, and anonymous ‘anyone’) towards authenticity 
“resoluteness of being in the face of death” (Carr 679).122 Levinas, however, repudiates 
this idea insisting that death is, on the contrary, the most Other.
123
  
Levinas claims that Heidegger, along with other existentialist thinkers, actually 
failed to focus on what he thought was the key philosophical problem after the world 
wars: how to intellectually and morally engage and transform the violent, brutal and 
inhumane tendencies that underlie the Western philosophical outlook.
124
 In 3.3, where I 
analyze Beckett’s Endgame, I argue that such a concern also troubles the immediate post-
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 “Nietzsche knew and experienced nihilism because he himself thought nihilistically. Nietzsche’s 
concept of nihilism is itself nihilistic” (Heidegger, Nietzsche 4: 22). 
121
 It has to be pointed out that by the mid-forties Heidegger will claim that “The essence of nihilism is not 
at all the affair of man, but of Being itself, and thereby of course also a matter of the essence of man, and 
only in that sequence at the same time a human concern”  (Nietzsche 4: 221). 
122
 Beyond all the differences between Heidegger and Nietzsche, both come to see (like Leopardi and 
Schopenhauer before them) art as the counterforce to nihilism. In poetry (particularly that of Hölderlin) 
Heidegger finds a language that names Being. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” published in Off the 
Beaten Track Heidegger argues that the genuine work of art “opens up, in its own way, the being of beings” 
(19). 
123
Levinas states: “The relationship with the Other is indeed posed by Heidegger as an ontological structure 
of Dasein. Then again, does solitude derive its tragic character from nothingness or from the privation of 
the Other that death accentuates? There is at least an ambiguity. I find here an invitation to go beyond the 
definition of solitude by sociality and sociality by solitude . . . In thus going back to the ontological root of 
solitude I hope to glimpse wherein this solitude can be exceeded. . . . This is when I come up against the 
problems of suffering and death . . . Before the death will be mystery and not necessarily nothingness, the 
absorption of one term by the other does not come about. I shall show finally how the duality evinced in 
death becomes the relationship with the other and time” (Time and the Other 40-41).  
124Another philosopher to famously  turn the tables on Heidegger’s emphasis on Being is Theodor Adorno 
who sees Heidegger’s thinking of Being as nihilism on account of its being profoundly “hostile to man”, 
centred as it is around “being towards death and the negating nothingness” (Against Epistemology 189). In 
Negative Dialectics Adorno speaks of the “absolute integration” (362) which reaches its consummation at 
Auschwitz. This integration is nihilist in that it reduces alterity and difference to nothing. For Adorno, then, 
as for Levinas, nihilism lies in the negation of otherness. The only way in which to counter this nihilist 
destruction of alterity for Adorno is to remain within the negative and resist the temptation of the positive.   
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war works of Beckett. In his critique of Heidegger, Levinas starts off by taking the 
Heideggerean distinction between Sein and Seindes, Being and being, and grafting onto 
these  the terms existing and existent, without, as he states, “ascribing a specifically 
existentialist meaning to these terms” (Time and the Other 44). He continues to say: 
. . . the ‘fact-of-being-thrown-in’. . . existence. It is as if the existent appeared 
only in an existence that preceded it, as though existence were independent of the 
existent, and the existent that finds itself thrown there could never become master 
of existence. It is precisely because of this that there is desertion and 
abandonment. (Time and the Other 46). 
But Levinas forcefully reiterates that “existing does not exist. It is the existent that 
exists.” Thus, he asks, how are we to approach this existing without existents? His 
answer is what he will refer to as the il y a, a state that, from more than one angle, can be 
perceived as, once more, approaching Beckett’s “suffering of being” and Leopardi’s 
atarassia  tinged by “souffrance.” The il y a is the “nocturnal dimension of the future” 
(TI 142). Against the anonymous il y a, the happiness of enjoyment affirms the I at home 
with itself. The happiness of enjoyment flourishes on the pain of need because “it 
anticipates the joy of satisfaction, which is better than ataraxy” (TI 145).125 The 
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 In Levinas, the self is initially conceived as anonymous and striving to become conscious to itself. This 
state is Levinas’ “there is” (il y a), which will be crucial in my analysis of Happy Days (see 3.4). 
Coincidentally, this is also Toshiki Tajiri’s 2012  reading of Happy Days in “Everyday Life and the Pain of 
Existence in Happy Days” in Beckett and Pain, 135-51. In the il y a there is existence, but not determined 
beings.The Il y a is forbiddingly difficult to present succinctly and the clearest way to describe it is as a 
state where all things return to nothingness, which results in an indeterminate ‘something’. What remains is 
“the impersonal ‘field of forces’ of existing”, which is neither subjective nor substantive (Time and the 
Other 46-47). For Levinas “Being is evil not because it is finite but because it is without limits” (Time and 
the Other 51). The feat of the ego is specifically that of withdrawing from the situation of impersonal 
vigilance:  “Consciousness is a rupture of the anonymous vigilance of the there is; it is already hypostasis; 
it refers to a situation where an existent is put in touch with its existing” (Time and the Other 51). 
Hypostasis is the emergence of the uniqueness of the self (Existence and Existents 83).  Hypostasis makes 
possible the virility of the subject “manifest in the phenomenon of the present in the light.” (Time and the 
Other 74). The suffering of anonymous existence demonstrates the dangers posed when the self is trying to 
determine itself self-sufficiently (see 3.4).This is in part a modification of Heidegger’s viewing existing as 
an attribute of a being.  Levinas interprets the solitude of Heidegger’s es gibt, which indeed becomes the il 
y a, as one of insomnia in which impersonal existence is “a vigilance without possible recourse to sleep” 
(Time and the Other 48-49). This impossibility of withdrawing signifies an existence that is “precisely the 
absence of all self a without-self” (Time and the Other 49). In Levinas’ later work there is a shift away 
from the prior of consciousness (which ultimately is the il y a) to the prior to consciousness, Levinas’ 
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Levinasian ‘need,’ and more emphatically Levinasian desire, (see 1.5) marks a way out of 
the state of the il y a and thus of impersonal existential pain. Levinas says, “pure existing 
is ataraxy; happiness is accomplishment. Enjoyment is made of the memory of its thirst; 
it is a quenching. It is the act that remembers its ‘potency’. . . It is . . . already the 
exceeding of being” (TI 113). 
 In chapter three, I argue that in both Leopardi and Beckett there is a Levinasian 
kind of desire which opposes the centrality of Being, particularly in the spirit of Levinas’ 
reading of Heidegger’s phenomenology. Instead there is an attempt to refocus on the 
individuality of being, the Other in all his or her otherness. 
The Other in “La Ginestra,” Endgame, and Happy Days is a unique mystery.  The 
relationship with the Other conceived in these terms is meant to be an escape from 
solitude which is other than absorption of the ego. Opening to the desire for the Other and 
thus to compassion lies in “the welcoming of the face [which] is peaceable from the first, 
for it answers to the unquenchable Desire for Infinity” (TI 150). In the coming chapters I 
attempt to show how in the infinite desire at the heart of both compassion and dark 
humour, states-of-being like  il y a, “suffering of being” and  “souffrance” are not 
conceived of as without exit.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
immemorial past or ‘an-archy.’ Levinas’ way out of the il ya, is through the confrontation with suffering in 
the face-to-face relationship and thus through an ethical response to suffering. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Making Suffering Sufferable: Desire for the Other in 
Leopardi and Beckett 
“Each of us is guilty before everyone for everyone, and I more than the others”   
Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Brothers Karamazov Book VI, IIa. 
In this chapter Lacanian and Levinasian desire are read side by side, a 
comparative reading that becomes central to the analyses that follow.
126
 I first focus on 
the founding moment of subjectivity in the desire of the O/other for Lacan and Levinas 
by briefly revisiting Lacan’s “Mirror Stage,” “Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis,” “The 
Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” and Levinas’s Time and 
the Other, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise Than Being. Drawing on Totality and 
Infinity, I discuss the Levinasian desire of the Other, located in the crucial face-to-face 
relationship and its interlacing with language and discourse. The latter connection is 
explored in Lacan through “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in 
Psychoanalysis” and “Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious”.  
The confrontation between Lacan and Levinas sets the stage for the textual 
examination. I first examine Leopardi’s post-1828 lyrical output leading up to the ciclo 
d’Aspasia poems, culminating in the analysis of one of the last canti: “La Ginestra o Il 
Fiore del Deserto.” I then proceed to a reading of Beckett’s plays Endgame and Happy 
Days, where I exclusively focus on the dramatic rather than the theatrical text.
127
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 It is here pertinent to point out that psychoanalytic studies has been a strong area of Beckett criticism, 
particularly in France. Jean-Michel Rabaté’s contribution through Beckett avant Beckett (1984) has been 
seminal, but Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have shown recurrent interest in Beckett’s work. Starting 
from the mid- 1980s, they placed his work in a political as well as a psychoanalytic perspective. As to 
Levinas, there is little criticism that makes a clear connection between the two thinkers. One good 
exception, however, is Anthony Uhlmann’s Beckett and Poststructuralism.  
127
 In using the terms “drama” and “theatre” and “dramatic” versus “theatrical text”, I follow Keir Elam 
where the dramatic text is exclusively the written text of the play and the theatrical text is the performed 
play. Elam, The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama, 2.    
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My aim is twofold. Firstly, I show that Lacan’s famous statement concerning the 
paradoxical infinitude of desire “not to want to desire and to desire [not to want to speak 
and to speak] are the same thing” (Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 235)  
can be partially placed at the root of Leopardi’s and Beckett’s art.128 The Leopardian and 
Beckettian torn subjects under scrutiny infinitely long for a reunification with the Other 
in a never-occurred perfectly blissful past, a frustrated longing whose aggression is 
transferred onto language.
 
 
On its obverse side, however,  the role of the Other could very well fit the Other 
in the Levinasian being-for-the-Other, where the self is compelled to respond to 
responsibility and the call to suffer for and address the “other” whose obscurity makes 
him Other, the latter taking precedence over the self’s freedom and decision. The 
Levinasian Other is first defined in Time and the Other where, “the Other as Other is not 
only an alter ego: the Other is what I myself am not. The Other is this, not because of the 
Other’s character, or physiognomy, or psychology, but because of the Other’s very 
alterity” (83). In Leopardi’s and Beckett’s chosen works I thus read a desire that hollows 
out and accentuates dearth, albeit it is a desire on which a challenge is  imposed, a 
challenge that compels towards responsibility and, very significantly, a very unique kind 
of Levinasian compassion.
129
 It is in the discomforting desire of the Other found in 
speech as the possibility of communication, in the Levinasian ‘saying’ rather than the 
‘said’ (see 1.5.6), in substitution for the Other, that this unique kind of compassion can be 
construed.
130
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 The thread of this argument is taken up again in chapter four, where I explore the infinite desire at the 
heart of the subversive Leopardian and Beckettian humour. 
129
 Levinas explains the conditions of possibility for compassion as follows: “The non-indifference of 
responsibility to the point of substitution for the neighbour is the source of all compassion. It is 
responsibility for the very outrage that the other, who qua other excludes me, inflicts on me, for the 
persecution with which, before any intention, he persecutes me” (OTB 166). 
130
 The linguistic encounter in Levinas is the encounter with singularity. The saying acts as a sign of the 
Levinasian being for-the-other. It is this original approach of the other that in fact founds language and 
grounds the possibility of exchange. Through the ethical encounter, through the linguistic approach of the 
other, language is not only transcended, but language itself also comes to be. Thus in acceding to language, 
while Lacan would see subjection to the Symbolic order, Levinas sees the possibility of the excess of the 
ethical, the good-beyond-being. 
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 I read the Leopardian poems as defined by the poetic I’s self-denial and the 
regressive movement of Imaginary desire (see 1.4.2), while simultaneously being 
permeated by an equally pugnacious combative spirit. This self-denial tendency is 
strongly countered by the time the reader gets to “La Ginestra.” The increasingly pressing 
concern to confront the irritating strangeness of the face-to-face encounter and the 
striving to become a desiring being for-the-Other become pivotal. In “La Ginestra” the 
individual is encouraged to seek solace by desiring to forge a social chain (“La Ginestra” 
in Canti 296-97), emerging to communicate with an otherwise hostile other and, as in the 
Levinasian Other, to find its strength in addressing and being-for-this-Other. Solidarity 
among men against the sublime in nature “contro l’empia natura / Strinse i mortali in 
social catena” (“that first joined mortals in a common pact / against unholy nature”; La 
Ginestra” lines 148-49 in Canti 296-97) is Leopardi’s ultra-filosofia.131 This same 
alliance in misery is also manifested in the Operette morali in “Dialogo di Plotino e 
Porfirio,” where the two characters finally agree to forge a pact which prefigures the 
“social catena” in “La Ginestra.” This social chain represents an attempt at resisting the 
burden of human existence through shouldering responsibility for the other, who is 
ultimately Other.
132
   
My second aim is to concentrate on the latter desire in the Leopardian and 
Beckettian literary subjects and explore how desire also resists nihilism and is best 
understood and expressed in terms of its animating principles−the indeclinable 
obligations to address, to be held responsible for and to be compassionate towards the 
Other. In Endgame and Happy Days I contrast the interminable desire of protagonists 
Clov, Nell, and Winnie to their difficult task in facing the other person who, directly or 
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 For Leopardi philosophy always entails a system of sorts: “ Frattanto però io dico che qualunque uomo 
ha forza di pensare da sé, qualunque s’interna colle sue proprie facoltà e, dirò così, co’ suoi propri passi, 
nella considerazione delle cose, in somma qualunque vero pensatore, non può assolutamente a meno di non 
formarsi, o di non seguire, o generalmente di non avere un sistema” (“In the meantime, however, I would 
say that any man who has a mind of his own and is able to think, anyone who immerses himself with his 
own faculties, and, so to speak, with his own thinking processes in the consideration of everything around 
him, in short any real thinker, cannot  seriously  follow and formulate his thoughts without having a 
system”; Zibaldone  945,2; my translation).   
132 Society for Leopardi is characterized by its Machiavellism: “Veramente e perfettamente 
compassionevoli, non si possono trovare fra gli uomini” (“Truly and perfectly compassionate human beings 
cannot be found”; Zibaldone 4287, 1 my translation). I conceive the Leopardian Other as characterized by 
his otherness in spite of which he/she needs to be addressed.  
77 
 
indirectly, has called the ‘self’ to be ethically responsible. In Endgame, the direct and 
unmediated urge to speak is unmistakable in the dialogue. Happy Days contains lengthy 
monologues punctured by little response. The latter aspect highlights the urge to escape 
the tormenting and self-absorbing mechanisms of the mind, and particularly the 
unconscious, behind this speech. The vivid recognition of one’s pain and that of others 
compels these characters to want to take the sting out of desire and prevent further 
suffering from coming in. This becomes possible not through cleansing oneself of desire, 
as was the case in Proust and, in part, Leopardi in “A se stesso” (see 2.1), but through 
complete and lasting renunciation of desire.  In the latter renunciation lies the admittance 
not only of desire’s perennial remainder that ineluctably resists but also of the possibility 
of a desire through which one can intuit the infinite.  
In Leopardi, this infinite desire is present in the same dialectical process that 
characterizes Leopardian art which does not accept totalizing negation as much as it 
refuses absolute affirmation. This aspect was already highlighted in the nineteenth-
century by Francesco De Sanctis who pointed out that the affirmation implied in the 
negation in Leopardi underscores the important reflection on desire (Leopardi 276). 
Leopardian art is founded on an inconclusive open-endedness which points towards an 
essential human desire that, even in its minimalist residue, ultimately remains. In 
Endgame and Happy Days I read a similarly inexhaustible desire that, on the one hand, in 
its perforating force perennially burdens the being. On the other hand, however, it finds 
its expression through being for and addressing the Other. This desire takes the shape of 
Clov and Hamm’s and Nell and Nagg’s problematic being “for-the-Other” and Winnie’s 
desperate attempt to be a being-for-Willie, the latter in his radical otherness and absent 
presence.  
The Leopardian poetic ‘I’ in the later poems and the dramatic protagonists that 
mark Beckett’s move from prose to drama133 oscillate between being torn subjects unable 
                                                 
133
 As Séan Kennedy points out the move from prose to drama was also marked by an ethical concern: 
“Beckett’s impasse was ethical as well as aesthetic in that it threatened an end to representation in both the 
linguistic and political senses of that word, and it may be that Beckett’s turn to theatre after the Trilogy was 
an attempt to re-negotiate the terms of his fidelity to trauma in ways that allowed him to bear witness to 
more than his felt inadequacy”; introduction, Samuel Beckett: History, Memory, Archive, 6. 
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to reconcile with themselves while being inexorably bent on addressing, suffering and, 
almost against their will, desiring-the-good-of-the-Other. In short these poetic voices and 
dramatic personae are here being construed as paradoxically capable of a unique kind of 
compassion.
134
    
In Leopardi’s later poetry and Beckett’s early drama one can sense the recognition 
of the inextinguishable human desire emerging out of the struggle between the Symbolic 
and the static image of the Imaginary. It is in the struggle between the bodily wanting of 
the union-in-Otherness which is life-desire in the Symbolic and what Lacan terms 
‘demand’ which is conceptually close to non-desire in the Imaginary (the desire not to 
desire or anti-desire, see 1.4.2), that the infinite desire for the Other can be evinced. 
There is indeed parallelism between Leopardi and Beckett in their 
acknowledgement of desire as the ultimate minimal remainder that can bring about a 
unique kind of compassion in their philosophy of resistance to the sense of nothingness. 
In this light, Beckett’s antidote to the aporia of living is, I argue, more in sync with that 
of Leopardi than has been acknowledged so far.  
3.1 Lacanian versus Levinasian Desire 
I now turn to a comparative reading of Lacanian and Levinasian desire which will 
be crucial for the textual analysis of Leopardi’s poetry and Beckett’s plays. Lacan and 
Levinas (who wrote and lectured about similar themes at about the same time in Paris) 
represent two competing methodologies: the psychoanalytic (see 1.4) and the 
phenomenological-philosophical (1.5). Notwithstanding this, desire rooted in subjectivity 
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 The search for the good is only applicable to Levinasian desire. When it comes to Lacanian desire, 
Lacan himself shows that the search for the good and the expression of desire stand in each other’s way. He 
writes: “The dimension of the good erects a strong wall across the path of our desire. It is, in fact, at every 
moment and always, the first barrier that we have to deal with” (Seminar VII 230). At a later point in the 
same seminar Lacan is even more explicit: “Our daily experience proves to us that beneath what we call the 
subject’s defenses, the paths leading to the pursuit of the good . . . reveal themselves to us constantly . . . 
the whole analytical experience [then] is no more than an invitation to the revelation of his desire [as that 
which stands in the way of the good–and vice versa]” (Seminar VII 221). An ethics of psychoanalysis aims 
the patient away from a pursuit of the good and toward her desire, which points the patient toward her 
Unconscious. The conflicts of the Unconscious as ethical are seen more clearly in the Real onto which the 
grafting of a sense of the moral as a basic driving force takes place: “Moral action is, in effect, grafted on to 
the real” (Seminar VII 21). 
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is problematized in both authors and is construed in both thinkers as the state of being of 
over-determined agents resulting from external as well as internal practices. For both 
Lacan and Levinas the subject is a social subject, one categorized in terms prescribed by 
the Symbolic/social order. Indeed both authors are interested in how these over-
determined agents structure the subject’s ethicality ethical in the sense of responsibility 
to oneself and, above all, for others. Furthermore, for both Lacan and Levinas, the 
subject’s sexed position calls the latter into relation with another and his or her ability to 
speak is predicated on a preexisting system of meaning.
135
   
Lacan and Levinas indeed share some basic interests and, as David Ross Fryer 
claims, “Both Levinas and Lacan view their projects as attempts to intervene in the 
liberal humanist constructions of ethical systems, examining and questioning the nature 
and the role of the subject in moral action” (The Intervention of the Other 19). In the first 
chapter, I introduced Lacan’s psychoanalytic study of subjectivity in the unveiling of its 
rooting in desire, leading to the understanding of psychic conflict lodged within the 
Unconscious. As explained in 1.4, Lacan is concerned with the way the vicissitudes of 
the drives are manifested in language and thus meaning is seen as occluded and only 
partially available through an examination of the extraneous. In Levinasian thought, on 
the other hand, meaning emerges through strict philosophical analysis. Levinas’ Totality 
and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority and Otherwise Than Being deal with language but 
more from a conscious, moral and, at least in the former work, from a perception that still 
recalls a phenomenological angle.
136
 Human consciousness in Levinas is an essential 
starting point, although transcendence is posited beyond mundane consciousness.
137
 For 
Levinas, I argue below, it is the ‘an-archic’ foundation from the past that structures 
subjects’ desire for-the-Other.138 Both Lacan and Levinas thus deal with the said deep 
                                                 
135
 Only for Levinas, however, and I shall amplify on this below, is this pre-existing system indicative of an 
ethical order prior to signification. 
136
 In the first book Levinas focuses on ethics and alterity, in the second he deals with the modalities that 
orient a subject that is sensitive to otherness. Otherwise Than Being can also be read as a revision of 
Totality and Infinity influenced by Jacques Derrida’s 1978 reading of the earlier work in his essay 
“Violence and Metaphysics: An essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas.” 
137
 Unlike Edmund Husserl, Levinas will insist on a radical transcendence; a transcendence beyond human 
consciousness. See 2.5. 
138
 An-archy is the immemorial past but also the pure future, both existing outside synchronous time. An-
archy is a mode of temporality not representable by historical narrative or rational discourse. If the 
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structure of ethical subjectivity, expressed as the ethical demand of the Other as the 
grounding hermeneutic horizon.
139
 
3.1.1 Lacanian alongside Levinasian Desire 
I now briefly retrace the two notions of desire by reading Lacanian alongside 
Levinasian desire. I then revisit each thinker separately to consider issues relevant to this 
study but which prove tricky when read alongside. The point of departure for both 
Lacanian and Levinasian desire is the intervention of the other. The linguistic system 
undergirds both Lacan’s and Levinas’ thought and the linguistic order emerges into their 
respective modes of thinking.  In Lacan it is that through which the subject comes to be 
while for Levinas it is that by which the subject becomes situated.
140
 For both Lacan and 
Levinas the ‘self’ is not an established ego prior to its encounter with the other. It is the 
other imposing its existence on the ‘self’ that requires the latter to emerge out of its 
solitude and take on an identity.  Such an identity is for both Lacan and Levinas an 
identity of the other. As a result, the desire of the other becomes, in different ways for the 
two thinkers, the desire of the self. The intervention of the other thus marks the shift, in 
Lacan and Levinas, out of the humanist paradigm into the post-humanist (see 1.1). The 
self now finds itself as subject in and through the eyes of the other. It is in the creation of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
intelligible is correlated to vision, this in turn opens up the question of consciousness. Consciousness is the 
directedness of an ‘ I’ toward its object of thought whereby the object of thought remains object, being kept 
within the realm of the self and the same. In vision as intentionality, the other is reduced to an object of 
presence. In this, the temporality of thought as re-presentation is privileged. Levinas, on the other hand, 
privileges the diachronic reading of temporality. In this manner time can be examined beyond the confines 
of being and representation.The immemorial is thus the impossibility of the dispersion of time to assemble 
itself in the present, the insurmountable diachrony of time. 
139
 David Ross Fryer aptly defines ethical subjectivity: “It means that in studying both ethics and 
subjectivity, our focus is on those things that structure us . . . ethical in the sense of being originally bound 
to each other in ways that cannot, or at least should not, be denied or ignored, ethical in the sense that, at 
our very core, we, as subjects, have commitments that we need to be aware of, what we need to nurture and 
cultivate, and that it is these commitments that make us who and what we are.” (The Intervention of the 
Other 18). 
140
 Whereas for Lacan the linguistic is primarily a symbolic order, for Levinas the linguistic has a special 
relation to the ontological, a special relationship to Being itself. For Lacan, the linguistic order is the end in 
itself. The linguistic order constructs in the subject a split, a breach. For Levinas, the resistance of the 
subject to the linguistic is a resistance of the singular in the face of the universal. The subject who emerges 
as constituted by but resistant to language is post-humanist.  
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the imaginary ego-self in Lacan and the construction of the subject in Levinas as marked 
by the linguistic intervention of the Other that desire is rooted. 
Having said this, a key difference remains because Lacan’s critique of ego 
psychology and the resulting de-centred subject (see 1.4.1) is conceived differently than 
in Levinas, where the ‘self’ is still whole when it is called to assume its prior obligation 
and take on responsibility for the other. When this happens there is no conflict of 
conscious and unconscious desires and no fiction of unity to which it falsely adheres. It is 
unified as entirely for the other person and it redirects its desire to the other as Other. In 
this, a Levinasian humanism of the other person retains the unity associated with 
humanism, but none of the self-sufficient power of the humanist self. Instead, this self-
now-subject is decidedly created by and for the other. What I mean by this is that rather 
than going in the direction of what Lacan conceives of as a torn subject, Levinas redirects 
desire towards the other person to invite transcendence beyond self-centric needs and 
towards the subsequent discovery of a deeper and stronger desire than that of self-
interest, self-sufficiency and individualism.  
Thus while in Lacan the sense of self comes from the other in an endless and 
elusive search for gratification of one’s relational needs that ultimately results in internal 
aggression, in Levinas, the subject declares, like the Biblical Abraham−“Heneni”−“Here 
I am!”141 understanding that the ‘I” is responsible for the other’s suffering and that “the 
node of the subjective is knotted in ethics understood as responsibility” (Ethics and 
Infinity 95).
142
 It is also pertinent to reiterate that whereas for Lacan the Other is in 
language itself, in the Symbolic order, for Levinas the Other is beyond both ontology and 
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 In Otherwise Than Being Levinas explains: “The ego stripped by the trauma of persecution of its 
scornful and imperialist subjectivity, is reduced to the ‘here I am,’ in a transparency without opaqueness, 
without heavy zones propitious for evasion. ‘Here I am’ as a witness of the Infinite, but a witness that does 
not thematize what it bears witness of, and whose truth is not the truth of representation, is not evidence. 
There is witness, a unique structure, an exception to the rule of being, irreducible to representation, only of 
the Infinite. The Infinite does not appear to him that bears witness to it. On the contrary the witness belongs 
to the glory of the Infinite. It is by the voice of the witness that the glory of the Infinite is glorified.” (OTB 
146). 
142
 The meaning of suffering in Levinas’ Time and the Other is directly linked to the solitude of the existent 
to which reference is made in the analysis of Happy Days: “Pain and sorrow are the phenomena to which 
the solitude of the existent is finally reduced” (68). The difference between existing and existence is 
explored in 2.5. 
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the linguistic system: “this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with 
an existent–precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being” (Totality and 
Infinity 48). This “prior to” is also the case with ethicality where for Lacan the 
Unconscious, in which desire and the ethical are rooted, is both prior to and is figured by 
the Symbolic order.
143
 For Levinas a conception of the ethical is possible beyond 
language and ontology in the Levinasian ‘an-archy.’144  
In spite of these divergences, I agree with Critchley when he suggests that the 
Lacanian conception of the Other can be woven through Levinas’ version of the Other, as 
are all three Lacanian registers. As Critchley puts it, the Levinasian subject’s 
confrontation with the Other, like the Lacanian one, is emptied out by a “non-intentional 
affectivity” that “tears into my subjectivity like an explosion, like a bomb that detonates 
without warning, like a bullet that hits me in the dark, fired from an unseen gun by an 
unknown assailant” (Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity 190). Critchley, however, stretches the 
argument to correlate Lacan’s description of the encounter with the Real to Levinas’ 
description of the encounter with the face.  This is clearly too neat a grafting of Lacan 
onto Levinas, and as Ross Fryer points out, it overlooks that the Real only is in relation to 
the Symbolic, while the face is an-archic and stands outside the realm of discursive 
signification including the Lacanian Symbolic (The Intervention of the Other 217-8). 
The grafting of Lacan onto Levinas that I here suggest is loose, hinting at 
similarity not congruence. Furthermore, it is pertinent to clarify that in the textual 
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 On the concept of “prior to” of crucial importance is Lacan’s treatment of the drive with which he deals 
in the Seminar, Book XI, translated as The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. 
144
 Indeed for Levinas it is not just the possibility of the good-beyond-being but also the God beyond being, 
into which issue I do not specifically delve. However, for Levinas the word God signifies something 
otherwise than presence and immanence: “the idea of God causes the breakup of the thinking that−as 
investment, synopsis, and synthesis−merely encloses in a presence, re-presents, brings back to presence, or 
lets be” (Of God who comes to mind 62-3). Similarly the good-beyond-being is a good beyond presence. It 
is in disrupting the idea of “presence” that objects can stand as subjects thereby becoming other than same. 
Consciousness is the reduction of all things to being and presence and therefore to the same. The problem 
of consciousness is also a problem of temporality, for in consciousness all is remembered as an event, an 
occurrence, with a beginning−an origin. Here everything can be reduced to a phenomenon, and as such to 
presentation and representation. In reducing the past to a modification of the present it becomes 
synchronous with the present and as such lumped in the register of the same. The “ethical encounter” with 
the other as an-archic is diachronous not synchronous with the present. It is not reducible to the same but, 
rather, exists within the realm of the other. It shakes consciousness and thus shakes immanence in its 
opening up to transcendence. 
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analyses that follow Lacanian and Levinasian desire will be pitted against each other and 
not superimposed.  At the centre of Levinas’ thought then, one could make a connection 
between the unique, irreducible face-to-face encounter and the Lacanian Imaginary, 
which, in its stark confrontation of pain and suffering, calls out for pity, responsibility 
and unique compassion. The Levinasian Other, recalls (but is not equivalent to) the 
dreaded neighbour-as-Stranger, the Lacanian Real, while the language that mediates the 
Other, also in its upbraiding, accusative aspect (see 1.5.7), could be construed as 
conceptually close to the Symbolic.
145
 From the viewpoint of the Symbolic order it is also 
relevant to point out that for Levinas the Other bears the same responsibility for me as I 
do for him. The reference to the other person in the social chain proposed in “La 
Ginestra,” Hamm and Nagg (Endgame) and Willie (Happy Days) are here conceived as 
such an Other mediated by an accusative language that elects the poetic voice in “La 
Ginestra,” Clov, Nell and Winnie respectively. The latter have to endure, shoulder the 
responsibility and find in themselves the unique compassion that results from this 
encounter. 
3.1.2 Revisiting Lacanian Desire 
I will now turn to Lacanian desire per se, briefly revisiting its emergence in 
relation to the subsequent literary analyses. I would like to reiterate that for the purposes 
of this study, I am mainly interested in the French psychoanalyst’s theory of desire as an 
infinite and paradoxical force and its effect on language.
146
 I certainly do not consider 
Leopardi’s and Beckett’s art an illustration of preconceived psychoanalytic concepts. 
Since Lacan’s theory refers to ‘organic’ human beings and not to the deliberate creations 
of poetic voices or dramatic personae, I cannot directly relate Lacan’s timing of the 
subject’s splitting (according to the three orders) to either poetic voices or dramatic 
                                                 
145
 The elusive concept of the Real is thus here taken to be central to Lacan’s theories of subjectivity but I 
am not making a one-to-one equation between the face of the other and the encounter with the Real. 
Furthermore, even though certain works have emerged that focus more on the Real as the key to Lacan, 
such a focus is not unanimously recognized as essential for a proper understanding of Lacan’s work. Van 
Pelt’s The Other side of Desire: Lacan’s Theory of the Registers (2000), for instance, has very little to say 
about the Real, focusing almost exclusively on the other two registers. 
146
 In particular I refer to spoken language, extending the concept to include the words spoken by a poetic 
voice and by dramatic personae. 
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characters. While I attempt to illustrate how the notion of desire manifests itself in the 
poems and plays under discussion, I do not make reference to Lacan’s name-of-the-
Father. It also appears to be highly reductive to classify Leopardi’s poetic voice(s) or 
Beckett’s dramatic characters in terms of psychological symptoms such as hysteria or 
psychosis. Instead, I propose that consciousness and language by themselves can be 
examined with respect to the suffering in Leopardi’s poetic voice(s) and Beckett’s 
dramatic personae. 
As explored in the Mirror Stage essay, alluded to in 1.4.1, the emergence of 
Lacanian desire takes place in the linguistic expression of a repressed longing to return to 
a never-occurred primordial perfection. The foundational moment for the creation of this 
fictive unity of the self occurs in this very stage, which results in alienation and 
aggression toward the other in the self. The resolution of this nodal point is in the Oedipal 
complex which significantly marks the shift from the duality of the Imaginary to the 
trifold structure of the Symbolic order, marking subjectivity in relation to the Other.  
The Lacanian Other, thus, never ‘is” (see 1.4.2) and in both the Leopardian poetic 
‘I’s desire for the Other and the characters in Endgame and Happy Days to whom I 
attribute this role, the Other remains distant, elusive, larger-than-life, in some cases 
almost a fiction. It is precisely in this fictive quality in the formation of the subject and its 
own unconscious feelings of not-knowing and incompleteness that the Unconscious is 
able to exert its power (see 1.3; 1.4). 
The poetic “I” in Leopardi’s later canti as well as Beckett’s Clov, Nell and 
Winnie are, when perceived from this specific angle, Lacanian subjects in search of a 
completeness that never existed and they come to see themselves as defined by the 
discourse of the Other. Desire has been displaced onto other objects, but particularly onto 
language and it is through the upbraiding accusative aspect of the latter that they attempt 
to mediate their way to the other.  
In “Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis,” Lacan focuses on the displacement of 
desire onto the image of the fragmented body. He says, “Aggressiveness presents itself in 
analysis as an aggressive intention and as an image of corporal dislocation” (Écrits 84). I 
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argue that this fragmentation of the body reflecting aggression is present in both the self-
denial bent of the speaking “I” of Leopardi’s later poems and the truncated bodies in 
Endgame and Happy Days. I read the same internal aggression that Lacan claims to be 
created during the formation of the ego, and the fundamentally alienating aspect of the 
taking up of an identity via the splitting of the subject, in the combative and pugnacious 
spirit that permeates Leopardi’s poems, particularly the post-1828 poems, and the 
aggressively cynical reactions of Clov, Nell and Winnie. This is the same aggression 
which knows its birth, as Lacan points out, in an “erotic relationship, in which the human 
individual fixates on an image that alienates him from himself” (Écrits 92).  
I argue that this same Lacanian desire displaced onto a pugnacious language of  
self-denial in Leopardi and a language of negation that attempts to mediate between 
truncated bodies in Beckett is not only alienating, and therefore betraying, but also 
competitive because the subject’s internal tension determines “ the awakening of his 
desire for the object of the other’s desire” (Écrits 92).  
3.1.3 Revisiting Levinasian Desire 
But the Leopardian and Beckettian subjects are also bent on their being-for-the-
Other, and I read this urge for a rupture of being in the desire of the other person as 
approaching the Levinasian conception of desire. Indeed where Lacan sees aggression 
and competition, Levinas sees responsibility and obligation. In this perception Levinas is 
frontally attacking Heidegger’s phenomenology in the tradition of hermeneutic 
philosophy of Being (see 1.5, 2.5). In Time and the Other Levinas argues: “sociality in 
Heidegger is found in the subject alone; . . . Against this collectivity of the side-by-side, I 
have tried to oppose the ‘I-you’ collectivity” (93).147 Levinas audaciously asserts that 
ethics and alterity (“the Other . . . is what I am not,” Existence and Existents 98), rather 
than ontology, is primary: “Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power . . . a 
philosophy of injustice” (Totality and Infinity 46).  In Otherwise Than Being ethical 
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 Among others who reject the collectivity of the side-by-side in the name of the “I-You” is Jean Paul 
Sartre (Being and Nothingness part 3, chapter 1). For Levinas, however, Sartre’s criticism is inadequate 
because the “I-you” it proposes remains an antagonistic relationship of two freedoms, a failure of 
communication. 
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philosophy is one based on sensibility which in itself leads to signification beyond 
ontology: “Western philosophy has never doubted the gnoseological, and consequently 
ontological, structure of signification. To say that in sensibility this structure is 
secondary, and that sensibility qua vulnerability nonetheless signifies, is to recognize a 
sense somewhere else than in ontology” (64). 
Levinas proposes that only the ethical relation permits us to transcend the 
isolation and aloneness of Being.
148
 He repudiates the Heideggerian notion of being-
toward-Death and instead he defines death as the most Other (see 2.5).
149
 This idea is in 
part proposed by Beckett in Proust when he claims, “Death has not required us to keep a 
day free” (Proust 17). Through this claim of ethics as first philosophy, Levinas 
consolidated a far-reaching critique of the Western philosophical tradition, primarily 
Judeo-Christian philosophy. Leopardi had been among the first to launch an attack on 
such philosophical tradition. This is testified to in many indices collected in Trattato delle 
passioni and in statements like “convertir la ragione in passione” (“convert rationality to 
passion”; Zibaldone 293,1; my translation).150  Philosophy according to Levinas−but 
again this was already the case with Leopardi’s attack on the “ragionevolezza di questo 
secolo” (“reasonableness of this century”; Zibaldone 1816, 2; my translation)−is not 
simply the Greek Sophia the love of wisdom, but rather, “the wisdom of love at the 
service of love” (Otherwise Than Being 162).151  
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 Derrida has noted that the history of Western philosophy-especially the philosopher Levinas is 
criticizing here, Heidegger, has not understood existence in this way. Instead, “being is nothing outside the 
existent, does not precede it; and therefore we simply cannot speak, as Levinas does, of “subordination” 
because it is not a ‘foreign power’ or ‘hostile neutral force’” (Writing and Difference 136). 
149
 Levinas says: “It is not the finitude of being that constitutes the essence of time, as Heidegger thinks, but 
its infinity. The death sentence does not approach as an end of being, but as an unknown, which as such 
suspends power. The constitution of the interval that liberates being from the limitation of fate calls for 
death. The nothingness of the interval–a dead time–is the production of infinity…” (TI 284). 
150
 Leopardi explains the difference in the rationale between a philosophy for the self and a philosophy of 
love for others: “ chi segue il suo odio fa per se, chi l’amore per altrui, chi si vendica giova a se, chi 
benefica, giova altrui, ne’ alcuno è mai tanto infiammato per giovare altrui quanto a se” (“he who follows 
his own hate  does it for himself, he who follows love, does so for others, he who seeks revenge delights in 
himself, he who does good, delights in others, no one is, however, as inflamed to delight others as  
himself”; 55,1; my translation).   
151
  Levinas’ demand of “ethics as first philosophy” is also heavily criticized by, among others, Alain 
Badiou who says that Levinas’ credo is based on a nostalgic, historicist vision of what philosophy should 
be, namely, an anti-philosophy. Badiou insists that in order to “make explicit the axioms of thought that 
decide an orientation such as Levinas’s: . . . the ethical primacy of the Other over the Same requires that the 
experience of alterity be ontologically ‘guaranteed’ as the experience of a distance, or an essential non-
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The wisdom of love opens a path to Levinas’ notion of substitution constituted as 
the foundation of subjectivity, which I construe as foreshadowed by Leopardi’s 
conception of compassion.
152
 In Leopardi compassion is possible at the sight of others’ 
effort. Compassion “mette l’anima in una certa azione, e le comunica una certa attività 
interiore, la rompe ec. L’esercita da lontano ec. E par ch’ella ne ritorni più forte, ed 
esercitata ec.” (“it puts one’s soul into action, and it communicates a certain interior 
activity, it ruptures  the soul. It exerts pressure on the soul from a distance. And it seems 
as if the soul emerges with renewed strength”; Zibaldone 2017,3;  my translation).  
The Levinasian substitution is also prefigured by Schopenhauer’s notion of 
compassion where, despite the fact that it is discovered when desire is stilled, the 
initiative is towards the other: “for the relationship between . . . egoism and compassion 
to emerge in any given person, it is not enough for that person to possess wealth and see 
others in need; he must also know what wealth can do both for himself and for others; the 
suffering of others must not only present itself, he must also know what suffering is” (1: 
321).  In Levinasian substitution, the one-for-the-other is prior to any sense of the self, 
and in the approach whether it is, as we shall argue, the notion of the face, proximity or 
the ‘Saying’ the other binds, makes responsible, holds hostage. 
  As introduced in 1.5, desire for the Other is possible for Levinas through 
metaphysical desire understood, in Lacanian terms, for the Other as wholly other, 
enigmatic, inaccessible, if not also threatening (Totality and Infinity 42-3). Contrary to 
the long lineage from Leopardi to Lacan whereby desire is primarily characterized by 
lack, in Levinas desire is contrasted with need and is not a longing for a return to the self: 
“metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything that can simply 
complete it. It is like goodness: the desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it” (Totality and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
identity, the traversal of which is the ethical experience itself. But nothing in the simple phenomenon of the 
other contains such a guarantee. And this simply because the finitude of the other’s appearing certainly can 
be conceived as resemblance, or as imitation, and thus lead back to the logic of the Same. The other always 
resembles me too much for the hypothesis of an originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true” 
(Ethics 22-3). 
152
 As already mentioned in the introduction, Levinas clearly states that his notion of substitution goes 
beyond the layman’s notion of compassion. 
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Infinity 34).
153
 Starting from the ‘I’ as ‘the same’ par excellence, Levinas thus searches 
for a radically transcendent alterity, which he discovers in the metaphysical and ethical 
alterity of the face that not only questions the ‘I’ but arouses it to responsibility.154 
Drawing on Platonic doctrine, in particular the form of the Good (see 1.1), and in a 
reaction to Enlightenment thought, Levinas abandons the world of free voluntary, self-
determining agents for an ethical sphere of dependency and, to a certain extent, 
susceptibility. Levinas stresses that “to be oneself, otherwise than being, to be dis-
interested, is to bear the wretchedness and bankruptcy of the other, and even the 
responsibility that the other can have for me” (Totality and Infinity 109). 155 This is an 
echo of Leopardi’s compassion which implies an identification with the suffering subject. 
The state of being a hostage requires always to have one degree of responsibility more, 
“the responsibility for the responsibility of the other” (Totality and Infinity 109).156   
The Levinasian subject that emerges from the later work is not simply a subject 
struggling against totality and towards infinity but also a linguistic subject struggling to 
put forth his or her responsibility before and behind the system of language / Being that 
structures her, putting the ‘Saying’ over and beyond the ‘Said’ (Otherwise than Being 
47). This Levinasian desire of the absolutely Other, which is not in the ordinary sense 
gratifying or desirable, is, in its pure, bruising strangeness, more like the Burkean  
Sublime than the Beautiful. 
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 Desire for Levinas aims at the Other, and not, as Socrates would have it, at immortality (TI 63). Desire 
aims at the above-mentioned ‘infinity’, and not at ‘totality’. See 1.5. 
154
 As explained in 2.5, while ontology for Levinas promotes freedom and totality, “the freedom that is the 
identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other” (TI 42), in metaphysics the other 
critiques the freedom of the “I.” Indeed metaphysics, as Levinas puts it, “discovers the dogmatism and 
naïve arbitrariness of its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the exercise of ontology . . .  
[it] calls into question the exercise of the same” (TI 43). Metaphysics as understood by Levinas opens up to 
infinity. The discovery of the “otherwise than being” is what enables the emergence out of the Il ya (see 
2.5). Levinas says: “The one in the- one-for-the-other is not a being outside of being, but signification, 
evacuation of Being’s essence for the other. The self is a substitution for the other, subjectivity as a 
subjection to everything, as a supporting everything and supporting the whole. The incessant murmur of the 
there is strikes with absurdity the active transcendental ego, beginning and present.” (OTB 164). 
155
 “. . . dis-interested,” says Levinas, means “disengaged from all participation” (Totality and Infinity 109). 
In an interview Levinas said that the Other is one “who is strange and indifferent to you, who belongs 
neither to the order of your interest nor to your affections,” but “at the same time [he or she] matters to 
you” (Is it Righteous to Be? 48). 
156
 Levinas is adamant that the encounter with the Other is primarily “pure communication as the 
communication of communication.” Quoted in Bloechl, The Face of the Other and the Trace Of God, 99. 
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This argument connects once again, as already introduced in 1.2.2, to 
Schopenhauer, who views the subjective component of the artist’s cognition as directly 
related to the feeling of the Sublime. The rupture of being for-the Other in Levinas thus 
comes close to offering a Schopenhauerian ‘disintegration-of-being’ in the artist’s 
cognition of the Sublime. The Levinasian desire, however, is deepened by its centrifugal 
movement and in rupturing the being it does not disintegrate it but, on the contrary, it 
inspires it.
157
 
3.2 Compassion as Pietas to overcome Ataraxia: Desire for the 
O/other in Leopardi  
Desire for Leopardi is primarily a thwarted desire for happiness that intrinsically 
defines the being in its bios: “la felicità che l’uomo naturalmente desidera è una felicità 
temporale, una felicità materiale” (“the happiness that man naturally desires is a temporal 
happiness; a material happiness”; Zibaldone 3497,1; my translation).158 It is thus a 
corporal desire that forever carries the scar of its impossible search for happiness (see 
1.2.1). 
159
  
                                                 
157
 H.C. Hutchens, when speaking about the notion of artwork in Levinas says: “The artwork is an Other, or 
rather, it conjures the Other in an unmediated way that the mind of the viewer cannot fully thematize. This 
very obscurity of the image uncovers the capacity for exposure to the artwork in pre-originary ways that the 
mind has not chosen.” (Levinas 143) 
158
 In Zibaldone 3497,1 Leopardi states: “L’uomo non desidera la felicità assolutamente, ma la felicità 
umana . . . Ei la desidera somma e infinita, ma nel suo genere, non infinita in questo senso ch’ella 
comprenda la felicità del bue, della pianta, dell’Angelo e tutti I generi di felicità ad uno ad uno. Infinita è 
realmente la sola felicità di Dio. Quanto all’infinità, l’uomo desidera una felicità come la divina, ma quanto 
all’altre qualità ed al genere di essa felicità, l’uomo non potrebbe già veramente desiderare la felicità di 
Dio.” (“The human being does not desire absolute happiness, but human happiness . . . He desires it in its 
entirety and infinity, but still specific to the human context; he does not desire its infinity in the sense that it 
would include the happiness of the bull, the plant, the Angel and all forms of happiness one by one . . . The 
only really infinite happiness is the happiness of God. As to infinity, the human being desires a happiness 
that is like the divine one, but as to the other qualities and to the kind of happiness, the human being cannot 
really desire the happiness of God”; my translation). The implication here is that desire of the infinite, as in 
Levinas, has to pass through the difficult desire of the finite. 
159
 The dictates of the philosophy of Antiquity, essentially based on a direct relationship with nature and a 
continuous dialogue with transcendence, are the vehicles through which Leopardi re-proposes the continual 
and essential search for happiness. This ancient essence of life is proximate to the Nietzschean innocence of 
becoming. This ancient élan vital has remained in the collective consciousness as only a memory of past 
happiness. The Leopardian passions are similar to pulsations from the unconscious and, as already alluded, 
prefigure Freudian thought. Leopardi will also prefigure Freud in arguing, in the posthumously-collected 
Memorie della mia vita, that psychological conflicts within the individual know their origin in infancy and 
within the family (1205,1) and also in his argument against the possibility of fully realizing pleasure which 
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The Leopardian desire for the other person, a difficult kind of desire, is proposed 
in his reflections when he states: “dopo che l’eroismo è sparito dal mondo, e invece v’è 
entrato l’universale egoismo, amicizia vera e capace di far sacrificare l’uno amico 
all’altro, in persone che ancora abbiano interessi e desideri, è ben difficilissima”  
(“following the disappearance from this world of the heroic ideal, and witnessing  instead 
the ushering in of universal egoism, real friendship capable of self-sacrifice for the other, 
in human beings who still have interests and desires, is very difficult to find”; Zibaldone 
104,1; my translation). Desiring the other person is problematic because social relations 
are at the mercy of the dictates of civilization: “Ne inferirai che dunque l’uomo è fatto per 
vivere in società. Ma io dico anzi che questa inclinazione o desiderio, benché paia 
naturale, è un effetto della società”  (“You will thus infer that the human being was 
created in order to live in society. But this inclination or desire, albeit appearing natural, 
is in effect forged by society”; Zibaldone 230,1; my translation). In 3117,1 Leopardi 
continues to say: “Quindi è che anche nei tempi moderni e civili la compassione non è 
propria se non degli animi colti e dei naturalmente delicati e sensibili, cioè fini e vivi” 
(“Thus it is also the case in modern and civil times that compassion is only to be 
associated with those who are learned, and whose disposition is delicate and sensitive, 
that is rarefied and alive”; my translation).  
As is the case with Levinas, it is thus in the act of being compassionate towards a 
hostile and threatening other that Leopardi construes magnanimity.
160
 The Leopardian 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Freud exposes in Civilization and its Discontents. In the posthumous collection Trattato delle passioni 
childhood seems to encompass the strong passions of remorse, hope, guilt, absolution, pain and pleasure 
which alternate in succession.  Leopardian passions aspire to approach the intensity of Antiquity but they 
are contrasted by the constant attempt of modern man towards rationalization.  For assonance between 
Leopardi and Nietzsche see M.A. Rigoni, Saggi sul pensiero leopardiano,78. See  also the introduction of  
C. Galimberti, Intorno a Leopardi.  
160
Although on other occasions Leopardi states the very opposite (and this is the case  with the citation on 
the next page), in Zibaldone 1724,1 the Italian poet-philosopher says that the capacity to love oneself less 
in order to love others is found more abundantly in elderly people: “l’amicizia è più facile tra un vecchio o 
maturo, . . . perché oggi, sparite le illusioni, e non trovandosi più la virtù ne’ giovani, I vecchi sono più a 
portata di amarsi meno, di essere stanchi dell’egoismo perché disingannati del mondo, e quindi di amare gli 
altri. Perciò è vero che la virtù, come predica Cicerone nel  De amicitia, è il fondamento dell’amicizia, né 
può essere amicizia senza virtù, perché la virtù non è altro che il contrario dell’egoismo, principale ostacolo 
all’amicizia ec.ec.ec.” (“Friendship is easier between  elderly or mature persons . . . because these days, 
with the disappearance of illusions, and virtue no longer being a value for the younger generations, elderly 
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search for the infinite intuited within the finite (see 1.2.1) approaches a similar notion 
proposed by Levinas. The Levinasian search for the Infinite, however, is redirected 
towards the other person, in that it is in the suffering imposed by the other that one can 
detect the sparkle of the Infinite (“the subject as hostage has been neither the experience 
nor the proof of the Infinite, but the witnessing of the Infinite”; Of God who comes to 
Mind 73). In Leopardi’s later poems attention towards the other is redirected in the full 
acknowledgement that the sense of the surrounding Infinity is primarily a malevolent 
force against which humanity is utterly helpless. Below, I first discuss Leopardi’s 
theorization of the desire for the Other conceived as compassion towards the Other. This 
notion is primarily discussed in Trattato delle passioni.
161
 I then proceed to an analysis of 
the above-mentioned poems arguing that while being permeated by a poetic voice that 
echoes a Lacanian torn subject, the poems are also defined by a poetic ‘I’ that desires life, 
which desire consolidates in an almost Levinasian desire for the Other in the final poem 
“La Ginestra.” 
 It is in its Latin etymological roots cum (with) and pati (‘suffer or bear’) that 
compassion is here understood implying, as in Levinas, transference geared towards the 
suffering subject. Indeed lamenting the difficulty of relating to and being compassionate 
towards an egoistic other, betrays a deeply ingrained belief in the value of being-for-the-
                                                                                                                                                 
 
people are capable of less love for themselves, and are tired of selfishness because they are disillusioned 
with the world, and with love for others. As a result, they are more capable of loving others. Thus it is true 
that virtue, as Cicero says in De amicitia, is at the basis of friendship, nor can there be friendship without 
virtue, because virtue is nothing but the opposite of selfishness, the primary obstacle to friendship”;  my 
translation). 
161
 Trattato delle passioni can be located in-between Manuale di filosofia pratica and the Memorie della 
mia vita. It is important to point out that these are not treatises as such, but collections of excerpts from 
Zibaldone. In these excerpts there is an almost Levinasian tension between a claim for totality and the 
search for infinity. This totality might be construed to correspond to the eighteenth-century encyclopedic 
request as do Leopardi’s philological interests, his search for a moral and metaphysical philosophical 
system, his studies in stylistics and rhetoric and his interest in memory. The search for infinity is found in 
the Romantic fragment-like quality of Leopardi’s ruminations, which gives adequate expression to a 
modern conscience that contradicts the contents of the Seventeenth century encyclopedic project. Having 
said this, the general framework of the Leopardian text, composed of fragments which are directed towards 
an overarching system whereby the encyclopedic thrust of the whole text is transmuted in the different 
textual threads, is very different from the Romantic thrust of, for instance, the Athenaeum. This tension 
compels one to read Leopardi as Classicist in form but Romantic in sentiment. 
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Other which is strictly connected to desire and amor proprio. Leopardi states that amor 
proprio and compassion go hand in glove:  
Dove maggiormente abbonda l’amor proprio, e dov’egli ha maggior forza, quivi 
più frequenti e maggiori siano i sacrifizi di se stesso, la compassione, l’abito, 
l’inclinazione, e gli atti di beneficenza . . . Ond’è che tutto questo debba trovarsi e 
si trovi infatti maggiore e più frequente ne’ giovani, negli antichi, negli uomini 
sensibili e d’animo vivo, e finalmente negli uomini, i quali hanno, generalmente 
parlando, maggiore quantità e forza d’amor proprio e minore d’egoismo; di quello 
che ne’ maturi e ne’ vecchi, ne’ moderni. (Zibaldone 3107,1)   
Where there is an abundance of self-love, self-sacrifice, compassion, 
comportment, inclination and acts of charity are more frequent . . . it is thus the 
case that all these qualities are to be found in greater abundance and more 
frequently in young people, in the people of Antiquity, in the sensitive and 
magnanimous, and finally in the male. All these demonstrate, as a general rule, 
that they are capable of more self-love and less egoism than the mature, the 
elderly and modern man. (my translation)  
Amor proprio taken to an extreme, on the other hand, impedes the human being from 
being capable of compassion and freezes him in the Rousseauite mauvaise honte (see 
2.4.1). In Trattato delle passioni Leopardi explores the notion of mauvaise honte which 
characterizes the modern human being who is petrified in his extreme defence from 
sentiment.
162
 To the latter Leopardi annexes the analysis of “timore” (“fear”; 458, 1). 
Desire here assumes “il coraggio di sostenere la privazione di ogni speranza” (“the 
courage to endure the deprivation of all hope”) and “mirare intrepidamente il deserto 
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One of the Romantic images attributed to Leopardi is that of the artist as isolated, lonely, different and 
other; a cultural trope which many literary figures and fictional characters helped to create: from Byron to 
Baudelaire and from Coleridge to Nietzsche. The myth of the Romantic artist has attracted conspicuous 
critical attention. See Mario Praz, The Romantic Agony, and M.H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: 
Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition. Levinas once more takes up the thread of solitude, 
emphasizing virility, pride and sovereignty, as opposed to the existentialist notion of solitude as despair and 
abandonment. Even though the existent’s solitude turns out to be insufficient (see Winnie of Happy Days in 
3.4) and inferior to ethical-social life, Levinas emphasizes that the existent ought not to be understood in 
terms of what it lacks (Time and the Other 55). 
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della vita” (“to look intrepidly at the desertification  of life”; “Dialogo di Tristano e un 
amico” in Operette Morali 488-89). This is a desire which transmutes dianoetic laughter 
to an inner state of being (see 4.1).
163
  
Compassion in Leopardi, however, is counterpoised to the mauvaise honte and to 
atarassia ‘ataraxia’ (see 2.2.1; 2.4.2), which in Zibaldone 65,1 is still suggested as the 
remedy to human misery. In 196,1, however, ‘ataraxia’ is debunked in favour of 
compassion as pietas. Here Leopardi underscores the importance of “provvedere per 
parte nostra alla conservazione di ‘tutto il buono’ ” (“we need to attend to the 
preservation of everything that is good”; Zibaldone 519,1; my translation). The poet-
philosopher states: “la debolezza in quanto tale comporta la compassione, che può 
trasformarsi dalla pietas in amore” (“Weakness as such brings about compassion, which 
can be transformed from pietas to love”; Zibaldone 211, 1; my translation). Leopardi also 
points out that being amiable evokes compassion (Zibaldone 220,3),  whereby the 
emphasis is on the weakness of the subject whose suffering is foiled. In Della natura 
degli uomini e delle cose Leopardi proposes that individuals be interdependent, where 
compassion for the other specifically springs in the strong at the sight of the weak who, 
however, are callous and insufferable: “la compassionevolezza natural ai forti, e la 
natural immisericordia e durezza dei deboli” (“compassion comes natural to the strong, 
and the natural lack of mercy and dourness is intrinsic to the weak”; Zibaldone 3271, 1; 
my translation). Compassion here entails that the strong subject is morally obliged to 
shoulder responsibility: “Il soffrire con pazienza e magnanimità, è indizio sicuro di 
coraggio e d’anima sublime; e l’abusare della propria forza è segno di codarda ferocia” 
                                                 
163
 It is in the same Trattato delle passioni that passions are portrayed as elusive to the tight hold of 
rationality and thus to the straightjacket into which eighteenth-century treatises attempted to fit them; 
passions are in these excerpts in a constant dialectic with virtù: “Speranza” (hope) is thus in dialectic with 
“desiderio” (desire) (see 1.2.1). The dichotomy between rationality and passions coincides with Leopardi’s 
reflections in Preambolo del volgarizzatore (which precedes his translation of the Manuale di Epitteto 
“Manual of Epitectus”), where he speaks about the necessity of Stoic philosophy (see 2.2.1). The necessity 
of a philosophy that defends the weak by conquering one’s passions is, nonetheless, slowly discarded for a 
philosophy that, on the contrary, imbues reason with passion. After reading the excerpts in Trattato delle 
passioni the over-all impression that emerges is that Leopardi seems to be bent on an anti-Epitectian stance. 
He later defines a model that increasingly distances itself from Epitectian virility and comes closer to what 
he terms a feminine ideal. It is interesting to note that Levinas will similarly identify in the figure of the 
female, particularly the mother in Otherwise than Being, the foundational mode of the subject’s being-for-
the-other (1.5). 
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(“enduring suffering with patience and magnanimity is a clear sign of courage and a 
sublime soul; abusing one’s strength is a sign of utter cowardice”; Zibaldone 940,2; my 
translation). In Trattato delle passioni and Manuale di filosofia pratica Leopardi 
specifically focuses on the other as a weak subject (Zibaldone 281,1) arguing that 
compassion “nasce nell’animo nostro alla vista di uno che soffre . . . in quel punto ci fa 
provare un sentimento affatto indipendente dal nostro vantaggio o piacere, e tutto relativo 
agli altri” (“is born in our soul at the sight of one who suffers . . . at that point it compels 
a feeling which is anything but extraneous to our vantage point or pleasure, and 
conceived entirely in relation to other people”; Zibaldone 108, 1; my translation).  
Nonetheless, compassion in Leopardi is not entirely free of egoism given that all 
Leopardian passions derive from amor proprio. Although the poet-philosopher does 
claim the opposite on various occasions, he also considers the act of compassion as “atto 
d’orgoglio che l’uomo fa tra se stesso” (“an act of pride that the human being does in 
relation to himself”; 3107, 1; my translation).164 Compassion is thus not always linked to 
pietas but is also attributed to pride while being simultaneously and inextricably linked to 
“speranza” (hope). As Leopardi explicitly states: “chi ha perduto la speranza d’essere 
felice, non può pensare alla felicità degli altri, perché l’uomo non può cercarla che per 
rispetto alla propria. Non può dunque neppure interessarsi dell’altrui infelicità” (“he who 
has lost hope of happiness, cannot think about others’ happiness, because the human 
being cannot seek happiness unless it is in relation to his own; he thus cannot take an 
interest in other people’s unhappiness either”; Zibaldone 1589, 1; my translation).165  
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 Suffice it to quote “la compassione, la quale io dico che è l’unica qualità e passione umana che non 
abbia nessunissima mescolanza di amor proprio” (“Compassion is, in my view, the only human quality and 
passion which is not in any way intermixed with self-love”; Zibaldone 108,1; my translation). In 3271,1 
Leopardi states: “Quanto più l’uomo è in istato di esser soggetto di compassione, o di bramarla, o di 
esigerla, e quanto più egli la brama o l’esige, anche a torto, e si persuade di meritarla, tanto meno egli 
compatisce,” (“The more the human being is subject to compassion, or the more he craves or expects 
compassion, even undeservingly, the more he convinces himself of deserving it, and the less is he able of 
being compassionate”; my translation). 
165
 It is indeed in Antiquity and in childhood, which in its extreme naturalness is closer to the intensity of 
Ancient passions and thus closer to the unconscious and farthest from rationality, that the nexus between 
the above-mentioned “speranza” (hope), and “timore” (fear), is strongest (Zibaldone 458,1). This is dealt 
with at length by thinkers like Descartes and Spinoza. In Leopardi this link is found in the desire to desire 
life and thus in the desire for illusions (Zibaldone 66, 2). The lack of illusions that Leopardi sees as a 
distinctive characteristic of modern society is at the root of the lack of “Vigore Corporale” (Physical 
Vigour). In 130,2 Leopardi describes the dearth of “Vigore Corporale” that characterizes the modern 
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Compassione is for Leopardi, as for Schopenhauer, the only real love (see 
introduction) because it is the only human quality that can, even in the presence of amor 
proprio, rise above self-interest. The Leopardian compassion towards the other, a quality 
that is severed from its Christian connotation, is the passion that guarantees the 
involvement that, for instance, Stoic philosophy negates (see 2.2.1).
166
 In Trattato delle 
passioni Leopardi launches a veritable attack against the indifference and ataraxia 
recommended by Epitectus in the presence of others’ dredging suffering (see 2.3.1), 
dubbing this attitude “irriflessione bestiale” (“a bestial kind of lack of reflection”; 
Zibaldone 196,1; my translation). Leopardi, like Schopenhauer and Levinas, affirms the 
value and the necessity of participating in others’ suffering.  
Compassion in Leopardi is thus the sentiment that can counter the impenetrability 
of stultified social relations which put all faith in the aforementioned “ragionevolezza del 
secolo” (“rationality of the century”). Despite underlining the ubiquitous Machiavellism 
of modern society, and indirectly the otherness of the Other, Leopardi alerts his readers to 
seek communication with l’altro (the other) in that only compassion can make human 
suffering sufferable. To a degree, Leopardi conceives the role of the rejected individual in 
his contemporary society as one that comes close to the sacrificial scapegoat who “suffers 
in order to relieve others from suffering” (Veronese 1000), thus coming close to the 
Levinasian notion of substitution. Compassion for Leopardi intensifies in proportion to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
human being, as the motive behind lack of Action, thus lack of  moral involvement in praxis, provoking 
what he conceives at this point (in June 1820) as the coring out of all virility in the modern human being. 
On the 19
th
 of January 1828 Leopardi explicitly links desire to hope: “La privazione di ogni speranza, 
succeduta al mio primo ingresso nel mondo, appoco appoco fu causa di spegnere in me quasi ogni 
desiderio. Ora, per le circostanze mutate, risorta la speranza, io mi trovo nella strana situazione di aver più 
speranza che desiderio, e più speranze che desiderii ecc..” (“The deprivation of any hope, which followed 
my initiation into this world, slowly put out in me almost every shred of desire. At this point, because of the 
changed circumstances, and with resurfaced hope, I find myself in the strange situation of having more 
hope than desire, and more things to hope for than to desire”; Zibaldone 105-108; my translation). 
166
 By considering compassion “un miracolo della natura” (“a miracle of nature”), however, Leopardi 
disassociates this feeling from the specific religious and Christian context. In disassociating compassion 
from any specific moral value, Leopardi differs from Levinas. 
96 
 
the guiltlessness and powerlessness of the sufferer, which is why Torquato Tasso’s 
miseries made him a strong object of sympathy in Leopardi’s eyes.167   
It is to Leopardi’s later poetry that I would now like to turn in order to analyze the 
dichotomy between the Leopardian poetic “I” as a Lacanian torn subject endlessly 
longing for an impossible desire, and the fighting spirit for life which, by the time the 
reader gets to “La Ginestra,” is a subject ruptured as a being-for-the-Other capable of 
unique compassion.  The poems I will briefly refer to are “Alla sua donna,” “Il Passero 
solitario,” “Il Risorgimento,” “A Silvia,” “Le Ricordanze,” and “ Canto notturno di un 
pastore errante dell’ Asia.” These references pave the way for an analysis of: “Il Pensiero 
dominante,” “Amore e Morte,” “A se stesso,” “Aspasia,” and finally “La Ginestra.” I 
argue that in these later poems the poetic ‘I’’s verbal symbolization can be seen as an 
obligation to express, a desire inscribed in the ‘I’’s speech which delineates a futile 
longing to recuperate a lost symbiosis. Desire distorts Leopardi’s poetic ‘I’’s language 
and prevents it from reconciling with itself, trapping it in its infinite movement. 
Nonetheless, while being permeated by the surrender to life’s endless pain, these poems 
are also defined by a combative spirit that desires life nonetheless, a desire that in “La 
Ginestra” becomes the capacity to be uniquely compassionate towards the other.  
It is in the same ability to be compassionate that the themes of isolation and 
solitude are turned into Leopardian poetic subjects. Indeed compassion is for Leopardi a 
highly poetic feeling because it soothes by giving pleasure. The therapeutic experience of 
being for the other in Leopardi shifts from being ascetic to becoming aesthetic.  For this 
purpose, I shall first examine the struggle at the core of which are entangled the desire to 
articulate life and the restraint from this desire in the mostly post-1828 canti. In these 
poems Leopardi’s subject confronts the frightening but real negative metaphysics taking 
stock of the fact that the human being is at the mercy of the desire of life, or as Nietzsche 
would put it, the will to power.  
                                                 
167
 Torquato Tasso (March 11, 1544 – April 25, 1595) was an Italian poet of the 16th century, best known 
for his poem La Gerusalemme Liberata (1580). 
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The infinite movement of desire already traverses “Alla sua donna” (1823) which 
sounds out Leopardi’s newfound poetic voice and evokes that something within the 
human which recalls the Levinasian desire of an infinite that lies beyond. In the early 
Levinas, as in Leopardi’s “Alla sua donna,” the hint of the infinite within the finite is 
intuited in the female figure and has a long tradition which goes back to Plato and passes 
through courtly love poetry, the Stilnovisti, Dante and Petrarch among others.
168
 In “Alla 
sua donna,” the desire of the infinite intuited in the female “Se dell’eterne idee / L’una 
sei tu, cui di sensibil forma / Sdegni l’eterno senno esser vestita” (“Whether you are the 
one and only / eternal idea that eternal wisdom / disdains to see arrayed in sensible form”; 
lines 45-47) is pitted against the diminishing desire that is palpably felt throughout the 
poem, where the poetic I often laments the “perduti desiri, e la perduta / Speme de’ giorni 
miei” (“lost desires, / my life’s lost hope”; lines 39-40). 
“Il Passero solitario” is similarly epitomized by Fernando Figurelli as a poem 
informed by the “nostalgia di un bene che egli [Leopardi] ama perdutamente e tuttavia 
non sa né può godere” (“nostalgia of a good thing that he [Leopardi] desperately loves 
but which nonetheless he has not come to know or enjoy”; 113; my translation).169 
Against Figurelli’s claim, I emphasize the poetic voice’s willingness to enjoy life, the 
desire to life that is ultimately inextinguishable. The speaking ‘I’ in “Il Passero solitario,” 
as other poems written by Leopardi at this time, is traversed both by loss and 
renunciation: “la beata gioventù vien meno” (“blessed youth is failing, too”; line 44 in 
Canti 103) and verbs that denote escaping the desire for pleasure; “schivi,” (“shun”), 
“non curo,”(“I take no notice of”), “fuggo lontano,”(“run away”), “indugio” (“put off”). 
The latter are, however, counterpoised to nouns connoting desire of life itself: “allegria,” 
(“happiness”), “sollazzo e riso,” (“delight and laughter”), and “diletto e gioco” (“pleasure 
and enjoyment”).  
                                                 
168
In his philosophy of love, Plato, and those directly following this Platonic credo, left to the feminine no 
other role than that of furnishing an example of the Idea, which alone can be the object of love. Levinas, I 
argue below, opposes what he conceives as Plato’s reduction of the feminine to matter because he claims 
that in this manner “the whole particularity of the relationship of one to another goes unnoticed” (Time and 
the Other 93). Leopardi will also repeatedly renounce Platonic Ideas. 
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In “Il Risorgimento” (1828) an equally bellicose poetic voice, the “virtù nova” 
(“new power”; line 83), fights against a poetic “I’ that laments a move to a decimation of 
desire; “duro mio sopor” (“my cruel sleep”; line 64) and  a closure of sentiment: “Il cor 
non mi feri” (“he couldn’t break into my heart”; line 48), where a split poetic voice that 
recalls the Lacanian subject split into “je” and “moi,” revisits the paradoxically infinite 
nature of human desire. The struggle is between the unconscious subject, which the 
poetic voice addresses, and the conscious subject, the poetic I itself, the former at one 
point nearing an impossible demand for entropy: “Desiderato il termine / Avrei del viver 
mio; Ma spento era il desio / nello spossato sen” (“I could have wanted / my life to end 
then, / except desire had died / in my powerless heart”; lines 69-72). Towards the end of 
the poem, however, the breached poetic ‘I’ is comforted and awakened by the “ardor 
natio” (“my own fire”; line 150). This is the same desire of life expressed in “Dialogo di 
Plotino e Porfirio”: “la persona, quantunque ben cognoscente e persuasa della verità, 
nondimeno a mal grado della ragione, e perseveri nella vita, e proceda in essa come fanno 
gli altri perché quel tal senso (si può dire) e non l’intelletto, è quello che ci governa” 
(“although one may be quite knowledgeable and persuaded of the truth, it is enough for 
him to continue with life, in spite of reason, and to proceed in it just like everyone else; 
for we can say that that sense, and not the intellect, is what rules us”; Operette morali  
472-73). 
In “A Silvia” the interminable movement of desire is, once more, woven through 
the poem and this is one of the many clear instances where Leopardi’s so called nihilism 
is revealed not to run deep enough to touch the well spring of his poetry. In “A Silvia” 
the longing for a perfectly blissful past: “rimembri ancora” (“do you remember still”; line 
1), idealized by being sifted through memory, as reveal phrases in the superlative like: 
“Quando beltà splendea negli occhi tuoi ridenti e fuggitivi” (“when beauty shimmered / 
in your smiling, startled eyes”; lines 3-4), imbues the whole poem. In the Zibaldone 
Leopardi explains how the past is often idealized through the tricks played by memory: 
“è assai più dolce il ricordarsi del bene (non mai provato, ma che in lontananza sembra di 
aver provato) che il goderne” (“it is far sweeter to think back on something good, but that 
was never really experienced, albeit it seems so when perceived from afar, rather than 
deriving direct pleasure from it” (1044,2;  my translation; see 1.2.1).  The desire for the 
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Other, in the form of an elusive youthfulness represented in the image of Silvia, is also a 
desire for a wholesomeness that is by now withered: “l’erbe inaridisse il verno,” (“winter 
had withered the grass”; line 40), to which are attributed adjectives like “acerbo e 
sconsolato” (“bitter, inconsolable”; line 34). The language of the poetic I in “A Silvia” 
strives to realize the desire for the wholeness of the past. It only succeeds, however, in 
snatching away what could be perceived as a Lacanian torn subject, from the grasp of a 
past that, not only is no longer, but that never was. The lamented bliss of the past is 
revealed to be a youth of “sudate carte” (“labored pages”; line 16), the idealization of 
which has been sustained through mere illusions. Concomitantly, however, the split 
poetic ‘I’ is caught in the infinitely cyclical desire. In the lament of the “cara compagna 
dell’eta’ mia nova” (“dear companion of my innocence”; line 54), and the ensuing elegiac 
tone, the desire for what was, or what was thought to be whole and pure, never ceases.  
In “Le Ricordanze” the poetic speaking subject cannot grasp its unconscious 
desires and frustrations in a complete manner and the repeated use of statements in the 
negative, starting from the first line “io non credea,” (“I never thought”) points towards 
the elusiveness of the poetic I’s attempt. A dark shadow keeps being recast on 
remembrances, “le ricordanze,” by the negative statements of the poetic ‘I’ who speaks of 
a past  “Di contenti, d’angosce e di desio” (“of happiness and anguish and desire”; line 
105), “l’esser vissuto indarno” (“that I lived in vain”; line 102) and recalls, in another 
Leopardian quotation which Beckett echoes, “dolorosamente / alla fioca lucerna 
poetando” (“miserably / writing poetry by my faint lantern”; 114-5).
170
 Nonetheless, the 
nostalgic lament “e intanto vola/ Il caro tempo giovanil” (“And all the while / youth’s 
beloved moment flies”; lines 43-44) is as forceful as the vociferous voicing of the present 
predicament: “Qui passo gli anni abbandonato, occulto. Senz’amor, senza vita” (“I spend 
my years secluded here, shut in, with no love and no life”; line 38-39). On the one hand 
there is the wish to recognize the full implication of the poetic I’s lament. On the other is 
the poetic voice’s longing to cancel its present existence and recoil from its own words: 
                                                 
170
 In Dream of Fair to Middling Women (18) Belacqua cites, and modifies, a line from Leopardi’s “Le 
Ricordanze.” Instead of “alla fioca lucerna poetando,” and in reaction to Smeraldina’s advances, he says: 
“alla fioca lucerna leggendo Meredith” (“by my faint lantern reading Meredith”; my translation). 
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“Qui di pietà mi spoglio e di virtudi. E sprezzator degli uomini mi rendo” (“I strip myself 
of gentleness and kindness, / becoming someone who despises men”; lines 41-42). In this 
discourse the wish to come to an end is identical with the determination not to give up. 
The “van desio” (“vain desire”; line 59), which becomes “mero desio” (“mere wishes”; 
line 83) thus follows a paradoxical symmetry of cancellation and recognition which 
recalls Lacan’s earlier quoted expression that  not to want to desire and to desire are the 
same thing. Desire is repressed beyond recognition but it continuously repeats itself and 
haunts the poetic voice’s present: “tu passasti, eterno sospiro mio: passasti e fia 
compagna d’ogni mio vago immaginar” (“You’re gone, / lifelong regret of mine, you’re 
gone; and the bitter memory will last”; lines 169-71).  
In “Canto notturno di un Pastore errante dell’Asia” (1829-30), the poetic I 
addresses the moon in an effort to come to terms with the passing of time through the 
alienating flux of words: “di tanto adoprar, di tanti moti” (“all these works and all this 
movement”; line 93). Words, however, seem unable to capture “del tacito, infinito andar 
del tempo” (“the silent, endless pace of time” line 72), and increasingly move the poetic 
‘I’ away from any grasping of assumed meaning. The rhetorical questions seek less to 
obtain hard-and-fast rules of signification than they attempt to sound out their 
infinitesimal insignificance: “Che fa l’aria infinita, e quel profondo / Infinito seren? Che 
vuol dir questa / Solitudine immensa ed io che sono?” (“What does the endless air do, 
and that deep / eternal blue? What is the meaning of / this huge solitude? And what am 
I?” lines 87-89). As will be the case in “La Ginestra,” the human being is frail “frale” 
(line 102) but s/he does not cease to desire, even a desire to desire the other in vain: 
“Mirando all’altrui sorte, il mio pensiero” (“imagining the destinies of others”; line 140). 
The above-mentioned poems clear the path for the movement of desire expressed 
in the ciclo d’Aspasia: primarily in the poems “Il Pensiero dominante,” “Amore e 
Morte,” “A se stesso,” and “Aspasia.”  
In “Il Pensiero dominante” the oxymoronic dominant but sweet fixation: 
“Dolcissimo possente Dominator” (“Sweetest, potent lord”; lines 1-2) holds the poetic ‘I’ 
hostage. This fixation could be compared to an unfulfilled desire for the Other which, 
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however, has the power to elevate the spirit: “Di qual mia seria cura ultimo obbietto / 
Non fosti tu?” (“what has the last object of my interest / been, if not you?; lines 137-38). 
This Leopardian Other is as elusive and fictitious as the Lacanian one and its Stilnovistic 
ascendancy renders eloquent and adept what is crucial to Lacan- the fictivity of woman at 
the heart of courtly love poetry: “torre/ In solitario campo, Tu stai solo, gigante, in mezzo 
a lei” (“Like a tower in an empty field, / you stand alone, gigantic, in my thinking”; lines 
19-20). In this poem the palpable desire for life permeates the verses not in spite of, but 
rather because of the desire for the Other: “Pregio non ha, non ha ragion la vita / Se non 
per lui, per lui ch’all’ uomo è tutto” (“Life has no worth, no reason / but this, which is 
everything to man”; lines 80-1). The endlessness and irrepressible nature of this desire is 
also the poetic voice’s wish to find reconciliation with life and thus with itself. This 
desire is seen as the only justification: “discolpa” (“exculpates”; line 82) for human life 
defined as “tanto patir senz’ altro frutto” (“to suffer so much for no other reason”; line 
84). The poetic voice’s quest for detachment from the cruel and base outside world is not 
merely a quest for self-sufficiency. Rather it is associated with the desire for the Other 
which also highlights the irreducible gap between the desire for recognition and the 
recognition of desire: “al cor non vile / La vita della morte è più gentile” (“the valiant 
heart, / can life be more beautiful than death”; lines 86-7). The painful desire for the 
Other is an illusion: “palese error” (“patent error”; line 111). It is, however, also a form 
of resistance, “Che incontro al ver tenacemente dura” (“that you hold up against the 
truth”; line 114). 
In “Amore e Morte,” desire for love is presented at its juncture with desire for 
death, both considered in this poem as the most desirable aspects of human life: “Amore 
e Morte / Ingenerò la sorte / Cose quaggiù si belle / Altre il mondo non ha, non han le 
stelle” (“two siblings, Love and Death. / No other thing as beautiful / exists down here, or 
in the stars above”; lines 1-4). The rich fervour of life can also be seen through the desire 
for death, just as in “Dialogo d'Ercole e di Atlante,” the rich fervour of life on earth is 
accentuated through its being reduced to an affair of mechanics. The paradoxical striving 
for two mutually exclusive goals recalls once more Lacan’s statement: “Man’s very 
desire is constituted . . . under the sign of mediation: it is the desire to have one’s desire 
recognized. Its object is a desire, that of other people, in the sense that man has no object 
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that is constituted for his desire without some mediation” (Écrits 148). Desire for life, the 
Leopardian “amoroso affetto” (“a loving feeling”; line 29) and desire for death, the “fier 
disio” (“fierce desire”; line 43) are two sides of the same coin as Freud would argue in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and as Lacan would flesh out in his distinction between 
demand and desire. The desire of death in this poem almost prefigures Lacanian moi’s 
desire for fusion manifesting itself in an underlying death wish which remains unfulfilled. 
Desire for death is here taken a step further in that it does not simply reflect the futile 
quest that is the nature of human desire but it is also elevated to become an act of 
magnanimity: “la gentilezza del morir” (“ death’s gentleness”; line 73). 
In “A se stesso”, the same poem Beckett repeatedly quotes in Proust (see 1.1), the 
cleaved  ‘I’ is even more pronounced, and in that split the poetic voice is, in a more 
accentuated manner than in the above-mentioned poems, in conflict. Nothing in the Canti 
has been seen as so starkly desolate as the epitaphic "A se stesso," in which Leopardi, 
announcing the death of hope and desire, commands his heart to stop beating (Perella 
370).  In this poem the poetic ‘I’ is an Other to itself and in this sense is Lacanian through 
and through. In this conflict which echoes the master-slave dialectic lies the poetic I’s 
subjection and attempt to resume control over the Other. The poetic ‘I,’ however, both 
desires and recoils from this Other, in this case the Other being the repository of 
sentiment, a source of acute pain and suffering: “perì l’inganno estremo / ch’eterno io mi 
credei. Perì” (“The ultimate illusion / that I thought was eternal died. It died” lines 2-3). 
The attempt to eliminate the Other is perceived at the level of the poetic I’s utterances 
which oscillate between “io” (‘I’) and “noi” (‘we’) when lamenting a desire that is no 
longer. The presence of words here, as in the fort/da game, is inextricably bound up with 
an absence: “Non val cosa nessuna / I moti tuoi” (“Nothing deserves your throbbing, nor 
is earth / worth sighing over”; lines 7-8). Words are uttered forcefully but seem powerless 
in the face of an infinitely malevolent universe. In “A se stesso” the poetic voice’s effort 
at, and resignation over, coming to terms with its own utterances, and its own suffering, 
can be equated, from a Lacanian perspective, to an apparently futile desire for the Other. 
From the outset the poetic ‘I’ immediately attempts to assume the lead over the 
Other in an urge to acquiesce suffering: “Or poserai per sempre/ Stanco mio cor” (“Now 
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you’ll rest forever, / worn-out heart”; lines 1-2) and “posa per sempre. Assai/ palpitasti” 
(“Be still forever. / You have beaten long enough”; lines 6-7). But the soothing hushing 
tones blend in with the harshness of a poetic voice that has turned dour and cynical in an 
urge to totally eliminate the Other as reveals the repetition of absolute words; “per 
sempre” (“forever”; line 1), “estremo” (“ultimate”; line 2), “per sempre” (“forever”; line 
6), “mai” (“never”; line 10), “l’ultimo” (‘last”; line 12) and “l’infinita” (“boundless”; line 
16). The mercilessness of the poetic I’s predicament, expressed in yet another turn of 
phrase echoed by Beckett (see 1.1) is clear enough: “Amore e noia/ La vita, altro mai 
nulla; e fango e’ il mondo” (“Life is only / bitterness and boredom, and the world is 
filth”; lines 9-10). Thus, on the one hand, is the poetic I’s unremitting failure to detach 
itself from life: “disprezza/ Te, la natura, il brutto/ Poter che, ascoso, a comun danno 
impera, / E l’infinita vanità del tutto” (“Disdain yourself now, nature, the brute / hidden 
power that rules to common harm, / and the boundless vanity of all”; lines 13-16); on the 
other hand is the repetitious circle in which the mind is bound to move and keep 
revisiting “l’inganno estremo” (“the ultimate illusion”; line 2). Once more, this two-way 
movement corresponds to Lacan’s already-quoted expression that not to want to desire 
and to desire are the same thing. It is an insatiable desire, a seeking without a finding that 
both underlines and undermines desire. The “inganno estremo” will never cease haunting 
and this is also the case in “Aspasia.” 
In this poem the poetic voice is lacerated by the bitter and not entirely graspable 
memories of the Other, in this case the evanescent image of Aspasia, who ubiquitously 
invades the present: “Al dì sereno, alle tacenti stelle” (“on a clear day, / under the silent 
stars”; line 5). These memories crowd the voice’s consciousness rendering this frustrated 
desire ineffable. Indeed words are here more akin to ghostly presences: “come cara larva, 
ad ora, ad ora / Tornar costuma e disparir” (“as a cherished shade, / she now and then 
returns, and disappears”; lines 73-4). Once more the presence of words is inextricably 
bound up with an absence. The Other here is an “eccelsa imago” (“high ideal”; line 48) 
who, unlike in “Alla sua donna,” is a source of frustration for the poetic voice who has to 
come to terms with its material fiction. The desire for unification with this “superba 
vision” (“exalted vision”; line 8), must resign itself to the unattainability of this end and 
to the realization that the Other is indeed fictitious: “perch’io te non amai, ma quella Diva 
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/ Che già vita, or sepolcro, ha nel mio core” (“because it wasn’t you I loved, but the 
Goddess / who lived once but now is buried in my heart”; line 78-79).  At the end of this 
poem, however, albeit describing itself as “neghittoso” (deprived of desire), the poetic 
voice releases its deep-seated and thwarted desire for life in a smile. This is the same 
Leopardian smile explored in chapter four, a smile that admits the insignificance of 
human life while it concomitantly braces to face it. This is a smile that in its dianoetic 
power reveals its capacity for compassion towards human frailty. 
The theme of compassion becomes central in “La Ginestra” (1836) particularly in 
the famous third ‘solidarity stanza’171 which has been the focus of critical debate since 
the studies published in 1947 by Walter Binni and Cesare Luporini. If the content of 
Leopardi’s early poetry is the ideal (‘idilli’), the content of the late poetry is seen as 
devoid of the ideal. Binni highlights the poetical quality of these analytical later works 
and calls this way of writing poetry “la tendenza antidillica” (“the anti-idyllic tendency”; 
my translation) which was to find its apotheosis in “La Ginestra” (163). Binni construes a 
moral and heroic commitment, a social message, in this specific poem. Luporini goes a 
step further in that he sees in this poem a concretely progressive attitude which he 
interprets as developing out of Leopardi’s materialism. Luporini cites several passages 
where Leopardi praises activity and he infers, perhaps overstating his case, that this 
activity is of a social and political nature and can aid in weakening the selfishness of the 
individual. This type of criticism has been very popular with scholars of a Marxist stamp. 
Timpanaro, in “Alcune osservazioni sul pensiero del Leopardi,” attempted to reduce the 
emphasis on the progressive aspect of Leopardi’s thought. According to Timpanaro, 
Leopardi’s progressivism is always at war with his pessimistic streak (152). More than a 
social protest, Leopardi’s protest is subjective and openly attacks  the injustice of 
physical inequalities (155). Timpanaro goes on to say that Leopardi was a materialist of 
the eighteenth century and his materialism in philosophy was not accompanied by 
progressivism in politics. While the ‘solidarity stanza’ has thus been primarily read in a 
social and political context,
172
 I am here proposing a Levinasian reading to shed light on 
                                                 
171
 See Williams, “Leopardi’s Philosophy of Consolation in ‘La Ginestra,’” 985-96. 
172
 See Nino Borsellino, Il Socialismo della ‘Ginestra’. Poesia e poetiche leopardiane. Poggibonsi: Lalli, 
1990; Sebastiano Timpanaro, Classicismo e Illuminismo nell’Ottocento italiano. 2nd edn. Pisa: Nistri 
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the notion of the desire of the other person conceived in the ability to be compassionate 
towards the other, which Leopardi theorizes at length in the excerpts of Trattato delle 
passioni.
173
  
In “La Ginestra” I read a nearly doomed desire for life expressed by the broom 
flower’s (“ginestra”) humble act of bending down: “piegherai / Sotto il fascio mortal non 
renitente / il tuo capo innocente” (“unresisting, / you’ll bow your blameless head / under 
the deadly scythe”; lines 304-06). This humble act of sympathy is redirected towards the 
other person’s suffering: “O fior gentile, e quasi / I Danni altrui commiserando” (“noble 
flower / . . ., as if sharing in the pain of others”; lines 34-35).  
I read the compassion towards the other in “La Ginestra” as Levinasian in the way 
it redirects towards the other person that same human attention that proves impossibly 
feeble when directed towards an immensely powerful Infinite. While in Levinas this 
thwarted search is redirected towards the other, admitting man’s endless desire of the 
Infinite detected in the other’s suffering, in “La Ginestra” directing desire towards the 
other is carried out in the full acknowledgment that the surrounding sense of the Infinite 
found in nature is Sublime and malevolent. Against the Leopardian Sublime universe the 
human being is utterly powerless: “dell’uman seme / Cui la dura nutrice, ou’ ei men teme 
/ Con lieve moto in un momento annulla” (“their cruel nurse, / when they fear it least, / 
with the slightest movement in a moment / partly destroys”; lines 43-45). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Lischi, 1969; Alfredo Bonadeo, “Dalle Operette Morali alla Ginestra: desiderio, felicita’ e morte.” Rivista 
di studi italiani 10:2 (1992) 1-21; Franco Ferrucci, “Memoria letteraria e memoria cosmica: Il caso della 
Ginesta” Lettere italiane 42 (1990), 363-73: Giuseppe Genco, “Dall’ eroe del mito all’ uomo povero di 
stato: gli umili nella poesia di Leopardi,” Otto/Novecento 19 (1995), 173-83. Another important critical 
work in this tradition is the essay by Dolfi. Departing from Binni’s interpretation of “La Ginestra,” Dolfi 
sees the poetic voice’s refusal to hope as the negative moment which will allow the rise of utopia (33). 
173
 The combative spirit of the poem primarily reacts to the Empiricists who, about fifty years before 
Leopardi’s time, had professed to do away with all the “intellectual sophistry and illusion” of metaphysics 
and theology. David Hume’s Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding ends with a dramatic 
debunking of false metaphysics: “If we take in our hand any volume: of divinity or school metaphysics for 
instance; let us ask, ‘Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it 
contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the 
flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion,” 165. 
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The inextinguishable desire that ineluctably seeks its satisfaction through human 
endeavour ultimately redirects attention towards the discovery of one’s ability to be 
compassionate: “Ed alle offese / Dell’uomo armar la destra, e laccio porre / Al vicino ed 
inciampo/ Stolto crede cosi qual fora in campo / Cinto d’oste contraria,” (“But to take up 
arms / against a man, or set a trap / or make trouble for his neighbour / seems to him as 
stupid as, / surrounded by hostile soldiers”; lines 135-39). This infinite movement of 
desire here takes place in the presence of the “fiera compiacenza” of not being deceived, 
whereby one “con franca lingua, / Nulla al ver detraendo, / Confessa il mal che ci fu dato 
in sorte” (“with honest words / that subtract nothing from the truth, / admits the pain that 
is our destiny”; lines 114-116). As Tristano claims in “Dialogo di Tristano e di un 
amico”:  
Calpesto la vigliaccheria degli uomini, rifiuto ogni consolazione e ogn’inganno 
puerile, . . . ed accett[o] tutte le conseguenze di una filosofia dolorosa, ma vera. 
La quale se non è utile ad altro, procura agli uomini forti la fiera compiacenza di 
vedere strappato ogni manto alla coperta e misteriosa crudeltà del destino umano. 
(Operette morali 488-89) 
I despise the cowardice of men; I reject all consolations and all childish 
deceptions . . . and . . . accept all the consequences of a philosophy that is painful 
but true−which philosophy, if not beneficial to anything else, at least provides 
strong men with the fierce satisfaction of seeing every mask torn from the hidden 
and mysterious cruelty of human destiny. (my translation)  
In “La Ginestra” this “misteriosa crudeltà del destino umano” is a Sublime Infinite power 
represented by the Vesuvius, the haunting skyscape and the apple that falls and crushes 
the ants beneath. In the initial stanza, the poetic ‘I’ addresses the “Odorata ginestra” 
(“scented broom”; line 6), the only thing that survives on the desolate slopes of the 
“sterminator Vesevo” (“Vesuvius the destroyer”; line 3). The broom flower is: “Di tristi / 
Lochi e dal mondo abbandonati amante, / E d’afflitte fortune ognor compagna” (“lover of 
sad places that the world has left / and constant friend of fallen greatness”; lines 14-16). 
The contemplation of this infinite power of the Vesuvius brings about reflection about the 
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futility of the infinite human endeavour: “A queste piagge/ Venga colui che d’esaltar con 
lode / Il nostro stato ha in uso, e vegga quanto / È il gener nostro in cura / All’amante 
natura” (“Let him who loves to praise our state / come to these slopes and see how well 
our kind / is served by loving nature”; lines 37-41). 
Facing up to the superior infinite force of Nature (lines 97-110) is only possible 
by admitting the futile human striving and redirecting that striving towards mutual 
compassion: “porgendo / Valida e pronta ed aspettando aita / Negli alterni perigli e nelle 
angosce / Della Guerra comune” (“offering / and expecting real and ready aid / in the 
alternating dangers and concerns / of our common struggle”; lines 132-35). Compassion 
has a similar end in Leopardi as in Levinas but in the latter the infinite superior force is 
distinctly metaphysical and it is the impossible human desire of this Infinity that is 
redirected in compassion towards the other person. In Levinas compassion is ultimately 
indicative of the human inability to directly achieve the Infinite, while in Leopardi 
compassion results from admitting the insignificance and helplessness of human life in 
the face of  physis: “granel di sabbia, il qual di terra ha nome” (“mere grain of sand called 
earth” line 191). As in the Stoic ethics of Epitectus, the suggestion is to strive for the 
good-of-the-other, but unlike the Epitectian case, faith should not be entirely put in 
rationality because: “la filosofia, sperando e promettendo a principio di medicare I nostri 
mali, in ultimo si reduce a desiderare invano di rimediare a se stessa” (“In short, 
philosophy starts out by hoping and promising to cure our ills and ends up by desiring in 
vain to find a remedy for itself”; “Dialogo di Timandro e di Eleandro” 412-3). Desiring 
the good of-the-other as envisaged in “La Ginestra” is thus a consolation for what Beckett 
would define as the “vain longing that vain longing go” (Worstward Ho 481, see 2.1) and 
thus the futility, albeit a necessary futility, of the desire of life itself.  
The use of the Biblical epigraph “E gli uomini vollero piuttosto le tenebre che la 
luce,”174 could refer to a life without desire for illusions and without reference to 
anything that goes beyond the material and tangible largely made possible during the 
                                                 
174
 As a matter of fact Leopardi turns John’s words upside down. John says: “E gli uomini vollero la luce 
piuttosto che le tenebre”. This is an interesting move on Leopardi’s part in that he deliberately turns John’s 
words on their head implicating that human beings painted themselves in a corner by resorting to rationality 
at all costs. 
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Enlightenment. Leopardi’s opposition to such excessive concentration on rationality and 
pragmatism, as is also the case with his disagreement with another popular creed of his 
century  utilitarianism is succinctly expressed by Tristano’s memorable phrase: 
“gl’individui sono spariti dinanzi alle masse” (“Individuals have disappeared before the 
masses”; Operette Morali 496-97). This quotation once more foreshadows Levinasian 
thought, specifically Levinas’ attack on totality as opposed to infinity. As in Levinas, the 
foundation of desiring the good-of-the-other in Leopardi is each individual’s capacity for 
suffering. In this sense Leopardi prefigures the Levinasian notion of substitution.   
The capacity to suffer and to guard oneself and others from suffering is already 
Leopardi’s aim in his translation of the above mentioned Manuale di Epitteto. “La 
Ginestra” is, to a degree, an extension of that endeavour in a social context. Rather than 
on ablating desire, however, the emphasis in “La Ginestra” is on the capacity to feel pain 
and the focus is shifted from the desire not to suffer onto the desire towards shouldering 
the other person’s suffering. As the poetic voice claims: “E il basso stato e frale / Quella 
che grande e forte/ Mostra sé nel soffrir, ne’ gli odii e l’ire / Fraterne, ancor piu’ gravi / 
D’ogni altro danno, accresce / Alle miserie sue, l’uomo incolpando / Del suo dolor” (“and 
our poor and feeble state; who shows he’s great and strong in suffering / and doesn’t add 
his brother’s hate or anger, / worse than any evil, to his ills / by blaming man for his 
unhappiness”; lines 117-123). Thus the individual is invited to desire community and to 
specifically address the Other through the “l’onesto e il retto / conversar cittadino / E 
giustizia e pietade” (“an honest, / just society of citizens / and right and piety will take 
root”; lines 152-53). The ethical importance of the “conversar cittadino” echoes the 
Levinasian “Saying” (1.5.5) whereby through this very conversation and social relation 
with the Other, one’s subjectivity is formed. 
A special conception of a social alliance,
175
 a communally agreed form of 
resistance is here being proposed also through the communicative value of conversation 
                                                 
175
 One might argue that this is a pre-social, rather than a social, alliance given its apolitical, almost purely 
ontological purposes. It is a pact against the fate of suffering decreed by nature, similar to the above-
mentioned pact by Plotino and Porfirio. Biral’s two essays on “La Ginestra” illustrate this difference. In an 
essay “Materialismo e progressismo,” Biral highlights the blind mechanism of nature’s permanence and the 
human consciousness of a kind of superiority over such permanence. This existential self-awareness is read 
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in that, as in the “Saying,” individuals are conceived as bound together before any social 
or political ties.
176
 According to this special conception, human beings are, in a 
Levinasian sense, called out of their solitariness to expose themselves to and find their 
strength in the other person. The coming together of individuals in Leopardi is thus 
grounded in the recognition that the infinitely omnipotent universe is, and here the 
distinction from Levinasian thought is striking, the common enemy to all humanity. The 
dread of this infinitely powerful force is still palpably felt in the peasant who works the 
ashy earth on the “arida schiena / Del formidabil monte” (“the dry flank / of the terrifying 
mountain”; lines 1-2) and the nearby excavations at Pompei standing “come sepolto / 
scheletro” (“like a buried skeleton”; lines 271-72). Human beings have to be 
compassionate towards one another’s suffering because, as in Levinas, the human 
condition is beyond human control and suffering predates it: “Dell’aspra sorte e del 
depresso loco / Che natura ci die’” (“the bitter fate / and miserable condition nature 
handed us”; lines 78-80). 
Human beings cannot rid themselves of amor proprio or desire, but they can 
direct the strength resulting from the latter towards mutual compassion. The Leopardian 
ethics in this poem prefigures the Levinasian one in that it places emphasis on respect for 
the moral worth of individuals based on their capacity to suffer. In this poem the notion 
of suffering also prefigures Freud’s whereby suffering is caused by the other as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
by Biral as a premise for a political opening (157). A year later Biral wrote “Considerazioni sul messaggio 
leopardiano” where the word ‘political’ has completely disappeared. The message of “La Ginestra” is now 
that human conscience is lacerated and desperately needs to find meaning in order to sustain existence in 
this world. Norbert Jonard in “Leopardi fra conservazione e progresso” explored this question further. He 
concludes that Leopardi’s vision is not one concerned with class but with a concept of human nature 
outside any temporal correlates (34). Leopardi’s materialism is subversive without, however, denying the 
humanity that makes the human being unique.  
176
 Leopardi’s conception of social alliance can be set apart from any theories of social contract per se but 
perhaps this distinction comes out best in a comparison with the first modern notion of social contract in 
Thomas Hobbes (to be mentioned in 4.1 with reference to Leopardi’s Teoria del Piacere). In Hobbes, 
human beings gave power to a sovereign because of their fear of living with each other in a state of nature 
where chaos reigned supreme. Leopardi’s desiring the good of-the-other is, as in Hobbes, rooted in amor 
proprio. The question whether morality is grounded in amor proprio or ‘benevolence’ dominated moral 
philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 588). This 
question was sharply posed by Hobbes, whose egoistic view of human nature and morality was challenged, 
perhaps most significantly, by David Hume, who thought that human beings acted on the basis of an innate 
benevolence that provided the rudimentary framework on which morality depended. (The Cambridge 
Companion to Hume 162).   
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“gratuitous addition” (Civilization and Its Discontents 77). The relations with other 
human beings will be for Freud, as they were for Leopardi, a source of pain for the 
individual and in this sense the other in Leopardi is Other in the same Levinasian bruising 
strangeness: “Mostra se’ nel soffrir, ne’ gli odii e l’ire/ Fraterne, ancor piu’ gravi d’ogni 
altro danno” (“doesn’t add his brother’s hate or anger, / worse than any evil, to his ills”; 
lines 119-21).
177
 This does not mean that in “La Ginestra” Leopardi is attempting to 
profess universal love as the solution to all human malaise. It means that a deep love for 
humanity is echoed in the poem, which reverberates with a profound regard for the very 
difficult kind of desire that human beings need to sustain towards one another. 
Humanity’s only consolation is solidarity towards one another’s suffering in the face of 
human infinitesimal insignificance in the endless surrounding misery. The appeal to 
humankind in “La Ginestra” is based on a solid foundation of the truth about the human 
condition and human nature: “L’onesto e il retto/ Conversar cittadino, /E giustizia e 
pietade, altra radice/ Avranno allor che non superbe fole” (“out of real wisdom, then an 
honest, / just society of citizens / and right and piety will take root”; lines 151-54).178 
The word “pietade” here reveals the need for compassion as pietas derived from 
the recognition of the suffering the human being is expected to endure. As in Levinas, the 
suffering and responsibility of the Other is the suffering and responsibility of the ‘I’. The 
individual is essentially a solitary suffering being, but resistance to the sense of 
nothingness can be achieved by standing in relation to the other. This situation, as I shall 
argue, is echoed in Beckett’s Endgame. 
                                                 
177
 The full quotation from Civilization and Its Discontents is: “we tend to regard the suffering that comes 
from our relations with other human beings as a kind of gratuitous addition, although it cannot be any less 
fatefully inevitable than the suffering which comes from elsewhere,” 77. 
178
 The importance of mutual compassion could also be linked to the Stoic philia (friendship) and the 
importance of “affezioni positive” (positive emotions) to which both Epictetus and Epicurus refer.  
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3.3  Lacanian and Levinasian Desire for the Other in 
Endgame 
In Beckett’s play Endgame compassion towards one another becomes crucial.179 I 
read Clov and Hamm and, to some degree, Nell and Nagg as situated on the cusp between 
two movements of desire. On the one hand, they are torn by a Lacanian desire that 
perennially creates longing and inner disjunction. On the other hand, there is an appeal to 
discover a Levinasian desire that brings out compassion towards the other. The appeal to 
compassion is necessary in order to brace against the immediate external surroundings 
which are described as “GRREY! . . . From pole to pole” (CDW 107), 180 where 
everything is “corpsed” (106).181 I argue that the desire that characterizes these 
                                                 
179
 It is interesting to note that James Knowlson recounts Beckett’s early interest in Unanimisme, especially 
the poetry of Jules Romains and Pierre-Jean Jouve, during his final year at Trinity College Dublin: “An 
outlook that sees the individual as finding some degree of solace in a collective must have held some 
attraction for a young man who at the time was feeling increasingly his own sense of isolation” (Damned to 
Fame 76). The importance of compassion to one another, also as a philosophical creed, was thus pivotal to 
Beckett from an early age. 
180
 In Endgame nature is as destructive as in “La Ginestra.” To counterpoise this destruction, Hamm often 
yearns for a pastoral alternative to the deserted greyness in which he lives. If he could fall asleep, he would, 
“go into the woods. My eyes would see . . .  the sky, the earth . . . I’d run, run, they wouldn’t catch me. 
(Pause) Nature!” (CDW 100). As in Leopardi, while the pastoral solace of Nature is nowhere to be found, 
the blind destruction of natural change and decay is everywhere in Endgame. 
181
 While the external world in “La Ginestra” is clearly located in the Neapolitan setting of “sterminator 
Vesevo,” the first thirty years of Beckett scholarship repeatedly claimed that Beckett’s “imagination 
functions almost entirely outside of history: what is, has been, and what has been, will be,” Gilman, 
“Beckett,” 83. It is worth noting, however, that the early drafts of Endgame show a specificity of time and 
place, namely Picardy/ Normandy in the wake of the First World War. According to S.E. Gontarski, “The 
devastation in the Picardy/Normandy area was familiar to Beckett, and the World War I setting was not a 
very subtle means of deflecting the play’s autobiographical level away from his World War II experiences 
in the region”( The Intent of Undoing 33). Gontarski suggests that the title of Beckett’s hospital activities 
for Irish Radio, “Humanity in Ruins,” might serve “as a gloss on Fin de Partie” (34). 
Recent Beckett scholarship, on the other hand, has placed Endgame in specific cultural and historical 
contexts. Julie Campbell talks about these cultural markers in “‘There is no more . . .’: Cultural Memory in 
Endgame”. In “Buried! Who would have buried her? : Famine ‘ghost graves’ in Samuel Beckett’s 
Endgame,” Julieann Ulin argues that Endgame plays out an Irish traumatic memory. The perception of the 
“corpsed” outside world of the play seen as an Irish cultural memory of trauma is also put forward by 
Ronán McDonald: “It is true that Beckett’s skeletal characters and desolate landscape are haunted by ghosts 
of Auschwitz. Yet it is also the case that the fragmentary narratives, the splintered memories, and the 
refusal of a dominant narrative voice betoken the fractured consciousness of a country with a traumatic 
history of famine, displacement, persecution and lost language.”  In Tragedy and Irish Writing: Synge, 
O’Casey, and Beckett, 142. For Peter Boxall, however, it is rather through a reading of Beckett’s “delicate 
tracery of reference to the cultural and political landscape of Ireland and Europe” that a sense of his politics 
can be discerned: tracing the traces by which Beckett “simultaneously refers and resists reference” to 
historical events. “Samuel Beckett”, 162. 
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personages is a far cry from the attempt to become indifferent to desire manifested in 
Proust.  
 Clov and Hamm and Nell and Nagg attempt to recapture a never occurred and 
never-to-be recovered unity revealed in the characters’ evocation of one another through 
speech. The latter paradoxically accentuates that same Lacanian gap “through which 
neurosis recreates a harmony with a real” (Seminar XI 22), that piece of the past that has 
been foreclosed and is now displaced onto language. As Clov states: “It’s my dream. A 
world where all would be silent and still and each thing in its last place, under the last 
dust” (CDW 120).  
Clov’s relation to Hamm and Nell’s rapport with Nagg can first be examined 
within the context of Lacan’s theory of interminable desire. The latter’s paradoxical 
nature is revealed in the first lines of the play: Clov’s “Finished, it’s finished, nearly 
finished, it must be nearly finished” keeps being countered by the sudden “heap, a little 
heap, the impossible heap” (CDW 92). The first phrase can be associated with Clov’s and 
Nell’s desire to cancel their identity whereas the second refers to Clov’s and Nell’s 
impossibility of escaping their increasingly burdensome entities. This interminable cycle 
is later repeated in Hamm’s “it’s time it ended” (98), which keeps being faced by “and 
yet I hesitate, I hesitate to . . . to end” (CDW 93).182 
 This interminable cycle of desire reflects Clov and Hamm’s and Nell and Nagg’s 
traumatic existence. Their trauma is constituted, on the one hand, by what they choose to 
conceive as a mythical past that they seem to be unable to recover and that is also a 
source of regret, as well as an imprisoning present spent in the doldrums of habit and 
routine. Their trauma lies in their being (apparently) irrecoverably crushed under the 
mordant bite of an infinitely cyclical desire manifest in their speech: “All life the same 
questions, the same answers” (CDW 94) marking “the end of the day like any other day” 
(98). The unending cycle of desire, exemplified by the characters’ compulsive dialogue, 
                                                 
182
 Pol Popovic Karic construes the dual movement of cancellation and assertion of identities through Clov 
and Hamm respectively: “In Clov’s and Hamm’s interaction, the former seeks the cancellation of their 
coexistence, while the latter tries to preserve it. Clov’s evasion hinges on the cancellation of their social ties 
and Hamm’s efforts to preserve them.” (Ironic Samuel Beckett 98).  
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thus reflects their apparent failure to withdraw from the lifelong pain of “this farce, day 
after day” (CDW 99). Furthermore, when pressed toward its furthest limit to express, 
their speech encounters its own insufficiency. The omnipotence and impotence of speech 
over-rule the speaker and the tormenting effects produced by language and its promise 
define the characters’ existence. Clov and Hamm’s, as well as, Nell and Nagg’s struggle, 
is also one with language as ‘Other.’  
The alienating speech of both Clov and Hamm and Nell and Nagg defines their 
Lacanian lack-of-being. Clov, for instance, is angry, frustrated and dissatisfied with his 
attempt at speech. Echoing Caliban’s outburst to Prospero in Shakespeare’s The Tempest 
he inveighs: “I use the words you taught me. If they don’t mean anything anymore, teach 
me others. Or let me be silent” (CDW 113).183  The Shakespearean quotations in this text, 
as will also be the case in Happy Days, once more highlight loss because they float like 
flotsam and jetsam of a devastated literary tradition.
184
 The play is in part characterized 
by this very failure of language, particularly speech, the impossibility of totally 
articulating thought and conveying meaning, the negation of anything that can ever 
“sprout” (98). The failure of language is evident in the fragmentary quality of Clov and 
Hamm’s conversation which only approximately succeeds in giving expression:  
CLOV: [Sadly.] No one that ever lived ever thought so crooked as we. 
HAMM: We do what we can. 
CLOV: We shouldn’t. 
[Pause] 
HAMM: You’re a bit of all right, aren’t you?  
CLOV: A smithereen.  
                                                 
183
 Jennifer Jeffers makes the interesting observation that Clov’s angry outburst at Hamm, asking him to 
reinvigorate a language which no longer produces meaning, is a futile appeal to a return to patriarchal 
control (Beckett’s Masculinity 116-7).  
184
 Shakespeare has been a constant presence in critical accounts of Beckett. As early as 1963, J. Russell 
Browne could write confidently of “Mr. Beckett’s Shakespeare.” Browne was quickly followed by Ruby 
Cohn in her seminal 1965 essay “The Tempest in an Endgame.” 
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[Pause.] 
HAMM: This is slow work. [Pause]  
(CDW 97) 
The characters’ speech is a manifestation of desire that expresses their futile longing to 
recuperate a lost symbiosis with the Other. Hamm and Clov are forced to endlessly desire 
an impossible “Once!” a never-achieved unity that will remain forever inaccessible and 
will inevitably keep causing pain. The characters are thus trapped into a desire for an 
irremediable past  in Hamm’s case they are painful childhood desires related to his 
“accursed progenitor” (CDW 96), in Nell and Nagg it is more a desire for the happiness 
of their youth.
185  The sense of loss permeates all the dialogue evoking nostalgia for a 
previous sense of a holistic self  “we change! We lose our hair, our teeth! Our bloom! 
Our ideals! ” (CDW 97). As a result the sense of death is palpable: “I see my light dying” 
(98). When Nagg says that he had lost his tooth the day before, all Nell can repeatedly 
sigh out in uncritical nostalgia is an elegiac: “Ah yesterday!” (CDW 99). Nell’s speech 
reveals an inexorable desire for a sepia-tinted past which, by contrast, highlights the 
present “Desert!” (CDW 103). Beckett had explicitly pointed out, as early as his 
monograph Proust, that time is not just spent but it spends us: “We are not merely more 
weary because of yesterday, we are other, no longer what we were before the calamity of 
yesterday” (Proust 13).  
This same futile urge for yesterday,  a longing  to recover a holistic past, is 
equivalent to the endless compulsion in the desire for the Other whose unconscious 
frustration and resulting aggression has been displaced onto the characters’ truncated or 
disabled bodies (Clov cannot sit, Hamm is in a wheelchair, Nell and Nagg are canned in 
bins). Their disabled and fragmentary bodies recall Lacan’s dictum that “Aggressiveness 
                                                 
185
Jeffers chooses to describe the impossible return to the past in the entire play in terms of an impossible 
reconnection of the filial bond between father and son: “Endgame is a staging of this painful impossibility 
of return to the father by the son because it would lead to a renewal” (Beckett’s Masculinity 110). 
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presents itself in analysis as an aggressive intention and as an image of corporal 
dislocation” (“Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis”; Écrits 84).186 
The trauma of these characters, however, is not just one of a futile desire for the 
Other. It is also constituted by the trauma of accusation (see 1.5.7), the trace of which, I 
argue below, also lies in the characters’ speech, hinting at the trace of a bond from an 
immemorial past. Clov, Nell (and as discussed in 3.4 this is also the case with Winnie) 
are all vulnerably exposed to the bruising proximity of the Other, to the passivity of the 
accusative form which ruptures their subjectivity, putting into question all affirmation 
for-oneself and forcing them to shoulder responsibility in addressing the Other. I argue 
below that they are all uniquely elected, a uniqueness not assumed, not subsumed, and 
which is traumatic. All three are involved in the risky uncovering of themselves and the 
breaking up of their inwardness by exposure to the Other. Their subjectivity is indeed the 
responsibility of being-in-question in the form of total exposure to offence. The 
wounding intervention of the Other and the resulting passivity of the accusative form 
constitutes their persecution. I make a claim for Clov, Nell (and also Winnie) as ordered 
from the outside, traumatically commanded. In the trauma of persecution they pass from 
the outrage undergone to the responsibility for the persecutor, and, in this sense they pass 
from the nothingness of suffering to the infinity in being hostages of the Other to the 
point of expiation, (Clov repeatedly claims that at certain instances he feels taken over by 
something, “I wonder if I’m in my right mind . . . in my right senses” [128]). 187 This 
transfer is subjectivity itself which is the saying proper to responsibility.
188
 
                                                 
186
 Jeffers conceives of this bodily fragmentation and disintegration as specifically indicative of a 
patriarchal order that has been completely severed: “Each of the males has become emasculated through 
disease and bodily disintegration, and with the loss of the masculine goes their concern for upholding the 
standards of masculinity” (Beckett’s Masculinity 113). 
187
 In Endgame the persecution lies, as in Levinas, in the obsession of the Other. Obsession, as in Levinas, 
is not consciousness, nor a species or a modality of consciousness, even though it overwhelms the 
consciousness that tends to assume it: “It is unassumable like a persecution…The extreme urgency of the 
assignation precisely breaks up the equality or serenity of consciousness, which espouses its visible or 
conceivable object” (OTB 87).  
188
 The self as responsibility for others is a persecuting obsession and goes against intentionality, such that 
responsibility for others is not primarily love. It is the impossibility of evading the assignation of the other 
without blame. 
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The strange asymmetry and complete supremacy of the Levinasian Other, can 
thus be ascribed to the self-Other relation in Clov and Hamm and, to a lesser degree, Nell 
and Nagg in relation to the Levinasian terms ‘infinity’ and ‘totality’ (see 1.5).189 The 
‘infinity’ beyond the confining walls (those same walls Hamm strikes with his knuckles 
while crying out: “All that’s hollow!” (CDW 104) is, from the very first stage direction, 
indirectly referred to and it looms large throughout the play. ‘Infinity’ is consistently 
implied through such details as Clov’s repeated attempt to look out of the window,  the 
telescope scene, the reference to dreams, forests, hills, woods,  the sky, the earth. 
Thematic allusions to the sea, the ocean beyond, convey a desire for motion, for escape 
from the instant: “the currents will carry us away, far away” (CDW 109).  The ‘Infinity 
beyond’ is also hinted at through the “no more” running gags which gesture toward literal 
statements of an alternative state of words detached from things and from objective 
referents. Indeed the play’s projected world is dislocated from objective reference and 
from the realm of traditional mimesis, and it metaphorically sets the receptor’s 
imaginative engagement adrift. The poetry of this drama questions and disturbs but is 
also magical in its indefiniteness. Beckett himself had said: “I want to bring poetry into 
drama, a poetry which has been through the void.”190 Thus the “vicinity” (97) of the 
world of Endgame is placed outside the world of nature and beyond its objective 
temporality so much so that scenes like the sails of the herring fleet appear to the 
perceptive as having been brought to a standstill, to “ashes” (113).191 The world of 
Endgame, as Gary Adelman points out, “negates time itself” (Naming Beckett’s 
Unnamable 108) and this sentiment is echoed in Hamm’s interjection: “moments for 
nothing, now as always, time was never and time is over, reckoning closed and story 
ended” (CDW 133). Above all, a sense of an inexplicable Infinite where linear 
                                                 
189
 The relationship between Hamm and Clov has also been taken to suggest hammer and nail (clou in 
Beckett’s French) (The Theatre of the Absurd 82). This would suggest both their mutual dependence and 
their capacity to inflict pain on one another.   
190
 Beckett is quoted by Knowlson, Damned to Fame, 427. 
191
 Michael Guest argues that Clov evokes both the Aristotelian and Augustinian notion of time by 
spatializing the relation between the continuous flow of time and the instantaneous present. Bringing 
temporal existence and non-existence into simultaneity, Clov brings the present of Endgame outside the 
world of nature and beyond its objective temporality in the Augustinian realm of divine eternity. In “Paul 
Ricoeur and Watching Endgame.” Byron, ed. Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, 85. 
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temporality has been suspended is conveyed by the final unexpected appearance of a little 
boy, an episode I deal with below.  
I argue that the inexplicable ‘Infinity beyond’ in Endgame can neither be 
rigorously described nor fully imagined but it is in the background and reference to it is 
also peppered throughout Clov and Hamm’s speech, the latter playing an important part 
in binding characters to one another. There is perhaps more behind Clov’s somewhat 
mocking statement that “something is taking its course” (98).192 Clov’s reference to the 
‘infinity’ beyond is explicit when he asks Hamm: “Do you believe in the life to come?” 
(CDW 116) and Hamm, somewhat jeeringly, does not seem to totally rule out this thought 
(CDW 119).
193
 This, however, does not mean that the sense of the ‘Infinite’ in Endgame 
is further from everything that appears, or is present in absence or shown by a symbol.  
Here the infinite signifies in the refusal of the characters, Clov in rapport with Hamm and 
Nell with Nagg, to allow themselves to be tamed or domesticated by a theme. I argue that 
their Saying (see 1.5.5) lies in their proximity to the Other that is an obligation, 
anachronously prior to any commitment opening onto the Infinite. 
Levinas’ ‘infinity’ (and ‘totality’) can thus be grafted, at least initially, onto Clov 
and Hamm’s world views. I read Hamm, “bang in the centre” (105), as at first totalitarian 
in his attempt to reduce Clov, but also Nagg and Nell,
194
 to the same. Hamm’s presence 
                                                 
192
 Russell Smith comments about this passage: “It is clear from the play that something is happening, but 
that this something is happening in a way that defies representation in terms of conventional narrative. The 
important thing is that a course is being taken: the cycle of repetition is not eternal and immutable, but 
contains within itself an element of constant but infinitesimal change” In “Endgame’s Remainders.” 
Byron,ed. Samuel Beckett’s Endgame,109. 
193
 Guest attributes the tenuous and ambiguous temporal condition of Endgame to the ambiguous character 
of Beckett’s indicators of metatheatricality. Guest states: “The watcher thus experiences an effect of flicker, 
of vacillation between mutually exclusive apprehensions of linear and instantaneous, objective and 
subjective time” (Samuel Beckett’s Endgame 90). 
194
 Nell and Nagg are another self-Other pair where Nagg is the one to knock on Nell’s lid and impose a 
confrontation, the latter being forced to respond to “this farce, day after day” (99). Nagg appeals to Nell in 
all his destitution and material nudity and Nell, in spite of her own misery, is reluctant but still not able to 
be deaf to that appeal. As the stage directions indicate, they can only “turn painfully towards each other” 
(99). Nell is forced to respond to the demand of Nagg, who, in turn, claims a pivotal role in wanting Nell’s 
being-for-him. When Nell tells of how she laughed on Lake Como because she was happy, Nagg 
indignantly accuses her of falsity: “It was not, it was not, it was my story and nothing else” (102 my 
emphasis). Nagg who disrupts Nell opens a new dimension shattering her solitude and demanding his 
place, awakening in Nell the desires in her memory. Nagg and Nell’s two ashbins, which are “touching 
each other, covered with an old sheet” (CDW 92), are indicative of the misery which both distances and 
unites them. As Pol Popovic Karic says, “This contact represents the physical proximity and the mysterious 
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is, from beginning to end, accusative in its demand for silence from Nell and Nagg, and 
merciless in its giving instructions to “Clear away this muck! Chuck it in the sea!” and 
“screw down the lids” (103). In the first lines of the play Hamm is a totalizer who is 
satisfied with the system he has been able to organize around himself. His outwardly 
directed but ultimately self-centred totalistic thinking, as well as his constant accusations 
to Clov (but also to his father: “Accursed progenitor!” and “accursed fornicator” [96], 
and his mother “damned busybody” [103]), give him control over the other characters. It 
is also clear that Hamm’s charity towards Clov as a child has been turned into an 
opportunity to wield power: “It was the moment I was waiting for . . .Would I consent to 
take in the child . . . I can see him still, down on his knees, his hands flat on the ground, 
glaring at me with his mad eyes, in defiance of my wishes” (118).   
 Hamm’s initial attempt to represent the other person is thus a representation 
whereby the ‘I’ dominates the other by attempting to capture the Other in a concept that 
reduces to the same. Notwithstanding Clov’s complaint that he is seeing his light die, 
Hamm still egoistically demands: “take a look at me” (CDW 98) and then “come back 
and tell me what you think of your light” (CDW 98).  Clov’s life is defined by Hamm’s 
irritating but pressing concerns (he lives in his kitchen “ten feet by ten feet by ten feet, 
and wait[s] for him to whistle me” CDW 93). Clov bears the quotidian brunt of caring for 
Hamm: “getting you up and putting you to bed every five minutes” (94). He desperately 
attempts to snap out of the trappings that life with Hamm has reserved for him but no 
casting up of his eyes or brandishing of his fists can make him find the courage to leave 
Hamm. 
Indeed, in being accused through constantly being addressed and contested by 
Hamm, Clov is singled out and held responsible, a responsibility he himself cannot 
fathom: “Do this, do that, and I do it. I never refuse. Why?” (113). The Levinasian notion 
of ipseity, where the self is an accusative without a nominative form, reflects this 
situation linguistically. Clov’s being in deficit with regard to himself is brought about by 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
abyss that separates the members of both couples, Nagg and Nell, as well as Hamm and Clov” (Ironic 
Samuel Beckett 109).  
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the moral obligation imposed through Hamm’s appeal and as a result Clov’s being is 
disinterested in that it is driven from the outside into itself but in exile in itself. As he 
admits to himself: “you must learn to suffer better than that if you want them to weary of 
punishing you” (CDW 132). Clov’s  and Hamm’s choice to engage in banter accusing the 
other of being the one lesser able to love and more prone to inflict pain, reveals a guilt-
ridden self that can only impotently rebel against its being open to an indomitable 
otherness, to what below I refer to as a Levinasian transcendence encountered at the very 
core of its subjectivity. Clov is thrown back upon himself in being called upon to answer 
not just for Hamm but in his place. Clov and Hamm’s encounter has indeed been a 
primordial encounter which obliges them to just be for the other person. As the play 
progresses, Clov’s desire for Hamm, and this is also the case with Nell’s desire for Nagg, 
becomes a desire whereby their ‘I’ is confronted by its own vulnerability. These personae 
disrupt each other’s sense of self becoming increasingly aware of how the irrevocable 
presence of the other person is accusative and has, in Levinasian terms, “put . . . the I in 
question” (Totality and Infinity 195). 
Clov has been wounded by Hamm, but this being afflicted by him still results in 
the former’s final decision not to quit. Indeed the blow in Clov’s affection makes an 
impact, traumatically, in a past more profound than all that he can reassemble by 
memory. To the repeated questions as to whether he remembers what has happened, Clov 
exasperatedly interjects:”What for Christ’s sake does it matter?” (CDW 128). Yet he still 
provides his support by remaining on site, a decision which does not seem to stem from 
his own initiative. Clov’s act of not leaving pertains less to the present than to the 
insurmountable diachrony of time. Clov’s subjectivity subjected to Hamm is an 
irrecoverable time.   
 Clov’s words to Hamm do not ultimately put forth his presence but they expose 
his exposedness to the latter. Clov’s final choice not to leave is the equivalent of the 
Biblical Abraham’s “Here I am,” referred to at the beginning of this chapter. It is a pure 
‘Saying’ not convertible into something put forth, the Said, in that, as in Levinas, it is 
120 
 
completely for-the-other (see 1.5.5).
195
 The relationship with Hamm, incontestably set up 
in Saying, is a responsibility for him without any limit or measure, an existence with 
sacrifice imposed on it without conditions.
196
 The relationship of Clov to Hamm is the 
equivalent of catching sight of an extreme passivity in the relationship with the other, the 
passive synthesis of its temporality. 
 Hamm’s attempt at ‘totality’ is thus increasingly called into question as the play 
unfolds, not least by himself, and Clov’s painfully endured coexistence with Hamm 
increasingly reveals itself incapable of shirking responsibility for the other. Clov, but also 
Nell, are irritated by the forced coexistence endured (“If I could kill him I’d die happy” 
105), but none of them is absolved from any responsibility for the Other. Clov subjects 
himself to Hamm,
197
 and through that subjection, he is involved in what, in Levinasian 
terms, would be called the resistance and the breakage of the ceiling of ‘totality’ (TI 171). 
His desire for Hamm, notwithstanding his attempt to concede otherwise, increasingly 
resembles Levinas’ concept of ‘infinity’. He only gets as far as the threatening “I’ll leave 
you” (96), and the reason why he never leaves is as comically banal but essential as the 
answer he provides to Hamm’s question: “Why don’t you kill me?” to which he replies, 
“I don’t know the combination of the larder.” (96). The essentiality of this relationship 
boils down to as crucial an issue as the one of nourishment. As Levinas states: “To 
recognize the Other is to recognize a hunger” (TI 75).   
Clov’s desire for Hamm is difficult and problematic and calls out for considerable 
suffering. As the play progresses, however, it is Hamm who calls out to Clov in an 
alarmingly anguished tone that has shed some of its arrogance and pretense. He starts to 
seek a conduit to Clov’s affective side with implorations (which might sound like 
provocations, but through which he seems to be testing Clov’s loyalty towards him) like:  
“Will you not kiss me?” (CDW 125).198  The importance of social unity, expressed 
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 In Otherwise Than Being Levinas says: “The subject of saying does not give signs, it becomes a sign, 
turns into an allegiance” (49). 
196
 In Otherwise Than Being Levinas states: “Of itself saying is the sense of patience and pain” (50). 
197
 To be subjected is to be exposed to the demand of the Other, a demand which invariably registers itself 
“on the surface of the skin, at the edge of the nerves” (Otherwise Than Being 81). 
198
 Pol Popovic Karic comments that Hamm “manages to mask his intentions to create social ties with Clov 
thanks to a veil of disinterested comments and futile tasks” (Ironic Samuel Beckett 102). 
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through “we,” and its potential value, “mean something”, comes to the fore when he asks 
“We’re not beginning to . . . to . . . mean something?” (108). As Levinas says, “To be we 
is not to ‘jostle’ one another or get together around a common task” (TI 213).199 
Furthermore, Hamm adds a new humane dimension when he ponders, again in significant 
first person plural, “we ourselves . . . [with emotion] . . . we ourselves . . . at certain 
moments . . . [Vehemently]. To think perhaps it won’t all have been for nothing!” 
(106).
200
   
Hamm’s attempt to dig up a past where he presents his actions as potentially 
ethically significant is a way of reinforcing the social bond that could possibly unite him 
to Clov. This attempt is also manifest when he insists on the narration of his story where 
he emphasizes what he chooses to present as ‘help’ he gave to Clov as a child in order for 
the latter to survive: “In the end he asked me would I consent to take in the child as well–
if he were still alive” (CDW 118). Clov is reluctant to hear this story about what Hamm 
chooses to present as his capacity for pity and compassion. Hamm’s later accusation of 
lack of pity directed towards Clov becomes  resonant with repressed guilt when viewed in 
the light of Hamm’s shabby treatment of his own parents and Nagg’s reverberating 
appeal to pity on account of his own kindness towards Hamm: “Whom did you call when 
you were a tiny boy, and were frightened, in the dark? Your mother? No. Me” (119). It is 
clear that Nagg still feels the burden of having dedicated himself to Hamm as a boy only 
to be paid back with the present unkindness, which heightens this burden with accusative 
remorse:  “ I hope the day will come when you’ll really need to have me listen to you, 
and need to hear my voice, any voice.[Pause] Yes, I hope I’ll live till then, to hear you 
calling me like when you were a tiny boy, and frightened, in the dark, and I was your 
only hope” (CDW 120).  
                                                 
199
 Levinas also expresses the concept of a ‘We’ as follows: “ In the measure that the face of the Other 
relates us with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the 
We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality” (TI 300).  
200
 In relation to the use of “we” in Endgame, Popovic points out, “The spectator senses the importance of 
social unity, ‘we’, and its potential value on the spiritual level: “mean something.” Hamm’s behavior 
confirms the spectator’s interpretation as he insists on their union despite Clov’s mockery” (Ironic Samuel 
Beckett 90). 
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But it is not just Nagg but also Clov who unearths accusations regarding Hamm’s 
past unethicality. Foremost among these instances are the Mother Pegg episode and 
Clov’s weeping for a bicycle and crawling at Hamm’s feet only to be told “to get out to 
hell” (96). The most telling instance, however, is Hamm’s own despairing rebuke 
directed towards his own lack of pity: “All those I might have helped. Helped! Saved. 
Saved! [Pause] The place was crawling with them!” (CDW 125). These passages speak 
volumes about the manner in which Clov is being asked to shoulder responsibility not 
simply for Hamm but also for Hamm’s failure to shoulder responsibility in the past.  The 
burden of this weight is clearly almost unbearable to Clov but his physical presence on 
stage and his propensity to listen to Hamm’s story overshadow his negative response. The 
threatening persona of Hamm, in what increasingly reveals itself to be a thin film of self-
defense, obliges Clov to stay.  
There is something almost transcendent that precedes these characters’ difficult 
cohabitation and that irresolutely binds Clov to Hamm (and Nell to Nagg).
201
 There is 
                                                 
201
 T.W. Adorno, in possibly the most famous essay on this play, first published in 1961(1969 in English) 
insists on its historical singularity after the Second World War, and praises it for its transcendent quality or 
what he calls:  “the play’s opposition to ontology” (43).  Adorno claims that Endgame addresses a crisis in 
meaning and representation precipitated by the horrors of World War II and the failure of Existentialism. 
For Adorno, Beckett’s Endgame is the imaginative counterpart to his philosophical critique of 
Enlightenment reason. This critique is linked with his horror of the Holocaust, which he saw as the logical 
endpoint of confidence in human perfectibility. In this vein Adorno attacks subject identity attempting to 
subvert the delusion of totality in which modern subjects live. He insists on the importance of reviving the 
vanishing sense of the importance of particulars, the elements that resist the simplifying sweep of the 
totalitarian mind. This argument, in spite of making very different meanderings, reaches a conclusion with 
clear resonances of Levinasian thought. This particular excerpt is very relevant in  echoing the Levinasian 
ethic, even though it reaches a conclusion about Endgame which is very different from my own: 
The individualistic position constitutes the opposite pole to the ontological approach of every kind of 
existentialism, including of Being and Time, and as such belongs with it. Beckett’s drama abandons that 
position like an outmoded bunker. If individual experience in its narrowness and contingency has 
interpreted itself as a figure of Being, it has received the authority to do so only by asserting itself to be the 
fundamental characteristic of Being. But that is precisely what is false. The immediacy of individuation 
was deception: the carrier of individual experience is mediated, conditioned. Endgame assumes that the 
individual’s claim to autonomy and being has lost its credibility. But although the prison of individuation is 
seen to be both prison and illusion– the stage set is the imago of this kind of insight–art cannot break the 
spell of a detached subjectivity; it can only give concrete form to solipsism (47). 
 In “Towards an Understanding of Endgame,”in Samuel Beckett, 39-49. Simon Critchley reacts to Adorno’s 
essay on Endgame and in Very Little . . . Almost Nothing: Death, Philosophy, Literature (1997), he states: 
“The philosopher who has come closest to describing the difficulties of interpreting Beckett and gone 
furthest in taking up the challenge that he poses to philosophy is, without doubt, Adorno”  (147). More 
recently, Jackie Blackman’s reading of Endgame situates the play at “a moment in history when silent 
images and meaningless words became the currency of catastrophe” (73). For Blackman, it was Beckett’s 
exemplary caution about representing the Holocaust that elevated Endgame to the status of a classic in 
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something which, as Beckett had said with reference to this play, ‘claws’202 at the deepest 
levels of experience and intuition which are quite ineffable.
203
 What I mean by 
transcendent here goes beyond the “transcendence of need” that places the subject “in 
front of nourishments, in front of the world as nourishment, this transcendence offers the 
subject a liberation from itself” (Time and the Other 67). In fact this instantaneous 
transcendence through space, to which Levinas refers in the early work Time and the 
Other, does not manage to provide escape from solitude. It is an instantaneous 
transcendence achieved through light. Levinas says, “Subjectivity is itself the objectivity 
of light. Every object can be spoken of in terms of consciousness–that is, can be brought 
to light” (Time and the Other 66).  Light in Levinas is thus described, along with the 
knowledge it brings, “as a way for the subject–emancipated from the anonymity of 
existing but riveted to itself through its identity as an existent (that is, materialized)–to 
take a distance with regard to its materiality” (Time and the Other 65). 
The transcendent bonding between Clov and Hamm cannot be achieved in light as 
much as it cannot be rationally explained away. Hamm and Clov are confined inside the 
walls on the stage and seem to have been bound together before time immemorial, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
Holocaust Studies. Blackman reads Endgame’s “oblique traces” of Auschwitz as Beckett’s ethical aesthetic 
response to the Holocaust (73). Blackman also speaks about Beckett-Adorno being positioned together. She 
says: “Within Holocaust studies and the context of the unsayable, Beckett’s play, Endgame (1956), and 
Adorno’s well-worn dictum “poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric” (1949) are often positioned together, even 
though there was no chronological connection between the two. A more definite linkage (not commonly 
alluded to) did come later, however, when Adorno re-visited his judgment of “no poetry” in the light of 
“Beckett’s exemplary autonomous art.” Blackman, “Beckett’s Theatre After Auschwitz,” 71. Blackman is 
here referring to Adorno’s article “Meditations on Metaphysics: After Auschwitz.” This is a passage from 
that essay, which Blackman indeed quotes: 
The most far-out dictum from Beckett’s Endgame, that there really is not so much to be feared any more, 
reacts to a practice whose first sample was given in the concentration camps. . . What the sadists in the 
camps foretold their victims, “Tomorrow you’ll be wiggling skyward as smoke from this chimney,” 
bespeaks the indifference of each individual life that is the direction of history. . . Perennial suffering has as 
much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after 
Auschwitz you could no longer write poems.(“Meditations on Metaphysics” 86 in Blackman, 71) 
202
Beckett wrote of the play’s power to ‘claw’ in a letter to Alan Schneider, dated 21st June 1956.  In M. 
Harmon, ed. No Author Better Served: The Correspondence of Samuel Beckett and Alan Schneider, 11. 
203
 We cannot ignore the time-honoured criticism that sees this as the ‘endgame’ in chess whereby the 
action seems leached of human will and the characters are chess-pieces being moved by forces outside their 
control. See McDonald, Cambridge Introduction to Samuel Beckett, 49. The reference to chess has also 
been construed as articulating a powerful metaphor for infinity. See Michael Worton, “Waiting for Godot 
and Endgame: theatre as text” in Pilling, ed. Cambridge Companion to Beckett, 71.  
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outside of light. Indeed, before any character speaks in Endgame, the stage directions 
offer a description of a “bare interior” with “grey light” and on the “left and right back, 
high up, two windows, curtains drawn” (CDW 92). The play is characterized throughout 
by the absence of much light. This lack of light resonates with meaning when read 
alongside Levinas’ statement: “a being is not placed in the light of another but presents 
itself in the manifestation that should only announce it . . . the absolute experience is not 
disclosure but revelation”  (TI 66).204 The word transcendent is thus here used  attributing 
to it more than “a transcendence of space” founded  on “a transcendence without a return 
to its point of departure” ( Time and the Other 66). It is more than an “everyday 
transcendence” that is stopped from “falling back upon a point that is always the same” 
(66). Indeed while the latter transcendence is a transcendence to be found in material 
existence, “wherein light is given in enjoyment” (66), the transcendence that binds these 
characters operates outside of all light. The characters in Endgame are not just torn by 
desire but they are also revealed through it while having their subjectivity pierced by the 
other’s accusation. Their ‘I’ substitutes itself for the other and, as in Clov’s case, remains 
and does not forsake the other. Thus being is transcended. The presence of Hamm in 
front of Clov, Nagg in front of Nell, and even more so Willie in the presence of Winnie 
(see 3.4) puts in question their world of things  experienced (in the case of Winnie also 
possessed). The encounter with the other is not “encountered as if this thing came from 
the ego” (Time and the Other 68) but an encounter “beyond the knowledge measuring 
beings–the inordinateness of Desire . . . desire for the absolutely other” (Totality and 
Infinity 34).
205
 As Hamm resignedly admits: “You’re leaving me all the same” (CDW 95) 
but as Clov answers, that would have been his very wish but he is powerless when 
confronted by the other’s concerns and is unable to quit, in spite of  having been 
perennially trying to do so. His passivity is prior to all receptivity, it is transcendent: 
                                                 
204
 For Levinas, the elemental world, apeiron, what he also terms “the bad infinite or the indefinite” (TI 
159), can be disclosed but what evokes the infinite, the Other, cannot (TI 158-59, 192-93). The infinite can 
only be revealed. The one who speaks is not disclosed but, in articulating the world, he or she is announced 
through what he or she presents (TI 65-66).
204
 And what he or she reveals is the face, the personal. Such 
revelation, particularly in Hamm’s case, reveals itself to Clov through speech.  
205
 Levinas explains: “If the notions of totality and being are notions that cover one another, the notion of 
the transcendent places us beyond categories of being. We thus encounter, in our own way, the Platonic 
idea of the Good beyond Being” (TI 293). 
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CLOV: Do this, do that, and I do it. I never refuse. Why? 
HAMM: You’re not able to (113). 
Something about Hamm freezes Clov on the spot and, by the end, makes him confront his 
suffering. The other is foreign to light because the other announces suffering and evokes 
death itself, outside all light, a confrontation through which the subject discovers its 
aforementioned passivity in the accusative form. The presence of Hamm announces an 
event over which Clov knows he is not master just as the presence of Nagg binds Nell to 
her quotidian sacrifice in shouldering the burden of life in a trash can. 
It is thus not in seeing, grasping or other modes of enjoyment, sensibility and 
possession that transcendence in this play can be achieved.
 206
  It is, however, in 
hospitality,
207
 in Clov and Hamm and Nell and Nagg addressing the Other and allowing 
the Other to be a concrete fact of their intrinsically guilty existence, that the Desire of the 
Other as absolutely transcendent can be found. The relationship with the Other is thus 
“the transcendence of expression that founds the contemporaneousness of civilization and 
the mutuality of every relationship . . . This transcendence of expression itself 
presupposes the future of alterity” (82). In confronting Hamm, Clov has reached the limit 
of the possible in suffering and he has been seized by the absolutely unknowable–
“absolutely unknowable means foreign to all light” (Time and the Other 71)–opening the 
way to the possibility of transcendence.  Levinasian transcendence here thus implies, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, “not just the disappearance of the self, but self-
forgetfulness, as a first abnegation” (Time and the Other 67).  What is claimed by the 
Levinasian transcendent is the “absolute exteriority of the metaphysical term” (Totality 
                                                 
206
 Levinas explains the difference between vision and discourse as follows: “Vision operates in this 
manner, totally impossible in discourse. For vision is essentially an adequation of exteriority with 
interiority: in it exteriority is reabsorbed in the contemplative soul and, as an adequate idea, revealed to be 
a priori . . . The exteriority of discourse cannot be converted into interiority” (TI 295). On the contrary, 
when it comes to the face-to-face proper to discourse, it “does not connect a subject with an object, and 
differs from the essentially adequate thematization. For no concept lays hold of exteriority” (TI 295). He 
goes on to explain: “Speech refuses vision, because the speaker does not deliver images of himself only, 
but is personally present in his speech, absolutely exterior to every image he would leave. In language 
exteriority is exercised, deployed, brought about” (TI 296). 
207
 On this theme Levinas states: “Hospitality, the one-for-the-other in the ego, delivers it more passively 
than any passivity from links in a causal chain. Being torn from oneself for another in giving to the other 
the bread from one’s mouth is being able to give up one’s soul for another” (79). 
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and Infinity 35). The other’s concern is put first while respecting an otherness that is a 
reminder of one’s guilt and fallibility. This, pushed to the limit, is “sensibility as the 
subjectivity of the subject. It is a substitution for another, one in the place of another, 
expiation” (Otherwise Than Being 15). I argue, using a Levinasian line of argumentation, 
that responsibility for the other in Clov is antecedent to representation and uncovers 
suffering in the denudation of the face.                          
The face of the other becomes concretely the intervention of the other and not just 
in its materiality.
208
 The face is that which marks, in Levinasian terms, what I earlier 
referred to as the failure of Western or traditional philosophy. Inasmuch as the access to 
beings concerns vision, it dominates those beings, exercises a power over them: “A thing 
is given, offers itself to me. In gaining access to it I maintain myself within the same. The 
face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that 
is, encompassed” (Totality and Infinity 194). The face in Levinas is that which marks the 
first limit of the self from outside: “The face has no form added to it, but does not present 
itself as the formless, as matter that lacks and calls for form” (TI 140). The face of 
Hamm, half covered in black glasses, as well as that of Nagg, cannot be frontally 
exposed, but both faces call Clov (and Nell) respectively into question. They are faces 
that are already absent from themselves. Indeed, as alluded above, they are either 
partially covered or hardly ever directly faced, but they stand for a fall into a past with an 
unrecoverable lapse, unearthing past suffering and failure. Hamm’s (and Nagg’s) faces 
can be construed as the Levinasian “face of the neighbour in its persecuting hatred 
[which] can by this very malice obsess as something pitiful” (OTB 111). 
 I read the face, particularly Hamm’s face, as an evocation of this inexplicable 
trauma for Clov who  is, on the one hand, palpably timorous of facing it, on the other, 
                                                 
208
 The Levinasian discussion of the face follows the description of the confrontation with the idea of death 
in Time and the Other (see 2.5). The encounter with the face is that which speaks to the inexplicability of 
the beyond, the ‘infinity’ beyond the ‘totality’.  Whereas in Time and the Other death for Levinas is an 
abstract fact of otherness (see 2.5), in Totality and Infinity the face emerges as the concrete event that calls 
attention to the otherness of a being, to death and, subsequently, to responsibility (see 1.5.4; 1.5.6). Levinas 
insists: “Death is not this master. Always future and unknown it gives rise to fear or flight from 
responsibilities. Courage exists in spite of it. It has its ideal elsewhere; it commits me to life. Death, source 
of all myths, is present only in the Other, and only in him does it summon me urgently to my final essence, 
to my responsibility” (TI 179). 
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unable to evade it.
209
 Throughout the play, Hamm insists that Clov looks into his scary 
eyes: “Did you ever see my eyes? . . . Did you never have the curiosity, while I was 
sleeping, to take off my glasses and look at my eyes? . . . One of these days I’ll show 
them to you.[Pause]. It seems they’ve gone all white” (94). Despite Clov’s repeated 
refusal, he cannot escape the close proximity of Hamm’s face, nor does Hamm shy away 
from imposing a face-to-face confrontation with Clov.  Hamm removes what on closer 
inspection reveals itself to be a “blood-stained handkerchief over his face” (93). He 
pockets it and whistles to summon Clov, who has been trying to unburden the moral and 
ethical weight imposed by the paralyzed, and paralyzing, Hamm. As pointed out above, 
Clov has been desperately trying “to be off” (98) and the overt wish to cancel Hamm’s 
influence is clear when he violently strikes him on the head with the dog.
210
 Hamm 
responds to Clov’s blows without swaying enhancing, in this way, Clov’s sense of guilt 
and rubbing salt into the accusative wound: “If you must hit me, hit me with the axe. Or 
with the gaff, hit me with the gaff. Not with the dog. With the gaff. Or with the axe” 
(CDW 130). The imploration of Hamm halts Clov and, following this hitting, he meekly 
gives the toy dog back to Hamm. As Levinas would say, “the eyes break through the 
mask−the language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble” (TI 66). Clov attempts to avoid, 
for as long as he can, confronting the language of Hamm’s hidden eyes.  
But the language of the eyes is also speech conceived as that which consolidates a 
bonding between human beings which is, as it were, “prior to every question” (177).211 
The linguistic system presupposes an ethical responsibility of the Levinasian ‘Saying’ 
prior to the ‘Said’ (see 1.5.5), a relationship that opens up to the above-mentioned 
‘infinity’ and does not reduce to ‘totality.’ The presence of exteriority in language, which 
                                                 
209
Catanzaro explains this ambiguity as follows: “Hamm exudes gravity, enigma, formal beauty–and 
exceptionalness, as if time itself had stopped to look at the face of the person sitting. His face assumes an 
aura of isolated originality and is, we are being told, what it means to be Other.” Mary Catanzaro, “Masking 
and the Body” In Byron, ed. Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, 177. 
210
 As Pol Popovic Karic says: “It is possible that the toy dog represents a deficient support that cannot 
stand up just as Clov is an unwilling helper” (Ironic Samuel Beckett 108). 
211 Levinas says: “Language accomplishes the primordial putting in common . . .The universality a thing 
receives from the word that extracts it from the hic et nunc loses its mystery in the ethical perspective in 
which language is situated. The hic et nunc itself issues from possession, in which the thing is grasped, and 
language, which designates it to the other, is a primordial dispossession, a first donation. The generality of 
the word institutes a common world. The ethical event at the basis of generalization is the underlying 
intention of language” (TI 173). 
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commences with the presence of the face, is produced as goodness.  As in Levinas, I read 
the conversation between Clov and Hamm, but also Nell and Nagg as “language [that] 
accomplishes a relation such that the terms are not limitrophe within this relation, such 
that the other, despite the relationship with the same, remains transcendent to the same” 
(Totality and Infinity 39). The encounter with the face thus becomes a linguistic 
experience that can potentially bring out goodness.
212
 This encounter becomes morality 
itself.  Prior to everything else, including their speech, Clov and Hamm and Nell and 
Nagg seem to have been lumped together in a confined space, outside of which is 
physical desertion: “humanity might start from there all over again!” (CDW 108). These 
characters are faced with the ethical choice to share the world of the neighbour-as-
stranger by answering to the call to address the Other. 
213
 This obligation to the Other is 
acted out in what resembles the Levinasian ethic, antecedent to but expressed in 
language. Such obligation is perhaps the reason why to Clov’s question “What is there to 
keep me here?” (120), Hamm answers “the dialogue” (121).  
 The relation with the other produced in language, the thinking of the other (and 
“thought consists in speaking” Totality and Infinity 40),  the Levinasian ‘Saying’ over the 
‘Said,’ opens the way to perceive the Other’s otherness and the possibility of intuiting 
infinity rather than the confinement of the Other to sameness and totality.
214
 I argue that it 
is through the ‘Saying’ that Clov, and to some extent Nell, is awakened to a sensitive 
awareness, a thinking stripped to the rawest nerve, to an unsupportable suffering. This is 
                                                 
212
 “Speech proceeds from absolute difference . . . [a]bsolute difference, inconceivable in terms of formal 
logic, is established only by language” (Totality and Infinity 194-95). Levinas claims that, “Speaking, 
rather than ‘letting be,’ solicits the other person” (Totality and Infinity 195). Speech assumes an 
interlocutor; the ‘I’ validates the other person as Other and in that act acknowledges that which exceeds 
itself.  
213
 The for-the-Other arises in Clov, but also in  Nell, as a commandment understood in its very obedience, 
“as if the I obeyed before having heard, as if the intrigue of alterity were woven prior to knowledge” 
(Thinking-of-the-Other 166). Speaking of commandments implies a creed of sorts. In this respect, Paul 
Cavill and Heather Ward conceive Beckett’s Endgame as a specific mockery of “the Christian idea that the 
suffering of Christ is redemptive” (Christian Tradition in English Literature 389). 
214
 The idea of infinity in Levinas implies a metaphysical infinite. To what extent can a metaphysical 
infinite be read in the backdrop of a play like Endgame? Matthew Feldman poses this question in 
“‘Agnostic Quietism’ and Samuel Beckett’s Early Development.” He states: “Surely by the Trilogy and 
Endgame, agnosticism confronts Beckett’s creatures in its baldest form: Does God exist and therefore bear 
responsibility for suffering?” (Samuel Beckett History, Memory, Archive 185).  In this article, Feldman 
goes on to argue that quietism in Beckett provides an ethical approach to suffering “as a spiritual purgation 
to living” (184; see 2.3.1).  
129 
 
what makes Clov persist in answering Hamm, even his most irritating of provocations, 
and it is also that which compels him to fixate Hamm and not move till the last line of the 
play.
215
  
Indeed in both the Clov-Hamm and Nell-Nagg rapport, “the language precisely 
maintains the other to whom it is addressed, whom it calls upon or invokes… their 
commerce … is ethical” (Totality and Infinity 73).216 Clov’s “I” leaves its comfort zone 
to address and be for Hamm. This relation is the very traversing of this distance, a 
distance which takes Clov only as far as opening the door of the cell. Clov’s realization, 
hard to live with but necessarily faced is that “the earth is extinguished, though I never 
saw it lit” (CDW 132). The bleakness of this earthly existence has to be faced in order to 
aspire to a beyond, in which aspiration lies Clov’s subjectivity. Hamm to Clov, as also 
Nagg to Nell, convey the same earthly bleakness that is necessarily confronted to get a 
foretaste of the otherness of death. Clov claims that: “the whole place stinks of corpses” 
(114) while Nell keeps repeating her near-to-drowning experience: “It was deep, deep. 
And you could see down to the bottom” (CDW 102). This face-to-face with the Other is 
thus also conceived as a relationship with the future of death in the face of which the ego 
is absolutely without initiative. By the end of the play, Clov has come to recognize 
himself as a finite being whose contact with Hamm brings to the fore the future of death 
against which he is totally passive.
217
 Clov’s passivity is in being accused. Through this 
passivity Clov can sense the desire for the infinite. The latter has to pass through the 
                                                 
215
 The dialogue between Clov and Hamm, despite being pared down to a minimum of logicality, is what 
gives expression to their ethical bond which in itself is antecedent to language. My line of argumentation is 
thus opposite to the one proposed by Jonathan Boulter’s 1998 essay on Endgame   whereby “. . . the focus 
in Endgame has shifted towards a situating of the possibility of ethics only in the irretrievable narrative 
past. By positing this I am suggesting that the narrative exchange between the past and the factical now of 
Endgame produces none of the actualities of the ethic . . .” (“Speak no more” 58).  
216
 Their dialogue, once conceived in the Levinasian terms of language as “Otherwise than Being” becomes 
“contact across a distance, relation with the non-touchable, across a void. It takes place in the dimension of 
absolute desire by which the same is in relation with another that was not simply lost by the same” (TI 
172). 
217
 Levinas says: “Metaphysics, the relation with exteriority, that is, with superiority, indicates, on the 
contrary, that the relation between the finite and the infinite does not consist in the finite being absorbed in 
what faces him, but in remaining in his own being, maintaining himself there, acting here below . . . To 
posit being as exteriority is to apperceive infinity as the Desire for infinity, and thus to understand that the 
production of infinity calls for separation, the production of the absolute arbitrariness of the I or of the 
origin” (TI  292). 
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desire for the non-desirable, the ability to face the full implication of one’s guilt in “all 
these dying of their wounds” (CDW 132).  
A clear parallel can here be drawn between Clov’s sense of the infinite and the 
poetic voice’s in Leopardi’s “L’Infinito” (see 1.2.1), particularly the sense of the finite 
self, confronted by the sublimity of the infinite. The Leopardian echoes can also be heard 
in the way that the other person elicits from within the individual the desire for the 
infinite (“Alla sua donna”; see 3.2).  
Clov senses this infinite beyond and in answer to his own question, “What is there 
to keep me here?” (120)  he promptly replies that, at least ontologically, “There’s 
nowhere else” (95). Clov desperately longs for new horizons that lie yonder. He has had 
enough “Of this . . . this . . . thing” (CDW 94). Nonetheless, as in the intuition of the 
Levinasian infinite, he can only sense what lies beyond through the obligation that his 
confined existence imposes on him. His situation mirrors the picture turned towards the 
wall (he spends most of his time in the kitchen “look[ing] at the wall”[93]) in that, like 
that same picture, he faces the intransigent reality in the hope of being turned (in Clov’s 
case perhaps whistled) to glimpse what lies on the obverse side. I read the character of 
Hamm as offering a glimpse of what lies yonder, the metaphysical mystery of the human 
person, the something that cannot be contained, the bruising impact of the neighbour-as-
stranger who calls the other to responsibility.  Hamm himself admits his irritating 
pompousness imposed on others but also the need for the other: “the bigger a man is the 
fuller he is.[Pause. Gloomily] And the emptier” (CDW 93). Hamm as a character stands 
for the something that exceeds grasp and, as such, Clov can only come closer to this 
infinity by remaining at a distance and by not being indifferent.
218
 By not being 
indifferent, Clov recognizes Hamm as master, who approaches “not from the outside but 
                                                 
218
 Levinas explains this relation with the other in terms of the desire for exteriority: “If exteriority consists 
not in being presented as a theme but in being open to desire, the existence of the separated being which 
desires exteriority no longer consists in caring for Being. To exist has a meaning in another dimension than 
that of the perduration of the totality; it can go beyond being.” This going beyond death is produced not in 
the universality of thought but in the pluralist relation, in the goodness of being for the Other, in justice: 
“The surpassing of being starting from being- the relation with exteriority– is not measured by duration. 
Duration itself becomes visible in the relation with the Other, where being is surpassed” (TI 302). 
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from above” (TI 171).219 The Other is a master who “does not conquer but teaches” (TI 
171).
220
 What the Other teaches is thus his or her very otherness, referred to as height (TI 
171), or surplus (TI 97) (see 1.5.2).
 221
  Hamm approaches Clov from a clear vantage 
point of height not just in the manner he accuses Clov but also in the way he threatens 
him: “I’ll give you nothing more to eat . . . I’ll give you enough to keep you from dying. 
You’ll be hungry all the time” (95). Hamm evokes a sense of Levinasian height, implying 
superiority whereby “the height from which language comes we designate with the term 
teaching” (TI 171).222 Height and Surplus thus entail facing the otherness of the Other 
which is also the otherness of a threatening death–death as “ungraspable” (Time and the 
Other 72).
223
 Height also entails the sensing of the infinite through the finite, constituted 
by the painful passage to glimpsing the beyond alluded to by Hamm, whereby death and 
darkness seem to fill it: “Infinite emptiness will be around you all the resurrected dead of 
all ages wouldn’t fill in . . .” (CDW 109). Ross Chambers explains the sensation of an 
awareness of the infinite in the characters of Endgame who seem to be “engaged in a 
temporal process comparable to the infinite divisions or doublings dear to Zeno.”224 
The sense of the Infinite is palpably felt in the telescope scene where there is both 
visual and imaginative projection. Clov’s otherwise sarcastic  “I see . . . a multitude . . . in 
                                                 
219
 Through the notion of ethical, Levinas brings in the theme of “justice” because this face-to-face 
approach in conversation is itself “justice.” 
220
 “Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, a hegemony at work within a totality, but it is 
the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality” (TI 171). In Levinas this “idea of the infinite . 
. . is concretely produced in the form of a relation with the face” (Totality and Infinity 196). The absolutely 
other of the others and the Infinite is ‘traced’ as an enigmatic quality in the face. The face of the other 
person is a “trace in the trace of an abandon, where the equivocation is never abandoned” and is a “trace of 
itself, trace expelled in a trace” (Otherwise Than Being 94). The face is merely a trace of the passing of the 
Infinite. 
221
 Levinas says: “Teaching is a way for truth to be produced such that it is not my work, such that I could 
not derive it from my own interiority. In affirming such a production of truth we modify the original 
meaning of truth . . . taken as the meaning of intentionality” (TI 295). 
222
 Teaching accentuates in the ‘I’ the capability of containing more than it can draw from itself. 
223
 The facing of the Other is the coinciding of the revealer and the revealed in the face. It discovers the 
“perpetual postponement of death, in the essential ignorance of its date” (TI 165). Levinas says: “The 
pathos of suffering does not consist solely in the impossibility of fleeing existing, of being backed up 
against it, but also in the terror of leaving this relationship of light whose transcendence death announces.” 
(Time and the Other 78).  It is, as Levinas says, “the situation in which an event happens to a subject who 
does not assume it, who is utterly unable in its regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front 
of the subject” (Totality and Infinity 39). In this relationship with the future the other is, in Levinas’ words, 
“not define[d] . . . by the future, but the future by the other, for the very future of death consists in its total 
alterity” (82).   
224
 Ross Chambers, “An Approach to Endgame”in Chevigny, 71-81. 
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transports . . . of joy” (CDW 106 ) could  be a poetic creation in being precisely the 
elaboration of a setting that is diametrically opposed to the finite one in which he lives. A 
climax is reached at a particular instant when, on looking through the telescope, a startled 
Clov exclaims: “Looks like a small boy!” (130). This sudden image of young life, “a 
potential procreator” (131), dumbfounds Clov and thereby wakes his thought out of self-
sameness.
 225
 His profound speech starting with “They said to me, That’s love . . . ,” 
where he clearly expounds the suffering in bearing life with the bruising strangeness of a 
fellow human being, follows. 
The boy who appears out of nothing, seen through that same telescope and who 
sits outside without harm even though “it’s death out there” (CDW 126), could thus be 
interpreted as a paradoxical reminder of the almost abandoned Clov as a child, welcomed 
in by Hamm: “It was I was a father to you . . . My house a home for you” (CDW 110).226 
Now it is Clov the adult’s turn to be inspired by Hamm’s ‘I’, the latter becoming a 
marker of finitude in the face of something more, the inability to contain the other: “The 
presence of a being not entering into, but overflowing the sphere of the same establishes 
its ‘status’ as infinite” (Totality and Infinity 195). The emphasis on the positive element 
of the final ‘boy’ clearly contradicts several early critical studies which insisted that 
Endgame is a despairing study of despair. In one of these early studies, however, Vivian 
Mercier adds:  
Many people . . . start hunting for more acceptable interpretations or for ‘the 
overtones.’ For one thing, the boy at the end of the play might, unknown to 
Hamm and Clov, represent a rebirth of life and hope. One similar thought occurs 
                                                 
225
 In early Beckett criticism, Martin Esslin had suggested that the boy forebodes to the godless Hamm 
“redemption from the illusion and evanescence of time through the recognition, and acceptance, of a higher 
reality,” and he saw in the mysterious apparition an allusion to the Christ (because he is a young boy, albeit 
not new-born) and to the Buddha (because he is contemplating his navel in some versions of the play). 
Esslin, Theatre of the Absurd, 70-72. 
226
 The father-son relationship is constantly on the backburner in the play. We cannot forget that in the 
earlier works of Levinas, the relationship with the Other is primarily focused on fecundity in the manner it 
can produce another Other, who is at once myself but also completely separate.  Levinas says: “In fecundity 
the I transcends the world of light  not to dissolve into the anonymity of the there is, but in order to go 
further than the light, to go elsewhere. . . The relation with the son in fecundity does not maintain us in this 
closed expanse of light and dream, cognitions and powers. It articulates the time of the absolutely other, an 
alteration of the very substance of him who can  his trans-substantiation” (TI 269). 
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to Hamm: ‘. . . here we’re down in a hole . . . But beyond the hills? Eh? Perhaps 
it’s still green? Eh?’227  
The reference to a sense of the beyond in the background of the play can thus be found 
even in unsuspecting early critical receptions which placed most of their emphasis on 
despair and misery.
228
 
The impossibly graspable Infinite, evoked through the intervention of Hamm, 
moulds Clov as an ethical subject capable of pity and compassion.
229
 Towards the end of 
the play, Hamm calls Clov back three times ending with a grand finale in which the 
former reminds the latter of his responsibility for him, appealing to his sense of 
compassion: “One day you’ll know what it is, you’ll be like me, except that you won’t 
have anyone with you, because you won’t have had pity on anyone and because there 
won’t be anyone left to have pity on” (110). The appeal to pity, as already mentioned, is 
rife with repressed guilt, and resurfaces towards the end when Hamm, in almost 
Levinasian terms and echoing Leopardi’s social catena, appeals: “Get out of here and 
love one another! Lick your neighbour as yourself! . . . like the solitary child who turns 
himself into children, two, three, so as to be together, and whisper together, in the dark” 
(125-6).
230
 This companionship, savage in essence, but  like the oft-mentioned painkiller, 
necessary in order to reduce suffering, is entirely different from the friendship Beckett 
had talked about earlier on  in Proust, a friendship situated “somewhere between fatigue 
and ennui” (Proust 63). 
                                                 
227
 Mercier, “How to read Endgame,” 12. 
228
 The boy episode is more important in the French version Fin de Partie. The role of the little boy has 
been, according to Colin Duckworth, “relega[ed] to near banality in Endgame . . . treated by critics as a 
mere successor to the departing Clov. . . This however could in fact be Beckett’s familiar reductive 
technique applied to the angel of Revelation, come to announce that (as the Jerusalem Bible has it), ‘The 
time of waiting is over.’ The polyvalent child . . . has arrived with the good news.” In Colin Duckworth, 
“Re-Evaluating Endgame.” Byron,ed. Samuel Beckett’s Endgame, 37. 
229
 Clov has been drawn into this face-to-face encounter and is constrained to become responsible for the 
Other. In the presence of the Other, Clov can make neither an unconstrained act of will nor an impartial 
decision. It is a matter of compulsion rather than choice, a measureless imbalance of a relation that is more 
of a non-relation. 
230
 Michael Worton interprets Hamm’s “Get out of here and love one another! Lick your neighbour as 
yourself” as a pungent parody of Jesus’exhortation”Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself” (Matthew, 
19:19). According to Worton, “Beckett . . . is reminding us of the textual nature of the Bible and thereby 
suggesting that it does not have to be believed in toto or as dogma” (The Cambridge Companion to Beckett 
84). 
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Hamm’s appeal to Clov to put himself in his shoes could be mapped onto what 
marks the movement from the central concept of the intervention of the face in Totality 
and Infinity to what becomes central in Otherwise than Being: the approach, or 
“proximity” of the Other that calls the self into “substitution.”231  The “proximity” of the 
Other cannot be reduced to a moment in time or to a piece of knowledge. A constant 
backdrop to this play, as alluded to above, is the idea that time cannot be reduced to a 
linear event but a radical rethinking of the role of a past, particularly a past that echoes 
the Levinasian notion of an-archic past, is continually pressing on the ethical relations 
between characters. Events in Endgame are “always ‘already in the past’” (Otherwise 
Than Being 100),
232
 and ethical action is now required to shoulder responsibility for that 
past. 
I read Hamm’s final approach as an-archic in its call to responsibility and in its 
calling out forth for “substitution.” Clov is a subject for Hamm in finding himself 
accused by Hamm. Clov’s response is not an act of self-positing, it is rather the passivity 
of an exposure. His final decision to remain is a subjection of himself to the Good. By the 
end of the play Clov has revealed the singularity of his subjectivity faced by the 
inapprehendability of Hamm’s otherness and the unsatisfiability of the moral exigency he 
presents. In responding to Hamm, Clov takes upon himself Hamm’s past and present 
suffering and in the end does not leave. Substitution becomes, as I point out at the 
beginning of this chapter and with reference to Leopardian compassion, not simply taking 
on responsibility for but the taking on of the responsibility of the other person.
233
   
                                                 
231
 Clearly in this later work Levinas is at his most sophisticated where the approach and substitution are 
the events of the Other described in non-phenomenological terms. In the earlier work Levinas stressed the 
difficulty of describing the event of the face, marking it as the failure of philosophy. In Otherwise Than 
Being, Levinas actually attempts to make the move beyond phenomenology itself. 
232
 “An-archy” is that which “brings to a halt the ontological play which, precisely qua play, is 
consciousness, where being is lost and found again” (Otherwise Than Being 101). An-archy is the event 
that interrupts the ego in its solitude, “interrupting it, leaving it speechless. Anarchy is persecution” 
(Otherwise Than Being 101). 
233
 As Levinas puts it: “The uniqueness of the self is the very fact of bearing the fault of the other person. In 
responsibility for the other person subjectivity is only this unlimited passivity of an accusative which does 
not issue out of a declension it would have undergone starting from the normative . . . Everything is from 
the start in the accusative” (Otherwise Than Being 112).  
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When Clov turns towards Hamm and fixedly looks at him, first in response to 
Hamm’s “It was I was a father to you” (CDW 110), and then at the very end of the play, 
an action that repeats the one with which the play opens, it is clear that the same 
inexplicable bond that kept Clov serving Hamm at the beginning cannot be erased. The 
appeal to responsibility flows forth from Hamm’s suffering: “Clov, dressed for the road. 
Panama hat, tweed coat, raincoat over his arm, umbrella, bag. He halts by the door and 
stands there, impassive and motionless, his eyes fixed on Hamm, till the end” (CDW 133, 
my emphasis). In the end Clov’s responsibility to Hamm is based on a desire that is 
positively attracted by something other not yet possessed or needed. 
234
 He is faced by the 
crucial issue as to what is orienting his ethical action in such dire and bleak 
circumstances where Hamm’s “Discard” constitutes the essence of relations. His is an 
intuition of the Infinite or, as in Levinas, the “idea of the Good in me” (Of God who 
comes to mind 23), which leaves its mark in the subject’s depths and is what inspires the 
human being to be humane and compassionate. The idea of the Infinite is precisely the 
signification of something non-finite within the finite or, as Leopardi argues, “L’uomo . . 
. non è propriamente mai toccato ne’ da invidia ne’ da desiderio dell’immensa e piena 
felicità di Dio, se non solo in quanto immensa, e più in quanto piena e perfetta” (“the 
human being . . . is never really touched by envy or desire of the immensity and the 
fullness of God’s happiness, if not only in terms of its immensity, its fullness and its 
perfection”; Zibaldone 3497,1; my translation). As Levinas writes: “the in of the Infinite 
signified at once the non- and the within” (Of God who comes to mind 63). Clov’s choice 
to stay is the recognition of a desire for the Infinite, a desire for the other that leaves itself 
as a trace in the same.
235
 This metaphysical element that looms large in the play is like 
the “in” of the Infinite, which: 
Hollows out a desire that could not be filled, one nourished from its own increase, 
exalted as Desire–one that withdraws from its satisfaction as it draws near to the 
                                                 
234
 This desire comes close to the Levinasian desire described as that through which signification could be 
measured: “Signification, irreducible to intuitions, is measured by Desire, morality, and goodness–the 
infinite exigency with regard to oneself, or Desire of the other, or relation with infinity” ( TI 297).:  
235
 Dirk Van Hulle points out that in early manuscripts which genetic research has variously attributed  to 
Endgame, “A and B respectively persuade themselves that they are not alone…the characters wonder  
whether the ‘third’ might be Christ.” “Writing Relics.” Samuel Beckett: History, Memory, Achive. Ed.Sean 
Kennedy and Katherine Weiss. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 173-74. 
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Desirable. This is a Desire for what is beyond satisfaction, and which does not 
identify, as need does, a term or an end. A desire without end, from beyond 
Being: dis-interestedness, transcendence–desire for the Good. (Of God that comes 
to mind 67) 
The desire for the good beyond being is finally expressed in the fact that it is not simply 
Clov that is obliged to Hamm, or Hamm to Clov but “It’s we are obliged to each other” 
(CDW 132).  In the ethically-marked subject, a notion of the infinite, “the wholly Other, 
the most strange of all who at the same time is the most near, can be traced” (Of God who 
comes to mind 68). Clov, in his vulnerability, has been awakened into an alert response, 
or as Hamm claims in his last speech: “I put him before his responsibilities!” (CDW 133). 
The desire for that which exceeds him, the “good beyond being” is awakened. The good 
beyond being in Clov, his desire to be more than he is and to think more than he can 
think, is in part incarnated in the little boy standing on his own at the door and re-
awakening the image of little Clov at Hamm’s door. This image brings out in Clov a 
good beyond being which is also beyond thought and is that which won’t allow him to do 
what is rationally obvious–leave. Indeed in a play where the ubiquitous bareness, 
greyness, gloominess and confinement are sounded out very early on, it is through the 
confrontation with such bleakness that the desire of the  Other is brought to the fore, a 
desire which has revealed its compassionate side that can offer that something which is 
not utter nothingness. As Levinas says: “It is through the condition of being hostage that 
there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity–even the little there is” 
(OTB 118).  
For the characters in Endgame then, as for Levinas, desiring the Other is not a 
sign of heroic mastery but an indication of vulnerability which is not harmful since, to 
use Levinas’ term, the Other is a marvel (TI 292). It is also in this desire that the 
possibility of showing human love, that horror of horrors that oozes contempt out of 
many, is awakened.
236
 This is a love that does not degenerate into Eros and is defined by 
Levinas as follows: 
                                                 
236
 One critic to have specifically argued for love in Beckett is Alain Badiou in his Beckett: L’increvable 
désir (1995), a short volume which effectively summarizes ideas about Beckett’s output which made 
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For the Desire beyond being . . . might not be an absorption into immanence . . . 
the Desirable . . . must remain separated in the Desire; as desirable-near yet 
different . . .  This can only be if the Desirable commands me to what is the non-
desirable, to the undesirable par excellence; to another. We have shown elsewhere 
the substitution for another at the heart of this responsibility . . . thus also the 
transcendence of goodness, the nobility of pure enduring, an ipseity of pure 
election. Love without Eros (Of God who comes to Mind 68).
237
 
The teaching of the critique of heroic or Western self-sufficiency is then built on a type of 
vulnerability, a type of openness that, alongside any intent of undoing, struggles to bear 
witness revealing ethical engagement. It is a desire of the Infinite that turns us away from 
the Infinite as object of desire towards that which is undesirable–the other person. The 
openness to the Other exposes a quality insistently present in the lines of Endgame. That 
quality is painful human love. Its corollaries are compassion and affirmation. In Jonathan 
Boulter’s words, this play demonstrates its theme(s): “ruthlessly  though with no small 
amount of compassion” (Beckett: A Guide For the Perplexed 104).  In answer to Clov’s 
query “Why [do] I always obey you. Can you explain that to me?”  Hamm’s own words 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
themselves heard more forcefully towards the turn of the century. Badiou adds to the trajectory of criticism 
on Beckett begun by Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot in the early 1950s and picked up by Deleuze 
in the 1990s. Badiou vociferously argues against what was then the still prevalent view that Beckett’s later 
drama and fiction betokens increasing negativity and nihilism. He insists, on the contrary, that Beckett’s 
plays tend, almost aggressively, towards affirmation (L’Increvable désir 13). Interestingly, Badiou argues 
that the most important technique in projecting the human figure in its infinite poverty is that of seeking, as 
a necessary preliminary, to reduce humanity to its indestructible functions (19). Badiou concentrates on 
Beckett’s rethinking of human subjectivity and moves, as does this dissertation, from a discussion of  
Beckett’s early ‘methodical asceticism’ to a reading of a very important shift he sees in Beckett’s work, 
from the solitary human subject to questions of the Other, thus relationships with others.  Badiou explicitly 
states that whereas the early prose works journey towards inner solitude, the shift to theatre marks an 
increasing movement towards the couple, the voice of the other, and love (47). While I obviously agree 
with this line of argumentation, which, as a matter of fact, I follow in this dissertation, I do think that 
Badiou fails to emphasize the difficulty and painfulness of the human love Beckett is projecting in the 
plays. It is also ironic that Badiou would have never considered Levinas’ notion of the desire of the Other 
as applicable to the desire of the Other in Beckett’s plays, given that he was overtly, I would say, unfairly, 
ultra-critical of Levinas’ philosophy. 
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 It is pertinent to note that in Otherwise Than Being, Levinas refrains from calling this desire love: “The 
for-the-other characteristic of the subject can be interpreted neither as a guilt complex . . . nor as some love 
or tendency to sacrifice” (124). At the very end of Otherwise Than Being, however, Levinas uses 
specifically this word: “The caress of love, always the same, in the last accounting . . . is always different 
and overflows with exorbitance the songs, poems and admissions in which it is said in so many different 
ways and through so many themes” (OTB 184).  
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are particularly evocative in conveying this very message: “perhaps it’s compassion 
[Pause.] A kind of great compassion. [Pause.] Oh you won’t find it easy, you won’t find 
it easy” (CDW 129).238  
3.4 Lacanian and Levinasian Desire for the Other in Happy Days  
In Happy Days Winnie is as much the Lacanian split subject as she is a being, in 
Levinasian terms, “for-the-Other”.  At the opening of the play, the Leopardian noia as 
frustrated desire, discussed in 2.1, appears to fill the interstices of this play and indeed 
Winnie attempts to exploit as much as she struggles against it.
239
 Winnie’s desire for the 
O/other can therefore be identified with a struggle in which there is, on the one hand, the 
Lacanian human desire that is forever haunted by the dream of recovering an original 
source of utter plenitude and un-differentiation. It is thus a Lacanian desire that is illusory 
and was never possessed, the same “wilderness” she wishes she could but knows she 
cannot ever bear, the “all comes back” that she quickly corrects to “All? […] No, not all. 
[smile] No no. [smile off]. Not quite” (144).  On the other hand, it is a desire that, while 
seeming to hang on the flimsiest of strings, calls for responsibility for the other and 
ultimately assumes its Levinasian obligation to the Other. Winnie’s desire is thus a web 
of both unconscious forces as well as a desire that founds her subjectivity as signification 
of her being-for-the-Other. As in the Lacanian “I” and the Levinasian subject, each 
foundationally inscribed by the intervention of the other while remaining two radically 
differing versions of the self, Winnie struggles between two poles of  the ‘self’. As she 
states: “some day the earth will yield and let me go, the pull is so great” (CDW 151-2). 
Whether in the Lacanian Other, or the Levinasian being-for-the-Other, the linguistic 
aspect for Winnie is inescapable. As she asks herself upfront “What would I do without 
them, when words fail?” (162) 
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 The play ends with Hamm putting a stauncher of blood (the hankerchief) over his face. The stanch can, 
however, also refer to a staunch friend whose companionship is capable of stopping further haemorraege of 
pain. It could be that Hamm’s last words “You remain” might be a command to his partner to stay.  
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 The situation of Winnie and Willie seems to echo the one of Clov and Hamm and Nell and Nagg in that 
they seem to be the last inhabitants following a world catastrophe. The Shower or Cooker couple seem to 
be “last human kind- to stray this way” (157). Stanley Gontarski in The Intent of Undoing in Samuel 
Beckett’s Dramatic Texts, points out that in the early manuscripts of this play, Willie reads a newspaper 
whose headline is about rockets attacking the earth (80). 
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Winnie’s unconscious forces indeed find their milieu in “the unconscious desire 
of the Other” (Écrits 267), which is the Lacanian Other as the locus of the linguistic 
signifier. As Drucilla Cornell puts it, evoking Winnie who goes on talking as she sinks: 
“The voice of Woman evokes hope of a beyond, an Other in her very effort to talk” 
(205).  While I would not go as far as speaking about ‘hope’ in Happy Days, I argue that 
Winnie’s words are indicative of her attempt to pursue and express her frustrated desire 
of the Other, an Other that gives her little solace and causes her much irritation but who is 
simultaneously perceived as necessary: 
If only I could bear to be alone, I mean prattle away with not a soul to 
hear.[Pause]. Not that I flatter myself you hear much, no Willie, God Forbid. 
[Pause.] Days perhaps when you hear nothing. [Pause] But days too when you 
answer. [Pause] So that I may say at all times, even when you do not answer and 
perhaps hear nothing, something of this is being heard, I am not merely talking to 
myself, that is in the wilderness, a thing I could never bear to do–for any length of 
time. [Pause] That is what enables me to go on, go on talking that is. (145)  
Winnie clings to what she insists on construing as the positivity of the other’s presence: 
“Someone is looking at me still . . . Caring for me still” (160). Her perceived aliveness is 
insistently sensed in her desperate conviction that, for all the bleakness and waste, there is 
the inextinguishable sense that “There always remains something . . . Of everything . . . 
Some remains” (161). Her desire of the Other, as also her desire to communicate, is 
indeed infinitely cyclical. Winnie implores Willie: “Don’t go off on me again now dear 
will you please, I may need you” (CDW 141). She tells him this as she brings out the 
revolver from her “capacious black bag”, holds it up and kisses it, even though, 
significantly, she never avails herself of its service.
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  Constant references to things that 
are “running out . . . cannot be helped . . . old things . . . no zest . . . no interest . . . sleep 
forever” (139), “loss of spirits . . . lack of keenness . . . want of appetite . . .”, “fleeting 
joys” (141), are juxtaposed to the ubiquitous expressions of “Oh this is going to be 
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 It is thus not only the otherness of death that is intuited in the absent presence of Willie and not just her 
own death that she wishes for but, as alluded to below, she also paradoxically recognizes, and through her 
desire attempts to override, her murderous instincts towards Willie.   
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another happy day” (142) and “that is what I find so wonderful” (143). The same see-
sawing is present in the stage directions which frequently indicate “happy expression off” 
preceded by “happy expression.”  
Winnie’s speech thus masks a two-pronged desire: a Lacanian versus a 
Levinasian desire, the latter to be discussed below. The first instance is the desire, or anti-
desire (see 1.4.2), to return to the state where neither desire nor language are any longer 
possible but where, as evoked in Beckett’s Proust, a zone of heightened sensitivity brings 
out the suffering of being:  
And if for some strange reason no further pains are possible, why then just close 
the eyes–[she does so]– and wait for the day to come–[opens eyes]–the happy day 
to come when flesh melts at so many degrees and the night of the moon has so 
many hundred hours.  (CDW 144)  
The disintegration of the self seems to be what Winnie’s subject at its very imaginary 
heart is  pure fiction that can melt away and disappear into thin air. The urge to reach the 
suspension of desire, the very struggle at the heart of the Imaginary, could be expressed 
by Winnie’s dream of “that feeling . . . of being sucked up” (CDW 152), echoing the 
Lacanian encounter with the other that clearly marks an “antihumanist” reading of the 
creation of the ‘I’. Winnie desperately attempts to keep her life pieced together creating 
herself in relation to the other. Her words re-create her as striving to be the whole she is 
not, while those same fragmentary utterances reveal the violence of a displaced frustrated 
desire. Winnie’s articulations reveal disjointedness and brokenness that refer back to her 
essentially broken self. There is, underneath the defensively chirpy prattle, a deeper 
tormented ‘self’ in troubling discord with itself. The play is shot through with indications 
that point to Winnie as a Lacanian breached subject.
241
 Lacan’s thoughts on the speaking 
subject are pertinent to Winnie’s case: 
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 Beckett would refer to Winnie as an ‘interrupted being.’During the rehearsals of the Royal Court 
production of Happy Days in 1979 that he himself directed, he commented, “One of the clues of the play is 
interruption. Something begins; something else begins. She begins but doesn’t carry through with it. She’s 
constantly being interrupted or interrupting herself. She’s an interrupted being.” In Martha Fehsenfeld’s 
Rehearsal Diary, in James Knowlson, ed. Happy Days: The Production Notebook of Samuel Beckett, 177. 
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It is the world of words that creates the world of things- things which at first run 
together in the hic et nunc of the all in the process of becoming – by giving its 
concrete being to their essence, and its ubiquity to what has always been … Man 
thus speaks, but it is because the symbol has made him man (Écrits 229).
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Winnie assiduously struggles in attempting to utter life through the flow of her non-stop 
utterances, a manifestation of the infinite desire of the Other. Her speech, however, is 
necessary and is instigated and driven by that which she does not contain or comprehend 
but which exceeds her, as is the futurity and mystery of death, the latter intuited through 
Willie. The distance separating Winnie and Willie is indeed filled with words and things 
commented upon, or read out, using more words. As she tells him “if you were to die–
[smile]–to speak in the old style– [smile off]–or go away and leave me, then what would I 
do, what could I do, all day long, I mean between the bell for waking and the bell for 
sleep? [pause] Simply gaze before me with compressed lips” (145,  emphasis mine). 
 It is Willie who gives birth in Winnie to language used for communication 
thereby becoming her Other since the origin of her speech lies in an articulate response to 
his unsettling presence. As Levinas says, the one who speaks is, in articulating the world, 
announced across what he or she presents (TI 65-66). In Winnie’s case, language is the 
very passage from the individual to the general. Winnie’s running commentary attempts, 
against all odds, to create a common world with the Other: questioning Willie about the 
use of correct grammatical structures “them or it?” (146),  asking him whether even 
words sometimes fail and insisting that he repeats her quotation to which he reluctantly in 
part succumbs by uttering “fear no more” (148).243 Throughout the play she strives to 
achieve a face-to-face gaze and she is interested in the language of the eyes, already 
mentioned in the analysis of Endgame: “Could you see me, Willie, do you think, from 
where you are, if you were to raise your eyes in my direction?. . . Lift up your eyes to me, 
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 The implication of this assertion is what Lacan goes on to state, namely that language not only 
prefigures but forms sexual difference: “The signified is not what you hear. What you hear is the signifier. 
The signified is the effect of the signifier” (Seminar XX 33). In practice: the phallus comes first, the object 
of desire that it represents, second; the sexuated identity comes first, the biological body onto which it is 
described, second; the subject comes first, the self, second. All this implies the retroactive positing of the 
Real as prior. 
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 As Levinas would say, “to speak is to make the world common, to create commonplaces” (TI 76). 
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Willie, and tell me can you see me, do that for me” (149). This language is clearly headed 
one way and Winnie discovers her implacability in accepting the persecuting silence that 
ensues: “Oh I can well imagine what is passing through your mind, it is not enough to 
have to listen to the woman, now I must look at her as well” (148). Indeed her 
predicament, her ‘woe’, lies in having “. . . to see what I see” (CDW 140) and in her 
Saying over the Said, a discourse that opens up to the difficult Levinasian desire of the 
Other:  “what a joy in any case to know you are there, as usual, and perhaps awake, and 
perhaps taking all this in, some of all this, what a happy day for me . . . it will have been” 
(CDW 152).  
Behind the irony of these words there is a repressed tenderness. To wait and 
suffer for the Other is to evince a trait of bravery, even of nobility, the same magnanimity 
Leopardi spoke about. Winnie combats the encroaching external negativity by 
desperately seeking the presence of Willie’s miserable self. This gesture could once more 
be construed as a conceptual approximate to the social catena in “La Ginestra,” and thus 
as coming close to offering solidarity against the hostile infinite universe that Leopardi 
expounds.
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 At various points Winnie stops to check whether her words are being 
listened to: “I hope you are taking in . . .” (144) but she knows she can only limit herself 
to being-for-Willie without expecting anything in return: “just to know that in theory you 
can hear me even though in fact you don’t is all I need, just to feel you there within 
earshot and conceivably on the qui vive is all I ask” (148). A few lines down she 
explicitly gives voice to this bearing par excellence in her being-for-the other: “Oh I 
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 Annamaria Cascetta reports how Giorgio Strehler’s staging of Happy Days in the early eighties was 
“nourished by Leopardi and Camus, [who] imbued the performance with a heroic humanism and a 
pronounced ethical commitment by foregrounding the stoic resistance of the individual to evil, pain, and 
death. Both the décor and style of acting served to reinforce this interpretation. On stage, an undulating 
dune-like space covered by thin white dust simulated the desert. The yellow or light blue light peculiar to 
Strehler’s atmospheres dimmed the whiteness. Projected onto the background, a starry sky expanded into 
other galaxies with many Winnies reflecting the Winnie on stage. The allusion to Leopardi’s poetry is 
clear, especially “Alla Luna” and “Canto notturno di un pastore errante nell’Asia.” In referring to 
Leopardi’s poem “La Ginestra,” Strehler hints at the flower’s resistance, its tenacity and continuous re-
birth. For Leopardi, however, closer in spirit to Beckett, the ‘broom’ is flexible, humble, docile in the face 
of destiny (154). 
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know it does not follow when two are gathered together . . . that because one sees the 
other the other sees the one, life has taught me that” (149).245  
Willie holds Winnie hostage, and indeed her physical entrapment in a mound, 
while Willie nonchalantly positions himself around her, could be construed as a metaphor 
of her ‘an-archical’ and inescapable obligation to the other. As Jonathan Boulter says: 
“At one level thus Winnie’s physical predicament is a way of concretizing the notion of 
entrapment which occurs as roles, perhaps not of our choosing, are thrust upon us” (A 
Guide for the Perplexed 61, emphasis mine). The play opens with Winnie already stuck 
in a mound and no explanation is given as to what lead to this state of affairs. As in all of 
Beckett, however, realism is a deceptive sea where the strangest of fish can swim. Winnie 
herself does not pose the question despite knowing that her situation stands out. She 
reports others’ puzzlement at her sorry sight and, very significantly, she perceives herself 
as subjected to Willie: “Why doesn’t he dig her out? . . . What good is she to him like 
that?” (CDW 157).  
The opening to the desire of the Other, the intuition of the Infinite through the 
difficult and miserly existence offered by the finite, can offer, as Levinas points out, a 
way out of an aporetic existential condition. Willie’s presence serves Winnie as one of 
the poles of her address and a source of sorrow in which she insists on seeing joy. Winnie 
can thus also be construed as the ethical subject “for-the- Other” who assumes the 
responsibility that comes with finding herself, in Levinasian terms, elected. In 
metaphysical desire, the Other, who cannot be integrated, disrupts the sense of self. In 
being open to a transcendence encountered at the very core of subjectivity, with which no 
bartering, exchange or reciprocity is conceivable, Winnie’s guilt-ridden self is witnessed, 
as the play unfolds, in its struggle to exist. 
 Indeed at the beginning of the play Winnie looks more like an emerging 
Levinasian existent, where the Ego attempts to master and leave behind the anonymous  
“there is” described in Time and the Other and other later works (see 2.5). Winnie strives 
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 As Levinas would say in Otherwise Than Being “the-one-for-the-other itself–is the preoriginal 
signifyingness that gives sense, because it gives” (78). 
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to overcome the tragedy of solitude and material life almost echoing Levinas’ dictum 
that, “materiality and solitude go together. Solitude is . . . the companion, so to speak, of 
an everyday existence haunted by matter” (58).  
 Winnie initially seems to be an existent in solitude who has recognized material 
life in its triumph over the anonymity of existing, and the tragic finality to which she is 
bound in this very freedom. She is left alone and unformed caught up from the waist 
down in a mound. All the material things, which she starts to deliberately display around 
her, become an extension of her own persona. She is at this early stage, as Levinas would 
describe, an existent “occupied with itself . . . Identity [being] . . . an enchainment to 
itself” (Time and the Other 55). Winnie initially resembles the Levinasian ego turning 
back on itself as described in Time and the Other, where the relationship is with: “a 
double chained to the ego, a viscous, heavy, stupid double, but one the ego [le moi] is 
with precisely because it is me [moi]. This is manifest in the fact that it is necessary to be 
occupied with oneself” (Time and the Other 56). The finality of Winnie as an existent, 
which initially constitutes the tragedy of her solitude, is thus her materiality whereby she 
is reduced to being literally mired in her own trapping mound surrounded by things. Her 
solitude is tragic because she is shut up within the captivity of her mound and totally 
absorbed in the contents of her “capacious black bag” (CDW 138). In order for Winnie to 
shatter the enchainment of matter, she has to shatter the finality of hypostasis (see 2.5).  
In Time and the Other Levinas states that, “Though in the pure and simple 
identity of hypostasis, the subject is bogged down in itself, in the world, instead of a 
return to itself, there is a ‘relationship with everything that is necessary for being’. The 
subject separates from itself. Light is the prerequisite for such a possibility” (Time and 
the Other 63). All these trivial objects, totally and completely revealed under the “blaze 
of hellish light” (CDW 140) increasingly make Winnie confront the objects she is 
accumulating around her. This confrontation is telling in view of Levinas’ teaching on 
light (see 3.3). Concern for things and needs absorbs Winnie in solitude; the encounter 
with objects under the blazing light is intelligibility itself and makes Winnie’s 
encountered things as if they were in a direct relation to her ego. Winnie becomes an 
existent in this subjective act. In Proust Beckett had expressed a similar sentiment when 
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he defines “attainment” as “the identification of the subject with the object of his desire” 
(Proust 14).  
In Time and the Other the itinerary–from anonymous “there is” to the emergence 
of subjectivity and its practice is concluded in the subject’s shattering relationship with 
the alterity of the other person, dealt specifically in terms of eros, voluptuosity and 
fecundity. In a similar movement this is also the case in my reading of the unfolding of 
Winnie’s existence in relation to Willie, who is “the absolutely other–[who] paralyzes 
possession” (TI 171).246 Intimate self-enclosure of the Levinasian subject is evaded by 
being-in-the-world: “our existence in the world constitute[s] a fundamental advance of 
the subject in overcoming the weight that it is to itself, in overcoming its materiality–that 
is to say, in loosening the bond between the self and the ego” (Time and the Other 62).  
Winnie also needs to shatter her bond to materiality and, subsequently, her solitude.
247 
 
I read in Winnie a progression toward a desire to break out of the circuits of 
sameness, a desire that she attempts through the Levinasian ‘caress,’ despite being 
confronted by the failure of eros, voluptuosity and fecundity.
248
 In Totality and Infinity, 
Levinas says:  
The caress consists in seizing upon nothing, in soliciting what ceaselessly escapes 
its form toward a future never future enough, in soliciting what slips away as 
though it were not yet. It searches, it forages. It is not an intentionality of 
disclosure but of search: a movement unto the invisible. In a certain sense it 
expresses love, but suffers from an inability to tell it” (TI 258).   
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 In Time and the Other Levinas has already caught sight of the subject’s desire to escape itself, where the 
subject’s ecstatic projection into the world is characterized as “salvation” (Time and the Other 61). 
247
 In so doing she needs to overcome the absence of time by being in time. Time is here conceived in 
Levinasian terms as the future that, as I argue, is evoked by the presence of the Other. In Time and the 
Other Levinas follows a rather strict usage of phenomenological reduction: the analysis of the phenomenon 
of the advent of the other as breaking up the synchrony of time. 
248
 Levinas says: “ There is in the erotic relationship a characteristic reversal of the subjectivity issued from 
position, a reversion of the virile and heroic I which in positing itself put an end to the anonymity of the 
there is, and determined a mode of existence that opens forth the light” (TI 270). Levinas, however, also 
points out that in the erotic relationship “The I springs forth without returning, finds itself the self of an 
other: its pleasure, its pain is pleasure over the pleasure of the other or over his pain though not through 
sympathy or compassion” (TI 271). 
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The erotic relationship, central to Time and the Other, and which I read in the backdrop 
of Happy Days, is in this play accentuated through its failure. I argue below that Winnie 
is here conceived of as both the “feminine Other”249 who attempts to escape presence, as 
well as being the one attempting the ‘caress’ to the withdrawing Willie, putting into 
practice the Levinasian dictum that “Eros . . . arrests the return of the I to itself” ( TI 
271).
250
 To recognize the Other is also to come to him across the world of possessed 
things.
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Winnie’s desire of Willie conceived from this angle is particularly challenging 
because it fails to accomplish those same two aspects Levinas mentions in his early work 
as the crowning achievements of  desire. According to Levinas, desire is above all 
accomplished in the face-to-face relation, which is, as argued in the analysis of Endgame, 
clearly not just the materiality of skin and facial features, much as the latter are not 
precluded. The second aspect which neatly ties in with the erotic aspect is fecundity, first 
discussed by Levinas in Time and the Other but further amplified in Totality and 
Infinity.
252
 These two Levinasian aspects associated with desire are underscored in Happy 
Days through their absence which looms large. The play constantly alludes to the 
childlessness and senility of this old couple who are struggling with the difficulty of 
“crawling backwards” (CDW 147). In the end, Winnie is faced by the inability of being in 
relation with another Other, because of her childlessness and senility.  
Winnie appears as an object of need but by the end she still proves capable of a 
desire not based on need. The presence of Willie tears her away from solitude and throws 
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 The feminine Other is described in Levinas as follows: “the sbsolutely contrary contrary, whose 
contrariety is in no way affected by the relationship that can be established between it and its correlative, 
the contrariety that permits its terms to remain absolutely other, is the feminine” (85). 
250
 As the feminine Other, Levinas projects this figure as withdrawing in a mystery: “In voluptuosity the 
Other, the feminine, withdraws into its mystery. The relation with it is a relation with its absence, an 
absence on the plane of knowledge the unknown but a presence in voluptuosity” (TI 277). 
251
 Winnie’s desire of Willie tangentially alludes to sentimental or erotic love which is, at least in part, 
hinted at by Willie’s obscene picture. Love as Eros is here partially relevant because, as in Lacan, it is here 
also construed as bound up with aggression, knowledge and a struggle for an impossible unity. As Lacan 
asks, “What is involved in love? . . . is love about making one? Is Eros a tension toward the One?” 
(Seminar XX 5). Lacan would insist that love confirms the self’s struggle for unity, for a desire to return to 
a phantasmatic unity based on a prior union, a phantasy to return to the womb, which is one aspect of 
Winnie’s desire. 
252
 Through the category of fecundity, the feminine as alterity in Levinas can also offer a way of 
transcendence. 
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her into contact with the Other. As Annamaria Cascetta proposes, contrary to the Sartrean 
look of alienation, “for Beckett’s Winnie, the ‘look’ is relationship, reciprocity, and the 
sense of existence” (153).  It is not until the intervention of the other−on whom she grafts 
the obscurity of her own Other−and thus Willie’s briefest of brief answers to her 
imploring questions, that Winnie as feminine accomplishes alterity. Indeed Winnie is not 
accomplished as a being in transcendence toward light, but in modesty. Her 
transcendence consists in withdrawing in the mound (up to the neck by the second act), a 
movement opposed to the movement of consciousness. The relationship of Winnie to 
Willie is also a relationship with alterity, with mystery, with the future, “with what (in a 
world where there is everything) is never there, with what cannot be there when 
everything is there not with a being that is not there, but with the very dimension of 
alterity” (88). Winnie thus attempts ‘the caress’ towards Willie but not in terms of contact 
as sensation but in terms of the seeking of the caress which, Levinas explains, 
“constitutes its essence by the fact that the caress does not know what it seeks” (Time and 
the Other 89). 
253
 Indeed Winnie never entirely gives up the possibility of the Levinasian 
“caress” (see 1.5), even when she is sucked down to her neck. In the failure of the 
movement of Eros, as in the failure of voluptuosity and the erotic encounter, something 
Willie seems to be concerned with because of his keen interest in obscene posters, there 
is still the possibility of “compassion for the passivity, for the suffering, for the 
evanescence of the tender” (Totality and Infinity 259). Compassion is here indicated, as 
was the case for Leopardi and Schopenhauer, as a greatly superior form of love and 
desire. Indeed the failure of Eros opens up the possibility of the universalization of the 
an-archical ethical. 
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 The presentation of the feminine in Levinas is rather problematic. Whereas he attempts to distance his 
treatment of the feminine from patriarchal forces (“I do not want to ignore the legitimate claims of the 
feminism that presupposes all the acquired attainments of civilisation” [Time and the Other 86]), Levinas 
engages in a characterization of the feminine that cannot but be construed as masculinist. The subject for 
Levinas is always masculine. In Otherwise Than Being Eros is significantly given up in favour of 
substitution and the feminine is no longer posited as alterity personified. By abstracting the confrontation 
with the other person, and in so doing thereby moving toward a confrontation with otherness in the person 
as the trace of God, Levinas offers a different way of thinking alterity and transcendence that is not 
masculinist in approach. Much as I make considerable use of the earlier works in the analysis of Happy 
Days, I agree more with Levinas’ later abstraction. 
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In the notion of the erotic, the future of time (central to the idea of death), is at its 
very kernel: “voluptuousness is the very event of the future” because “The relationship 
with the Other is the absence of the other . . . absence in a horizon of the future, an 
absence that is time” (Time and the Other 90). The futurity of death as that which is 
ungraspable is wrapped up in the radically and irreducibly other, what in Time and the 
Other Levinas calls the “mystery” of the other person. As partially alluded to in 
Endgame, the Other also evokes and interestingly plays out a potent sense of death. Death 
is here woven through as the most other, as the future that, like Willie, is always looming 
but never yet present, since with its complete presence the existent is no more. The face 
of the Other is also the one who calls on the individual from high in Totality and Infinity 
(and which face, like Willie’s, is barely glimpsed) evoking the fearful otherness of death. 
The reference to the Levinasian height (see 1.5.2; 3.3) is here once more pivotal.  
Willie is both the frail, boyish other Winnie feels compelled to mother (and as in 
Levinas the for-the-other in vulnerability also refers to maternity): “Not head first . . . , 
how are you going to turn? [Pause] That’s it . . . right round . . . now . . . back in.[Pause] 
Oh I know it is not easy, dear” (CDW 147), but he is simultaneously her master. It is on 
the ‘height’ imbued by his utterances that Winnie’s happiness depends: “Oh you are 
going to talk to me today, this is going to be a happy day!” (CDW 146). Winnie is 
morally singularized, not by herself but despite herself, an-archically, by the Other. 
Winnie, in facing Willie, is exposed to death but in such exposure she finds herself 
elected to be a being for Willie, disrupted by what could be construed as a Levinasian 
command from on high, and asked to desire Willie in the radical passivity of the good 
will.
254
  
“Goodness,” continues Levinas, “consists in taking up a position in being such 
that the Other counts more than myself. Goodness thus involves the possibility for the ‘I’ 
that is exposed to the alienation of its powers by death to not be for death” (Totality and 
Infinity 347). Winnie’s subjectivity recognizes the ‘Thou shalt not kill’ commandment 
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 I bring in the idea of radical passivity in the same spirit in which it is brought in in Time and the Other 
where by superlative passivity  Levinas means what is more passive than, or prior to, all the syntheses 
which have hitherto defined time, subjectivity, being, and truth for philosophy. 
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when, almost testing her potentially violent nature, she asks Willie: “You are going, 
Willie, aren’t you?” [Pause. Louder] You will be going soon, Willie, won’t you?” (CDW 
148). Winnie’s solitude is thus not confirmed by Willie’s presence in its evocation of 
death. It is, as in Time and the Other “broken by it” (74). Death in terms of the alterity of 
the other person becomes murder.  
Murder at the origin of death, reveals a cruel world, but one to the scale of human 
relations. The will . . . exposed to death but not immediately, has time to be for 
the Other, and thus to recover meaning despite death. This existence for the Other, 
this Desire of the other, this goodness liberated from the egoist gravitation, . . . 
retains a personal character. . . The Desire into which the threatened will dissolves 
no longer defends the powers of a will, but, as the goodness whose meaning death 
cannot efface, has its centre outside of itself. (Totality and Infinity 236)    
Indeed Winnie’s desire for death by not being for death is inextricably linked to her 
desperate attempt to hold on to life. As Lacan states, “life and death come together in a 
relation of polar opposites at the very heart of phenomena that people associate with life” 
(Écrits 261). Winnie persists in appealing to the Other despite the lack of response on the 
part of Willie who deepens her desire and undergirds her vulnerability. Willie is indeed 
remote and incomprehensible, experienced by Winnie in the manner of the Freudian 
superego as an impossible demand, a crushing burden but at the same time 
overpoweringly intimate, a kind of alterity within her. He is at once proximate, (he 
manages to hand her back the parasol when it falls) and elusive, too near to avoid but too 
remote to grasp. Willie confronts and disrupts Winnie’s settled location breaking silently 
but violently into her world, casting her adrift and indirectly summoning her to shoulder 
the burden of an infinite responsibility on his behalf.  
Entangled in this presence, Winnie feels uneasy, invested in guilt and her ‘self’ 
totally decentred as, by the second act, she has been sucked further down  into the mound 
up to her neck. She is traumatized and is shaken out of her absorption in the world of 
things, owing to the impact of a moral force the asymmetrical “height and destitution” of 
the Other. Winnie’s obligations towards Willie are those of a being-for-the-Other that 
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moves towards a measureless self-giving. It is what she conceives as Willie’s infinity of 
demand that is so crushing and burdensome yet essential. The alterity of the Other in 
Willie is not simply recalcitrant to caresses; it is a painful but somewhat positive force 
whose positivity is a moral rather than an ontological or epistemological force. Faced by 
this intractable presence Winnie finds temporal transcendence of the present toward the 
mystery of the future. 
 Winnie is thus as much a fractured Lacanian split subject perpetually unable to 
coincide with herself as she is self-defined by her desiring the Other, a Levinasian desire 
lacking reciprocity and involving asymmetry and abjection, which is incomparably more 
taxing and perhaps more morally-deserving. Levinas’ words are particularly pertinent to 
conclude with: “Non-I sweeps away the I into an absolute future where it escapes itself 
and loses its position as a subject. Its ‘intention’ no longer goes forth unto the light, unto 
the meaningful. Wholly passion, it is compassion for the passivity, the suffering” (TI 
259). 
Winnie finds herself fully and wholly for-the-Other, which notion echoes 
Leopardi’s appeal to address and stand in for the Other’s suffering. The Other is indeed 
both a hostile presence as well as a fellow sufferer and being compassionate towards the 
Other entails coming to terms with one’s own suffering. 
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Chapter 4   
4 The Paradoxical In-Between Space for Desire: Leopardi’s 
and Beckett’s Humour 
A real comedian - that’s a daring man. He dares to see what his listeners shy away from, fear to express. 
And what he sees is a sort of truth about people, about their situation, about what hurts or terrifies them, 
about what’s hard, above all, about what they want . . . a true joke . . . has to do more than release tension, 
it has to liberate the will and the desire, it has to change the situation.   (Griffiths, Comedians 20, my 
emphasis) 
. . . in life and in letters, fate reserved for the fool, oh Shakespeare, the task of keeping accessible the place 
of truth that Freud brought to light. (Lacan,  Écrits 554) 
While in chapter three Lacanian and Levinasian desire were pitted against each 
other and read in contradistinction, in this chapter the focus will be specifically on the 
manifestation of Lacanian desire in Leopardi’s and Beckett’s similarly conceived dark 
humour, best expressed through their shared dianoetic laugh. I argue that this humour, 
together with the previously discussed desire of the O/other, offers to the two writers an 
antidote to their otherwise pessimistic and nihilistic philosophic outlook (see 2.3; 2.4).  
Through their conception of humour the two authors introduce, what we shall 
term, a paradoxical intermediate space for desire. It is in this dialectic, as amplified 
below, that humour is closely allied to the reductively termed comic, but also inextricably 
linked to something unsettling, grimacing and yet, potentially elevating. This humour 
noir has been defined as typical of the Zeitgeist of the previous century (Kayser, The 
Grotesque in Art and Literature 188).  
This grim ribaldry could, at least apparently, be expressed as the sense of the 
absurd at the root of the characteristic philosophy of existentialism. Nonetheless, both 
Leopardi and Beckett, as already stated in 2.5, combat existentialist stalemates (in 
Leopardi’s case ante-litteram). The humour under discussion thus merits finer 
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qualification. Massimo Cacciari in Hamletica describes the potency of a particularly grim 
kind of humour, citing as his examples none other than Leopardi and Beckett: 
Il riso del comico . . . non s’abbatte sull’impotenza di caratteri determinati, ma 
appartiene all’impotenza che segue all’esaurirsi della grande marea delle 
rappresentazioni . . . E’ riso pregno di purissimo aidos, di vergogna e pietas,che 
riflette sull’ultimo giorno, sull’unica ‘arte’ che ne potrebbe seguire. Che ha saputo 
la fine del pianto tragico e dell’ironia della commedia. Riso toto corde 
leopardiano: ‘Quanto piu’ l’uomo cresce . . . e crescendo si fa piu’ incapace di 
felicità, tanto egli si fa proclive e domestico al riso, e piu’ straniero al pianto.’ 
Riso, a sua volta, opposto a ogni sarcasmo, disincantato anzitutto sulla ‘potenza’ 
del proprio disinganno–poiché il disincanto nulla trasforma, cosí come il pensiero 
di per sé nulla muove. Esso custodisce lo scandalo dell’essere infelice dal 
ricorrente assalto di ideologie, visioni del mondo, teodicee secolarizzate. Soltanto 
di opere come quelle di . . . Beckett sarà perciò ‘lecito’ ridere; soltanto loro lo 
meritano. (Hamletica 106) 
The comedian’s laughter . . . does not crush the impotence of certain characters, 
but it belongs to the impotence that follows the exhaustion of the great tide of 
representations, . . . it is laughter pregnant with the purest aidos, with shame and 
pietas that reflect on the last day, on the only ‘art’ that could follow. It has come 
to know the end of the tragic cry and of comic irony. It is laughter that is 
leopardian toto corde ‘the more man ages, and ageing he becomes increasingly 
incapable of happiness, the more he is prone and susceptible to laughter, and the 
more he becomes a stranger to crying.’ It is laughter that is opposed to any 
sarcasm, and is disenchanted first and foremost by the potency of its own 
disillusion–in that the disenchantment does not change anything, in the same way 
that thought in itself does not move anything. It preserves the scandal of being 
unhappy from the recurrent assault of ideologies, world views, and secularized 
theodicy. Only works like those written by Beckett justify our laughter; only they 
deserve our laughter. (my translation) 
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I argue that this particularly grim humour is succinctly given expression through what in 
both Leopardi and Beckett comes close to dianoetic laughter. Jacobsen and Mueller state 
that the dianoetic laugh is directed primarily against the mysterious, malignant outer 
forces, thereby constituting relief, although the immediate victim of that laugh is the 
human being who suffers (92). They also claim, however, that the dianoetic laugh is 
directed against “that which mocks suffering,” that is “those malevolent powers which 
delight in torturing poor mortals” (174) thereby erasing the human victim. Yet surely the 
human sufferer has the right to wed affliction and wit and promote laughter at her or his 
own misfortunes. This is a right Leopardi and Beckett support through their portrayal of 
dianoetic laughter at the crux of which one can construe desire-as-paradox. 
It is thus in spite of the remarkable predilection for ataraxic bliss expressed in 
their work, that Leopardi’s and Beckett’s characters oftentimes wryly mock their distress, 
and it is through this mockery that they give expression to desire. Beckett defines the 
laughter that results from dianoia in his novel Watt after he gives a short catalogue of 
laughs: 
Of all the laughs that strictly speaking are not laughs but modes of ululation, only 
three I think need detain us, I mean the bitter, the hollow and the mirthless. They 
correspond to successive, how shall I say successive . . . suc . . . successive 
excoriations of the understanding, and the passage from the one to the other is the 
passage from the lesser to the greater, from the lower to the higher, from the outer 
to the inner, from the gross to the fine, from the matter to the form. The laugh that 
now is mirthless once was hollow, the laugh that once was hollow once was bitter. 
And the laugh that once was bitter? . . . The bitter laugh laughs at that which is not 
good, it is the ethical laugh. The hollow laugh laughs at that which is not true, it is 
the intellectual laugh. Not good! Not true! Well well. (47)  
The third laugh, however, the “mirthless laugh” is the laugh that concerns us most here. 
Arsene continues to say that the object of this “mirthless laugh” is neither that which is 
not good nor that which is not true but “that which is unhappy” (Watt 47). The dianoetic 
laugh, in Arsene’s words, is the “laugh of laughs, the risus purus,” (47). In Endgame this 
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Beckettian principle of resistance is expressed in Nell’s statement: “Nothing is funnier 
than unhappiness” (CDW 101). I argue that the mirthless laugh of laughs in Leopardi and 
Beckett can be conceived through Sigmund Freud’s theories (taken up by Lacan) because 
the humour under question acknowledges and draws strength from human impotence and 
its radical inner split. 
 It is thus my contention that Freud’s thinking about humour, particularly the 
revised ideas expressed in his 1927 essay ‘Der Humor,’ and the way these ideas manifest 
themselves in Lacan’s work, are particularly pertinent to the Leopardian and Beckettian 
contributions to theories on laughter.
255
 What Freud has to say about the drives at the core 
of humour, and the way desire erupts in Lacan’s witticisms and jokes, deserves specific 
attention in relation to Leopardi’s and Beckett’s dianoetic laugh.256 While the humour in 
question thus goes back specifically to Freud (it is the same notion Simon Critchley 
exhumes in On Humour in his defence of Beckett, whose resistance to nothingness is 
construed as taking the form of the comic) the desire-as-paradox at the heart of this 
humour, particularly desire in Beckett, could be construed as Lacanian. Desire in this 
context is Lacanian in the way (very reductively put) it condenses Freudian 'wish' and 
'drive' while adding an elusive supplement. Lacan writes: 
. . . it was certainly the Word that was in the beginning, and we live in its creation, 
but it is our mental action that continues this creation by constantly renewing it. 
And we can only think back to this action by allowing ourselves to be driven ever 
further ahead by it. (Écrits 225) 
In Beckett, the role of an ambivalent desire as an infinite and paradoxical force that 
underlies but contemporaneously emerges during the humorous moment is analysed 
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 Wolfgang Iser in “The Art of Failure: The Stifled Laugh in Beckett’s Theatre” also argues that Freudian 
humour is central to Beckett. Surprisingly, it is only Freud’s argument in the Jokes book that is quoted. Iser 
construes the theatre of Beckett as one where, at the very moment when we have recognized non-
seriousness as a means of self-liberation, it suddenly turns into seriousness again and, at that point, laughter 
dies on our lips (207). Iser, however, makes the interesting claim that “the function of Beckett’s theatre is 
to engage the spectator in a way that produces for him the experience of self as a decentred subjectivity–the 
characteristic sign of our times” (202). In Samuel Beckett, Birkett and Ince, ed. 201-29. 
256
 Morton Gurewitch had already suggested that Freud’s thinking about humour yields valuable dividends 
with regard to Beckett’s humour. The Chicago Review 33, no.2 (1982): 95. 
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through old man Krapp’s laugh in Krapp’s Last Tape (1958) as well as Mouth’s 
reverberating laugh in Not I (1972). Both Krapp and Mouth are driven primarily by desire 
since, I suggest, their motives lie in the language of the body expressed in a body of 
language that struggles with unconscious desires. On the one hand, desire regresses (and 
here it is closer to Lacanian demand) to assert that its source holds its very death. On the 
other hand, it lucidly and satirically moves forward, despite being fully aware that it is 
directed toward an absence, a something that language cannot attain and contain. This 
interminable desire is the driving force behind the conflicting and paradoxical forces in 
Krapp's and Mouth’s dark humour. Furthermore, the emergence of desire-as-paradox 
expressive of the dianoia at the kernel of the echoing laugh, particularly in Krapp’s Last 
Tape, contributes to our witnessing a change in the type of comic deployed from 
beginning to end. In Leopardi, on the other hand, the intertwining of humour and a not 
entirely discreditable desire is found in passages in his Operette morali and in the 
Zibaldone. The role of the Leopardian dianoetic laugh opens a paradoxical in-between 
space for the infinite movement of desire. Of particular interest in this regard are excerpts 
in Leopardi’s Zibaldone and the moral tales “Dialogo di Timandro e di Eleandro” and 
“Detti Memorabili di Filippo Ottonieri.” 
Freud's second revised version of humour, particularly when analysed from a 
Lacanian perspective, comes conceptually close to the humour expressed by Leopardi’s 
and Beckett’s dianoetic laugh. This guffaw at once witnesses the human frailty in all its 
repressed misery and fights it by laughingly giving expression to such misery, accepting 
the infinite cyclicality of physis. It echoes the humour of pre-Socratic philosophers to 
which Leopardi referred to as “veramente sostanzioso, esprimeva sempre e metteva sotto 
gli occhi, per dir cosi, un corpo di ridicolo” (“a humour that was truly substantial, whose 
expressive potential brought to light, so to speak, that which is essentially ridiculous”).257 
Beckett would specifically refer to the pre-Socratic philosopher Democritus of Abdera as 
early as his first published novel Murphy (1938), where “in the guffaw of the Abderite 
naught is more real” (Murphy 246).258 This dark humour, stemming from Democritus and 
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 Quoted in Luigi Pirandello, 42, my translation. 
258
 Democritus is the first literary protagonist to develop the maniac theme of laughter where madness is 
wise and wisdom is madness. According to the ‘laughing philosopher’ one could not but laugh at what he 
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the pre-Socratic philosophers, woven through the centuries, owes its intricacies to 
numerous contributions. The humour discussed in this chapter is indeed part of a 
remarkably long lineage in which both Leopardi and Beckett participate.
259
 It is not 
surprising that Leopardi should contribute to this dark humour which interweaves 
opposing strands in order to attempt to alleviate “souffrance” (see 1.2.1; 2.1).  
4.1 Ride si sapis: “Ridendo dei nostri mali, trovo qualche 
conforto” 
In Pensieri di varia filosofia e di bella letteratura, Leopardi defines his suffering 
as more in sync with the desperate pain of Antiquity rather than the Romantic conception 
of, say, Jean Paul.
260
 As mentioned above, Leopardi defends the comicality of pre-
Socratic philosophers as opposed to modern notions of the comic. The Italian poet-
philosopher, however, is also full of praise for the French comic esprit, and this in spite 
of the fact that he pits the latter against classic humour. As Luigi Pirandello points out in 
L’Umorismo, however, “Il Leopardi . . . parla qui dell’esprit francese in contrapposizione 
del ridicolo classico senza pensare che questo . . . è classico anch’esso” (“Leopardi . . . 
here speaks of the French esprit counterpoising it to the classic humour without realizing 
that the latter . . . is also classic”; L’Umorismo 42; my translation). Thus Leopardi is, at 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
perceived to be human follies. I argue below that Democritus’ insane laughter at the human being’s 
seriousness is however different from, for instance, the Rabelaisian apology of folly. In Democritus the 
cerebral power is exalted whilst in Rabelais it is the bodily aspect of the laugh that is underlined. 
259 Among the writers who participate in this dark humour, at the heart of which are interwoven conflicting 
strands, are Friedrich Jean Paul Richter, Nietzsche and Henri Bergson (see 4.2), As Zarathustra teaches: “he 
who wanteth to kill most thoroughly, laugheth” (Thus Spake Zarathustra 387). Bergson underscores that 
“an absence of feeling” accompanies laughter since it “has no greater foe than emotion” (63). In stating that 
humour “demands something like a momentary anaesthesia of the heart” (64), Bergson was depicting 
humour as a temporary relief from the usual restrictions of social feeling and sanity, thus portraying it as a 
catalyst of insanity. Nietzsche too will mention this insane aspect of laughter whose bacchanalian joys 
“want deep, profound eternity” (Thus Spake Zarathustra 397). Freud in his 1927 essay (see 4.3), claims 
that humour is one of the great series of methods that the human mind has constructed in order to evade the 
compulsion to suffer “a series which begins with neurosis and culminates in madness” ( “Humour” 429). 
Indeed humour is a moment where the senses are closed off to the world, (or, as argued in 4.3, where there 
is a regress of anti-desire), but one cannot ignore that it is also an empowering moment which comes to 
terms with human desire. Dark humour is on the one hand a rational and lucid moment where there is an 
interruption of feeling but, on the other, it is a moment when human fallibility is laughingly acknowledged. 
260
 Also see Zibaldone 107,1 and 188,1. 
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one point, construing classic humour, the humour of Democritus and the Pre-Socratics, as 
shot through with the same dialectical qualities that Jean Paul refers to as both “the 
annihilating and infinite idea of humour.”261  
Leopardi is indeed fully aware of the empowering quality of dialectical 
oppositions and his poetics of “il vago” and “l’infinito” has, as a matter of fact, a 
dialectical basis (see 1.2.1). The poetical quality of all that is indefinite lies in its being 
the opposite of the limited reality which the human being faces and his poem “L’Infinito” 
is the apex of this fusion of opposites. In the Zibaldone he explains: “una torre . . . veduta 
in modo che ella paia innalzarsi sola sopra l’orizzonte, e questo non si veda, produce un 
contrasto efficacissimo e sublimissimo tra il finito e l’indefinito” (“a tower . . . perceived 
in such a way that it appears as if it alone soars above the horizon, while the horizon 
cannot be seen, produces a most effective and sublime contrast between the finite and the 
indefinite”; Zibaldone 953; my translation). Following the contrast in the intertwining of 
similarly opposite threads in humour, we come face-to-face with one of its sine qua non 
characteristics–ambiguity. Those same ambiguous strings, somewhat frayed by wear, 
reappear as the threads that knot together this space as, very significantly, an empowering 
one. Leopardi offers various reflections on humour, some falling under what is known as 
the superiority theory, others under the so-called theory of incongruity. 
In the Zibaldone and in Pensieri, Leopardi defines laughter as a means of success 
and integration in the mundane, a superiority that, however, masks only weakness. 
Perceived from the latter angle, Leopardi’s is more of a Hobbesian laugh, a joyless 
grimace. Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan perhaps produced the first superiority theory of 
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 This starts to explain why at a later stage in L’Umorismo, Pirandello will cite specifically Leopardi as a 
good example of ‘umorismo’ as opposed to ‘comicita’’, (which recalls, as we shall explain at a later stage, 
the same Freudian distinction between humour and the comic). On listing Italian literati who are truly 
capable of umorismo Pirandello states: “penso a quei certi dialoghi e a quelle certe prosette del Leopardi” 
(“what comes to mind are some of those dialogues and prose pieces by Leopardi”; L’Umorismo 127; my 
translation). In his 1984 essay “The Frames of Comic Freedom” Umberto Eco also distinguishes between 
the “comic” and “humour”. In Eco the comic operates at the level of the fabula (story) while humour 
operates at the level of discourse. Carla Locatelli uses Eco’s theoretical framework to speak about the 
comic strategies in Beckett. She identifies three phases in Beckett’s comic writing between the 1930s and 
the 1980s: the parodic, the metanarrative and the discursive. She argues that it is in the last that Beckett is 
at his most original. “Comic Strategies in Beckett’s Narratives.” Samuel Beckett, Birkett and Ince, ed. 233-
44. 
158 
 
laughter.
262
 While Leopardi proposes a version of this theory in “Detti Memorabili di 
Filippo Ottonieri,” it has to be underlined that, to some extent, Plato was already 
expounding this theory when he questioned the motives behind laughter. The superiority 
theory of laughter is indeed also in tune with what would become the first definition of 
Freudian humour in his Jokes book, since Hobbes’ laugh was more strained and cynical, 
or better “that passion that hath no name.”263 The superiority theory deals with mockery 
and was part of a fearful vision of society, offering clues about the maintenance of 
ideological self-deception. The clear Hobbesian echoes in Leopardi have deep roots. In 
discouraging the unquestioning acceptance of the goodness of laughter and in hinting at 
its underlying malice, Hobbes argues for a pleasure that induces one to draw near to the 
thing that provoked the feeling, and for pain that induces one to “retire from the thing that 
displeaseth” (Human Nature 43). In this line of argumentation, Hobbes outlined an early 
utilitarian, materialist psychology similar to the one which Leopardi would later expound 
in his teoria del piacere (see 1.2.1).   
According to the latter sensationalistic procedure, pleasure and pain stem from 
need, from the desire for self-preservation (echoed in the Freudian death drive): “E 
questo amore del piacere è una conseguenza spontanea dell’amor di sé e della propria 
conservazione” (“And this love of pleasure is a spontaneous consequence of self- love 
and the urge for self-preservation”; Zibaldone 196; my translation). Desire in Leopardi is 
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 But the dark side of humour is already expounded as far back as antiquity for meanings in comedy are 
tribally old and theorists like Leopardi and Beckett refine, almost beyond recognition, that same violence in 
comedy that is indeed primitive. Comedy is a rite transformed into art, or, as Francis M. Cornford puts it, 
“a scene of sacrifice and a feast” (The Origin of Attic Comedy 47). Plato in Philebus 47B- 50E intimated as 
much making reference to phthonos or malice which plays an important role in comedy. Peter Berger 
points to an underlying implication of phthonos when he states: “Since malice is hardly an admirable 
quality, this also raises an ethical issue: Is there something reprehensible about comic laughter?” (18). The 
Greek festival in honour of Gelos, as well as the Festival of Risus at the core of the Roman carnival, were, 
as Mikhail Bakhtin reminds us, as much about birth as about death and their crude mockery continued in an 
unbroken tradition from the ancient world to the carnivals of the medieval period (The Dialogic 
Imagination 52). That these comic protagonists had to be depicted as “worse than the average [since] the 
comic is a sub-species of the ugly” (Poetics 1963 ed. 10), is a view reiterated by, among others, Agnes 
Heller, who insists that humour and laughter exalt ugliness rather than beauty and, as already stated, 
rationality over intuition (See Heller 8). In the schadenfreude of the comic protagonists’ tormentors, 
receptors poured their savage and sadistic glee at others’ misfortunes. Their laughter expressed a disdain 
roused by seeing someone’s mischance, deformity, or ugliness. The latter reaction of laughter constitutes, 
perhaps, the oldest of theories about humour, the superiority theory (the other two theoretical traditions 
being the theories of incongruity and release referred to in this chapter).  
263
 In Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 61. 
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founded on this same amor proprio, a desire for pleasure that is concerned with both 
stilling ‘unpleasure’ as well as seeking pleasure that can never be completely satisfied. 
Thus it is a desire based on lack.
264
 Freud would later expand a similar argument in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (see 1.3).   
The sensationalistic procedure in Leopardi’s poetical creation begins from this 
internal sensation of lack, transforming itself into attention, memory and finally, as 
argued below, into imagination and judgment. In the poem “La quiete dopo la tempesta” 
Leopardi gives a negative definition of pleasure, which can be experienced only as the 
absence of pain. In 1821 Leopardi had already written, “il piacere umano . . . si puo’ dire 
ch’è sempre futuro . . . L’atto proprio del piacere non si da’” (“Human pleasure . . . could 
be defined as always future . . . The real act of feeling pleasure is never experienced”; 
Zibaldone  414; my translation). The resultant view of human beings and their motives 
paves the way for Leopardi’s idea that the moral beliefs of humankind are really 
expressions of selfish, material desire. Leopardi writes: 
L’infinità della  inclinazione dell’uomo al piacere, è una infinità materiale, e non 
se ne può dedur nulla di grande o di infinito in favore dell’ anima umana, più di 
quello che si possa in favore dei bruti nei quali è naturale ch’esista lo stesso 
amore e nello stesso grado, essendo conseguenza immediata dell’amor proprio. 
(Zibaldone 194) 
The infinite human inclination towards pleasure, is a material infinite, and one 
cannot deduce anything grand or infinite in favour of the human soul, more than 
what one can deduce in favour of brutes in whom that same love is intrinsic and is 
expressed in a similar manner, being an immediate consequence of self-love. (my 
translation)  
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Sensation is thus primary in pursuing pleasure and is indeed the parameter by which Leopardi analyzed 
the formation of human faculties and by which he arrived at the establishment of a hedonistic ethic. As 
Daniela Bini put it: “the sensationalistic methodology which Leopardi followed strictly led him to a 
materialistic view of the world” (9). It is not clear whether Leopardi knew Hobbes but he definitely knew 
that sensationalism and materialism owed much to John Locke who, in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, reduced all ideas to sensation.  
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Leopardi’s enquiry on the nature of pleasure is, nonetheless, concluded with his statement 
that “gli esseri sensibili sono per natura souffrants” (“sensitive human beings are by their 
own nature souffrants”; Zibaldone 960; my translation). Amor proprio constitutes 
souffrance, which is the case with every living, striving organism. This is expressed in 
the famously terrifying inscription above Leopardi’s garden of unhappiness (see 1.1). The 
complete removal of desire, proposed at a later stage, is explicitly announced in 
Leopardi’s poem “A se stesso” (quoted subsequently by Beckett), which knows its roots 
and motivations in this inscription. Only distraction through a multitude of chores can 
drive a wedge between man’s insatiable desire of amor proprio, and the inevitable 
souffrance to which it leads. In the operetta morale “Storia del genere umano,” Leopardi 
points out: 
Bramando sempre e in qualunque stato l’impossibile, tanto più si travagliano con 
questo desiderio da se medesimi, quanto meno sono afflitti dagli altri mali; 
deliberò valersi di nuove arti a conservare questo misero genere . . . implicarla in 
mille negozi e fatiche, ad effetto d’intrattenere gli uomini, e divertirli quanto più 
si potesse dal conversare col proprio animo, o almeno col desiderio di quella loro 
incognita e vana felicità. (32-33). 
They [humans] crave the impossible, they always and in any state they found 
themselves in, crave the impossible, and the more they torment themselves with 
such desire, the less they are afflicted by other evils; He decided, therefore, to 
have recourse to chiefly two new expedients for preserving this miserable species 
. . . to involve men in a thousand activities and a thousand toils so as to occupy 
them and divert them as much as possible from communing with their own 
minds–or at least with their desire for an unknown and impalpable happiness. (my 
translation) 
The need to distract oneself from one’s own desire implies that a wedge be driven 
between desire of self-love and unhappiness. In “Detti Memorabili Di Filippo Ottonieri,” 
(“Memorable Sayings of Filippo Ottonieri”), the Italian poet-philosopher hints that this 
same wedge can become the above-mentioned humorous moment. Leopardi insists that 
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seldom do we laugh at things that are truly laughable but at things that are not really 
worthy of our laughter; in this way laughter is a manner of distancing and distracting 
ourselves, and thus a way of keeping ourselves in check from trying to dig deep into the 
underlying unpalatable truth that we refuse to face. Leopardi thus proposes to suspend 
desire by slicing open laughter, which conceals the malicious nature of the human being’s 
desires from itself:  
D’infinite cose che nella vita comune, o negli uomini particulari, sono ridicole 
veramente, è rarissimo che si rida; e se pure alcuno vi si prova, non gli venendo 
fatto di comunicare il suo riso agli altri, presto se ne rimane. All’incontro, di mille 
cose o gravissime o convenientissime, tutto giorno si ride, e con facilità grande se 
ne muovono le risa negli altri. Anzi le più delle cose delle quali si ride 
ordinariamente, sono tutt’altro che ridicole in effetto; e di moltissime si ride per 
questa cagione stessa, che elle non sono degne di riso o in parte alcuna o tanto che 
basti. (“Detti Memorabili di Filippo Ottonieri” in Operette Morali 322-25) 
There are an infinite number of things in everyday life and in individual men that 
are extremely ridiculous, and yet they are very seldom laughed at; and if someone 
laughs at them, as soon as he discovers that he cannot communicate his laughter 
to others, he quickly desists. On the contrary, we always laugh at many things that 
are either extremely serious or extremely dignified, and we very easily manage to 
have others join in our laughter. As a matter of fact, most of the things at which 
we normally laugh are actually anything but ridiculous; and at a great many of 
them we laugh for the very reason that they are not worthy of our laughter either 
in part or in whole.
265
 
It is thus a cold and calculating laugh rather than a boisterous one that here veils 
what lies underneath. Indirectly, this is also a way of asserting both our superiority to the 
object of laughter as much as the ultimate vacuity of the humorous moment, which has 
been stripped of anything that comes close to passions or feelings.  
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 For passages dealing with the same argument see Zibaldone 1774 (23 rd September  1821); Zibaldone, 
3000 (11th July 1823); Pensieri  CVI. 
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Sopravvenendo il pericolo, ridere, diventare allegro fuor dell’uso, o più che il 
momento prima non si era, o di malinconico farsi giulivo; divenir loquace essendo 
taciturno di natura, o rompere il silenzio fino allora per qualche ragione tenuto; 
scherzare, saltare, cantare, e simili cose, non sono già segni di coraggio, come si 
stimano, ma per lo contrario son segni di timori. (Zibaldone 3526,1) 
In the face of danger, if one laughs or becomes immeasurably and more than ever 
joyful, or turns from melancholy to mirthful, or becomes loquacious despite 
having a taciturn temperament, or ruptures the silence up till then held for 
whatever reason, becoming suddenly jocular, jumping, singing and doing similar 
things, these are not signs of bravery, as it is thought, but on the contrary, they are 
signs of fear. (my translation) 
But the humour smokescreen in Leopardi is doubly oxymoronic. Desire being directly 
linked to amor proprio and the impossible search for happiness, implies that to cut 
through humour and reveal the consuming effect of desire, the human being needs to be 
distanced from his search for happiness and readily admit his insignificance in the face of 
physis. This task, as Farfarello tells Malambruno in “Dialogo di Malambruno e di 
Farfarello,” is  impossible:  
FARFARELLO: Dunque, amandoti necessariamente del maggiore amore che tu 
sei capace, necessariamente desideri il più che puoi la felicità propria; e non 
potendo mai di gran lunga essere soddisfatto di questo tuo desiderio, che e` 
sommo, resta che tu non possi fuggire per nessun verso di non essere infelice. 
(“Dialogo di Farfarello e di Malambruno” in Operette Morali 100- 101) 
Well, then, since of necessity you love yourself with the greatest love of which 
you’re capable, of necessity you desire your happiness as strongly as you can. 
And since this supreme desire of yours can never be satisfied even in the smallest 
degree, it follows that in no way can you escape being unhappy.  
In “Dialogo della natura e di un anima” Nature echoes the same concept once 
more underlining the link between amor proprio and unhappiness (Operette morali 106). 
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But just as, on the one hand, the drive to pleasure and pain is focused on material 
desire, on the other hand, that same pleasure and pain can be subsumed in memory from 
which imagination finally springs. Imagination, possessing sensations in act and 
remembrance, can create the new. In his teoria del piacere, Leopardi places at the 
forefront the drive exerted by the imagination and the resultant deluding power which is, 
above all, absolutely necessary. In “Storia del Genere Umano” he speaks about the 
importance of dreams and illusions (28-9). Leopardi’s idealistic aesthetics thus offers 
resistance to the insufficiency of reality and its lack of purpose which allows man to 
create his own meaningful world, a world that is acknowledged to be de facto a necessary 
illusion. Senseless matter can be overcome through the exploitation of that very 
recognition. As discussed above, that same garden which evokes images of beauty and 
harmony hides but suffering and death and reflects how life perpetuates itself through 
death. Leopardi overcomes this paradoxical principle by subsuming it into a higher 
paradox: indeed that of a dianoetic laugh. Laughter is a celebration of the deluding but 
necessary power of the imagination in the face of the recognition of nothingness. 
Rather than the humour smokescreen, then, the attenuation of human pain is 
possible through the Leopardian dianoetic laugh where the human being accepts 
suffering, concomitantly empowering oneself by resorting to the stormy depths of the 
imagination.
266
 The weapons of the ridiculous are used to deconstruct the weapons of 
pure rationality. In the Zibaldone he writes: 
Ne’ miei dialoghi io cercherò di portar la commedia a quello che finora è stato 
proprio della tragedia, cioe’ i vizi dei grandi, i principii fondamentali delle 
calamità e della miseria umana . . . E credo che le armi del ridicolo, massime in 
questo ridicolissimo e freddissimo tempo . . . potranno giovare più . . . Cosí a 
scuotere la mia povera patria, e secolo, io mi troverò avere impiegato le armi dell’ 
immaginazione nella lirica, e in quelle prose letterarie ch’io potrò scrivere; le armi 
della ragione, della logica, della filosofia, ne’ trattati filosofici ch’io dispongo; e 
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 While the drive to pleasure and pain is focused on material desire, that same pleasure and pain can be 
subsumed in memory from which imagination finally springs. Imagination, possessing sensations in act and 
remembrance, can create the new. 
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le armi del ridicolo ne’ dialoghi e novelle Lucianee ch’io vo preparando. 
(Zibaldone 1394) 
In my dialogues I will attempt to bring into comedy that which has been so far  
subject matter of tragedy, that is the vices of the great ones, the principal causes 
of human calamities and miseries . . . And I believe that the weapons of the 
ridiculous, particularly in this most ridiculous and glacial of times . . . would be 
more beneficial . . . Thus in order to shake my poor country, and the century in 
which I live, I will have to resort to the weapons of the imagination in my poems, 
and in the literary prose works that I will be writing: the weapons of reason, logic, 
philosophy in the philosophical treatises that I will pen; and the weapons of the 
ridiculous in the dialogues and Lucianesque short stories that I am preparing. (my 
translation) 
Counterpoising the Hobbesian echoes of superiority theory in his excerpts about 
humour,
267
 Leopardi thus strives to uncover what his “secol superbo e sciocco” (“proud 
and foolish century”; “La Ginestra” line 53) did not have the courage to face, pointing out 
the importance of humorously acknowledging this foolishness.
268
 Hence, following the 
long lineage of philosophers starting with the above-mentioned Democritus, Leopardi’s 
conception of one of the functions of humour is that of offering a shield against the 
heritage of man’s ancient impotence in nature’s presence. This is the result of a 
perspective based on the idea of incongruity,
269
 a response to Hobbes’ austere notion of 
humour. In Leopardi, as in Democritus, insanity is wisdom and the world is ultimately a 
fable that nourishes illusions. On December 17, 1823 Leopardi writes:  “Tutto è follia in 
questo mondo fuorché il folleggiare. Tutto è degno di riso fuorché il ridersi di tutto. Tutto 
è vanità fuorché le belle illusioni e le dilettevoli frivolezze” (“Everything is insane in this 
world except for behaving insanely. Everything is worth being laughed at except for 
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 These ideas were opposed by eighteenth-century British philosophers like Lord Shaftesbury for whom 
humour was the very height of reasonableness. 
268
 In Leopardian prose, “allegrezza” (cheerfulness) is not disjuncted from “tristezza” (sadness). The 
relationship between physical reaction and passion reflects the influence of the idéologues (Tracy, 
Cabanis). See 1.2.1. 
269
 The basic idea of incongruity theory was that two different ideas would be suddenly connected with 
comic effect. Immanuel Kant phrases the incongruity theory in a brilliant short discussion of laughter from 
The Critique of Judgement where humour is a sudden evaporation of expectation to nothing (196-203). 
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laughing at everything. Everything is vanity except for the beautiful illusions and the 
pleasant frivolities”; Zibaldone 3990; my translation).270  
It is in this paradoxical but highly creative zone, where one laughs at the 
engulfing misery of one’s ephemeral physicality that the Leopardian humour mentioned 
by Pirandello in L’Umorismo (42) comes to life.271 Through this very humour the 
nihilistic notion regarding the human being’s doom is fought. Indeed, for Leopardi, 
humour acts like a double-edged sword. While it offers strong resistance to the ubiquitous 
earthly delusions and to the consuming effect of desire, acting as a buffer between the 
human being and his passions, it is also the only conceivable way to respond to the trials 
and tribulations of life, paradoxically allowing expression to the desiring self. Indeed 
Leopardi’s humour is worked through a tongue-in-cheek kind of writing whereby the 
laughter of his so-called ‘cosmi-comic’ writing faces the stark confrontation between its 
fable-like quality and the finitude of the physical world.  
In Freud’s words humour is “the contribution made to the comic through the 
agency of the super-ego” (“Humour” 432), or in Lacan’s words “Humour betrays the 
very function of the superego in comedy” (Écrits 648). Leopardi's humorous attitude 
towards oneself thus prefigures Freud's humour (see 4.3) which turns the oedipalist 
concept on its head. As Freud points out, the superego treats the ego as one treats oneself 
as a child from an adult perspective, recognizing and laughing at one’s insignificance. 
Leopardi and Freud indeed interpret that same impudence of humour not simply as an act 
of superiority (and in Freud, as already mentioned, it is a superiority with clear oedipalist 
echoes), but also as a mode of representation through the opposite, an ability to laugh in 
the face of adversity. This humour is superior to the laughter of superiority, which, on its 
own, is simply the expression of repressed desire and unconscious aggression (“Humour” 
429). 
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 In “Storia del genere umano” Leopardi explores the importance of dreams and illusions (Operette 
morali 28-9). 
271
 As stated at the beginning of 4.1, in L’Umorismo, Pirandello specifically cites Leopardi as a good 
example of ‘umorismo’ as opposed to ‘comicità’, (which recalls, as explained in 4.3, the same Freudian 
distinction between humour and the comic).  
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In May 1825 Leopardi gives expression to this laugh of dianoia: “quanto più 
l’uomo cresce . . . e crescendo si fa più incapace di felicità, tanto egli si fa proclive e 
domestico al riso, e più straniero al pianto” (“the more the human being ages, and ageing 
he becomes increasingly incapable of happiness, the more is he prone and susceptible to 
laughter, and a stranger to crying”; Zibaldone 4138; my translation). This is a dignified 
ageing laugh that is echoed in Eleandro’s “la disperazione [che] ha sempre nella bocca un 
sorriso” (“despair [that] always carries a smile on its lips”; “Dialogo di Timandro e di 
Eleandro” 404-406).  It is a dignified smile that acknowledges and bravely takes stock of 
human weaknesses, not precluding the infinite human predisposition to desire in vain. 
The Leopardian ageing laugh and his dignified, desperate smile is imbued with value in 
the way the laughter of superiority is not, because through it one can, at least partially, 
find solace. The Leopardian desperate smile and ageing laugh form part of the thread that 
leads up to Freudian humour, particularly as envisaged according to the latter’s second 
topography.  
In the classical quaestio−whether it would be better to laugh or cry when 
confronted with the misfortunes and unhappiness of the world–for Leopardi’s Eleandro, 
the obvious choice is the aforementioned Democritian laughter, central to Leopardi as 
also to Beckett, a guffaw that laughs madly at the ills of the physical world:  
Ridendo dei nostri mali, trovo qualche conforto; e procuro di recarne altrui nello 
stesso modo. Se questo non mi vien fatto, tengo pure per fermo che il ridere dei 
nostri mali sia l’unico profitto che se ne possa cavare, e l’unico rimedio che vi si 
trovi. (“Dialogo di Timandro e di Eleandro,” Operette Morali 406-7) 
Laughing at our ills gives me some comfort and helps me to bring some to others. 
Even If I could not do this, I would still remain thoroughly convinced that 
laughing at our ills is the only benefit we can draw from them and the only 
remedy we can find in them.   
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4.2 From Leopardi to Freud: Incongruity Theory in 
Schopenhauer, Bergson and Lewis 
As discussed in the previous chapters, Schopenhauer is the immediate heir of 
Leopardi and this influence is also clear in the Schopenhauerian version of the 
incongruity theory. Schopenhauer, echoing Leopardi, argued that “understanding . . . 
transforms dull, meaningless sensation into intuition” (The World as Will and 
Representation 1: 33). It is not through rationality but through intuition that humanity can 
start to comprehend its infinitesimal insignificance and, at that realization, it can only 
laugh at its own complete impotence. Henri Bergson, discussed below, will echo the 
same feeling when he states that: “the specific remedy for vanity is laughter . . . the one 
failing that is essentially laughable” (173). Freud would later recognize debt, particularly 
to Schopenhauer, claiming that the latter not only asserted “the dominance of the 
emotions and the supreme importance of sexuality but he was even aware of the 
mechanism of repression” (Historical and Expository Works 244). 
 In the brief section on humour in The World as Will and Representation, 
Schopenhauer, along with Leopardi, reveals to be one of the first to define what comes 
close to the romantic irony of the desolately-smiling marginalized man. He proposed that:  
laughter arises from nothing other than the sudden perception of an incongruity 
between a concept and the real objects that are, in some respect, thought through 
the concept; in fact laughter itself is simply the expression of this incongruity . . . 
All laughter is occasioned by a paradoxical and hence unexpected subsumption, 
irrespective of whether it is expressed in words or deeds.” (The World as Will and 
Representation 84) 
Schopenhauer divides the ridiculous in “either a witty conceit or an act of foolishness, 
according to whether there is a movement from the discrepancy between objects to the 
unity of a concept or the other way around: the former is always voluntary, the latter 
always involuntary and is forced on people only from outside” (85). As is the case with 
Leopardian humour, the art of the real humourist is that of tacitly masking wit as 
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foolishness. Schopenhauer specifically mentions the court jester or the Fool (as will do 
Lacan) as the one who deliberately switches the two around, referring to the time-
honoured sage veiled as a Fool.
272
  
This brings us back to another influential version of the incongruity theory, this 
time by Bergson. According to Bergson, laughter is more visual than verbal, whereby 
“the body tak[es] precedence of the soul . . . the manner seeking to outdo the matter, the 
letter aiming at ousting the spirit” (94). The prototypes of the comic tend to be wordless, 
slapstick humour whose comicality is experienced at the fringe of intuitions.
273
 Bergson’s 
is a reaction to an automation which stings us with its strangeness whereby “the attitudes, 
gestures and movements of the human body are laughable in exact proportion as that 
body reminds us of a mere machine” (79). Thus, the comic is “something mechanical 
encrusted on the living” (84) and “we laugh every time a person gives us the impression 
of being a thing” (97). This mechanization-in-the-making contains “a repressed feeling 
which goes off like a spring, and . . . delights in repressing the feeling anew” (108). The 
act of repressing and releasing can be equated to that same infinite desire at once 
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 The mirth of the consumed, frustrated Fool reaches its shrillest pitch in Nietzsche who, like Leopardi, 
Schopenhauer and later Freud, equates laughing with the ability to suffer excruciatingly. But Nietzsche’s 
direst, most inward sickness is the thwarting of will, the shrill laugh of Silenus who states that what would 
have been best for the human being is “not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best 
is to die soon” (The Birth of Tragedy 29). The mad laugh is once more tapped by Charles Baudelaire, as a 
source of great creativity. In ‘The Essence of Laughter’, similar to Hobbes’ and some of Leopardi’s 
notions, Baudelaire states that laughter springs from the idea of one’s own perceived superiority. It is, 
however, primarily a symptom of one’s failing. Baudelaire places at the root of this accursed grin the 
miscreants of the character Melmoth created by Reverend Maturin. Laughter is, according to Baudelaire, a 
sign of superiority in relation to brute creation but a sign of inferiority in relation to the wise (154). 
Baudelaire describes the latter as the “absolute comic” (157) as opposed to the ordinary type termed 
“significative” (157). The association of madness with the creative process is also crucial in Wolfgang 
Kayser’s The Grotesque in Art and Literature (187). Kayser argues that the abysmal, ominous humour of 
the mechanical object, who is alienated by being brought to life, (and thus the mechanical liveliness of the 
puppet, the marionette, the automaton, the face frozen into a mask), counteracts the human being who is, in 
this vein, increasingly projected as deprived of such life. Mad laughter is also central to Mikhail Bakhtin in 
Rabelais and His World. Bakhtin states that the negation in the comic is a negation of an entire order of life 
through which there occurs, paradoxically, an affirmation (322). For Bakhtin humour is also an explosive 
life-force burst of desire, mainly expressed with the body. This conception of the mad laugh as a bodily 
explosion, which in its emphasis on the physicality differs from the Democritian laughter central to 
Leopardi and Beckett, is conveyed by a whole tradition extending not only from Rabelais and the 
commedia dell’arte to Baudelaire and Bakhtin, but also includes André Breton and Helmuth Plessner (see 
4.5).  
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 Bergson’s appreciation of wordless, bodily humour owes perhaps to the tradition of Mime, Mask and 
Caricature but it differs, for instance, from the aforementioned Bakhtinian carnivalesque aesthetic. Bergson 
never champions the vulgar since comedy “oscillates between life and art” (74). 
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repressed and released, lodged at the core of the humorous moment under discussion: “a 
particular mechanical arrangement which it reveals to us, as through a glass, at the back 
of the series of effects and causes” (116). Bergson goes on to describe the “mechanical 
combination to be generally reversible” (114). In this he prefigures Wyndham Lewis. The 
mechanical quality is the result of a human desire at once repressed but also attempting a 
release and creating a situation that belongs simultaneously to two aspects: the human 
attempting to be non-human and (and here comes the anticipation of Lewis) the non-
human in which human qualities can be detected.
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The laughable aspect of a thing that gives its viewer the impression of a human is 
the position argued for by Lewis. In a brief essay, written, like Freud’s, in 1927 and 
entitled “The Meaning of the Wild Body”, Lewis writes against Bergson: 
. . . with a denial of ‘the person’, life becomes immediately both ‘real’ and very 
serious. To bring vividly to our mind what we mean by ‘absurd,’ let us turn to the 
plant, and enquire how the plant could be absurd. Suppose you came upon an 
orchid or a cabbage reading Flaubert’s Salambô or Plutarch’s Moralia, you would 
be very much surprised. But if you found a man or a woman reading it, you would 
not be surprised. (158-59) 
Lewis’ laughable thing-become-person is clearly a reversal of Bergson’s person-become-
thing but beyond this simple reversal, Lewis is making a more poignant remark on 
humour. He continues, 
Now in one sense you ought to be just as much surprised at finding a man 
occupied in this way as if you had found an orchid or a cabbage, or a tom-cat, to 
include the animal world. There is the same physical anomaly. It is just as absurd 
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This is, once more, the same space which allows the previously mentioned Bakhtinian inversion of the 
normal order of things, the playfulness of the mind and the transposition of the natural expression of an 
idea into another key. This is the same dolce far niente of stock characters in the commedia dell’arte. 
Nonetheless, as previously-discussed, this in-between space only apparently gives rise to play. It is about 
very serious business and Bergson speaks of the humorous moment as a “corrective” (117). 
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externally . . . The deepest root of the Comic is to be sought in this anomaly. 
(159) 
The root of the comic is then not so much a thing behaving like a person but a person 
acting like a person. There is something quintessentially ridiculous about a person taking 
his or her human role seriously. Humour is not just a process of safeguarding pleasure 
against the denials of reason, which is wary of pleasure. Freud’s analysis dovetails 
Bergson’s but, in a way, also Lewis’s. Freud does not simply convey the message that 
laughter is not necessarily an honest reflection of the soul, as he expounds in his Jokes 
and Their Relation to the Unconscious. In his essay written in the same year as Lewis’, 
Freud speaks of the superego who laughs at the ego, an internal human mechanism 
whereby one refuses to take oneself seriously. The magnanimity of humour in Freud’s 
1927 essay goes beyond any notion of a malicious desire that is repressed beneath a 
humorous front.  
4.3 Freudian Humour: The Blossomed Leopardian Seed within 
Victorian Relief Theory  
A malevolent dimension is characteristic of the relief theory of humour, whose 
origins lie within the materialist philosophy of the nineteenth century.
275
 Not surprisingly, 
more than one parallel can be drawn with some of Leopardi’s conceptions of humour. At 
the core of relief theory one can detect the basic elements of the first version of Freudian 
theory of laughter which echoes not just Victorian writers of humour but also, among 
others, Leopardi, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The latter three writers had already 
explored many ideas about human intuitions and desire that Freud came to propose.  
The universality of human strivings expressed as the death-drive pitted against 
life-drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (see 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.3; 1.4.2; 4.1), Reisner’s 
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 The laughter at the heart of Victorian Relief Theory, whose pleasures are once more seen as not entirely 
estimable, appears, for instance, in the nonsense genre, particularly in innocent-looking, unsuspicious 
works like the Book of Nonsense by Edward Lear. Nonsense is based on that same Bakhtinian 
‘topsyturvydom’ and dwells on the incongruities that result from turning the world of sense, rules and 
plausibility upside down. Laughter in this case represents a rebellion against order, a temptation to a 
dangerous moment of anarchy against the severe demands of social constraint. 
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anti-desire struggling against desire (21), or Lacanian Imaginary demand pitted against 
Symbolic desire enact that same tension in Freud between the need to restore to an earlier 
state of things and a perennially insatiable desire to placate the desire of self-assertion 
(see 1.3). I argue below that this same tension is crucial to humour. In The Interpretation 
of Dreams, Freud makes an important remark about the relation between the comic and 
repression: 
Evidence, finally, of the increase in activity which becomes necessary when these 
primary modes of functioning are inhibited is to be found in the fact that we 
produce a comic effect, that is, a surplus of energy which has to be discharged in 
laughter, if we allow these modes of thinking to force their way through into 
consciousness.  (766) 
The claim here is that one produces a surplus of energy in laughter when repressed 
unconscious material threatens to force its way through into consciousness. In Jokes and 
Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905), Freud delves deeper into the argument. He 
proposes that the energy that is relieved and discharged in laughter provides pleasure 
because it allegedly economizes upon energy that would ordinarily be used to contain or 
repress psychic activity. It is also in the Jokes book that Freud specifically distinguishes 
between the comic and humour.
276
 Freud states that “what are quite especially 
unfavourable for the comic are all kinds of intellectual processes . . . There is no place 
whatever left for the comic in abstract reflection except when that mode of thought is 
suddenly interrupted.” (Jokes 219). But Freud dissects the comic further and 
counterpoises it to humour: 
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 It is Freud’s same distinction between humour and the comic that lies at the core of ‘L’Umorismo’ (‘On 
Humour’), Luigi Pirandello’s essay written in 1908. Among other sources of ‘L’Umorismo’ is Theodor 
Lipps’ ‘Komik und Humor’ (1898), which is also mentioned by Freud (Jokes and their Relation to 
Unconscious 202). For Pirandello, feeling is the pivot of his philosophy, adopting the anti-intellectual 
tradition of Western thought represented by the already-mentioned lineage of Jean Paul, Leopardi, 
Schopenhauer and Bergson, all quoted in ‘L’Umorismo’. Pirandello claims that the comic, namely the 
“avvertimento del contrario” (the “perception of the opposite”) should not be confused with humour, 
namely “il sentimento del contrario” (“the feeling of the opposite”; L’Umorismo 135; my translation). As in 
Leopardi’s theory of humour, Pirandello in ‘L’Umorismo’ makes rationality crumble plunging the human 
being into a darkness which, however, is not complete. The Pirandellian laugh indeed laughs at life which 
is unpredictable but whose elusiveness does not impede, as in Leopardi, a feeling for it. 
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The comic is greatly interfered with if the situation from which it ought to 
develop gives rise at the same time to a release of strong affect . . . Yet precisely 
in cases where there is a release of affect one can observe a particularly strong 
difference in expenditure bring about the automatism of release [. . . these are] 
case[s] in which laughter occurs in circumstances other than pleasurable ones and 
accompanied by intensely distressing or strained emotions. (Jokes 221)  
If the release of distressing affects is, as Freud puts it “the greatest obstacle to the 
emergence of the comic” (228), humour is “a means of obtaining pleasure in spite of the 
distressing affects that interfere with it; it acts as a substitute for the generation of these 
affects, it puts itself in their place” (228). The conditions of humour are given when “we 
should be tempted to release a distressing affect and if motives then operate upon us 
which suppress that affect in statu nascendi.” (Jokes 228). Freud goes on to pay homage 
to disaster humour and its variant, gallows humour−where the threat of death and facts of 
human catastrophe are transformed into the material for jokes. Humour is then, according 
to Freud’s first model proposed in the Jokes book, what Critchley terms “[a] symptom . . . 
of societal repression . . . a return of the repressed” (On Humour 12).  
In the Jokes book Freud already pursued the attempt to discover the essence of 
humour, in a preconscious link and a comparison with puerile pleasure. Despite being a 
defence mechanism, Freud asserted that humour goes beyond the arch-defence process of 
repression. Indeed, he explains, humour “scorns to withdraw the ideational content 
bearing the distressing affect from conscious attention as repression does, and thus 
surmounts the automatism of defence.” Humour brings this change about by finding a 
means of “withdrawing the energy from the release of un-pleasure that is already in 
preparation and of transforming it, by discharge, into pleasure” (Jokes 233). Unpleasant 
feelings are thus transformed and released during the humorous moment. It is no wonder 
that death and suffering are spoken of with utter humour in many of Leopardi’s Operette 
morali as well as Beckett’s plays. Freud offers this explanation to such transformation 
during the humorous moment: 
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The species of humour are extraordinarily variegated according to the nature of 
the emotion which is economized in favour of the humour: pity, anger, pain, 
tenderness, and so on. Their number seems to remain uncompleted because the 
kingdom of humour is constantly being enlarged whenever an artist or writer 
succeeds in submitting some hitherto unconquered emotions to the control of 
humour, in making them,  . . . into sources of humorous pleasure. (Jokes 232) 
It is, however, in his later essay “Humour” that Freud adds, very significantly, that 
humour allows one not only to release repressed emotion, desire not precluded, and 
derive pleasure out of it, but to laugh at oneself, taking stock of one’s fallacies which 
leads to an elevating feeling. The humour proposed in this revised version comes close to 
the concept of the dianoetic laugh. In his 1927 essay Freud concludes that humour is the 
contribution made to the comic by the inflated position of the super-ego, who 
reassuringly laughs at the ego. Baudelaire had already alluded to this splitting that takes 
place during the humorous moment when he comments: “the man who trips would be the 
last to laugh at his own fall, unless he happened to be a philosopher, one who had 
acquired by habit a power of rapid self-division and thus of assisting as a disinterested 
spectator at the phenomena of his own ego” (154).277 
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 The splitting of the human interior during the humorous moment, echoing Freud’s dialectic between ego 
and super ego, is primary in  Jean Paul’s Preschool of Aesthetics, particularly in a section dealing with “the 
annihilating or infinite idea of humour,”(Jean Paul: A Reader 253). It is significant, nonetheless, that this 
humour is defined once more through an oxymoron: it is at once infinite and devoid of anything, recalling 
the aforementioned dialectic of opposites so central to Leopardi’s poetics (see 4.1). It is humour as the 
“inverse sublime” (Jean Paul: A Reader 250). Freud would also refer to the “degradation of the sublime” 
which creates “the comparison between this new ideational method . . . and the previously habitual one . . 
.this comparison . . . creates the difference in expenditure which can be discharged by laughter” (Jokes and 
their Relation to the Unconscious 201). As Jean Paul states, “humour might seem to border on madness, 
which takes leave of its senses naturally, as the philosopher artificially, but like the latter, keeping its 
reason; humour is, as the ancients dubbed Diogenes, a raving Socrates” (Jean Paul: A Reader 259). This 
contradictoriness is also highlighted by Baudelaire who states that “Laughter is satanic: It is thus 
profoundly human . . . and since laughter is essentially human, it is, in fact, essentially contradictory” (On 
the Essence of Laughter 153). Jean Paul also delves into the satanic aspect in humour, the devil being 
“usually the tomfool” (253). Nietzsche echoes this thought: “night is also a sun-go away! Or ye will learn 
that a sage is also a fool” (Thus Spake Zarathustra 396). Humour, according to Kayser, is “filled with 
bitterness, it takes on characteristics of the mocking, cynical, and ultimately satanic laughter” (187). This 
satanic aspect is also raised by Bergson who speaks of the comic art as having “a touch of the diabolical, 
rais[ing] up the demon who had been thrown by the angel” in that it divines “beneath the skin-deep 
harmony of form . . . the deep-seated recalcitrance of matter” (77).  
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André Breton, directly inspired by Freud’s 1927 paper, would call this humour 
l’humour noir (1). Indeed black humour is replete with the unhappy black bile, the 
medieval melan-cholia, to which Freud attributes a mental state expressed as the 
suppression of the ego by the usually cruel (in the case of humour noir, not-so-cruel) 
super-ego (“Humour” 431). This humour has, as Freud specifies, “something liberating 
about it; but it also has something of grandeur and elevation” (“Humour” 428) which is 
why it comes conceptually close to dianoetic laughter. This elevation, also of primary 
importance in Leopardi, serves to bring out an interesting contrast between Freud’s 
revised notion of humour that echoes the cerebral resistance of dianoia, and what he had 
stated in his Jokes book. Freud’s revised notion is empowering in that it brings about a 
change of situation where the real is ‘surrealized’, which is why Breton was so interested 
in l’ humour noir. According to the latter conception, unlike the humour of jokes, one 
laughs at oneself and acknowledges this in a dignified humorous attitude. Freud 
continues to explain: “Humour possesses a dignity which is wholly lacking, for instance, 
in jokes” (“Humour” 429). The grandeur of such a humorous moment lies, as Freud 
concludes, in the triumph of narcissism (“Humour” 428). And with the triumph of the ego 
comes also that of the previously- mentioned Freudian ‘pleasure principle.’  
 But it is precisely here that the line of argumentation merits further scrutiny. It 
cannot be ignored that in the same 1927 essay, Freud states that, “the putting through of 
the pleasure principle- bring [s] humour near to the regressive or reactionary processes” 
(429). As already stated (see 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.3; 4.1), the pleasure principle emerges from 
the reactionary mechanism of “a return to the peace of the inorganic world,” (Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle 166) but also, as Freud specifies, “the pleasure-principle however 
remains for a long time the method of operation of the sex impulses” (Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle 143). One cannot thus overlook that the pleasure principle in Freud 
operates at the heart of the dualistic theory of death and life forces (Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle 167). Reisner underlines that death and life are both goals of desire (Death 
Ego14). This thought adds an interesting twist to the matter. As much as the regressive, 
reactionary forces of that “opposition to desire within the ego” are crucial to this humour, 
one cannot ignore that struggling against this force is the “desire which supersedes the 
ego.”  Humour thus lies not only near to the regressive process, or, as Freud defines it in 
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the same essay, to the ego which refuses to be wiped out by the surrounding engulfing 
distress, but it also has to struggle against an opposite force of desire, “the keenest threat 
to the sovereignty of the ego” (Death Ego 34). 
In the 1927 essay then, Freud affirms that humour conceals repressed desire 
(“Humour” 429), without, however, also highlighting its opposing force. Humour indeed 
strives to allow that same “desire which supersedes the ego” (Death Ego 34), to break 
through the pressure weighing down on it. The way repressed desire erupts in humour is 
through language a language also made up of witticisms and puns. It is a language 
characterized by lack, by the inability to grasp the underlying unconscious desires. 
Language can only signify a coming to terms with a loss, ultimately the lack-of-being, or 
the desire that is “desire for desire, the Other's desire,” that defines the Lacanian split 
subject (Écrits 723). 
If, at this point, we bring in as supplement to Freud the Lacanian registers of 
human experience, the Symbolic, Imaginary and Real orders of being (see 1.4; 4.4 
below), some crucial distinctions can be made between the energies, actions and 
expressions of the dual movement of desire at the core of this humour.  
4.4 Lacan on Humour 
Freudian humour paves the way for Lacan’s views on the duality of the ‘self’ and 
the role of this splitting particularly as manifested in witticisms. Lacan points out the 
central theme of the breach, resulting in the internal conflict within the ‘self’ on various 
occasions: “If we ignore the self’s radical ex-centricity to itself with which man is 
confronted, in other words, the truth discovered by Freud, we shall falsify both the order 
and the methods of psychoanalytic mediation” (Écrits 171). The radical internal breach 
that defines the individual’s ex-centricity, his or her being off the centre and thus the 
radical split within the human subject is caused by desire which renders that same subject 
darkly humorous or tragicomic: 
The pathetic side . . . the counterpart of tragedy. They are not incompatible since 
tragi-comedy exists. That is where the experience of human action resides. And it 
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is because we know better than those who went before how to recognize the 
nature of desire, which is at the heart of this experience, that a reconsideration of 
ethics is possible. (Seminar VII 314)       
The tragicomic resides within the human inner split, within the human being’s inability to 
come to terms with the overwhelming force that is desire. Starting off by quoting Freud 
on jokes and then concluding with his own remarks, Lacan surmises: 
For, however little interest has been taken in it–and for good reason–Jokes and 
their Relation to the Unconscious remains the most unchallengeable of his 
[Freud’s] works because it is the most transparent; in it, the effect of the 
unconscious is demonstrated in all its subtlety. And the visage it reveals to us is 
that of wit in the ambiguity conferred on it by language, where the other face of 
its regalia power is the witticism, by which the whole of its order is annihilated in 
an instant–the witticism, indeed, in which language’s creative activity unveils its 
absolute gratuitousness, in which its domination of reality is expressed in the 
challenge of nonmeaning, and in which the humour, in the malicious grace of the 
free spirit, symbolizes a truth that does not say its last word . . . Nowhere is the 
individual’s intent more evidently surpassed by the subject’s find nowhere is the 
distinction I make between the individual and the subject so palpable since not 
only must there have been something foreign to me in my find for me to take 
pleasure in it, but some of it must remain foreign for this find to hit home. This 
takes on its importance due to the necessity, so clearly indicated by Freud, of a 
joke’s third person, who is always presupposed, and to the fact that a joke does 
not lose its power when told in the form of indirect speech. In short, this points, in 
the Other’s locus. (Écrits 223-24) 
Without an understanding of the fact of desire and the unconscious, the human being is 
susceptible to losing what little control he or she has in a world in which mastery is 
elusive. A search for mastery and unity is not only destined to fail but is also where the 
tragicomic destiny of humanity is, as it were, lodged. Knowledge of the fictions of the 
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Lacanian Real and the power of the unconscious allow us to better come to terms with 
our tragicomic selves.  
At this point supplementing Freud’s revised theory of humour with Lacan’s 
theory of the registers (see 1.4.1) can elucidate our line of argumentation. Indeed, the 
transition from the Imaginary to the Symbolic Order entails a loss: a loss of “the Other’s 
desire since it is originally desire for what the Other desires” (Écrits 662). And if an 
intrinsic link can be traced between the Imaginary and the death drive, on the one hand, 
and the Symbolic and the life drive, on the other, then the Imaginary involves a yielding, 
while the Symbolic entails play. The latter is, however, a play of signifiers which, as in 
the fort/da game described in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, is a presence 
playing on an absence.  To regress to the Imaginary is to turn away from desire, to lose 
and undo desire, Reisner's “anti-desire” (Death Ego 21). This is the desire to cease 
desiring, the “ablation of desire” that I initially refer to (see introduction). The Symbolic, 
on the other hand, progresses by the finding of desire, but significantly this desire “comes 
from the Other” (Écrits 724). 
The humour under discussion, the humour expressed through the laugh of 
dianoia, construed by deploying Lacanian tools, results in a struggle between Imaginary 
desire, which forcefully attempts to still the current and stop it mid-stream, and Symbolic 
desire which fights back satirically. Freud’s insistence that “humour is not resigned; it is 
rebellious” (“Humour” 429), and is inextricably linked to something elevating 
(“Humour” 428), acquires new meaning when perceived in this light.  
4.5 Beckett’s Humour  
Beckett’s humour is characterized by the same “mirthless laugh” referred to 
previously, the laughter that, as Critchley puts it, “opens us up and causes our defenses to 
drop momentarily, but it is precisely at that moment of weakness that Beckett’s humour 
rebounds upon the subject” (On Humour 49).278 Critchley defines it as the “subtle but 
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 Simon Critchley chooses to define Beckett’s laughter as resulting from “humour that resists direct 
translation and can only be thematized humourlessly” (Very Little . . . Almost Nothing 157). It is humour 
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devastating force of Beckett’s humour” (Very Little . . . Almost Nothing 157). Christopher 
Ricks links Beckett’s comic to death stating that “Beckett’s apprehension of death . . . is 
unsurprisingly the lens of his translucent comedy” (20), an argument that echoes a one-
sided Freud. Shane Weller disagrees with the argument that Beckett’s humour is a form 
of resistance to nihilism. On the contrary he argues humour in Beckett might be masking 
nihilism just because it is the last place where you would expect to find it. As he 
eloquently puts it, deliberately echoing Nietzsche, Beckettian humour might be “just a 
function of nihilism’s uncanniness” (A Taste for the Negative Beckett and Nihilism 
143).Yet, all this criticism still begs the following question: what does Beckett’s work 
say about humour? In Molloy Moran debates the point with Father Ambrose, 
Like Job haha, he said. I too said haha. What a joy it is to laugh, from time to 
time, he said. Is it not? I said. It is peculiar to man, he said. So I have noticed, I 
said. A brief silence ensued . . . Animals never laugh, he said. It takes us to find 
that funny, I said. What? He said. It takes us to find that funny, I said loudly. He 
mused. Christ never laughed either, he said, so far as we know. He looked at me. 
Can you wonder? I said. (93) 
In typical tongue-in-cheek fashion, humour is here being attributed to human beings. 
Critchley pin-points precisely this element when, referring to Helmuth Plessner, he 
explains the specifically human element of humour as follows, 
As Plessner puts it, laughter confirms the eccentric (exzentrisch) position of the 
human being in the world of nature. Plessner’s thesis is that the life of animals is 
zentrisch, it is centred. This means that the animal simply lives and experiences 
(lebt und erlebt). By contrast, the human being not only lives and experiences, he 
or she experiences those experiences (erlebt sein Erleben). That is, the human 
being has a reflective attitude towards its experiences and towards itself. This is 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
expressed in the “syntax of weakness, as a comic syntax” (On Humour 49) and that constitutes an 
“acknowledgement of finitude” (Very Little . . . Almost Nothing  159). The genius of Beckett’s humour, 
continues Critchley, is that “he makes us laugh and then calls us into question through that laughter” (On 
Humour 41). 
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why humans are eccentric, because they live beyond the limits set for them by 
nature by taking up a distance from their immediate experience. . . . The working 
out of the consequences of the eccentric position of the human is the main task of 
a philosophical anthropology, which is why laughter has such an absolutely 
central role in Plessner’s work (28). 
The human’s return to a ‘centric’ position, to animal-like sheer immediacy stands out as 
anomalous because the human being has an ex-centric position vis-à-vis itself. The 
human being’s ex-centricity, its ability to be reflective about itself explains the cynical, 
brooding, black misanthropy of some excerpts in Leopardi as also the Beckettian 
mirthless laugh. The ex-centricity of this humour, however, also recalls the Lacanian split 
self in its tragicomic fate, unable to come to terms with its own desire. 
Thus, as Beckett specifies, humour is human and, as he shows through his work, 
its effect banks on its ex-centric quality. Human beings are eccentric animals defined by 
their continual failure to coincide with themselves, and particularly with their bodies. As 
Critchley states, “humour takes place in the gap between being a body and having a 
body” (On Humour 44). The body, in all its crude desire, is what returns in humour. The 
tension that holds this humour together is rife because of the incongruity between the 
attempt to repress and close off the body, and the explosive nature of its sheer materiality. 
This tension is very evident in, for instance, the scene from Molloy where the latter 
concocts a mathematical analysis of his farting (Molloy 30).  
The body, however, is not here being idealized, an accusation Critchley (to a 
degree justifiably) launches at Bakhtin (On Humour 51). The body that is object and 
subject of humour is disoriented, estranged and failing. It is a body that laughs but is 
troubled by what it laughs at. That same wedge driven between amor proprio and 
unhappiness in Leopardi is filled specifically with this laughter. It is a laugh that 
imperceptibly and restlessly agitates, shattering any possibility of inner peace since it is a 
relic of the radical ex-centricity of man.  
It is not, however, the laughter Theodor Adorno perceives in Endgame where he 
concludes that this is “what has become of humour after it has grown obsolete as an 
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aesthetic medium and revolting without a canon of the truly humorous, without a place of 
reconciliation from where one could laugh, without anything left between heaven and 
earth that is really harmless, that would permit itself to be laughed at” (“Towards an 
Understanding of Endgame” 98). The laugh in Beckett’s oeuvre is dianoetic. It celebrates 
cerebral power but it cannot, on its own, laugh off adversity. Freudian revised humour 
that accompanies this laugh is, as a matter of fact, essential. 
4.5.1 The Humorous Resistance: Krapp's Last Tape 
Laughing at our ills, or in Winnie of Happy Days’ words, “laughing wild amid 
severest woe” (CDW 150),279 is Beckett’s attempt to offer resistance against earthly 
insignificance. This resistance is particularly strong in the grotesque comedy deployed in 
Beckett’s drama. Krapp's Last Tape offers what could be construed as a craftily-nuanced 
portrayal of that same “force of desire which supersedes the ego” that intriguingly 
attempts to surface in the grim humour of “wearish old man” Krapp (CDW  215). This 
humour is inextricably interlaced to the ubiquitously repressed desire of not simply the 
old man, but also his younger self on tape who, in his turn, simultaneously wishes to both 
retrieve and ablate entire years sprouting from his past.  Through his dark humour, Old 
Krapp both retreats from the fast-encroaching darkness (literal and metaphorical) which, 
following his listening, almost threatens to engulf him, but he also attempts to brace for 
the final “on” of his last tape.  At the experiential kernel of Old Krapp's humour, as is the 
case in Leopardi’s humour, it is desire-as- paradox that has taken root. It is repressed 
desire as well as the necessary continuation of desire, the infinite desire that will maintain 
its quest. In Beckett’s play this desire could be construed as corresponding to Lacan's 
notion of the desire for the Other, which finds its locus in language. Lacan writes: 
Desire is that which is manifested in the interval that demand hollows within 
itself, in as much as the subject, in articulating the signifying chain, brings to light 
the want-to-be, together with the appeal to receive the complement from the 
Other, if the Other, the locus of speech, is also the locus of this want, or lack 
(Écrits 263).  
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 Winnie is here echoing Thomas Gray’s Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College. 
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The voice on tape can be conceived of as such a complement from the Other in relation to 
old Krapp. The intricate relationship that slowly unfolds between old Krapp and the voice 
towards which he directs his longing to “be again” can be appropriated to Lacan's 
understanding of desire as lack-of-being. The concept of paradoxical and infinite desire is 
thus illuminated as old Krapp laughingly attempts to silence the desires of the past but is 
increasingly traversed by the desire of the voice, of the Other.  
When Krapp is first listening to the tape, still “adjacent to strong white light” 
(CDW 215), he repeats the action that Krapp-at-thirty-nine describes: “I close my eyes 
and try to imagine them” (CDW 218). His attempt to assume the identity of his former 
self paradoxically both fails and succeeds because the same lack-of-being inhabits both 
the past Krapp and the present older counterpart. The same failure is clear when old 
Krapp initially laughs, twice joining in the brief laugh of Krapp- at-thirty-nine, who is 
being dismissive of his younger self full of “aspirations” and “resolutions.” The voice 
prefigures the later Krapp when it says “Hard to believe I was ever that young whelp” 
(later echoed by “hard to believe I was ever as bad as that”), but it is also the expression 
of a repressed desire to once more be that young “whelp” capable of aspiring to be 
someone and resolve something (CDW  218). Desire here regresses to the Imaginary 
where its course is resisted, being trapped as a subject of repressed desire. At this initial 
stage, this is the laugh that laughs at another perhaps expressing the laughter of lofty 
isolation, a manic laughter as in Freud's early hydraulic model: juvenile, or wanting to be 
juvenile, and perverse. It could be heard to echo the laugh that reverberates in “Live 
dangerously”, a “victorious hiccup in vacuo, as the national anthem of the true ego exiled 
in habit” (Proust 8-9).  
The laughter that follows the third time is, significantly, Krapp laughing all 
“alone” (CDW 218). It is old Krapp who now laughs at his old self, recognizing the 
impossibility of self-reconciliation. His old self laughs heartily at the wish expressed by 
his younger self to drink less, a laugh that becomes all the more resonant as we hear 
Krapp the elder’s cork-popping in the dark. Old Krapp's laughing “alone” echoes with 
accentuated emphasis the weaker Freudian laughter that insists that one has to 
acknowledge oneself comically. It arises out of a palpable sense of inability and 
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impotence producing a laugh that is dark, sardonic, wicked but lucid. Old Krapp’s desire 
has now been displaced to a dissembled language that is as tattered as his old self, and the 
lucid recognition that follows this laughing “alone” accompanies old Krapp till the last 
line of the play. Indeed the laughable aspect of “rusty” old Krapp has changed from 
beginning to end, spanning, as Rónán McDonald says: “[a] rich and multiple irony, in 
which the middle-aged man derides his youthful ambitions and then, years later, derides 
the derider. The sheer disappointment of advancing age has rarely been dramatized with 
an economy that so satisfyingly combines poignancy and humour” (60). 
 It is also a humour, as referred to above, which changes from beginning to end. 
Old Krapp initially manifests all those gestures and movements that give off the whiff of 
comicality and remind us of Bergson's “something mechanical encrusted on the living.” ( 
84).
280
 It is the kind of comic that comes complete with stock farcical numbers, such as 
the pratfalls, the fumbling with objects in and out of pockets and drawers, the sudden 
pulling out of bananas like rabbits out of hats, the extremely strained actions as a result of 
utter near-sightedness or deafness and the tossing of objects (banana skin in this case) 
into the pit, reminding us of the rupture of the fourth wall theatrical convention usually 
deployed for comic effect. The image here conveyed has clear echoes of the Bergsonian 
comic where “something mechanical in something living” (110), creates “an effect of 
automatism and of inelasticity” (72).  Krapp’s “wearish” self, however,  jars with his 
strikingly comic attire: the too-short trousers, the clownish capacious pockets, the boots 
that are more than a size too big and the buffoon-like “purple nose” (CDW  215). From 
the start, old Krapp’s “disordered grey hair,” his being “unshaven” (CDW 215) and his 
laborious walk, give away all that slovenliness-cum-loneliness that sadly characterizes an 
interest in life that has been stifled. 
                                                 
280 In this kind of comic by a certain arrangement of rhythm and rhyme, the words in Beckett’s plays 
produce a lulling of the imagination, a rocking to and fro between like and like with a regular see-saw 
motion that prepares the reader, as well as the audience, to submissively accept the transformation of a 
person into a thing taking place before one’s very own eyes. What might appear as a thin fabric of banter 
dazzling us with its quick venue of phrase- quid pro quo-  can be equated to this same transformation which 
Bergson calls “the comic created by language” (127), rather than expressed by it.  
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 Indeed, throughout the play, the two core concepts in Bergson's discussion of 
laughter, rigidity and repetition, slowly but steadily start to change form. As the play 
progresses, the clumsiness of the buffoon-like creature is of a less automaton-type, 
increasingly shorn of its funny side, beginning to verge on a palpable human ineptitude 
soon to stand out against the inhumanity of the machine itself over which, at the end, 
Krapp throws himself.  The winding down of comicality unfolds through the increasingly 
brisk switching on and off of the tape recorder, the more impatient winding backwards 
and forwards, the longer and more frequent tense, almost delirious, brooding. In this 
bewildering display of euphoria and wretchedness, one starts to recognize the farcical 
reversals and cracked grandeur not of an ordinary clown, but a very tragic one.
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 Indeed 
increasingly the humour that Krapp visibly manifested at the start of the play becomes 
almost uncanny. 
What is slowly unveiled through these increasingly agitated gestures, which reach 
their apex with the violent “wrench[ing] off [of] tape” (CDW 223), is the sense of lack-
of-being, the desire for the Other inhering in the old man. This alienation from his former 
self is reflected in an alienation from his old language on tape and the frustrated desire for 
the Other is displaced onto fragmented utterances oddly strung together: “Maybe he was 
right. [Broods. Realizes. Switches off. Consults envelope.] Pah! [Crumples it and Throws 
it away. Broods. Switches on.] Nothing to say. Not a squeak” (CDW 222). Krapp's 
linguistic competence increasingly reveals absence within its structure: a stark, 
fragmentary language that reflects his enfeebled condition: “What’s a year now? The sour 
cud and the iron stool” (CDW 222 ). The latter phrase is a far cry from the energetic and 
smug voice that declared: “Thirty-nine today, sound as a bell, apart from my old 
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 Ruby Cohn has dealt at length with Beckettian humour. In Back to Beckett Cohn, arguing against Hugh 
Kenner, who had emphasized Beckett’s affinity with tragic yet indomitable clowns, declares that “the 
clown mask is shattered by anguish” (Back to Beckett 4). In Just Play: Beckett’s Theatre, Cohn states that 
Beckett’s humour “has grown grimmer” and that, though his “wide appeal . . . rests uneasily upon his 
humour,” his vision is “tragic . . . in its frustration at absurdity” (11). In The Comic Gamut Cohn expounds 
a tragicomic cosmic irony (“ironic cosmological comedy”) as the key to Beckett’s major works. Though 
Cohn acknowledges that Beckett is a master of Chaplinesque clowning, “cosmic irony” (which usually 
conveys a sense of injustice, victimization and acrid pathos) remains the most important category. For 
Cohn, Beckett’s laughter is non-cathartic since it is “a mask for, not a release from, despair” (The Comic 
Gamut 287). This description resembles Baudelaire’s portrait of Melmoth the Wanderer’s demonic 
laughter, an argument that is clearly opposed in this chapter. 
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weakness, and intellectually I have now every reason to suspect at the . . . (hesitates) . . . 
crest of a wave-or thereabouts” (CDW 217). There is none of the arcane vocabulary of his 
younger self and, as happens with “viduity”, a term old Krapp is now obliged to look up, 
Krapp's desire has been displaced onto a language that revolves endlessly around 
absence, particularly around the metonymic displacement to the “fare well to love” entry 
on one of the spools. The latter is an episode whose impact and temptation Krapp is 
unable to overcome, as he is, however, equally unable to undo his former aspiration to 
that farewell.  
Indeed, the risibility of the “wearish old man,” which appears from the beginning 
as tinged with melancholy in its interweaving of pathos and buffoonery, crystallizes by 
the end of the play into a language that is a direct manifestation of an infinite cycle of 
desire and finally a silent acknowledgement of an absolute impotence against it. 
Following old Krapp’s third lonesome laugh, the sardonic but lucid qualities increasingly 
hijack this humour until by the end it is only old Krapp’s mind that along with the tape 
runs on in silence.  The final stage direction informs us that Krapp remains motionless, 
immobilized by the “strong white light”, but his mind seems to be as intensely focussed 
as the darkness offstage, where the evocation of the Caravaggesque chiaroscuro 
highlights the disturbingly imbued scuro of his mind bursting at the seams.
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 Krapp is 
besieged by relentlessly un-giggling voices, and he is haunted by laughter-less 
metaphysical dungeons. This final image cannot alienate us, for it is all too recognizably 
human. Our initial visible amusement has slowly turned into an embarrassed smirk 
because we are troubled by the mirthlessness we laugh at as we wait with abated breath 
for Krapp's attempt at articulating a response: “Pause. Krapp's lips move. No sound” 
(223).   
The persona of Krapp has passed from an evocation of Bergson’s “mechanical 
arrangement . . . at the back of the series of effects and causes” (116), creating a situation 
that belongs to the human attempting to be non-human, to an osmotic movement, 
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whereby that initial puppet-like creature slowly recovers his crude humanity by giving 
vent to his frustrated desire through his fragmentary language. The latter clearly reflects 
his inability to reconcile with his former speech and self. This language increasingly 
works absence within its structure, until, by the end, the intense lucid stare takes over. 
And, while the first thesis has to be granted to Bergson, its opposite, that is the comicality 
of the thing-become-human, is the position argued for by Wyndham Lewis (see 4.3) who, 
in the already-quoted essay “The Meaning of the Wild Body” (1927), proposes: 
The root of the Comic is to be sought in the sensations resulting from the 
observations of a thing behaving like a person. But from that point of view all 
men are necessarily comic: for they are all things, or physical bodies, behaving as 
persons. It is only when you come to deny that they are 'persons,' or that there is 
any 'mind' or 'person' there at all, that the world of appearance is accepted as quite 
natural and not at all ridiculous. (158-59)  
Lewis thus stretches the argument about the funny aspect of thing-become-person to 
arrive at his root of the comic–a person acting like a person: a humour that entails 
detaching oneself from one's body. Leopardi's outer ageing laugh detached from an inner 
suffering, as well as the same splitting in the self that Freud construes during the 
humorous moment, spring to mind. The same cleaving paves the way for the Lacanian 
split subject, where desire, realized at the level of language, points to the impossibility of 
attaining a unified perception of the self. It is in this gap within the self that Krapp's 
humour takes root. It is a humour that starts by laughing at a human being behaving like a 
thing, and at a voice to which he feels superior. By the end, however, what is humorous is 
that same disjunction that torments the old self whose infinitely cyclical desire is elusive.  
The dark laughable aspect of a person behaving like a person, in Krapp resigning 
to carry on with his old self, is in the wintry consolation of Krapp pulling himself up 
short in front of himself.  Old Krapp's humour is a celebration of the dianoetic laugh. It is 
a certain fragile affirmation, which echoes the Leopardian ageing laugh and the desperate 
smile in the face of the recognition of human insignificance. It is the lack of “desire to 
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express, together with the obligation to express” (Three Dialogues 103) that compels one 
to soldier on.  
4.5.2 The Humorous Resistance: Not I 
In Not I (1972), Mouth’s brief, stifled laugh followed by a “good laugh,” which 
twice reverberates in the play, are construed as dianoetic laughter at the heart of which is 
the acknowledgment of the infinite movement of desire. Mouth’s dianoetic laugh, 
demoniacally reverberating like a Satanic Oracle, but having none of the Satanic qualities 
of the laugh of Baudelaire’s Melmoth, gives vent  to an infinitely cyclical desire that has 
split the speaking voice into an “I” and a “She”, echoing Lacan’s “moi” and “je” (see 
1.4.1). Mouth “faintly lit from close-up and below” (CDW 376) surrounded by engulfing 
darkness twice concedes a laugh which, though at first abrupt and quickly-stifled, soon 
breaks out into a guffaw shot through with a humour that is pitch black. The initial brief 
laugh at the idea of mercy is immediately followed by the shaking laugh at the mention of 
God: “brought up as she had been to believe . . . with the other waifs . . . in a merciful . . . 
[Brief laugh] . . . God . . . [Good Laugh]” (377). This laughter is indicative of a perennial 
disjunction that characterizes Mouth both within and without. As Linda Ben-Zvi 
describes the play: 
Not I is ur-Beckett, the image that underlies all other Beckett works: a mouth, 
unable to stop, unable to get ‘It’ right or ‘I’ acknowledged, attempting to talk 
itself–in this case herself–into sense, attempting in the process to find an author of 
the words and of the self, and failing in both endeavours. (260)  
Mouth ponders that: “writhe she could not . . . as if in actual agony” (378), and thus the 
inability to manifest pain compels the latter to be displaced onto the mode of being 
“disconnected”, “numbed”, but “the brain still . . . still sufficiently . . . in control” (378) 
or better “under control” (378). This idea of disconnection and evasion from the ‘self’ is 
announced as the principal theme in the title of Not I. The “godforsaken hole” exposes a 
fractured existence in the very attempt to deny its own pronominal, ontological bond with 
that existence. Mouth’s vehement refusal to say “I,” marked by four moments of crisis in 
which her monologue becomes a dialogue with an inner inaudible voice: “what? . . 
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.who?. . .no!. . .she!” is an implicit rejection of the first person pronoun that threatens to 
invade her resolute “she”-narration. And yet, while Mouth refuses to be the subject of the 
enunciation, thereby rejecting an active role in her life, her mouth boundlessly gives 
voice to what turn out to be the decisive aspects of her life. 
It transpires that at the heart of this laughter, through which Mouth attempts stoic 
resistance against the ubiquitous misery, is indeed an outpouring beyond control: an 
infinite attempt not to desire which brings to the fore that very desire. It is an unstoppable 
outpouring against which the attempt to shore up speech is totally elusive. Mouth’s laugh 
clearly does not lead to a liberating communal laugh a la Bakhtin but is more akin to the 
dark but empowering laugh at the core of Freud’s humour, as expressed in his 1927 
essay. Mouth’s is the mirthless laugh of the revised Freudian version, as is also Krapp’s 
laugh at his old self, a guffaw that faces up to its own unhappiness and failure. It 
confronts its own contradictions, longing to be free from the constraints of its 
accompanying discourse, but accepting the impossibility of such freedom. The raising of 
what has been displaced to the threshold of its perception in language allows Mouth to 
laughingly face up to the profound unhappiness that has imbued her entire life. This 
unhappiness raised to consciousness is the source of dianoetic laughter.  
Opposing Wolfgang Iser’s argument on Beckett’s laughter, where he exclusively 
focuses on Freud’s early hydraulic model of humour, I argue that the dianoetic laughter is 
a cognitive laugh and does have a cathartic effect.
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 Mouth’s  second convulsive laugh is 
cognitive in the way it paradoxically acknowledges itself not only as already a decentred 
subject, perennially split at its heart between “I” and “She,” but  that breach reminds us of 
Lacan’s reading of the Hegelian slave’s futile attempt at eliminating the master.   
Mouth, representing the simulacrum of a narrator, while “rest of face [is] in 
shadow” (CDW 376), is enslaved by the incessant spate of words that insistently pours 
out. The mouth itself, from where the bellowing laugh erupts, is given maximal attention 
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and Jennifer Birkett, 223.  
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zooming in on the suspended orifice and thus privileging her status as Mouth- the organ 
of compulsive enunciation. Mouth’s guffaw acknowledges the “I” to “she” in the 
bondage of speech, apparent in her twofold desire: on the one hand, the longing to erase 
her words thereby recoiling from her existence, on the other, striving to recognize her 
speech: “can’t stop the stream . . . and the whole brain begging . . . begging the mouth to 
stop . . . straining to hear . . . piece it together . . . and the brain . . . raving away on its 
own . . . trying to make sense of it . . . or make it stop” (CDW 380 ). The irony lies in 
hearing herself say: “it can’t go on” in relation to “straining to hear” which renders her 
whole stream of speech without beginning or end eerily laughable. Mouth’s guffaw is an 
acceptance of the infinite desire expressed in this logorrhoea where the wish to come to 
an end coincides with the will to carry on. 
Indeed it is a logorrhoea, as it has often been described, where “words were. . . 
words were coming . . . imagine! . . . words were coming . . . a voice she did not 
recognize . . . at first . . . then finally had to admit . . . could be none other . . . than her 
own” (379). It is a “stream . . . steady stream . . . she who had never . . . practically 
speechless . . . all her days” (379). She needs to rush to “nearest lavatory . . . start pouring 
it out . . . mad stuff” (382). It is an overwhelming “mouth on fire” that cannot be put out 
and it seems to come from the darker Hell of Dante’s Inferno.284 
Mouth’s laugh, however, is also a laugh of dried-up tears: “just the tears . . . sat 
and watched them dry . . . all over in a second” (381). Mouth laughingly acknowledges 
the bitterness in the paradoxical symmetry of cancellation and recognition which reminds 
us of Lacan’s earlier-mentioned expression that not to want to desire and to desire are the 
same thing. For Mouth’s laughs are also a desperate response to her urge to end her 
discourse as she struggles with the alienating flux of words that only distances her further 
from the “begging it all to stop” (382). This two-pronged movement again brings to the 
surface Lacan’s already cited statement where he asserts that it is: “not so much because 
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the other holds the keys to the desired object, as because his object(ive) is to be 
recognized by the other” (Écrits 222).   
Mouth laughs at the realization that the gap between “I” and “she” will never be 
healed and, in the light of Lacan’s quoted statement, it is also the realization that that 
same desire realized at the level of words, is perennially misrecognized. Hers is a darkly 
humorous confrontation of the ambivalent desire to “make something of it” (380), which 
represents the wish both to demystify but also paradoxically to recognize the opaque 
nature of her own unconscious−“She” (as an Other). Mouth as a breached subject is a 
slave to her speech who has to “. . . keep on . . . trying . . . not knowing what . . . what she 
was trying” (382). In Lacanian terms, Mouth’s split subject is after the demand for love, a 
doomed demand. This demand for love manifested at the level of Mouth’s speech is 
hinted at from the very beginning of the play where we already get an inkling as to why 
she is both desperate for and in total denial of recognition from the external other:
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Out…into this world…this world…tiny little thing…before its time…in a godfor-
…what?. . .girl?. . .yes…tiny little girl…into this…out into this…before her 
time…godforsaken hole called …called…no matter…parents unknown…unheard 
of…he having vanished…thin air…no sooner buttoned up his breeches…she 
similarly… eight months later… almost to the tick…so no love…spared that…no 
love such as normally vented on the…speechless infant…in the home…no…nor 
indeed for that matter any of any kind…no love of any kind…at any subsequent 
stage. (377) 
The interminable and alienating nature of desire is thus coming from the perspective of 
an internal/external Other and it can be seen in Mouth’s signifying flow: “ . . . so that 
people would stare . . . once or twice a year . . . stare at her uncomprehending” (379) and 
“. . . sudden urge to . . . tell . . . then rush out stop the first she saw . . . half the vowels 
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wrong . . . no one could follow . . . till she saw the stare she was getting . . . then die of 
shame . . . crawl back in” (382).  
As a torn subject separated from unconscious desire, and sensing her existence in 
relation to an Other, Mouth’s position as a slave of her utterances corresponds to her 
distance and alienation from the outside world. Her laugh at once expresses the effort to 
escape from her solitude by dismissing it, while making a statement about her 
predicament to reach out to the external other only to get people to “stare at her 
uncomprehending” (379) compelling her sense of inadequacy, wanting to “die of shame” 
(382).  
Mouth’s twice repeated guffaw is then not just a way of asserting detachment 
from the outside world and a quest for self-sufficiency but is also associated with the 
irreducible gap between the desire for recognition and the recognition of the irreducibility 
of desire.  
Mouth’s semantic tirade at the alien external other who is unable to relate to her 
discourse can also be identified in the Auditor, a silent witness in his recurring “gesture 
of helpless compassion.” The latter implies the communication gap between the 
impossibility of both recognizing desire and bringing it to a halt, knowledge of which 
impossibility is locked at the heart of Mouth’s guffaw. Ragland-Sullivan once more 
comes to the aid in elucidating Lacan’s argument: “Repetition, therefore, is a normal 
mode of the subject, unaware that its curious structure makes it live the dialectical 
unconscious at the level of conscious life” (112).  
In Not I this conscious life is thus to be found in the signifying chain best 
exemplified by the insistence, on Mouth’s part, to shift to the third person pronoun in her 
speech. The continuous employment of “she” underscores that the speaker fails to say “I” 
and that “she” has to resign to the role of a shifting signifier. Indeed Mouth insists on an 
endless litany of negations (“ . . . words were– . . .what? . . . who? . . . no! . . . she!” ) 
where she is reduced to the linguistic medium per se a status that disintegrates 
personhood. Mouth’s emphasis on the third person pronoun can be related to the cleavage 
between speech and the subject’s entity, the decentred subject or the ex-centricity of the 
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subject that brings us back to Plessner’s discussion on humour quoted by Critchley (see 
4.5) and Freud’s discussion of the super-ego laughing at the ego as defined in his essay 
‘Humour’ (see 4.3).  
The ex-centricity of this humour emphasizing a gap within the self which permits 
that one laughingly views the ‘self’ as if from the outside is the very predominant 
characteristic of Mouth’s risus purus.  Mouth’s is the pure laugh that recognizes that it 
can only identify itself through verbal interaction, a process which is, however, 
continually distorted and repeated by the always-already-present repressed discourse of 
the “I” and its desire of the Other. In this context, the Lacanian “moi”’s interference at the 
level of the “je” could be grafted onto the “I” whose interference is denied by the place 
taken by “she.” And as in the 1927 version of Freudian humour, characterized by a two-
way movement between desire and anti-desire (see 1.2.1; 1.3; 1.4.2; 4.3), in Not I there is 
also this two-pronged move. As in the desire of the Lacanian Moi for fusion with the 
Other, the “I” in Not I manifests an underlying death wish which, apparently, remains 
unfulfilled: “. . . April morning . . .face in the grass . . . nothing but the larks . . . pick it 
up” (382). The attempt of “I”to harm itself is equivalent to the attempt to emaciate desire 
and still it forever. In the opposite direction, however, kicks back the “She” to whom the 
infinite ‘rushing out’ into language is willingly attributed. As the play draws to an end, 
this infinite movement at the centre of that earlier still-echoing laugh is predominant: the 
voice, on the one hand regresses, slowly diminishing in volume, on the other it continues 
“behind curtain, unintelligible” (383), until darkness ceases.  
Beckett’s, as well as Leopardi’s laugh thus has a more pronounced positive side, 
pars construens, than a negative side, pars destruens. The Leopardian and Beckettian 
dianoetic laugh is ultimately a cognitive laugh in its wise acceptance of the finite. The 
dianoetic laugh in these two thinkers is an expression of the self’s consciousness of itself 
marked by an awareness of its own limitations in the face of that which is infinite desire.  
It is also constructive in its knowledge that that final “incomparable” (almost deafening) 
silence and the fast encroaching darkness require, in the end, to be bravely faced. 
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Conclusion 
Following an exploration of the various facets of desire, from Leopardi’s 
reflection on the subject until Beckett takes up the issue by quoting the Recanati poet, I 
establish that the former’s reading of the latter is neither one nor the other’s last word on 
the question of desire. I examine the notion of desire that compelled one author to uphold 
the other, concluding that Beckett’s reading of Leopardi is rather reductive (and it is a 
reductive image of the artisan de ses malheurs that is sometimes being mocked). Beckett 
chooses to focus on the early, somewhat negative, period of Leopardi’s writings and it is 
no wonder that these early phases in both authors have instigated readings that point to 
pessimism and nihilism in their most acute expression. Beckett’s reading apparently 
disregards how the Italian poet’s thoughts on desire radically change at a not-so-later 
stage and how Leopardi ultimately deems human desire and the illusions that come with 
it as absolutely necessary.  
A twist to the entire argument, however, is that desire indeed remains central not 
just for Leopardi but for both authors, and both Leopardi and Beckett go beyond the 
question of the ablation of desire. I attempt to show how both writers come to view and 
project desire in their later work in an eerily similar manner, an interesting occurrence, 
given that they had been brought together because of their similar aspiration for stoic 
ataraxic bliss. 
Beckett clearly admired Leopardi as a poet. In “Dante…Bruno.Vico..Joyce” in 
Disjecta (30), Beckett celebrates the writer he considered his master in his early 
career−James Joyce. Here he quotes from Leopardi’s poem “Sopra il monumento di 
Dante che si preparava in Firenze” (“On the monument to Dante being prepared in 
Florence”). Significantly, he cites Leopardi’s phrase (where the latter upholds Dante as 
the only poet capable of reaching Homer’s height): “colui per lo cui verso−il meonio 
cantor non è più solo” (“the poet thanks to whom / Homer doesn’t stand alone”; lines 21-
22). The implication is clearly that the poet who penned these lines is capable of equal 
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greatness as is testified to by calling Leopardi a ‘sage’ in the context where the desire not 
to desire is discussed. 
Nonetheless, while the desire not to desire was a pivotal issue for Beckett in the 
early 1930s, as much as for Leopardi, particularly in the period that spanned 1819 to 
1828, desire continues to resurface in both authors. This is especially the case in one of 
Beckett’s first plays−Endgame (but also plays written at a later stage like Happy Days) 
and in Leopardi’s last poem “La Ginestra.” The acknowledgment that desire is 
inextinguishable and that ultimately the desire to desire (even in vain) is absolutely 
necessary becomes, for Leopardi and Beckett, increasingly thematic. This realization 
makes the pessimist and nihilist readings of either one, the other, or both writers’ oeuvre, 
look increasingly tenuous.  
I have attempted to show that desire in Leopardi’s and Beckett’s work is both 
characterized by dearth and an inability to come to terms with expression, a Lacanian 
desire characterized by a ‘coring out’ effect, as much as it is a desire for the other person 
which acts as an inspiration of the infinite, even when the infinite is a threatening, 
malevolent force. This desire is anything but pleasant and it is clear that contact with the 
other is intrinsically difficult, if not bruising. The latter desire, however, in spite of its 
irritating strangeness, can bring about compassion for one’s neighbour (albeit a 
neighbour-as-stranger)− a Levinasian kind of compassion based on the presence of desire 
and not, as in Schopenhauer, on its emaciation. 
Desire in Leopardi and Beckett is also crucial to their similarly construed dark 
humour, best given expression through their shared dianoetic laugh. The desire at the 
heart of this laughter is infinite and consumes the human being in his or her futile quest 
for life’s happiness. In both authors, the suffering that characterizes earthly life is central 
but it can be alleviated through the laugh that imbues with cerebral power, the laugh that 
knows what it is laughing at and that admits human insignificance ride si sapis. In this 
sense, Leopardi’s and Beckett’s oeuvres resort to humour in the full knowledge of what 
the latter masks: the ineluctable nature of life’s suffering. 
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Beckett’s oeuvre, then, does not simply deal with life as a Schopenhauerian 
pensum waiting for the defunctus, as the emphasis in Proust seems to be (see 2.3). Nor is 
life simply Leopardian “souffrance” where the Epitectian self-restraint is all one should 
aspire to in order to alleviate the quotidian earthly pain (2.2). Beckett offers an excellent 
comment upon the ineluctable nature of life’s suffering in the conclusion to his short 
story “Dante and the Lobster,” where protagonist Belacqua, after mocking Italian 
nineteenth-century writers by referring to his “impression, that the nineteenth century in 
Italy was full of old hens trying to cluck,” (More Pricks than Kicks 15), ends with his 
oxymoronic statement about life: “it’s a quick death, God help us all. It is not” (More 
Pricks than Kicks 19, my emphasis).  
Life is not a quick death. Towards the end of this story the “Take into the air my 
quiet breath” (19) eerily echoes, once more, the opening line “or posa per sempre” in “A 
se stesso.”  What Beckett is here proposing−stillness, what he had proposed in Proust the 
complete identification of the subject with the object of one’s desire, as well as what 
Leopardi early on sought in Stoic philosophy, were all revealed to be, by both writers’ 
own admission, impossible to attain. If these latter necessary conditions of happiness are 
impossible, and life is indeed not a quick death, then some form of happiness has to put 
up with desire and its partial satisfaction, both being not just unavoidable but necessary. 
And if desire is susceptible to some gratification, then the “ablation of desire” need not 
always be recommended. This is also the case with relation to its ethical role.  
In Proust Beckett speaks about the futility of friendship, describing it as, at best, a 
“tragic” form and a “failure to possess” (46). The impossibility of love and true 
friendship is deduced from the inexplicable phenomenon of the continuum of entities 
where an infinite regress follows when you try to relate the figures on common ground. 
Proust’s lovers, Beckett’s “subject and object,” are torn by a similar problem: the 
impossibility of being grasped. The lover’s quest is revealed to be a perpetual labour. In 
Leopardi, desire in friendship proves to be equally elusive. The Operette morali end with 
Plotino, who preaches the necessity of love, countered by Tristano, who preaches truth. 
No progress has been made from the beginning of the moral tales, specifically the first 
operetta morale entitled “Storia del genere umano,” and Plotino and Tristano are the 
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human personification of the “genii” sent to earth by Zeus. However, Tristano’s brave 
refusal of any deceptive consolation and Plotino’s “senso dell’animo” serve to continue 
to desire and suffer for mankind. Indeed this union gives life to “La Ginestra.” 
 In my reading of “La Ginestra” within a tradition of criticism that finds in this 
poem a crucial ethical message, the human being faces the smallness and precariousness 
of his existence and desires a harmonious creation with the other in order to attempt to 
overcome the lawless chaos. The poetic voice perceives the surrounding destructiveness 
of nature but instead of withdrawing it reaches out to the other through the “conversar 
cittadino.” This is also my reading of Beckett’s plays Endgame and Happy Days. In 
Leopardi’s poem and Beckett’s chosen plays, I read an appeal to humankind to endure 
together a life which offers neither hope nor comfort as a way of accepting the difficult 
desire of the other, transfiguring this appeal to desire into poetic creation.  
The desire intrinsic to human beings has to be accepted as a form of illusion, of 
aiding the human being to endure, whether through the ability of being compassionate 
towards the other or the ability to find humour. Desire among human beings can never be 
neatly and harmoniously pigeon-holed or possessed. Friendship and ethicality in general 
cannot be conceived to be about ‘totalizing.’ I believe, and here I bring back Levinas, that 
desire for the other, rather than ‘totalizing’ the differences, is about ‘infinitizing,’ or 
rather making room for the infinite differences of the other, be s/he friend or foe. Desire 
for this other is indeed infinite and infinitely cyclical, but rather than throwing the 
gauntlet on the impossibility of totalizing desire, one can acknowledge one’s impotence 
in its presence and derive strength out of it. The poetic voices and dramatis personae in 
the chosen works of Leopardi and Beckett, I attempt to prove in this study, succeed in 
doing just that. 
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